Exploring the links between climate transparency and mitigation policy through a reflexive capacity lens: case studies of Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and Mexico

As the multilateral climate transparency mechanism increasingly blurs the differentiation between developed and developing countries, it catalyses international pressure on the latter to adopt more ambitious mitigation policies and stringent reporting. This article delves into the relationship between the International Consultation and Analysis (ICA), a climate transparency mechanism under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the mitigation policies of emerging economies, namely Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and Mexico. Using the conceptual framework of reflexive capacity, we explore how the ICA enhances the ability of these countries' governments to recognize, reflect upon, and respond to demands for mitigation information. Our research draws on interviews with key government officials, UNFCCC personnel, and experts involved in the ICA process, participant observation, and extensive analysis of primary documents including the Biennial Update Reports, Technical Analysis Synthesis Reports, and countryspecific submissions. The findings demonstrate that the ICA fosters the enhancement of government actors’ reflexive capacities by furthering their understanding of transparency’s significance, advancing their technical reporting expertise, and subjecting individual country performance to scrutiny. Such capacities not only lead to improvements in domestic practices related to the generation and disclosure of mitigation-related information but also empower these countries to assert their entitlement to differentiated responsibilities in the face of increasing demands for mitigation and reporting. The enhanced reflexive capacity and heightened scrutiny are anticipated to play pivotal role in facilitating the development of more ambitious mitigation policies and more effective climate transparency mechanisms at both domestic and global levels.


Introduction
Transparency, generally understood as the disclosure of information, is assumed to be key in improving environmental performance through enabling the holding of powerful actors, both public and private, accountable for non-or underperformance (Florini, 2010;Gupta & Mason, 2014).Transparency is also considered to play a crucial role in reflexive policymaking process.The general idea is that generating and disclosing information about past and present performances, practices, and existing problems leads to learning and enhances policymakers' reflexive capacity to become more self-critical and self-conscious in mobilising knowledge and resources to develop better and more effective policies and problemsolving strategies (Bostrom et al., 2017;Feindt & Weiland, 2018;Meadowcroft & Steuer, 2013;Voss & Kemp, 2006).
In climate governance, transparency is heralded as one of the pillars to achieving the global climate goals.Taking the form of report and review, the multilateral climate transparency mechanism operating under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) requires countries to generate and disclose information on their individual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and removals-implying mitigation policy. 1 As such, transparency is expected to facilitate countries to hold each other to account to enhance mutual trust and improve mitigation policy by furthering understanding on successes as well as challenges in policy implementation (Gupta & van Asselt, 2019;UNFCCC, 2015).The Paris Agreement's Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) aims to generate information that provide clarity on and track progress towards achieving, Parties'2 individual mitigation commitments (UNFCCC, 2015).Information generated through the ETF will feed the global stocktake, a mechanism to account and assess countries' collective progress, and the outcomes of which will inform countries in enhancing their actions and ambitions over time (Deprez et al., 2015).
The ETF, set to take effect from year 2024, supersedes the previous transparency mechanism that encompassed separate systems for developed and developing countries, known as the International Assessment and Review (IAR) and the International Consultation and Analysis (ICA) respectively.The shift from the bifurcated IAR-ICA systems to the standardised ETF has been marked with political contestation centred around the UNFCCC principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" (CBDR-RC). 3On one hand, concerns arise regarding the feasibility and justification of imposing standardised and stringent transparency measures on developing countries, given the disparities in historical emissions and perceived capacity, resources, and experience limitations (Ji & Sha, 2015;Kamil, 2013;Wang & Gao, 2018).On the other hand, the upward trajectory of GHG emissions and economic development in some developing countries prompts arguments for re-evaluating the differentiation approaches and enabling countries to enhance mitigation ambition irrespective of their status (Rajamani, 2016;Voigt & Ferreira, 2016).
Despite the contestation, the ICA process has been operational for nearly a decade with little scrutiny on its linkages to domestic mitigation policy.This study seeks to investigate this links using reflexive capacity as a conceptual lens.In the context of climate transparency, reflexive capacity refers to the ability of actors or institutions to recognise, reflect upon, and respond to the demands for information on mitigation actions.Our understanding of reflexive capacity draws upon the conceptual framework of ecological reflexivity, which pertains to the capacity to recognise and monitor global ecological shifts and reconfigure practices accordingly (Dryzek and Pickering, 2018;Pickering et al., 2018;Pickering, 2019).To address the objective of this research, we formulate the following research question: in what ways does the ICA foster reflexive capacity of the emerging economies to improve mitigation-related policies?Answering this question allows us to delve into the implications of reflexive capacity on the improvement of domestic mitigation policies, and consider its relevance for the future implementation of the ETF and the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement.
We selected Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and Mexico as case studies due to their unique position resulting from the diminishing differentiation between developed and developing countries, as highlighted in the Paris Agreement (Maljean-Dubois, 2016;Pauwelyn, 2013).These countries are technically entitled to the differentiated treatment which distinguishes developed countries from developing countries in terms of rights and obligations regarding climate mitigation and reporting.However, as the largest GHG emitters among developing countries, 4 these countries face mounting international pressure to assume their "fair share" of mitigation efforts 5 and to provide robust reporting on the implementation of mitigation policies. 6Furthermore, their mitigation commitments are closely scrutinised and often criticised for being inadequate and insufficient (e.g., per country analysis by the Climate Action Tracker, see also Harris, 2017;D'Souza, 2022), while their classification as "developing" countries are being questioned (Depledge and Yamin, 2009;Fite, 2018;Ling, 2020;Pauw et al., 2019).
This article proceeds as follows.Section 2 describes the evolution of multilateral climate transparency arrangements for developing countries and the implications for these emerging economies.Section 3 presents the conceptualisation of reflexive capacity and its operationalisation in the ICA context, while Sect. 4 details research methodology and methods of data collection and analysis.Section 5 presents findings on the ways the ICA fosters reflexive capacity of the case countries, followed by discussion in Sect.6. Section 7 provides conclusions and recommendations for future transparency implementation.

Evolving climate transparency mechanism for developing countries
The UNFCCC's principle of CBDR-RC establishes distinct obligations for developed and developing countries, or the Annex I and Non-annex I Parties 7 to the UNFCCC.While Annex I Parties are obligated to mitigate the adverse effect of climate change, Non-annex I Parties have the option to undertake mitigation actions voluntarily, provided they received international support (UNFCCC, 1992).In terms of reporting, all Parties are required to periodically communicate essential information related to their national inventory of GHG emissions, national circumstances, planned or adopted mitigation and adaptation measures, and other relevant details aligned with the objectives of the Climate Convention (UNF-CCC, 1999).However, in accordance with the CBDR-RC principle, different reporting requirements apply to Annex I and Non-annex I Parties.Annex I Parties are subject to detailed and more frequent reporting, including the submission of an annual national GHG inventory report, adherence to a common reporting format for GHG emissions and removals, and undergoing rigorous review of the National Communications.These Parties are also bound by the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, established in 1997, which entails a stringent measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) system. 8In contrast, Non-annex I Parties face less stringent reporting requirements, involving a combined report of national GHG inventory and other climate-related information, without undergoing any review process. 9Despite this relatively lenient approach, many developing countries have struggled to meet the four-year submission deadlines for the National Communications, resulting in significant gaps of up to ten years between submissions.
The Bali Action Plan in 2007 and the Copenhagen Accord in 2009 introduced two important decisions.Firstly, developing countries are to undertake mitigation actions, and secondly, 5 https:// china dialo gue.net/ en/ clima te/ 10976-conse nsus-eludes-clima te-talks-over-finan ce-and-trans paren cy/ accessed on 20 October 2021. 6https:// www.thegu ardian.com/ scien ce/ 2018/ dec/ 13/ china-deman ds-devel oped-count ries-pay-their-debtson-clima te-change accessed on 16 October 2021. 7See Pauw et al. (2019) for the distinction between the terms developed and developing countries versus Annex I and Non-annex I Parties.This paper, however, uses both terms interchangeably. 8See https:// unfccc.int/ kyoto_ proto col accessed on 30 June 2021. 9See https:// unfccc.int/ non-annex-I-NCs for requirements for developing countries' national communications submissions, accessed on 30 June 2021.these actions would be subject to international MRV (UNFCCC, 2007(UNFCCC, , 2009(UNFCCC, , 2010)).Developing countries are required to submit Biennial Update Report (BUR) every two years, which builds upon and enhances their National Communication.The scope of the BUR includes information on national circumstances and institutional arrangements, national GHG inventory, mitigation actions and domestic MRV system, as well as constraints, gaps, and support needed and received (UNFCCC, 2011).Through the 2010 Cancun Agreement and subsequent agreements leading up to Paris in 2015, the international MRV mechanism is further refined into two distinct processes: the IAR for Annex I Parties and the ICA for Non-annex I Parties.The IAR process involves a technical review of the Biennial Reports submitted by Annex I Parties and a Multilateral Assessment (MA) workshop.The ICA includes a Technical Analysis of Non-annex I Biennial Update Reports and a Facilitative Sharing of Views (FSV) workshop.These processes differ in terms of mandates and objectives, where the IAR aims to assess and promote comparability among developed countries' individual mitigation efforts, while the ICA aims to facilitate transparency and understanding of domestic mitigation actions and effects and does not involve discussion about the appropriateness individual policies and measures (Gupta et al., 2021;Weikmans et al., 2020).
The Paris Agreement adopted a more nuanced approach toward differentiation.While all countries are required to establish individual mitigation contribution with "highest possible ambition", differentiated treatment continues to exist and is reflected through attributes such as "takes into account Parties' different capacities" or "in light of different national circumstances".The Agreement also recognises the principle of progression in mitigation efforts, allowing for increasing ambition over time (Rajamani, 2016;Voigt and Perreira, 2016) and for Parties to "graduate" within the binary grouping of countries (Pauw et al., 2019).In terms of transparency, the Enhanced Transparency Framework was established and merges the reporting and review processes for both Annex I and Non-annex I Parties.The ETF is neither differentiated nor fully standardised, with provision of "flexibility to those developing countries that need it in light of their capacities" (UNFCCC, 2018;Winkler et al., 2017).All parties are required to submit biennial reports that include a national inventory report of GHG emissions and removals, information necessary to track progress in implementing and achieving mitigation contributions, information related to climate impacts and adaptation, and information on financial, technology, and capacity building support provided (by developed countries) and received (by developing countries).Table 1 summarises the development of transparency mechanism for developing countries from the Convention's National Communication (NC), to the Cancun MRV system, and to the Paris Agreement ETF.
It is within this evolving climate transparency mechanism that the emerging economies continue to actively engage in the ICA process and navigate their way to meeting the reporting requirements.We turn next to the conceptual framework of reflexive capacity that we use as a guiding lens through which we analyse the links between the ICA process and domestic mitigation policy.

Reflexive capacity in the context of ICA
The concept of reflexive capacity takes its root from theories of reflexive governance, which can be defined as a form of governance that engages in self-critical scrutiny, embraces questioning of assumptions, and seeks innovative problem-solving approaches in a given context.This approach emphasises a commitment to continuous learning and improvement (Boström et al. 2017;Smith & Stirling, 2010;Voss & Kemp, 2006).Voss and Kemp (2006) distinguish two forms of reflexivity: first-order reflexivity, which involves unconscious self-reflection by governance actors within the cycle of problem production and solving, and second-order reflexivity, which entails conscious cognitive learning and re-evaluation of this cycle, leading to a critical reassessment of existing methods and the development of new or alternative approaches.
In the broader context of reflexivity, information, knowledge, and experience play crucial roles in the decision-making process.Information disclosure is expected to instigate a process where governance actors consciously and continuously question assumptions and confront the underlying causes of socio-political problems (Smith & Stirling, 2010;Stirling, 2008;Voss & Kemp, 2006).This process can generate new knowledge that challenges current practices, policies, and strategies, enabling the development of more effective responses to existing and emerging problems (Beck et al., 1994(Beck et al., , 2003;;Meadowcroft and Steuer, 2013).Studies of reflexive environmental and sustainability governance have emerged as a response to the limited effectiveness of traditional regulatory and marketbased approaches to environmental policies (Feindt & Weiland, 2018;Gottschick, 2018).These studies have contributed to a better understanding of how societal and institutional transformation can occur in response to environmental and ecological problems.
Reflexivity is considered a valuable attribute of governance in the Anthropocene.In this era, the focus of environmental sustainability has shifted from natural resources conservation to the capacity of governance actors and institutions to anticipate, prevent, and respond to ecological crises.This concept is known as ecological reflexivity, understood as the that need it in light of their capacity, with the 'need* to be self-determined and the basis for determination not to be reviewed capacity of actors or institutions to critically reflecting on their performance and becoming more open-ended, anticipatory, and far-sighted in their visions and practices to address such crises (Dryzek & Pickering, 2018).Ecological reflexivity concept entails components which includes (i) recognising and monitoring ecological impacts, including institutional impacts on ecosystems and vice versa; (ii) rethinking core aims, values, and assumptions, drawing on lessons learnt from past performances, and envisioning possible futures; and (iii) responding to self-scrutiny by making changes to policies and practices in this ecological context (Pickering, 2019;Pickering et al., 2018) (Fig. 1).
In alignment with our research objectives, we have adapted the components of ecological reflexivity to the specific context of climate transparency.The first component involves recognising the impacts of climate change on national circumstances and vulnerability, as well as acknowledging the national development trajectory that contributes to cumulative global GHG emissions.The second component requires rethinking of core aims and priorities related to transparency, drawing insights from past performances and practices of transparency at both the national and international levels, and envisioning the future implementation of transparency.The third component, labelled as responding, entails the reconfiguration of national policies related to mitigation and rearticulation of mitigation targets.We use these components to systematically analyse whether information generated and disclosed under the ICA prompts a conscious and critical reflection on the opportunities and challenges associated with participating in the international transparency process, and whether and how this information is used as a basis for problem-solving and the development of a more effective domestic mitigation policy.With this reflexive capacity lens, we process our collected data utilising the methods detailed below.

Methods
This paper employs qualitative case study research to acquire an in-depth understanding of transparency as a socio-political phenomenon and its connection to domestic mitigation policy (Harrison et al., 2017;Yin & Campbell, 2018).Initially, we analysed the case countries' Biennial Update Reports (BURs), Technical Analysis Synthesis Reports (TASRs), NDCs, and other relevant submissions made to the UNFCCC.Concurrently, we observed the FSV workshops, where the case countries presented their BURs, either through direct participation or by utilising official recordings publicly available on the UNFCCC website.Subsequently, we conducted semi-structured interviews with key representatives from the case countries, including government policy-makers and negotiators on transparency issues, key UNFCCC officials who are involved in the ICA process, and third-party experts who conducted the technical analysis of the BURs.The interviews were conducted between 2016 and 2020 through face-to-face meetings, online communications, and email exchanges.
We transcribed the interview results and FSV proceedings and analysed and coded them, along with the countries' documents, using Atlas.tisoftware v8.0 and a manual coding method.We categorised the data according to the reflexive capacity components of recognising, rethinking, and responding.We present our findings by providing specific details about who said what or by using descriptors such as "all", "one of the", "most (represents four out of five)", and "some (represents two or three out of five)" countries.Specifically on the component of responding, we assessed the changes made in each of the section of the BUR, including the national circumstances (including mitigation target), GHG inventory, mitigation and domestic MRV, and the identification of support needed and received,.Except for the national circumstances section, we incorporated evaluations from the TASR documents on the remaining sections combining the remarks of "yes", "partly", and "no" along with the corresponding explanations, to determine whether improvements are made.
Finally, we triangulated all materials and conducted a directed interpretive content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) to make sense of and interpret our findings.This enabled us to identify how participating in the ICA process enhances the case countries' reflexive capacity, as evidenced by the changes and improvements made in their respective BURs, which are taken as reflecting actual changes and improvements at the domestic level.Information on the interviewees analysed documents, and observed FSV sessions are listed in Appendix A, while Appendix B provides a synthesis of the case countries' TASRs.

Reflexive capacity as fostered by the ICA
This section presents the findings of our study regarding the ways in which the ICA process fosters reflexive capacity.Section 5.1 delves into the connection between the ICA and an increased recognition of the adverse impacts of climate change on national vulnerability, and conversely, how the national development path contributes to global climate change.Section 5.2 provides insights into how participation in the ICA leads to a rethinking of domestic aims and priorities related to transparency, drawing on past performance and practices, and envisioning the future implementation of the multilateral transparency mechanism.Lastly, Sect.5.3 demonstrates how the process of generating and disclosing information as required by the ICA enables the case countries to reconfigure and rearticulate domestic mitigation policy and target.

Recognising the impacts of and on climate change
As major developing countries characterised by vast territories, diverse climate and geographical situations, and large populations, the case countries examined in this study are highly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change.These impacts encompass a range of extreme weather events such as rainstorms, droughts, typhoons, and tropical cyclones, resulting in environmental disasters like flooding, landslides, forest fires, and crop failures (World Bank, 2013).Additionally, these countries are home to most densely populated cities grappling with socio-economic issues such as poverty, high unemployment rates, limited access to education, healthcare, housing, energy, water and sanitation, and inadequate infrastructure.While climate vulnerability information is not part of the sections of BURs that is being reviewed, each of the case countries provided more detailed information on these aspects compared to their initial reports.Furthermore, these countries, along with other developing country Parties, commonly commenced their presentations at the FSV workshops by elaborating on their national vulnerabilities and other developmental challenges.
On the other hand, some of the case countries acknowledged that their development paths have significantly contributed to the global GHG emission levels.In their first BUR, Brazil noted that a large part of their GHG emissions come from their conventional agricultural system (P1, Brazil's first BUR).Similarly, Indonesia acknowledged that their economic development model still heavily relies on fossil fuels (P4).Amid the growing realisation of the climate impact on national vulnerability and, in reverse, national contributions to the global climate change, the UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COPs) in 2009 decided that developing countries were to share the burden of mitigation actions, of which the actions are measurable, reportable, and verifiable (UNFCCC, 2009).Following this decision, all the case countries pledged their Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) targets, encompassing diverse emission reduction efforts, activities, baseline, base year, and sources of funding.Table 2 summarises the information on these targets as reported in the national circumstances section of the BURs.
Although the requirements to uptake for NAMAs and MRV came from UNFCCC decisions, the case countries revealed that participation in the ICA heightened their awareness and understanding of the crucial role of transparency in advancing domestic mitigation policy-making and implementation.Consequently, these countries have embraced transparency requirements.Brazil, for instance, emphasised that "transparency is the heart of this current regime" and that "we were the very first country to submit the first BUR and also technical annex on REDD (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation)" (P1).Mexico expressed their engagement with the ICA process as means to enhance understanding and improve resilience, stating "we believe that is the way to go because it is a way for us to better understand how and where we can do things better and be less vulnerable" (P6).Furthermore, they stated that, "we have done a lot of work in updating its information, bringing it up to speed in terms of [the] latest guidance and guidelines from the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), implemented approach to enhance the robustness of the quality of data.So that it can better serve for the purposes of mitigation" (P6, P7).
Recognising their existing vulnerabilities and developmental challenges, Brazil, India, and Indonesia highlighted the need for support in undertaking mitigation and reporting activities (P1, P3, P4).Brazil and Mexico also argued that developing countries mitigation contribution should remain voluntary and contingent upon international support in the form of finance, technology, and capacity building, citing their limited capacities and resources, (P1, P6, country submission).Such assertions align with the perspectives of some of the international experts who conducted the technical analyses of the BURs.These experts acknowledged the arduous nature of mitigation and reporting tasks for developing countries, justifying the need for international support (P8, P10).However, one expert observed that developing countries' negotiators "tried hard to avoid having (a) standardised or common system and methodology (for reporting of mitigation measures)" irrespective of their vulnerabilities and capacities (P8).Another expert indicated that "countries' capacities and domestic politics play critical roles in steering their position toward being obligated to report, and held accountable for their (lack of) effort" (P10).Despite these challenges and limitations, the five emerging economies remain committed to participating in the ICA and endeavour to comply with its reporting requirements.

Rethinking priorities, practices, and future implementation of transparency
While explicit endorsement of transparency requirements varied among the case countries, all acknowledged the benefits of participating in the ICA process, as it facilitates "understanding (on) how and where we can do (mitigation) better and become less vulnerable" (P6).The call to disclose mitigation information have raised awareness among government institutions and between governmental and non-government stakeholders regarding the significance of transparency in developing evidence-based climate policy.According to China and Mexico, this awareness has further led to the strengthening of inter-ministerial coordination for the development of the GHG inventory system, climate legislation, and the BUR itself (P2, P6).The technical analysis process was identified by all countries as instrumental in enhancing their knowledge and technical capacity in conducting GHG emissions inventories and mitigation actions.Brazil, China, and Indonesia specified that their capacities are enhanced in areas such as utilising country-specific emission factors, increasing the tier of inventory methodology, and applying quality assurance and quality control measures (P1, P2, P5).India, Indonesia, and Mexico highlighted their enhanced understanding of identifying mitigation potentials, collecting data activity, measuring and verifying data, and identifying areas in need of support (P3, P5, P6).
The FSV workshops also played a crucial role by providing a platform for mutual learning, sharing of experiences, and exchanging best practices among countries.Indonesia, for instance, recalled that they "…learned from India and China on how to prepare their renewable energy industry" (P4), while China wanted to know how others institutionalise their GHG inventory and domestic MRV systems (P2).India, on the other hand, expressed interest in "learning how other large developing countries are managing the institutional arrangements, data collection, and the use of IPCC 2006 guidelines for GHG inventory" (P3).Participating countries also sought acknowledgement for their mitigation efforts and achievements through FSV presentations, aiming to leverage this acknowledgement to furthering their mitigation actions through the emission trading schemes (P4), tapping into financial support and capacity building under the UNFCCC Capacity Building Initiative on Transparency, the Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (P2, P3), and enhancing bilateral and regional cooperations with developed countries and other stakeholders (P2) (Table 3).
Participation in the ICA has also led to reflection over the challenges faced at the national level and within the ICA itself.Brazil and Indonesia highlighted the lack of mutual understanding regarding the importance of transparency among different government agencies as a primary domestic challenges.Incoherencies also exist within agencies, involving different departments, units, and individuals who are either directly involved and thus familiarised with UNFCCC processes or lack direct involvement and understanding.These challenges have resulted in wider incoherencies and coordination gaps, both intergovernmental and between the government and other relevant stakeholders such as experts, consultants, verifier bodies, businesses, and financial actors (P1, P2, P4, P6).Interestingly, two technical analysis experts noted that gaps also exist between countries' negotiators and technical officials responsible for implementing or monitoring mitigation activities on the ground.While negotiators may prefer less stringent MRV, technical officials are mostly of the view that clear rules and guidelines would actually facilitate domestic MRV processes (P9, P10).
China, Indonesia, and Mexico identified insufficient knowledge, technical and technological capacities, and human and financial resources to implement mitigation and reporting as the second major challenge.They attributed these deficiencies to ineffective coordination, lack of leaders' commitments, bureaucratic complexities, overlapping regulations, and reliance on external consultants and experts (P2, P4, P6).Mexico specifically mentioned the lack of dedicated and knowledgeable staff to implement and report climate activities (P6, P7), while Indonesia highlighted the impact of rotation practices within government institutions, that "even with a regular training programme on GHG Inventory and mitigation and MRV, trained staff can be mutated again so we lost expertise, time, and resources" (P4, P5).Data availability, quality, and management is another significant challenge.China mentioned the difficulties in establishing national GHG inventory and MRV systems due to reliance on ad-hoc and project-based data collection and processing, which are conducted by external consultants (P2).In contrast, Indonesia revealed that even with established national GHG inventory and MRV system, they face ongoing struggle to obtain credible and accurate data from both public and private sectors due to the aforementioned challenges of understaffing, limited knowhow and technical capacity, and coordination gaps (P5).Meanwhile, the conflicting schedules between UNFCCC negotiation meetings and the FSV workshops were seen as problematic by Brazil and India.This resulted in lesser participation of developing countries, especially those with smaller delegation sizes, in the FSVs, which in turn limited opportunities for mutual learning and sharing of experiences and best practices among developing countries (P1, P3).Brazil and China cited language barriers as a constraint during the FSVs, particularly if national technical personnel were required to answer technical questions (P1, P2).Furthermore, the shortage of technical experts was identified as the cause of the long waiting periods in the technical analysis process.Brazil and India also noted that the input provided by the experts during the technical analysis was often overly prescriptive (P1, P3), while Mexico expressed concerns about the handling of reported data, which may contain sensitive information (P6).Financial support for the development of the BURs was a concern, with India experiencing delayed disbursement and Indonesia receiving smaller amount (P3, P4).A UNFCCC staff member pointed out that the issue of financial support was decided at the COPs, but acknowledged delays in the technical analysis process due to a shortage of dedicated experts (P14). 10n terms of envisioning future transparency implementation, nearly all case countries emphasised the importance of upholding the CBDR-RC principle.The vulnerabilities, developmental challenges, and limited technical capacities, resources, and experience of these countries were considered justifications for their eligibility to apply for flexibility in reporting.Consistent with the language of the Paris Agreement, these countries believe that the determination of flexibility application should be self-determined and not subject to review.Brazil highlighted that flexibility should be applied for during the necessary time period for developing countries to progress toward transparency on par with developed countries (P1, Brazil's individual submission).India, China, and Brazil expressed concerns over different reporting requirements such as types of gases or emissions projection.They believe that since mitigation contribution by developing countries should remain voluntary contribution by developing countries, reporting should thus be "encouraged" instead of "required", using terms such as "should" and "may" instead of "shall" (P1, P2, P3, countries' individual submissions).The flexibility application extends to the adoption of standardised reporting formats and tables, with India stating that providing such tables should be optional while China suggesting that developing countries should be exempt from this requirement altogether (countries individual submissions).
All countries further agreed that developed countries, with their ample experiences from the Kyoto Protocol's MRV mechanism, should take the lead in the transparency process.They should not backtrack from the current rigorous reporting and review process, and should be subject to stringent transparency for the support that they have mobilised and provided.These emerging economies unanimously envisioned that the transparency process under the ETF would maintain its facilitative nature, alongside sustained support, particularly in terms of capacity building and training for domestic experts (P1, P2, P3, P4, P6, countries' individual submissions).Despite this strong collective stance in the face of increasing transparency demands, these case countries continue to improve their BURs, as elaborated below.

Responding through reconfiguring policy and rearticulating target
The third component of reflexive capacity within the context of the ICA involves the reconfiguration of national mitigation-related policies and rearticulation of mitigation targets.The changes made by the case countries in these areas are illustrated in Table 4, which includes the following sections: (i) national institutional arrangements, (ii) national GHG inventories, (iii) mitigation actions and effects, including the establishment of the domestic MRV system, and (iv) the identification of support needed and received.Additionally, we include the mitigation target under the NDCs to highlight the changes as compared to the targets under the NAMAs scheme outlined in Table 2.The accompanying text provides a comprehensive explanation of the underlying reasons for these changes.
All case countries demonstrated improvements in their reporting on the national institutional arrangements for climate change.These improvements include broader engagement of government and non-government institutions as well as other stakeholders, clarification of roles and responsibilities for each institution, and establishment of more the permanent statutes for certain entities.Brazil, for instance, progressed from listing only two government institutions responsible for national climate governance in their first BUR to including an additional governing agency on REDD + in the second BUR, and ultimately outlining comprehensive array of newly participating institutions from both government and non-government sectors along with their respective tasks, programmes, and projects in the third BUR (Brazil's BUR 1, 2, 3).In their second BUR, India expanded their roster of agencies overseeing their GHG inventory, mitigation action, and domestic MRV by adding three new institutions to the existing ones (P3, India's BUR 2).Indonesia highlighted the establishment of GHG inventory systems not only at the national but also provincial levels (P5, Indonesia's BUR 2), while China transferred the position of the national climate change focal point from the National Development Agency to the Ministry of Environment (P2).Brazil and Mexico also revealed the transitions from ad hoc-based climate governance arrangements to national and permanent-based structures (P1, P7).
On national GHG inventory, the use of IPCC guidelines holds significant importance as it determines the accuracy and reliability of emissions level accounting.Whether a country is using IPCC 1996 guidelines or the more recent IPCC 2006 guidelines is one of the most frequently asked questions during the FSV workshops (participant observation, see also Gupta et al., 2021).Among the five case countries, three of them underscore the significance of this issue.India seeks information and best practices on transitioning from the IPCC 1996 to the 2006 guidelines (P3), Mexico aims to expedite the transition to the 2006 guidelines, while Indonesia indicates that it has already fully used the 2006 guidelines (P5).Each case country has updated their GHG activity data and emission factors, albeit with variations on the data tiering, which indicates the level of accuracy in the information.However, discrepancies exist regarding the extent of improvements made.Some case countries still lack certain reporting elements such as uncertainty analysis, consistent time series, complete coverage of gases, or compliance with the emissions reporting timeline, which is typically every four years.It is interesting to note that Indonesia, despite being the only country that has fully adopted the IPCC 2006 guidelines, received a lower assessment for its GHG inventory reporting in the second BUR compared to the first.This was attributed to the omission of reports on the level of uncertainty in GHG emissions accounting, emissions from F-gases, emissions from marine and aviation sectors, as well as an inaccurate presentation where "(certain) data and tables presented are still following the IPCC 1996 instead of 2006 guidelines" (P4, Indonesia's TASR 2).
On mitigation action and effects, all case countries to various extents have provide updated and more detailed information in their subsequent BURs.This includes details on the planned and implemented actions, methodologies and assumptions used, progress of implementation, and results and achievements.Surprisingly, our analysis reveals that, except for Brazil which consistently reported the same number of mitigation actions in all three BURs, the other four countries reported lower number of actions in their second compared to the first BURs.A closer examination reveals that these four countries have either refined the classification of actions or, in the case of Indonesia, possibly removed actions that turned out to be unverifiable (see Kamil et al., 2021).Each country has also updated information regarding the establishment of domestic MRV system.This includes details on the transition process from an ad hoc, project-based, MRV to a nationally integrated MRV system, the setting up of online registry system for climate actions and support, and the enactment of a budgetary system to track and verify the source and utilisation of climate finance (P4, P5).As previously noted, Brazil's report on this element in the second BUR is considered to be insufficient, as indicated in Brazil's TASR 2.This deficiency stemmed from the fact that Brazil developed and submitted the second BUR prior to the development of the synthesis report.Consequently, Brazil did not take into account the input and corrections provided during the technical analysis process (P1).It is also important to note that China's reports were regarded as stagnant since they received perfect score in both first and second BURs.
On the last BUR element, it is worth noting that countries except India and China have provided updates on the identified support needed and received.India's report is considered as insufficient to the due the omission of the information on technological support received, while China's report is considered stagnant as they have once again received perfect scores in both BURs.India and China further emphasised the need for support not only for mitigation but also for adaptation measures, particularly in the area of disaster risk reduction management, with India underlining the need for new and additional resources so as to ensure the availability and continuity of support (P2, P3).
Furthermore, all case countries have rearticulated and improved their mitigation targets under the NDCs in comparison with the previously established NAMAs.However, it should be noted that the increase in ambition is not solely attributed to transparency, as the demands for NDC submissions and the implementation of the ICA process occurred simultaneously.India disclosed that "since our NDC was submitted much before the first and the second BUR, so there is no opportunity as such to use (information from the ICA process) for designing of the NDC.And we have not taken any decision to revise the NDC because our NDC has been evaluated as very ambitious, and we are among the few countries which are 2 degrees compliant.But then the overall recommendation was about how to improve over time" (P3).On the contrary, China asserted that they would "take all the questions and feedback given during the FSV very seriously and will consider them when updating our NDCs" (P2).
In addition to the improvements made in the BURs and mitigation targets, the case countries revealed that they have taken various actions to address the identified challenges.For example, Brazil addresses organisational gaps by conducting inter-ministerial coordination meetings prior to BUR development to foster a common vision and awareness (P1).Indonesia has taken measures to resolve incoherencies between the Ministry of National Development and Planning and Ministry of Environment and Forestry, the institutions responsible for mitigation planning and transparency implementation, respectively (P4, P5).Similarly, China's transfer of the climate change focal point position from the National Development Agency to the Ministry of Environment can be seen as a measure to reduce bureaucratic complexity (P2).To tackle issues related to climate data and information, India published a Forest Survey Report highlighting the increase in national forest cover and reduced deforestation (P3), while Mexico and Indonesia established long-term GHG inventory, domestic MRV, and national mitigation registry systems (P4, P6).
In efforts to address resource and capacity challenges, China has applied for support from the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT) programme to improve its GHG Inventory system (P2).Indonesia has proposed a capacity building programme tailored to country's specific needs in addition to the existing regional-based UNFCCC-led training programmes (P4).Brazil, along with other Portuguese-speaking countries, has launched a Lusophone cluster of the partnership on transparency "as a space for experts to overcome language barrier and to exchange experiences in order to help each other, better train and prepare ourselves for the ICA process" (P1).Finally, India has established the International Solar Alliance and Space Research Organization, which is expected to contribute to India's achievement of its mitigation target (P3).

Discussion
Our findings indicate that the generation and disclosure of information through the BURs have increased the awareness of the case countries regarding their growing national climate vulnerabilities and significant GHG emissions contributions.Participation in the ICA process has furthered understanding of the significance of transparency in achieving the pledged mitigation targets.It has also enabled the case countries to recognise and reflect upon the opportunities and challenges associated with transparency at both national and international levels.This knowledge empowers the case countries to reconfigure their domestic policies for mitigation, and rearticulate mitigation target as reported in their respective BURs.The reconfiguration and improvements are more evident in GHG emissions inventory compared to mitigation policy and support, aligning with the BUR's requirements and the discussion in the FSV meetings that predominantly focus on this aspect, deliberately avoiding discussions on mitigation ambition (Gupta et al., 2021).While the improvements in mitigation targets observed when comparing NAMAs to the NDCs cannot be solely attributed to the ICA, our results demonstrate that countries are beginning to consider the information gained for future mitigation policy-making processes.The increased awareness, ability to identify challenges, and capacities to respond to these challenges are essential for the development of more effective mitigation and related policies.
Our findings further reveal that the case countries have implemented a broader range of changes at the domestic level in respond to the identified challenges in the transparency system.These changes can be categorised into improvements in (i) government structure, arrangement, and coordination, (ii) data and information management, and (iii) cooperation with non-governmental partners and international bodies to garner more support.These changes, indicative of enhanced reflexive capacity, exhibit slight variations among the five countries in terms of types and extent, reflecting their respective national interests, capacities, and challenges.Some countries demonstrate a greater focus on seeking acknowledgement and support while being critical of the provisions and limitations of the UNFCCC.Others prioritise improving institutional arrangement and technical capacity for emissions and mitigation data and accounting.Some countries may be more advanced in GHG inventory and the establishment of domestic MRV system but provide opaque information regarding their mitigation actions, while others may not be as advanced but manage to provide detailed and transparent information on their mitigation actions.
Despite the variations among the case countries, they share similar views and positions regarding future transparency implementation.Firstly, these countries considers themselves part of, and will remain to be part of, the developing countries under the UNFCCC system.Secondly, recognising that developed and developing countries are at different stages of development and have different developmental agendas, these countries argue that differentiated treatment should apply, taking into account historical cumulative emissions (Ji & Sha, 2015;Wang & Gao, 2018).They assert their entitlement to a certain degree of flexibility in reporting.Lastly, these emerging economies emphasise that demands to scale up mitigation actions and ambitions, as well as more stringent reporting, should be justified only if promises of international support are fulfilled, and there is an equally stringent transparency in the provision of such support (Baatz, 2013;Kamil, 2013).
This shared position can be interpreted in two ways.From the capacity perspective, it is not surprising that these countries are unwilling to be subjected to and judged for lagging behind in meeting onerous reporting deadlines.The generation and reporting of bottomup GHG emissions and mitigation-related information require significant efforts, time, and knowledge and skills, especially for geographically large countries like those in our case studies.Reflexive capacity itself involves iterative learning processes and experimentation with problem-solving (Voss & Kemp, 2006), which may take time to yield substantial results or changes.However, from an equity perspective, this positioning can be seen as an attempt to avoid more rigorous reporting and, by extension, a fair-share of mitigation responsibilities.While the term "fair" lacks a globally agreed-upon definition (as noted by Winkler et al., 2018), transparent, accurate, and comparable information is crucial for advancing understanding of mitigation successes and challenges.Such information provides a basis for the development of fair and ambitious mitigation policies.The evolution in the multilateral transparency mechanism, which has imposed increasing reporting requirements on developing countries, has given rise to capacity building for transparency as a new arena in the international climate negotiations.While this development can be seen a positive outcome, it also raises concern about the potential diversion of attention away from mitigation efforts.By leveraging their status as developing countries, these emerging economies may be inclined to continue shifting responsibilities and hinging the progression of mitigation and reporting to those of developed countries, as well as to the provision of international support.Conversely, an emphasis on capacity building may further encourage major developed countries to evade their obligation to take the lead in the global mitigation efforts and be held accountable for failing to meet this responsibility.This situation reflects broader political-economic and geopolitical power dynamics among major economies, which can influence and shape domestic decisions on climate transparency within and beyond the UNFCCC (Gupta and van Asselt, 2019;Mason, 2020).
Given this context, question arises on whether and how the enhanced transparency framework, which is expected to become operational in the near future, can effectively address the issue of differentiation.Failing to adequately address this issue will hinder the realisation of transparency's potential to advance domestic mitigation ambition, ensure global state-to-state accountability, and foster trust among countries.Resolving the issue of differentiation is essential for the transparency framework to fulfil its role in facilitating ambitious and equitable climate change mitigation action.

Conclusion
By using the components of recognition, rethinking, and responding, this article offers valuable insights into how the ICA process enhances reflexive capacity to improve mitigation policy.Beyond its role as a reporting and reviewing mechanism, the ICA facilitates learning, enabling government actors to identify opportunities and challenges while also enhancing their technical and non-technical capacities to address the challenges and maximise opportunities aligned with national priorities.Moreover, the ICA introduces an element of scrutiny into the performance of developing countries, a feature that was absent in the previous transparency mechanism.Despite the contestation and resistance surrounding the diminishing differentiation within the UNFCCC transparency arrangement, the development of national capacities and scrutiny is expected to contribute to the formulation of informed, effective, and robust mitigation policies.
Adopting a reflexive capacity lens provides a new perspective on how the global transparency mechanism operates and influences the capacities of those involved in process.Through this lens, our study provides empirical evidences supporting the theorised and widely assumed link between transparency and climate (mitigation) action and ambition, accountability, and compliance with UNFCCC decisions and agreements (Gupta & van Asselt, 2019;Gupta et al., 2021;Weikmans & Gupta, 2021;Weikmans et al., 2020).Furthermore, this article offers first-hand accounts from government actors and policymakers in the Global South, which are often overlooked or underrepresented in broader studies on climate policy and governance (Geden, 2016).
While this article sheds light on the potential connection between global transparency mechanism and reflexive capacity of the emerging economies to improve mitigation-related policies, further investigation is needed to deepen our understanding.Are improvements in reporting reflected consistently at the national level or do disparities exist (a suggested by Peterson, 2022)?How do the diverse political systems and economies of these countries influence the establishment of domestic transparency system, particularly in light of the diminishing differentiation within the global forum?These questions warrant further in-depth investigation within individual countries.Additionally, to gain a more comprehensive understanding on reflexive capacity, it is recommended to conduct research encompassing a wider range of case studies across developing nations.Does transparency yield similar effects on reflexive capacity of the middle-income and least developed countries?What kinds of domestic changes does transparency help generate in these countries, and how do they navigate the evolving multilateral climate transparency arrangement?Addressing these questions can provide valuable insights for global decision-making and national policy-making processes and inform the design and infrastructure of future transparency mechanisms.

Table 2
National circumstances and vulnerabilities and NAMAs pledges.Source Authors, synthesised from key actors' interviews and the case countries' Biennial Update Reports

Table 3
Rethinking aims and priorities, performances and practices, and future implementation.Source Authors, synthesised from key actors' interviews and the case countries' Bienial Update Reports, Technical Analysis Synthesis Reports, and other country-specific submissions to the UNFCCC

Table 4
Responding by reconfiguring and rearticulating mitigation-related policies and targets.Source Authors, synthesised from the case countries' Biennial Update Reports and Technical Analysis Synthesis Reports.Blue arrows facing upwards illustrate improvements, grey arrows facing sideways illustrate stagnancy, and yellow arrows facing downward illustrate regression