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CORRECTION

Correction to: Ringleader Discrimination in Leniency Policies

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In the original publication of the article, the appearance of $\widetilde{\mu}$ and the inequalities $\mu \geq \widetilde{\mu}$ and $\mu < \widetilde{\mu}$ throughout the paper are disorderly presented.

In Tables 1 and 2, the payoff combination "B, B" is placed without space.

The text between Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, Lemma 7 and Proposition 2 and incorrectly provided in italics.

The mathematical expressions in the paragraph below Lemma 8 "$(\delta_{pd}^{'}(\sigma_1)$ and $V_{pd}^{'}(\sigma_1))$" are placed very closely that may cause confusion.

In the Appendix, the Proof of *Lemma 8* and *Proposition 3* (especially the first lines) on p. 18 is not properly presented. I quote the correct form of this proof right below:

Recall that the critical discount factors for the ringleader and the follower are

$$\delta_n'(\sigma) = \frac{2(1-\sigma) + a\sigma\mu}{2(1-a)} \quad \text{and} \quad \delta_n''(\sigma) = \frac{2\sigma + a\mu(1-\sigma)}{2(1-a)},$$

respectively when both report under non-discrimination. Observe that $\frac{\partial \delta_n'}{\partial \sigma} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial \delta_n''}{\partial \sigma} > 0$; the ringleader's (follower's) ICC loosens (tightens) with σ.

For $\sigma = \frac{1}{2}$, $\delta_n'\left(\frac{1}{2}\right) = \delta_n''\left(\frac{1}{2}\right) = \delta_n = \frac{2+a\mu}{4(1-a)}$; $max\{\delta_n', \delta_n''\}$; is minimized; and the firms' expected collusive payoffs are also equal: $V_n'\left(\frac{1}{2}\right) = V_n''\left(\frac{1}{2}\right) = \frac{\pi(2-a\mu)}{2[1-\delta(1-a)]}$.

The original article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-022-09875-w.

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The critical discount factors for the ringleader and the follower are $\delta'_{pd}(\sigma) = \frac{1-\sigma+a\sigma\mu}{1-a}$ and $\delta''_{pd}(\sigma) = \frac{\sigma}{1-a'}$, respectively, given that the investigated follower reports under partial discrimination. Observe that $\frac{\partial\delta'_{pd}}{\partial\sigma} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial\delta''_{pd}}{\partial\sigma} > 0$; the ringleader's (follower's) ICC loosens (tightens) with σ.

For $\sigma = \sigma_1 \equiv \frac{1}{2-a\mu}$, $\delta'_{pd}(\sigma_1) = \delta''_{pd}(\sigma_1) = \frac{1}{(1-a)(2-a\mu)}$. For $\sigma = \sigma_1$ the firms' expected collusive payoffs are also equal: $V'_{pd}(\sigma_1) = V''_{pd}(\sigma_1)$. It is easy to verify that

$$\delta'_{pd}(\sigma_1) = \frac{1}{(1-a)(2-a\mu)} > \delta_n = \frac{2+a\mu}{4(1-a)}.$$