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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

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Willard van Orman Quine's 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' is thought to have revolutionary implications for philosophical methodology – and the methodology of so-called conceptual analysis, in particular.¹ It is commonly thought that traditional conceptual analysis, which involves giving a philosophical explication of the content of a concept and hence on the metaphysical nature of the things to which the concept term refers, relies on the familiar distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. Quine argues that there is no non-circular way to explicate the notion of analyticity. Together with his view that any claim can be revised in the face of recalcitrant experience, he seems to have refuted the view that there are conceptual truths that are necessarily true and hence that we can identify the nature of a thing by analyzing the concept-term that refers to the thing. Accordingly, on Quine's view, philosophy – and metaphysics and conceptual analysis, specifically – lacks a distinct methodology and should be 'continuous with scientific theorizing'. In other words, philosophy should be grounded in a methodology that begins with empirical inquiry. Philosophy might be thought of, on this view, as one of the more reflective and abstract areas of scientific inquiry.

It is difficult to say exactly how much has changed in philosophy as a consequence of what has come to be known as 'the naturalistic turn'. Certainly, empirical inquiry has informed much philosophizing in areas as diverse as bioethics, philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of science. Metaphysics and conceptual analysis, however, continue to be done in the traditional way by many philosophers specializing in these areas. While the naturalistic turn has surely changed much in philosophical practice (and for the better,

¹ W.V.O. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', *Philosophical Review* 60 (1951).

I might add), it is unclear that philosophy has been naturalized, so to speak, all the way down. For what it is worth, I have continued to do conceptual analysis but it would not surprise me if I were confused; I assume that most of my work has exhibited deep confusion.

This much is surely true, though. The traditional methodology for conceptual analysis is widely practiced in philosophy of law, perhaps more than anywhere else. Brian Leiter, for example, complains that legal philosophy has ignored what he takes to be the damning Quinean criticisms of TCA: 'While every major area of philosophy – meta-ethics, philosophy of language, epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind – has undergone a naturalistic turn over the last quarter-century, Anglo-American legal philosophy has remained untouched by these intellectual developments'.² Again, while it is hard to say just how deeply philosophical methodology has been revolutionized by the naturalistic turn, Leiter's observation about legal philosophy is surely true.

Brian Leiter is the most influential proponent of naturalizing legal philosophy and his recent book, *Naturalizing Jurisprudence*,³ might very well be the best and most thoroughgoing defense of naturalizing, not just philosophy of law, but philosophy in general – at least since the earliest debates in general – at least since the earliest debates. To my knowledge, no one has written with such breadth and depth about the methodology of philosophy and conceptual analysis. And, on my view, it is, and will be for some time, one of those books in legal philosophy that everyone interested in the subject should read.

This volume of *Law and Philosophy* is devoted to a discussion of Leiter's seminal work on the topic and includes contributions from some of the very best scholars in legal philosophy: Julie Dickson, Michael Steven Green, and Mark Greenberg. These young scholars (younger than I am, anyway) offer clear, concise, and penetrating counterarguments and criticisms of Leiter's view. Leiter graciously contributes a response that is classic Leiter: deep, detailed, sometimes conciliatory and sometimes cutting.

² Brian Leiter, 'Naturalism and Naturalized Jurisprudence', in Brian Bix (ed.), *Analyzing Law* (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 80.

³ Brian Leiter, *Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

I am grateful to the editors at *Law and Philosophy*, Michael Moore and now Douglas Husak for the opportunity to edit this volume of the journal and for their otherworldly patience with frequent delays owing to my lack of organizational and time-management skills. I am also deeply grateful for the patience of the contributors and for the quality of their contributions. As they can articulate their views far more eloquently than I, I forego the usual practice of writing one-paragraph summaries that would be too brief to do justice to the articles.

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