Abstract
A variety of economists welcome the positive findings and explanations of behavioral economics as an alternative to the standard methodology employed by neoclassical economists but question its normative conclusions when, in particular, such conclusions suggest a rejection of market institutions. This article’s main concern is to demonstrate, however, that the central ways that behavioral economics largely accepts the conceptual understandings and paradigm of neoclassical economics presents obstacles for the ability to adequately investigate a range of important empirical questions. I will show this largely in the context of discussions about, and ongoing research into, altruistic and other pro-social behavior.
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Notes
For a good discussion of this difference, see Rosenberg (1992).
See, for instance, the work discussed throughout the 2004 book, Advances in behavioral economics (edited by Camerer et al., 2004).
As employed here, altruistic behavior does not imply that there cannot be net benefits in terms of one’s reproductive fitness. Acts of altruism that benefit one’s offspring for instance may promote one’s reproductive fitness but may still be costly to one’s own individual welfare. The important consideration here is whether there are costs to the individual’s welfare. For the topic of the evolution of altruism, see Sober and Wilson (1998) and Kitcher (1993).
Andersen et al. (2011).
Interestingly, a delay in response reduces responders’ rejection rates. See Grimm and Mengel (2011).
Even some neoclassical economists seem to make this kind of a distinction. See, for instance, Andreoni (1990).
As employed here, altruistic behavior does not imply that there cannot be net benefits in terms of one’s reproductive fitness. Acts of altruism that benefit one’s offspring, for instance, may promote one’s reproductive fitness but may still be costly to one’s own individual welfare. The important consideration here is whether there are costs to the individual’s welfare. For the topic of the evolution of altruism, see Sober and Wilson (1998) and Kitcher (1993).
Brennan and Petit (2004) argue, for instance, that the desire for esteem and status plays a large role in both economic and political life.
A traditional view of action-explanation is that in order for a reason to explain an action, it must refer not to an agent’s psychological state or disposition but to the agent’s normative or evaluative attitude towards the action. In particular, many maintain that in order for an action to be intelligible, the agent must have acted from a reason he regarded as warranted, good, or worth acting on. That is, at least from the agent’s point of view, the reason for acting must have been regarded “under the aspect of some good.” See Anscombe (1963), McDowell (1998), Raz (1999), and Aristotle (2000).
More recent literature, however, has distinguished the explanatory role of one’s normative reasons from that of one’s “motivating reasons.” As frequently observed, an agent, A, may have a motivating reason to φ, while regarding himself as failing to have a normative reason to φ, and vice versa. Authors like Setiva (2007) and Smith (1994, p 94) argue that even though the agent does not regard his reason as being good, his action can still be explained in terms of a (motivating) reason he “actually has” (M Smith, p 96). See also Bratman (2007, esp. pp 89–105).
Perhaps this is because we already assume that pizza is something the agent sees “under the aspect of some good” (Anscombe, 1963, p. 75).
Researchers do not think that intrinsic preferences are impervious to change, only that instrumental preferences are much less impervious to change.
Even though we might be able to say that one gets pleasure from having new tools, we should resist the temptation to recast this preference as an instrumental one. If we do that, then we could do the same to intrinsic altruistic preferences, and the preference view would not have a stable way of defining altruistic motivation. We must be able to treat certain preferences as intrinsic without the temptation to reduce them to other preferences.
In regard to stability, if you lost one of the two intrinsic preferences you would still retain the instrumental preference.
A possible alternative is to say that the object of an intrinsic preference is special and unique in that it is irreplaceable with other objects; the only thing that satisfies the preference is this object. While it is true that the object of an intrinsic preference is the only thing that satisfies the preference, this doesn’t necessarily seem to suggest that it is special in any way. In particular, this might shift the burden of establishing specialness to the level of preference: How many such preferences does one have? Perhaps it would make sense to assume that people have very few intrinsic preferences—not for objects like tools but for things like one’s well-being and the well-being of one’s family—and this is why the object of any given intrinsic preference is special. But it’s very unclear why should we assume this, especially since intrinsic preferences need not be psychologically experienced or felt.
For instance, one would also have to take actions on its behalf, and there may be further conditions.
There are a variety of feelings, including itches, sensations, hunger and fatigue, but only one type would seem to be relevant for caring: feelings that are conceptually connected to or are included in emotions. Some researchers maintain that emotions do not contain feelings essentially. However, this is not relevant to the discussion here. What is relevant is that most researchers maintain a distinction between those feelings that are related to emotions—affective feelings—and other sorts of feelings. For a discussion of this point and a survey of the prominent emotion views, see Prinz (2004).
Similarly, Butler (1983) writes that “caring for someone involves a whole complex of emotions, sensitivities, and dispositions to attend in ways that a simple desire … need not. If someone about whom I care is miserable and suffering, I will be disposed to emotional responses … to sadness on his behalf” (p 2). Conversely, he argues, emotions like sadness “cannot be explained by the mere failure of an intrinsic desire for (another’s) welfare to be satisfied” (p 13).
It is often argued that their notion of sympathy is much more akin to the way we use the term ‘empathy’ today, as connoting a capacity for experiencing what others experience and identifying with others.
For a brief discussion of some of the concerns with revealed preference theory, see Hausman and McPherson (1996, p 27–29).
This is one issue I explored in my dissertation in philosophy. Akhtar (2008).
While there are differences in these views, these differences are not important to the purposes in this paper.
Some prominent Austrians have suggested this view of the difference between preferences and emotions. For instance, consider Mises’ understanding of the emotions: “What distinguishes an emotional action from other actions is the valuation of input and output. Emotions disarrange valuations. Inflamed with passion, man sees the goal as more desirable and the price he has to pay for it as less burdensome” (von Mises, 1966, p. 16). On how emotions are distinct from instincts, see his p 15.
Economists adopting the revealed-preference framework seem to maintain that expressive behavior can be fully captured in terms of preferences and thereby subject to cost-benefit analysis; put simply, if one engages in some expressive act, researchers will assume there is a preference to express oneself. But when expressive behavior is not for the sake of achieving any outcome—as is often the case—it is far from clear how we can subject it to cost-benefit considerations. How do we meaningfully determine the costs and benefits of expressing ourselves if expression is not for the purpose of achieving any (further) result? Put differently, what standards should we employ for measuring the costs and benefits of an action when the action is the end itself? Moreover, as discussed above, there is sometimes an overwhelmingness to emotions, so much so that they are not just, if at all, objects of maximization, but rather serve to frame our evaluation of the costs and benefits.
For a seminal discussion of how rational choice theorists have frequently accommodated empirical anomalies by expanding the range of preferences to the point that theories become tautological, see Green and Shapiro (1994, especially pp 47–53, 87–97).
Moreover, it’s not plausible to consider preferences as essentially being affective, especially long-term preferences. Consider the long-term preference to be a doctor. In moments of reaffirmation of this preference, following periods of doubt, the preference to practice medicine might express itself with a kind of force and perhaps even a feeling. But even in the absence of this feeling—during times in which the preference is not being challenged or reassessed—it would be odd to say that this preference simply goes away.
For instance, work published in NeuroImage by Nitschke et al. (2003) suggests that the feelings of love that mothers experience with their babies is reflected in very strong activity in the orbitofrontal cortex. Also see Davidson and Irwin (1999) and Adolphs et al. (1995). See also the separate works on the role of emotional salience by Haidt (2001), Kensinger and Corkin (2004), and Dolcos et al. (2004).
One final difference between the two views of altruism is the following: whereas the preference-view maintains that there is one and only one kind of genuine altruism—the individual must have an ultimate preference for others’ welfare—the affect-view is consistent with the recognition that there may be different feelings that are relevant to altruism depending upon the culture. After examining various cross-cultural research, Paul Eckman has famously argued that there are primary or basic affects, such as anger and sadness, that are universal, and more sophisticated affects, which are rooted in the basic ones, that vary across cultures. And it may be the case that the affects involved with altruism are of the latter sort. If this idea is correct, then in order to study altruism, we would first need to have an understanding of which feelings are central to a particular culture and then inquire into the prevalence of those feelings and the contexts in which they arise. (See Eckman, 1997.)
To take just one example, consider someone who loses his child. If he is in shock and sincerely reports not feeling any sadness, then it would not make sense to insist that he does in fact feel sadness but does not know it. It would be more appropriate to say that he does not feel sad yet because he has not internalized or accepted what has happened—that he is still in shock.
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Akhtar, S. Behavioral economics and the problem of altruism. Rev Austrian Econ (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-023-00636-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-023-00636-w