Editorial preface

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In the first article in this issue, Justin Mooney, discusses three critical objections that threaten to defeat the most popular materialist theory of resurrection, namely, the reassembly model. The first problem is the duplicate problem: if God reassembles Paul at age 10, or just before his death in old age, both would have a claim to be the real Paul, since both would be composed of the same particles that once composed Paul. Mooney says that this problem has been solved in the literature where it is claimed, for example, that only one object can have Paul's emergent particularity. The second problem is the cannibal problem. When a cannibal eats Paul, the two share the same particles at death. Mooney offers a new way of solving this problem. Perhaps the issue is not so much about spatial locations as it is about time. For any set of people (Paul and the cannibal who ate Paul) that share particles upon death, God could resurrect one of them at a time. In so doing, God could remove the particles that are not intrinsic to Paul and remove the particles that are not intrinsic to the cannibal consumer, preserving the separate identities of each. In the last section of the essay, Mooney addresses the so-called "gap problem" that plagues the reassembly model. He concludes with an upgraded version of the reassembly model, according to which the resurrection is not merely a matter of time travel. He rejects the claim that the dead jump immediately to a new life. Rather, he says: "The crucial, identity-preserving causal connection reaching from Paul's pre-mortem life to the afterlife does not bypass Paul's death and decomposition, so it seems wrong to say that Paul jumps to the afterlife without dying. Rather, Paul dies, decomposes, and is later reassembled."

Next, Michael Bauwens offers an essay with an intriguing title that includes a reference to Louis XIV. He favors what he calls a performative or judicial (as opposed to a substance) definition of a person and exploits some ideas and distinctions drawn from social ontology. For one, he distinguishes between a natural person and an artificial one. A natural person is defined by his or her *ability* to perform certain actions. An artificial person (like a state, corporation, king, or president, or any social institution) also has a performative or juridical definition. Here the defining element is not ability but liberty. Others grant an artificial

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person the liberty to perform certain actions that are constitutive of the kind of artificial person it happens to be. Accordingly, there is a difference between what a natural person *can* do and what an artificial person (the King or President, for example) is *allowed* (by deontic arrangements) to do. This social ontological distinction gives us a formal model that makes the possibility of a hypostatic union of the divine and the human intelligible. On this model, Jesus was fully human and so had all the *abilities* of a natural person and yet fully divine insofar as he also, and at the same time, occupied a divine office—an office that carries with it with all of the rights and powers that are unique to the Divine. As such, Louis was a fully human person who also and at the same time occupied and was fully absorbed into a well-defined office. As Louis, put it, “I am the state.”

In the next paper, Stefan Wintein charges that a new and novel argument for God’s existence is flawed. That argument was formulated in a recent article by Emanuel Rutten entitled, “A Modal-Epistemic Argument for God’s Existence” (2014). He begins by stating a simplified version of Rutten’s argument: Since all possibly true propositions are knowable, and since the proposition that God does not exist is not knowable, it follows that the proposition that God exists is necessarily true. Of course, if this argument were not flawed it would be earth shaking. It would succeed where traditional deductive arguments for God’s existence have failed. I am assuming that most agree that these traditional arguments do not demonstrate (deductively prove) that God exists. The path to the flaw(s) that Wintein is trying to make explicit is not always easy to follow, but it is well worth the journey. Moreover, there is much at stake.

It is well known that Kierkegaard was a philosopher of the inward life, what we call subjectivity. For him trust, engagement, authenticity, compassion, love, respect, joy, care, and gratitude are some of the key subjective emotional elements of the religious modality of faith. These positive emotional elements are not, however, without their emotional enemies, such as anxiety, despair, suspicion, worry, disengagement, selfish pleasures, hatred, envy, vulnerability, insecurity, and the like. In our next article, Paul Carron, sees Kierkegaard’s work in his *Christian Discourses* as recommendations for cultivating the positive emotions of the life of faith and warding off those emotional states that threaten it. Carron discusses some of the strategies Kierkegaard develops in his *Christian Discourses* and shows that they parallel some accounts found in contemporary psychological research. He finds these present-day findings in psychology regarding the emotions and strategies for their regulation to illuminate Kierkegaard’s work. He also asserts that Kierkegaard’s work can illuminate contemporary psychological research into the emotions and their regulation.

In the final article, Kirk Robert MacGregor attempts to reconcile Molina’s doctrines of individual predestination and libertarian freedom with William Lane Craig’s version of Molinism. Craig’s version seems to embrace the doctrine of transworld damnation. This doctrine claims that anyone lost (unsaved) in the actual world would have been lost in any feasible possible world. The issue seems to turn on the question of whether someone lost in the actual world, due to a failure of access to the Gospel, would be lost in a possible world in which that person does have access to the Gospel. If this is possible, then transworld

damnation is denied. Craig thinks that it is not possible. Rather he asserts that a person who has not had access to the special revelation of the Gospel would still be lost even if that person did have access to it in another feasible possible world. MacGregor thinks that Craig can have his way on this matter without embracing transworld damnation. This is because God can create any kind of feasible world he so desires. In his sovereignty, he decided not to make such a possible world wherein one lost in the actual world could be saved.