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Do crises lead to policy change? The multiple streams framework and the European Union’s economic governance instruments

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Abstract

The aim of this paper was to understand in which direction policies change in periods of crisis. Do they lead to the hardening of norms or the introduction of softer rules governing public policies? Based on the study of policy change in two periods of economic governance—the 2003–2005 Stability and Growth Pact crisis, and the 2009–2013 economic governance crisis, this article explains why the policy change in the first case led to softer governance mechanisms, while during the second crisis, soft governance mechanisms were transformed into hard law. In applying the multiple streams framework to study these policy changes, we argue that the wider the window of opportunity and the more coherent the coalition of policy entrepreneurs, the higher the possibility for these actors to push in favour of legally constraining norms. Hence, it is not solely the power or capacity of one policy entrepreneur, in this case—the German government—that leads to hardening of soft law, but the coherence of the coalition the policy entrepreneur is able to build.

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Notes

  1. Now art. 127–144 TFEU.

  2. Now art. 120–126 TFEU.

  3. Regulation (EC) 1467/1997, OJ L174, 7.7.05.

  4. Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005, amending Regulation (EC) 1467/1997, OJ L174, 7.7.05.

  5. Regulation (EU) n°1173/2011 of the Parliament of the Council of 16 November 2011; Regulation (EU) n°1174/2011 of the Parliament of the Council of 16 November 2011; Regulation (EU) n°1175/2011 of the Parliament of the Council of 16 November 2011, amending Regulation (EC) 1466/1997; Regulation (EU) n°1176/2011 of the Parliament of the Council of 16 November 2011; Regulation (EU)n°1177/2011 of the Council of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) n°1467/97; Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011. These acts have been published in OJ L306, 23.11.2011.

  6. Regulation (EU) n°472/2013 of 21 may 2013, OJ L140, 27.05.2013; Regulation (EU) n°473/2013 of 21 may 2013, OJ L140, 27.05.2013. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union signed on 2 March 2012, entered into force on 1 January 2013, Doc/12/2, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-12-2_en.htm, accessed 10 December 2014.

  7. Economic and Financial Council, 2546th Council meeting, 25 November 2003, 14492/1/03 REV 1.

  8. Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia.

  9. Economic and Financial Council, 2546th Council meeting, 25 November 2003, 14492/1/03 REV 1.

  10. However, the German ordoliberals arguing in favour of stricter rules in 2005 are not a entirely coherent group of policy entrepreneurs. Jacoby (2014, 2015) argues that ordoliberalism is a big enough tent that key German actors draw powerfully different policy implications from its general tenets.

  11. Chaired by the President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, and composed of representatives [primarily the Minister of Finance] of all member states. In addition, Jean-Claude Juncker, chairman of the Eurogroup and Olli Rehn, Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, participated in the work of the task force.

  12. The European Semester was endorsed by the European Council on 17 June 2010 and validated by the European Council on 28–29 October 2010. It was launched on 12 January 2011 with a conference on the Annual Growth Survey [AGS] in Brussels.

  13. European Commission, Communication from the Commission about reinforcing economic policy coordination, Brussels, 12 May 2010 [COM (2010) 250 final].

  14. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia.

  15. Cyprus, France, Greece, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, the UK. In addition, new EDPs were opened in 2013 for Malta and 2014 for Croatia.

  16. French officials have pushed forward the idea of an “economic government” since a declaration made by Pierre Bérogovoy in the early 1990s, in which he argued in favour of broad orientations of the ECOFIN in both monetary and economic policy (Howarth 2007: 1067). Nicolas Sarkozy reiterated this position in a statement made at the European Parliament on 21 October 2008 (Jabko and Massoc 2012; Clift and Ryner 2014).

  17. Forelle et al., Charles, As Ireland Fails, Europe Lurches Across the Rubicon, The Wall Street Journal, 27 December 2010.

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Acknowledgments

The article has benefitted from valuable comments and remarks. We would like to thank Nikos Zahariadis, Claire Dupuy, Isabelle Guinaudeau, Anna Jeannesson, the participants of the workshop on Multiple-Streams Approaches held at the University of Alabama at Birmingham, USA, in November 2014 and the research seminar at the University of Luxembourg in February 2015, as well as four anonymous reviewers for their extremely useful criticism. The usual disclaimer applies.

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  1. Sciences Po Grenoble, PACTE, BP 48, 38040, Grenoble Cedex 9, France

    Sabine Saurugger

  2. Sciences Po Grenoble, CECISE, BP 48, 38040, Grenoble Cedex 9, France

    Fabien Terpan

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  1. Sabine Saurugger
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  2. Fabien Terpan
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Correspondence to Sabine Saurugger.

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Saurugger, S., Terpan, F. Do crises lead to policy change? The multiple streams framework and the European Union’s economic governance instruments. Policy Sci 49, 35–53 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-015-9239-4

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