Correction to: Teleological epistemology

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In Section 3 of the original version, the Weak Evidentialist Norm is given as follows: ‘For every S, p and t, S’s coming to know p at t is permissible’. Unfortunately, this is a (duplicate) statement of the Weak Knowledge Norm.

In fact, the Weak Evidentialist Norm says: ‘If one’s total evidence clearly and decisively supports p at t, then believing p at t based on that evidence is permissible’.

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