



# The Conundrum of Kundakunda's Status in the Digambara Tradition

Jayandra Soni<sup>1</sup> 

Accepted: 13 July 2023 / Published online: 2 September 2023

© The Author(s) 2023

**Abstract** Kundakunda's handling of several basic ideas cannot be omitted when one deals with the following concepts in Jaina philosophy: 1. *Syāt/siya, syādvāda* or *saptabhaṅgī*. 2. *Nayas, vyavahāra* and *nīścaya nayas* and *nayavāda*. 3. *Sapta* and *Nava tattvas/padārtha* and 4. *Anekāntavāda*. No doubt his dates are a major conundrum; recent research regards him to have lived around the fourth or fifth centuries (Brill's Encyclopedia of Jainism, BEJ: Brill's Encyclopedia of Jainism (Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 2 South Asia), edited by Knut Jacobsen, John A. Cort, Paul Dundas and Kristi L. Wiley. Leiden | Boston: Brill, 2020., p. 853). Moreover, it has been said that Kundakunda “*thread a somewhat new path on which he virtually remained a lone traveller*”, evident by the fact that hardly, if any, Digambara or even Śvetāmbara scholar elaborates on his ideas, let alone crediting him for significant basic insights into Jaina philosophy. Moreover, it seems to be evident, as will be attempted to show, that some ideas appear to be taken over from Kundakunda. Together with Kundakunda's ‘legacy’, this article will highlight several conundrums regarding the philosophical impact of several concepts in his works that fortunately have not been relegated to oblivion.

**Keywords** Kundakunda · Syādvāda · Nayavāda · Anekāntavāda

---

This article is based on the presentation given at the 22nd Annual Jaina Lecture of the Centre of Jaina Studies, SOAS, London, on 15 April 2023. It is dedicated to the fond memory of my friend and colleague Paul Dundas (1952–2023) who had seen my previous work on Kundakunda. It is sad not to have benefitted from his ever ready expertise and generosity.

---

✉ Jayandra Soni  
jayandra.soni@uibk.ac.at

<sup>1</sup> University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

The Digambara tradition took centre-stage early in the Jaina philosophical arena, as is evident from a list of thinkers up to the 10th c.: Kundakunda (4/5th century),<sup>1</sup> Umāsvāti (ca. 5th c.), Siddhasena Divākara (5th c.), Pūjyapāda (6th c.), Samantabhadra (6th c.),<sup>2</sup> Akalaṅka (8th c.) and Vidyānandin (10th c.).

With the first Sanskrit rendering of basic Jaina thought in the form of other *sūtra* works in Indian philosophy, Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* (TAS) set the stage to sow a productive and fertile field of ideas that added to the richness of concepts coming from Indian culture, in addition to those of the Brahmanic/Vedic and Buddhist streams. The philosophical thought of all these three indigenous traditions emerged out of the same milieu in the Indian sub-continent after the 4th century BCE, indicating in some cases noteworthy mutual similarities and especially mutual divergencies.

From the list of Jaina thinkers mentioned above, I would like to single out here Kundakunda (*kevala* Kundakunda) in what I intend to deal with because in several respects he is a puzzle and an enigma in the Digambara tradition.

In order to bring out the conundrums associated with Kundakunda, five topics intrinsic to Jaina thought have been selected, with reference to which his name cannot be ignored:

1. *Syāt*, *syādvāda* or *saptabhaṅgī*.<sup>3</sup>
2. *Nayas* and *nayavāda*, *vyavahāra* and *nīścaya nayas*.
3. *Sapta* and *Nava tattvas/padārtha*.
4. *Anekāntavāda*.
5. Kundakunda's legacy.

These topics are well-known in Jainism. The list given here looks neat and tidy, but will soon get ruffled up when probing into the details of their use on the basis of selected thinkers. In any case, it allows me a modicum of orientation, so a revisit may be appropriate in recalling them, and also in order to highlight several puzzling problems, even in the rather faint hope of arriving at any *new* and *definite* solutions.

<sup>1</sup> Cf.: "One of the first Jain authors to apply it [*siya/syāt*] was Kundakunda around the 4th/5th century CE ..." Balcerowicz 2020 on Kundakunda, BEJ, on Jaina Epistemology, p. 854.

<sup>2</sup> The date 8th c. for Samantabhadra given in 1996 (Soni, 1996, p. 32, fn. 18) was on the basis of Pathak (1930), Mukhtar (1934) and Schubring (1935, § 29, p. 44). English tr. 2000, p. 59). These references are listed below again. Recent scholarship dates Samantabhadra as having lived between 530 and 590 CE, see Piotr Balcerowicz's "Periodization and Main Thinkers" 2020 in BEJ, p. 837.

<sup>3</sup> These terms are basic to Jaina thought and refer: 1. to the use of the word *syāt* in the well-known theory of *syād-vāda* which contains seven parts or predication (*sapta-bhaṅgī*) made about an object of investigation from a particular perspective (from the perspective of her mother she is a daughter, from the perspective of her daughter she is a mother, etc.) where a particular perspective is required in a particular context: 2. *naya* and *naya-vāda* also concern the epistemological context of referring to an object from a particular standpoint, like the general or universal standpoint (similar to the use of universals and particulars) in a particular context. These two aspects (the perspectives and the standpoints) have come to be seen as constituting *anekānta-vāda* mentioned in point 4., the theory of manifoldness in Jainism that was developed to avoid any absolutistic statements or standpoints or to show how others do so. *Vyavahāra* and *nīścaya nayas* are standpoints used particularly by Kundakunda, referring to the mundane and definite (or absolute) standpoints discussed below. Most standard works on Jainism deal with these technical terms: the BEJ published in 2020 summarises them and in some cases also shows the history of the development of these ideas.

It is hoped that the references to at least these selected themes scattered in various texts and studies can be selectively compiled here in one place in dealing with the conundrum of Kundakunda's status in the Digambara tradition.

The main concern here in the use of these terms is about their employment till about the eighth century when, by Akalaṅka's time, there is better textual evidence in helping us to trace a kind of history of their use and relevance, so as to show how they developed later on.

## **Syāt, Syādvāda and Saptabhaṅgī**

Early in my concern with Jaina philosophy, since the early 1990s, I have been continually puzzled by a point that I still can *not* reconcile, namely, about the earliest references to *syādvāda* or *saptabhaṅgī* (and the well-known term of *anekāntavāda*), which has undoubtedly become one of the hallmarks of Jaina philosophy, at least since Śaṅkara's time in the 8th century.<sup>4</sup> We know that Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* of the fourth or fifth century CE is a monumental Sanskrit work that lays down the basic structure of Jaina philosophy in the *sūtra*-style of all the other known Indian philosophies. What is a continued puzzle is the statement that:

“There is no explicit reference to Syādvāda in [the] *Tattvārthasūtras*; it is said to be implied by the *sūtra*: *arpitānarpita-siddheḥ* (V.32)” [since it (*syādvāda*) is established on the basis of importance and unimportance].<sup>5</sup>

A.N. Upadhye wrote this in 1935 in his introduction to Kundakunda's *Pravacanasaṅgāra* (*Pavayaṇasaṅgāra*) which we have come across very early in our studies. Apart from the absence of the term *syādvāda*, the term *anekāntavāda* is also *not* used in the TAS, although *nayavāda* is sufficiently dealt with, as we shall see.

This is the context in which the *sūtra* mentioned by Upadhye occurs in chapter 5 of the TAS which, as he says, *implies* the use of *syādvāda*:

*sad dravya-lakṣaṇam* || TAS 5.29 ||

The characteristic feature of a substance is (what) really is or exists.

*utpāda-vyaya-dhauvyaya-yuktaṁ sat* || TAS 5.30 ||

Existence is furnished or endowed with origination, disappearance or destruction and duration or permanence.

*tad-bhāvavyayam nityam* || TAS 5.31 ||

Perpetuity is its (the substance's) indestructible true condition or essential nature,

*arpitānarpita-siddheḥ* || TAS 5.32 ||

because ('contradictory' views like destruction and duration) are established on the basis of their importance or unimportance [in a specific context].

<sup>4</sup> See Soni (1996) booklet *Aspects of Jaina Philosophy*, especially the second essay “*Syādvāda* is not *Samśayaavāda*”, pp. 20–45.

<sup>5</sup> Upadhye's introduction to the PrS, p. 83 (revised 1964, see Editor's Preface to the third ed. p. 25).

*sigdha-rūkṣatvād bandhaḥ* || TAS 5.33 || The binding (of atoms occurs) because of the greasy/sticky and dry/rough (properties/natures of the atoms).

These *sūtras* are not the problem. Relevant parts of Pūjyapāda's 6th century *Sarvārthasiddhi* (SAS) commentary on 5.32 above is what is being highlighted here for a puzzle that occurs regarding the *sūtra* which Upadhye refers to as *implying syādvāda*, namely: *arpitānarpita-siddheḥ*. The terms *arpita* and *anarpita* in the *sūtra* signify making something prominent or important and ignoring what is unimportant. Pūjyapāda comments on this *sūtra* in two paragraphs, 588–589.

In the first paragraph (§ 588) of his commentary to this, Pūjyapāda indicates that since substances have manifold attributes (*anekāntātmakasya vastunaḥ*), there is a need to give prominence to one or the other attribute, because the remaining ones are not important in a specific context (*arpita* and *anarpita* are the words he uses here), without any contradiction.<sup>6</sup>

He then gives the example of Devadatta being a father, a son, a brother, a nephew and so on, where the context demands the use of one or the other attribute in a specific sense, without the others being needed. This is a simple explanation of *arpitānarpita-siddheḥ*. There can be no gainsaying that speaking of a father, son, brother, etc. *sounds* like the known use of *syādvāda* or *saptabhaṅgī*, without the explicit use of these words themselves, neither in the *sūtra* of the TAS nor in its commentary. *Syādvāda* or *saptabhaṅgī* are key terms in the *anekānta*-theory as we know it to be, especially by using the words father, son, etc. What Pūjyapāda wrote seems to be quite understandable as such in mentioning Devadatta being a father, etc., without further details. However, taking into account the context of the *sūtra*, what Pūjyapāda says sounds a bit far-fetched not only because the use of *syāt* is *explicitly avoided* and not even hinted at, but also, because the mention of Devadatta being a father, son, etc., has little to do with the permanence, duration and destruction of a *substance* or *dravya*, which is the point here in the *sūtra*. One conclusion we can tentatively draw is that the use of *syāt* and/or *saptabhaṅgī* was not common parlance in his tradition when Pūjyapāda wrote this commentary.

In the second paragraph (§ 589) of his commentary to the same *sūtra* 5.32, Pūjyapāda goes on to talk about atoms and molecules which combine on the basis of their intrinsic capacity to do so, proceeding to the next *sūtra* of the TAS about the combination of atoms which takes place because of their greasy or dry natures.<sup>7</sup> This part of the commentary is in continuation of the theme concerning

<sup>6</sup> SAS on TAS 5.32, § 588. *anekāntātmakasya vastunaḥ* prayojanavaśād yasya kasyacid dharmasya vivaṣṭayā prāpitam prādhānyam arpitam upanūtam iti yāvat. tadviparītam anarpitam. prayojanābhāvāt sato 'py avivaṣṭā bhavatyūpasarjanibhūtam anarpitam ity ucyate. arpitam cānarpitam cārpitānanarpite. tābhyām siddher arpitānanarpitasiddher nāsti virodhaḥ. tad yathā—ekasya devadattasya pitā putro bhrātā bhāgīneya ity evam ādayaḥ sambandhā janakatva-janyatvādinimittā na virudhyante; arpaṇābheda. putrāpekṣayā pitā, pitrā-pekṣayā putra ity evam ādiḥ. tathā dravyam api sāmānyārpaṇayā nityam, viśeṣārpaṇayānityam iti nāsti virodhaḥ. tau ca sāmānyaviśeṣau kathaṁcid bhedābhedābhyām vyavahāra-hetū bhavataḥ.

<sup>7</sup> SAS on TAS 5.32, § 589: *atrāha, sato 'neka-naya-vyavahāra-tantratvāt upapannā bheda-saṁghātebhyaḥ satām skandhāmanotpattiḥ. idaṁ tu samdigdham, kiṁ saṁghātaḥ saṁyogād eva dyaṇukādīlakṣaṇo bhavati, uta kaścid viśeṣo 'vadhriyate iti?* ucyate, 'sati saṁyoge bandhād ekatva-pariṇāmātmakāt saṁghāto nīspadyate. yady evam idaṁ ucyatām, kuto nu khalu pudgalajātyaparitāyāge saṁyoge ca sati bhavati keṣāmcid bandho 'nyeṣāṁ ca neti?' ucyate, yasmāt teṣāṁ pudgalātmāviśeṣe 'py

substances to explain their origination, destruction and duration, without any contradiction, depending on which aspect one chooses to emphasise in a specific context. In the absence of any reference to *syāt* (only indirectly through *anantaparyāyāṇām*, viz., that substances can take on innumerable modes or modifications), Pūjyapāda here seems to be hinting at the use of the terms substance, quality and mode (*dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya*) explicitly mentioned a bit later, in TAS 5.38: *guṇa-paryaya-vad dravyam*, namely, that a substance intrinsically entails its qualities and modes. However he does not directly state it here in his commentary to TAS 5.32. Pūjyapāda justifies the need for these three terms *guṇa*, *paryaya* and *dravya* in a brief way, showing how they are required when talking about objects or persons later on in TAS 5.38.<sup>8</sup>

As we saw, Pūjyapāda does *indeed* use the word *aneka* in both the paragraphs in his commentary to TAS 5.32, albeit in a general way. The reference to attributing importance (*arpaṇa*) to Devadatta being a father, or son, or brother, or nephew, etc.. in § 588, seems to be only incidentally mentioned and out of the context of the *sūtra* which deals with substances and atoms combining together. Moreover, Devadatta being a father, son, etc., depending on what is important in a specific context, is mentioned without using the word *syāt*, which we know about from Kundakunda and Siddhasena Divākara. It is noteworthy to mention the use of such technical terms in order to trace their employment: even though Pūjyapāda uses the words *anekānta* and *aneka*, they are used in their 'simple' sense of substances having manifold attributes, without explicitly using the word *syāt*.

In a tantalising and even taunting way, we come across a similar Pūjyapāda formulation in Siddhasena Divākara's *Sammai Suttam* (*Sammati-sūtra*, -tarka or *prakaraṇa*) 3.17–18 who lived apparently before Pūjyapāda of the 6th century, if Siddhasena Divākara's dating to the 5th century is trustworthy.<sup>9</sup>

What Pūjyapāda says in prose is in content similar to what Siddhasena Divākara says in verse in his *Sammai Suttam* 3.17–18 (with the Sanskrit given in Śāstrī's ed.):

*piu-putta-ṇattu-bhavvaya-bhāṇaṃ ega-purisa-saṃbaṃdho |*  
*ṇa ya so egassa piya tti sesayāṇaṃ piyā hoi || Sammai Suttam 3.17 ||*  
*pitṛ-putra-naptṛ-bhāḡineya-bhrātrṇām eka-puruṣa-sambandhaḥ |*  
*na ca sa ekasya piteti śeṣānāṃ pitā bhavati || Sammai Suttam 3.17 ||*

Footnote 7 continued

*anantaparyāyāṇām* paraspara-vilakṣaṇa-pariṇāmād āhita-sāmartyād bhavan-praṭīṭha—snigdha-rūkṣat-vād bandhaḥ || TAS 5.33 ||

<sup>8</sup> In the Śvetāmbara version TAS 5.31 is TAS 5.32. In the Śvetāmbara commentary to it attributed to Umāsvāti, there is no reference to *aneka* or *anekānta*, or Devadatta, just the basic explanation of placing importance to one or the other aspect and not emphasising others. It is interesting to note that in his explanation, below his German translation of the *sūtra*, Jacobi (see under TAS) mentions the example of Devadatta, although he uses the Śvetāmbara version of the TAS.

<sup>9</sup> Balcerowicz (2020) BEJ on Siddhasena "450–500 CE", p. 905. In the same place on p. 906 Balcerowicz summarises Divākara's contribution and status in the Jaina tradition: "His [Siddhasena Divākara's] main contribution lies in epistemology, whereas his ontology and soteriology follow a general line of Jainism of his time. ... Siddhasena Divākara presents one of the earliest mature versions of the Jain doctrine of multiplexity of reality (*anekāntavāda*), which comprises three theories: of standpoints (*nikṣepavāda*, *nyāsavāda*), of viewpoints (*ṇayavāda*), and of the sevenfold modal description (*saptabhaṅgī*, *syādvāda*)."

The relation of one man [can be that] of father, son, grandson, nephew [or of] brother, and not that ‘the father of one’ is the father of all the others.

Compare this with Pūjyapāda’s SAS on TAS 5.32, § 588, about Devadatta being a father, or son, or brother, or nephew, just referred to above: *tad yathā—ekasya devadattasya pitā putro bhrātā bhāgineya ity evaṃ ādayaḥ sambandhā janakatva-janyatvādi-nimittā na virudhyante; arpaṇābhedāt.*

Siddhasena Divākara continues to explain:

*jaha sambandha-visiṭṭho so puriso purisa-bhāva-niraisao |  
taha davvam imdiya-gayaṃ rūvāi-visesaṇaṃ lahai || Sammaṃ Suttam 3.18 ||  
yathā sambandha-viṣiṭṭhaḥ sa puruṣaḥ puruṣa-bhāva-niratiśayaḥ |  
tathā dravyendriya-gataṃ rūpādi-viśeṣaṇaṃ labhate || Sammaṃ Suttam 3.18 ||*  
Just as an individual having a special relation is pre-eminent in the [specific] mode as [this particular] individual [e.g. as a father], so too a substance associated with a sense organ becomes an object [associated with] form, etc.

Further, we shall see in a moment that in his *Pañcāstikāyasāra* (14) Kundakunda uses the word *saptabhaṅga* and the word *siya/syāt* in the explicit sense of ‘is, is not, etc.’, depending on the perspective. Once again, if current dating is reliable, Kundakunda also probably lived in the 4th/5th century, before Pūjyapāda.

When we look at Kundakunda’s *Pravacanasāra* 2.22–23, we see a basic consensus between Umāsvāti and Kundakunda, with regard to a substance. Further, although Kundakunda does not use the word *naya*, it is clear that this is meant, when we read:

*davvaṭṭhiṇa savvaṃ davvaṃ taṃ pajjayaṭṭhiṇa puṇo |  
havadi ya aṇṇamaṇaṇṇāṃ tak-kāle taṃ-mayattādo || Pravacanasāra 2.22 ||  
dravyārthikena sarvaṃ dravyaṃ tat-paryāyārthikena punaḥ |  
bhavati cānyad anyat tat-kāle taṃ-mayavāt || Pravacanasāra 2.22 ||*  
“All substances are non-different from the substantial view-point, but again they are different from the modificational view-point, because of the individual modification pervading it for the time being” (tr. Upadhye, PrS p. 394).  
*atthi tti ya ṇatthi tti ya havadi avvattavvaṃ idi puṇo davvaṃ |  
pajjāyeṇa du keṇa vi tad ubbhayaṃ ādiṭṭhaṃ aṇaṃ vā || Pravacanasāra 2.23 ||  
astīti ca nāstīti ca bhavaty avaktavyam iti punar dravyam |  
paryāyeṇa tu kenāpi tad ubbhayaṃ ādiṣṭaṃ anyad vā || Pravacanasāra 2.23 ||*  
“According to some modification or the other it is stated that a substance exists, does not exist, is indescribable, is both or otherwise” (tr. Upadhye, PrS p. 394).

Note the use of *dravyārthika* and *paryāyārthika* in the first quotation of the *Pravacanasāra* in the sense of *naya*, and in the very next *gāthā* the use of *asti ca nāsti ca ... avaktavyam*, without the use of the word *siya/syāt*, which Kundakunda

explicitly uses in *Pañcāstikāyasāra* 14, together with the word *saptabhaṅga* (which is repeated in PS 71–72):

*siya atthi ṇatthi uhaṃ avvattavaṃ puno ya tat tidayaṃ |*  
*davvaṃ khu satta-bhaṅgaṃ ādesavasena saṃbhavadi || Pañcāstikāyasāra 14 ||*  
*syād asti nāsty ubhayaṃ ava[k]tavyaṃ punaś ca tat tritayaṃ |*  
*dravyaṃ khalu sapta-bhaṅgaṃ ādeśavasena saṃbhavati || Pañcāstikāya-*  
*sāra 14 ||*

Why Kundakunda uses *siya/syāt* and *saptabhaṅga* in his *Pañcāstikāyasāra* and not in his *Pravacanasāra* is a matter of debate requiring further detailed research.

What conclusions can be drawn from Divākara's and Kundakunda's statements in the fifth century and Pūjyapāda's in the sixth? Did Pūjyapāda know Divākara's or Kundakunda's works? Was there a common source that both drew from separately? Or were these ideas independent traditions without the Digambara-Śvetāmbara divide, in case Divākara also belonged to the Śvetāmbara tradition? These questions stand in a vacuum in the absence of any definite evidence of their relation in the Jaina tradition, adding to the enigma with regard to Kundakunda's status in the Digambara tradition.

In summarising the main points of what we have just seen in the context of *syāt*, in this section, the following points seem evident:

1. Both Umāsvāti and Kundakunda agree that a substance is intrinsically related to its *guṇa* and *paryāya*, however, Kundakunda implicitly mentions the word *naya* with reference to *dravya* and *paryāya* as the standpoints from which an object can be differentiated, whereas Umāsvāti merely states that a substance, *dravya*, intrinsically entails its *guṇa* and *paryāya*.
2. Umāsvāti does not use the word *naya* with regard to a *dravya*'s *guṇa* and *paryāya* —only Pūjyapāda does so in his SAS commentaries to TAS 1.6 (*pramāṇanayair adhigamaḥ*) and to TAS 1.33 where the seven *nayas* are listed. The next section below will deal with these points again. Moreover, with reference to *syāt*, with which we are concerned here, Umāsvāti does not use the word *syāt* as Kundakunda does in its Prakrit form *siya*, and he is: “One of the first Jain authors to apply it [*siya/syāt*] ... around the 4th/5th century CE ”<sup>10</sup>
3. As we saw in Pūjyapāda's SAS commentary to the TAS *sūtra arpitānarpita-siddheḥ* TAS 5.32, he uses the words *aneka* and *anekānta* “with a clear hint of the sense in which the term came to be applied as a synonym for the Jaina approach with its epistemological significance.” I had implied in that context in 1996 that he was the first Jaina thinker to use these terms, a point which seems to have been uncontested,<sup>11</sup> albeit not in their later technical sense of *anekāntavāda*.
4. In his *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* stanza 14, Samantabhadra in the 6th century uses the standard formulations *kathañcit sad eva*, *kathamcid asad eva*, etc. where he does

<sup>10</sup> Balcerowicz 2020 BEJ on Jaina Epistemology, p. 854.

<sup>11</sup> See Soni (1996, p. 40), Soni (2003, p. 33) and Balcerowicz's article on Jaina Epistemology in BEJ (2020, p. 854).

not use the word *syāt*, but *naya*, as we shall see when we deal with this point under *anekāntavāda* below. In the context here, the conundrum is why does not Pūjyapāda mention Samantabhadra or vice versa, or Siddhasena Divākara. Indeed, the latter two may have been contemporaries and passed on Jaina ideas independently, apparently in the same general sense of *anekāntavāda*.

In remembering the general consensus that both Pūjyapāda of the 6th century CE and Kundakunda by all accounts belonged to the Digambara tradition, this is my conundrum: Why is Kundakunda's use and meaning of the Prakrit form of *syāt*, *siya*, in his *saptabhaṅgī* neither listed nor hinted at by Pūjyapāda who only very indirectly refers to father, son, etc., obviously in Kundakunda's sense of *syāt*? In the light of recent opinion in 2020 this question can be put even more loudly when it is regarded, as already indicated, that: "One of the first Jain authors to apply it [*siya/syāt*] was Kundakunda around the 4th/5th century CE ..." <sup>12</sup>

Kundakunda is conspicuous by being left out in the clear line of the tradition from Umāsvāti (ca. 5th c.) to Pūjyapāda (6th c.), then Samantabhadra (6th c.) to Akalaṅka (8th c.) and to Vidyānandin (10th c.), with many of them respectfully referring to the others chronologically. None of them seems to refer to Kundakunda, directly or indirectly. Once again, it is indeed possible that Kundakunda and Pūjyapāda passed on Jaina ideas independently, apparently in a few cases in similar and general philosophical senses. Could we think of the possibility of a common Digambara tradition, although we in retrospect are unable to decipher it?

### ***Naya and Nayavāda, vyavahāra and niścaya nayas***

The use of the word *naya* clearly shows a continuation of its employment from the Jaina canonical texts from which both Kundakunda and Umāsvāti drew in their philosophical literature to couch many traditional ideas contained in the Jaina scriptures. In doing so they indicated their particular standpoints, excerpts and their own selections of themes from which to compile what each thought was specifically relevant.

The term *naya* was part of the 'gateways of investigation (*anuyogadvāra*)' consisting of a list of factors which were employed when investigating entities. These entities in the canon served as tools in analysing words, especially the titles of works and chapter-titles. In their philosophical implementation, these tools were applied generally to assertions about an object of inquiry from a particular standpoint, and the number seven was considered to be all-encompassing for possible assertions that could be made. In the Jaina canon these gateways to an investigation served to set down or bring forward (*nikṣepa*) the context when investigating an object of inquiry. Of several lists of tools, containing up to 13 items, the list of four, including the word *naya*, became popular, namely: the name or word used to designate the entity (*nāma*); the form or the way in which it can be illustrated (*sthāpanā*); the substance out of which it is constituted (*dravya*); and its

<sup>12</sup> Balcerowicz (2020) on Kundakunda, BEJ on Jaina Epistemology, p. 854.

specific state or condition at the moment of investigation (*bhāva* or *pariyāya*). We see this clearly as explicitly stated in TAS 1.5 with the words: *nāma-sthāpanā-dravya-bhāvatas tan-nyāsaḥ*. The term *bhāva(tas)* is a synonym for *pariyāya* and *nyāsaḥ* for *nikṣepa*.

The canonical mention of *naya* in the sense of a particular standpoint one takes, is the origin of the word *naya*. The first time we come across the word in the pro-canonical TAS is quite early in the work, namely in the context of epistemology. *Naya* is used in the context of how we know what we know. TAS 1.6 clearly indicates this in the *sūtra*: *pramāṇanayair adhigamaḥ* (knowledge is obtained through the *pramāṇas* and *nayas*). Here the context is the knowledge of the seven *tattvas* given in TAS 1.4, *jīvājīvāśrava-bandha ... etc.*, in the well-known *sūtra* that summarises Jaina ontology and metaphysics.

What is conspicuous by its absence in any of the *sūtras* of the TAS itself, is any reference to the *nayas* or standpoints pertaining specifically to an object with regard to its being a *dravya* or *pariyāya*, namely, with regard to it as a substance or its specific mode, as we just saw in Kundakunda (PrS 2.22) above with his reference to the *nayas* called *dravyārthika* and *pariyārthika*. Only Pūjyapāda's SAS commentary on TAS 1.6 *pramāṇa-nayair adhigamaḥ*, clearly uses these terms in their known senses: *nayo dvididhaḥ dravyārthikaḥ pariyārthikaś ca* (§ 24).<sup>13</sup> Pūjyapāda repeats it in its commentary to TAS 1.33 which lists the *nayas*, in SAS § 241, where the *dravyārthikaḥ pariyārthika nayas* are mentioned again.<sup>14</sup> We do not know where Pūjyapāda obtained this mention of the two *nayas*, although we know from Upadhye (Introduction to PrS, 1984, p. 65) that *guṇa* in the context of *dravya* and *pariyāya* occurs in *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra* 28. 5–6, *Bhagavatī-sūtra*, 18, 6, 631 (ref. from Shaha, 1975, p. 106, fn. 1) and the ŚKhĀ (*Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama*).

One intriguing point in the context of *naya* is Samantabhadra's 6th century use of the word in his *Āptamīmāṃsā* (ĀM) 14 and 104 that point at the use of the word *naya* in the sense of *syāt*, as we know it from the standard seven predications:

*kathañcit te sadeveṣṭaṃ kathañcid asad eva tat |*  
*tathobhayaṃ avācyaṃ ca nayayogān na sarvathā || ĀM 14 ||*

<sup>13</sup> *pramāṇanayair adhigamaḥ || TAS 1.6 || SAS commentary § 24: nāmādinikṣepavidhinopakṣiptānām jīvādīnām tattvaṃ pramāṇābhyām nayāis cādhigamyate. pramāṇanayā vakṣyamāṇalakṣaṇavikalpāḥ. tatra pramāṇaṃ dvididhaṃ svārthaṃ parārthaṃ ca. tatra svārthaṃ pramāṇaṃ śrutarvarjjam. śrutaṃ punaḥ svārthaṃ bhavati parārthaṃ ca. jñānātmakaṃ svārthaṃ vacanātmakaṃ parārthaṃ. tadvikalpā nayāḥ. atrāha—nayaśabdasya alpācātaratvāt pūrvanipātaḥ prāpnoti. naiṣa doṣaḥ. abhyarhitatvāt pramāṇasya pūrvanipātaḥ. abhyarhitatvaṃ ca sarvato balīyaḥ. kuto 'bhyarhitatvam? nayaprarūpanaprabhavya-onitvāt. evaṃ hy uktaṃ "pragrhya pramāṇataḥ pariṇativaiśeṣād arthāvadadhāraṇaṃ nayāḥ" iti. sakalaviṣayatvāc ca pramāṇasya. tathā cokaṭaṃ "sakalādeśaḥ pramāṇādhīno vikalādeśo nayādhīnaḥ" iti. nayo dvididhaḥ dravyārthikaḥ pariyārthikaś ca. pariyārthikanayena bhāvātattvaṃ adhigantavyam. itareṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ dravyārthikanayena, sāmānyātmakatvāt. dravyam arthaḥ prayojanam asyety asau dravyārthikaḥ. pariyāyo 'rthaḥ prayojanam asyety asau pariyārthikaḥ. tatsarvaṃ samuditam pramāṇenādhigantavyam.*

<sup>14</sup> SAS on TAS 1.33, § 241. *eteṣāṃ sāmānyaviśeṣalakṣaṇaṃ vaktavyam. sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ tāvad vastunyo anekāntātmany avirodhena hetvarpanāt sādhyaviśeṣasya yathātmayaprapāṇapraṇaṇaḥ prayogo nayāḥ. sa dvedhā dravyārthikaḥ pariyārthikaś ceti. dravyaṃ sāmānyam utsargaḥ anuvṛttir ity arthaḥ. tadviṣayo dravyārthikaḥ. pariyāyo viśeṣo 'pavādo vyāvṛttir ity arthaḥ. tadviṣayaḥ pariyārthikaḥ. taylor bhedā naigamādayaḥ.*

“With the application of *naya*, according to a particular sense, existence is accepted by you; according to another sense, non-existence (is accepted). Similarly (according to a particular sense) both (existence and non-existence) and indescribability are accepted by you (but) not in all respects.” (tr. Ghosal, *ĀM*, p. 68.)

The “not in all respects” refers to the view that each predication is not taken in an absolute way, but acknowledges others as well, as expressly stated in *ĀM* 104:

*syād-vādaḥ sarvathaikānta-tyāgāt kiṃ-vṛtta-cid-vidhiḥ |*  
*sapta-bhaṅga-nayāpekṣo heyādeya-viśeṣakaḥ || ĀM 104 ||*

“The word ‘*syāt*’, leaves out the absolute one-sided view point. (Its interpretations) are words derived from ‘*kim*’ and (derivations) ‘*chit*’ [*sic*] etc. This depends upon the sevenfold *Saptabhaṅgī Naya* and is distinguished by things to be discarded or acquired.” (tr. Ghosal, *ĀM*, p. 166.)

These stanzas question the aim to separate the use of the terms *naya*, *syāt* and *saptabhaṅgī*, as we at the outset began with for the sake of endeavouring for some sort of clarity. The 6th century *ĀM* adds to the conundrum in the use of these terms.

In the case of Kundakunda we come across a unique use of *naya* in the sense of *vyavahāra* and *niścaya nayas* (the mundane and definite or absolute standpoints). What Bansidhar Bhatt pointed in 1974 (p. 280) is still relevant for us:

While analysing the 2000 verses ascribed to Kundakunda [*Samayasāra*, *Anuprekṣā* and *Niyamasāra*] we are able to trace two patterns of this pair [*niścaya-naya* or its synonyms *śuddha-* and *paramārtha-naya*, and *vyavahāra-naya*]: The Mystic pattern and the Non-mystic pattern, which differ from each other and present contradictory views ... As far as these two patterns are concerned, it can easily be ascertained that the works ascribed to Kundakunda are not homogeneous.” Bhatt had already indicated that the pair “has no relation to the ‘standard nayas’”.<sup>15</sup>

This is how Kundakunda puts it in his *Samayasāra*:

*vavahāreṇa du ādā karedi ghaḍapaḍarathāṇi davvāni |*  
*karaṇāṇi ya kammāṇi ya ṇokammāṇiṭha vivihāṇi || SS 98 ||*<sup>16</sup>  
*vyavahāreṇa tv ātmā karoti ghaṭapaṭarathān dravyāṇi |*  
*karaṇāṇi ca karmaṇi ca nokarmāṇiṭha vividhāni || SS 98 ||*

“It is from the practical standpoint that the soul produces pitcher, cloth, chariot (and other) things, senses, and Karmas and quasi-Karmas of various kinds in this world” (tr. J.L. Jaini in the SBJ ed., p. 65).

*uppādedi karedi ya baṃdhadi pariṇāmaedi giṇhadi ya |*  
*ādāpuggaladvvaṃ vavahāraṇayassa vattavam || SS 107, SBJ ed. 114 ||*  
*utpādayati karoti ca badhnāti pariṇāmayati grhṇāti |*  
*ātmā pudgaladravyaṃ vavahāraṇayasya vaktavyam || SS 107, SBJ ed. 114 ||*

<sup>15</sup> Bhatt 1974, p. 279, fn. 1 supplies the Sanskrit and Prakrit terms: *niścaya/niścaya/niścaya* and *vyavahāra/vavahāra/vahāria/vavahāri*.

<sup>16</sup> The first line in the SBJ ed. of Kundakunda’s SS runs: *vavahāreṇa du evaṃ ghaḍapaḍarahādi davvāni* with the stanza no. 105, p. 65.

"The soul produces, causes, binds, causes to modify and assimilate Karmic Matter. (This) is (so), speaking from the practical standpoint" (tr. J.L. Jaini in the SBJ ed., p. 70).

These *gāthās* of the *Samayasāra* have to be regarded as stand-alone stanzas because no one else in the Jaina tradition seems to ascribe to the two levels or so-called truths of *nīścaya* and *vyavahāra nayas*. Indeed, there has been a doubt about whether in Kundakunda's other work, the *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, the two levels may be attributed to Kundakunda himself. It is supposed that "it is most probably the commentator Amṛtacandrasūri (10th cent. CE) who introduced them, and perhaps even composed the verse in question himself." (BEJ 849).<sup>17</sup> Be that as it may, with reference to the *Samayasāra*, we ascribe to the solid textual study by Bhatt in 1974 who concludes on p. 288: "it is highly probable that the nucleus of the *Samayasāra*, i.e., the sections treating the mystic pattern, was composed by one individual who was Kundakunda". Bhatt accepts Upadhye's dating of Kundakunda as belonging to the beginning of era, and mentions Schubring's view that Kundakunda lived in the 2nd–3rd century A.D. (Bhatt, 1974, p. 279).

It is a moot question whether the idea of a practical and a definite standpoint may have been prevalent in their nascent form in Kundakunda's time and reached his ears. If so, it was his genius to see how the idea could be employed in Jainism. It is easy to see how his use of *syāt* can be integrated to his views of the two levels in keeping with the Jaina *syādvāda*. In any case, we know that Kānjī Svāmī insisted "on the higher level of truth (*nīścaya naya*) over the lower one ordinary life (*vyavahāra naya*)."<sup>18</sup>

### **Sapta and Nava tattvas/padārtha**

Very early in the text, in TAS 1.4, the following well-known sequence and number of the basic Jaina categories is listed: *jīva*, *ajīva*, *āsrava*, *bandha*, *saṃvara*, *nirjarā* and *mokṣa*. These seven terms (*tattvas*) are different from the sequence and number listed by Kundakunda in his *Pañcastikāyasāra* 108 (quoting the Sanskrit forms for the sake of quick comparison): *jīva*, *ajīva*, *puṇya*, *pāpa*, *āsrava*, *saṃvara*, *nirjarā*, *bandha*, and *mokṣa*.<sup>19</sup> Not only are there nine terms but their sequence is different from that of the TAS with the addition of *puṇya* and *pāpa*, and with *bandha* mentioned before the last term *mokṣa* (see also Soni, 2001, pp. 135–140).

What is curious and perhaps also a conundrum is that in his SAS commentary to this same TAS 1.4 (§ 19), Pūjyapāda, as we have seen, is aware of and explicitly says that "there are others" who adhere to the view of the nine categories.<sup>20</sup> He

<sup>17</sup> There is no indication of "the verse in question" in the article. The contention is by Piotr Balcerowicz (BEJ 849). The footnote to this view refers to a forthcoming article entitled "A Note on the Ouvre of the 'Collective Thinker' Kundakunda ..." which does not refer to the two levels but refers again to a forthcoming article entitled "Kundakunda, the collective thinker and two truths." To date, I have not been able to trace this article and further details can be considered only after it appears.

<sup>18</sup> Dundas (2002, p. 267). See also pp. 265–271 for details of the influential 20th century movement Kānjī Svāmī Panth.

<sup>19</sup> In his commentary called *Tattvapradīpakāvṛtti* Amṛtacandra calls these nine terms *padārtha*.

<sup>20</sup> One paragraph of SAS on TAS 1.4, § 19 says: *iha puṇyapāpagrahaṇaṃ kartavyam. 'nava padārthāḥ' iti anyair apy uktavāt. na kartavyam, āsrave bandhe cāntarbhāvāt. yady evam āsravādi-graṇaṇam*

concludes that the mention of *puṇya* and *pāpa* is not necessary, because they are included in the term *āsrava*, the influx through our actions in thought, word and deed, of fine, invisible and subtle matter into the *jīva* with effects that can be auspicious or not.<sup>21</sup> It is puzzling that in his SAS commentary Pūjyapāda (§ 19) does not name Kundakunda but only indirectly hints at his list of nine categories, as just said, and simply sees *puṇya* and *pāpa* as being “unnecessary” because these are implied in *āsrava* and *bandha*.

In addition to this, we can point out that in his *Pañcastikāyasāra* 109, immediately following the list of nine categories, Kundakunda says that the *jīva* is characterised by *upayoga* (*upayoga-lakṣaṇa*), which he had dealt with earlier in the work in PS 40–42 (see Soni, 2007b). Pūjyapāda’s commentary intriguingly also mentions *upayoga* in the same commentary to TAS 1.4 which lists the seven categories, in § 20,<sup>22</sup> when in fact the topic of *upayoga* is specifically mentioned later, in TAS 2.8. The conundrum is this: Kundakunda consistently deals with *upayoga* in association with the *jīva* and Pūjyapāda’s commentary on the seven categories, for no apparent reason, simply mentions *upayoga*, and not under the first category *jīva* mentioned in the list of seven in TAS 1.4, but in a general way when talking the word *tattva* in the *sūtra*. I submit that Pūjyapāda’s brief and tangential hint at *upayoga* here, seems to suggest that in the context of the seven or nine categories of Jaina metaphysics and ontology, that he (Pūjyapāda) was aware of Kundakunda’s tradition, because he raises the issue of nine categories and apparently mentions *upayoga* out of context.

A tentative conclusion based on these points above, is that Pūjyapāda was obviously aware of the tradition of nine basic categories to which Kundakunda evidently adhered to, but Pūjyapāda somehow seems to conceal any clear indication of the tradition Kundakunda represented, and there seems to be no reason why he should *not* refer to Kundakunda’s Prakrit, although he quotes several Prakrit texts from the Digambara canon in his SAS commentary.<sup>23</sup> Pūjyapāda is rather critical of the nine categories.

The mention of the *sapta* and *nava tattvas* is here a matter of academic interest because it is necessary to simply remember two different traditions of what constitutes basic Jaina metaphysics and ontology. It is useful to refer to them again because the *tattvas* are mentioned by Śaṅkara in the eighth century when he criticises the Jainas in his commentary on Bādarāyaṇa’s *Vedāntasūtra*. Recalling this allows us to see how Jainism was depicted by him in the 8th century, especially for his refutation of the Jaina *anekāntavāda*.

Footnote 20 continued

*anarthakam, jīvājīvayor antarbhāvāt. nānarthakam. iha mokṣaḥ prakṛtaḥ. so ‘vaśyaṃ nirdeṣṭavyaḥ. sa ca saṃsāra-pūrvakaḥ. saṃsārasya pradhāna-hetur āsravo bandhaś ca. mokṣasya pradhāna-hetuḥ saṃvaro nirjarā ca. ataḥ pradhāna-hetu-hetumat-phala-nidarśanārthatvāt prthag-upadeśaḥ kṛtaḥ. drśyate hi sāmānye ‘ntarbhūtasāyāpi viśeṣasya prthag-upādānaṃ prayojanārtham. ‘kṣatriyā āyātāḥ sūravarmā ‘pi’ iti.*

<sup>21</sup> See Soni (2016).

<sup>22</sup> TAS 1.4, § 20: *tattvaśabdo bhāvavācīty uktāḥ. sa katham jīvādibhir dravyavacanaiḥ sāmānādhikarāṇyaṃ pratipadyate? avyatiṛekāt tadbhāvādhyāropāc ca sāmānādhikarāṇyaṃ bhavati. yathā ‘upayoga evātmā’ iti. yady evaṃ tattallīngasaṃkhyānuvṛttiḥ prāpnoti? ‘viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasaṃbande saty api śabdaśaktivyapekṣayā upāttaliṅgasaṃkhyāvyatikramo na bhavati.’ ayaṃ krama ādisūtre ‘pi yojyaḥ.*

<sup>23</sup> See for example SAS on TAS 2.7, § 269: *jīvabhavyābhavyatvāni ca*; and several Prakrit quotations on TAS 2.10: *saṃsāriṇo muktaś ca*, §§ 275–279.

## Anekāntavāda

Apart from the use of word *syāt* in its concern with *syādvāda*, the use of the word *anekāntavāda* itself has been a conundrum, because it is very difficult to obtain a clear picture about its employment before they became established in the way in which we know them since Akalaṅka's time in the 8th century.

It is noteworthy to point out that in his 8th c. *bhāṣya* to the *Vedāntasūtra*<sup>24</sup> Śaṅkara seems to present the Jaina worldview in an arbitrary way when he criticises it in four *sūtras* after attacking the Buddhists. Śaṅkara's four *sūtras* against Jainism are from 2.2.33–36: one against *anekāntavāda* and the other three on the Jaina view of the *jīva* in terms of its nature, mode or modification, and its size. For our purposes we'll be concerned with Śaṅkara's commentary to the first of these *sūtras* 2.3.33.

In our attempt to try and trace the use of the terms like *syādvāda*, *nayas*, etc. listed at the beginning, it is instructive to see how the Jaina worldview was seen by Śaṅkara. He begins by saying “*sapta caiṣāṃ padārthāḥ saṃmatā jīvājīvāsrava-saṃvara-nirjara-bandha-mokṣā nāma*” (2.2.33).

Not only are there seven categories as in Umāsvāti, but the last two are in Kundakunda's sequence. Of course, it is impossible to know what was Śaṅkara's source, as indeed of any of the thinkers and traditions he criticises, but in retrospect it is striking that we see a combination of Umāsvāti and Kundakunda in their lists of categories. Can we say that the two traditions represented by Kundakunda and Umāsvāti were widely prevalent during Śaṅkara's time and only the Jaina tradition was aware of their specific differences on closer examination?

The curiosity of Śaṅkara's sources is further intensified by the fact that just before making this point about the seven Jaina categories, Śaṅkara mentions that the Jainas also have a theory about the *astikāyas* (Prakrit *atthikāya*), the “bodies of existence” (BEJ p. 11). This is how he puts it:

*tayor imam aparaṃ prapañcam ācaṣṣate pañcāstikāyā nāma — jīvāstikāyaḥ pudgalāstikāyo dharmāstikāyo 'dharmāstikāya ākāśastikāyaśceti* |

The term *kāla* is correctly left out here, because for the Jainas it is not an *astikāya*. Anyone with a modicum of acquaintance of the Jaina principles would obviously think of Kundakunda's *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, especially because Umāsvāti's TAS avoids the explicit use of the term in the way Kundakunda uses it. Although the word *astikāya* appears in TAS 10.8 and in a few places of Pūjyapāda's SAS commentary (§§ 224, 549 and 559), the five *astikāyas* are not enumerated but hinted at by merely speaking of “*dharmāstikāya* etc.” And TAS 10.8 merely says *dharmāstikāyābhāvād*, “because there is no medium of motion [in *āloka*, in the non-universe]”.<sup>25</sup> We can only hint at this curiosity which is striking, namely that Kundakunda specifically deals with the *astikāyas* which evidently seem to have been ensconced in Jaina thought by Śaṅkara's time and credit for it may be

<sup>24</sup> For the text I'm using the GRETEL version: “TILBadarayana: Brahmasutra, with Samkara's Sarirakamimamsabhasya (input by members of the Sansknet project), available here: <http://gretel.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretel.html> (accessed 26 July 2022). See also Soni (1996, pp. 23–27).

<sup>25</sup> SAS § 224 has *dharmāstikāyādīny*; § 549: *dharmādharmāstikāya*; and § 559: *dharmādīnām*.

attributed to Kundakunda. In his SAS commentary Pūjyapāda, again, omits mentioning Kundakunda.

Śaṅkara's attack on the non-absolutistic position of the Jainas when they use the several devices like *syāt*, *saptabhaṅgī*, *naya*, *aneka*, etc., have had a long lasting detrimental influence on the value of Jaina thought and Śaṅkara undoubtedly set a trend of criticism which by and large has been adopted by others without question, especially by the Vedāntins. It has now become clear that Śaṅkara completely misunderstood the use of *syāt* in its technical sense in which the Jainas use it with logical consistency. This is how Śaṅkara puts it exactly:

*sarvatra cemaṃ saptabhaṅgīnayaṃ nāma nyāyam avatārayanti | syād asti, syān nāsti, syād asti ca nāsti ca, syād avaktavyaḥ, syād asti cāvaktavyaś ca, syān nāsti cāvaktavyaś ca, syād asti ca nāsti cāvaktavyaś ceti |* (2.2.33).

Since Umāsvāti does not use the word *syāt*, it is plausible that Śaṅkara takes it from Kundakunda's PS 14, as we saw above, or perhaps also from Siddhasena Divākara.<sup>26</sup> Whatever be the case, Śaṅkara presents the seven-fold *syāt* forms faithfully. When he criticises the Jaina position he says that its view of *syāt* is *viruddha* or contrary, that it involves *saṃśaya-jñāna* or a knowledge that is doubtful, that it is *viparīta* or contrary, that the theory is derived from a madman (*mattonmatta*).

There have been several *doṣas* or faults that have been levelled at what we can now call the *syādvāda* as a part of the *anekāntavāda* that also included the *nayavāda*. Jaina thinkers of both the Dīgambara and Śvetāmbara traditions have valiantly defended their theory and the following names stand out as champions who have defended the Jaina position and proved its faultlessness: Akalaṅka, Haribhadra, Vidyānandin, Prabhācandra, Abhayadeva, Vāḍidevasūri, Hemacandra, Malliṣeṇa all the way up to the erudite Yaśovijaya of the 17th century. They have argued and shown clearly that the following terms cannot be levelled against *syādvāda* because they do not apply to it. They say that *syādvāda* cannot be criticised as being: *virodha* (a contradiction), *saṃśaya* (expressing doubt), *vyadhikaraṇatā* (being incongruous), *anavastha* (leading to an infinite regress), etc.<sup>27</sup> As I said elsewhere, a moot question is about the source these Jaina thinkers drew from in referring to these terms that attack *syādvāda* or whether they invented them as possible objections for argument's sake, on the basis of existing ones such as *virodha* and *saṃśaya* (Soni, 2007a, pp. 484–486).

## Kundakunda's Legacy and Conclusion

We know that Kundakunda's commentators Amṛtacandra (10–11th centuries) and Jayasena (12th century) contributed to the fame of Kundakunda, with only the latter explicitly mentioning Kundakunda as the author of the works he comments on.

<sup>26</sup> See again Balcerowicz on Siddhasena Divākara in BEJ, pp. 907–908: "Siddhasena Divākara also knows the theory of sevenfold modal description (*saptabhaṅgī*, *syādvāda*) in its nascent form. He applies all the seven figures (*bhaṅga*), although he does not mention the sentential factor "in a certain sense" (*syāt*) and other crucial elements of the theory."

<sup>27</sup> See Soni 2007a where the *doṣas* are listed and shows which Jaina thinker has replied to them in the lists supplied on p. 485 for both the Jaina traditions, with examples from all the nine thinkers listed.

I pointed out elsewhere (BEJ p. 902): That the philosophical impact of Kundakunda's works was not relegated to oblivion is due not only to these exceptional commentators but also to a rendering of Kundakunda's views on the essential nature of the sentient principle (*jīva*), namely in the popular Apabhramśa work *Paramappapayāsu* (Skt. *Paramātmaprakāśa*) by Joindu (or Yogindu, Yogīndu), perhaps 6th century CE. (see Dundas BEJ 107–108, who accepts A.N. Upadhye's dating).

We quoted Bhatt (1974, p. 279) above that “the sections treating the mystic pattern, was composed by one individual who was Kundakunda”.<sup>28</sup> Jérôme Petit (2014) has traced the transmission chain of the “mystical” trend based on Kundakunda's work, particularly his “*Samayasāra* mysticism,” from Yogīndu, perhaps 6th century, to the poet and merchant Banārsīdās (1586–1643). Banārsīdās was responsible for the religious movement emphasizing Kundakunda's “mysticism” known as the Adhyātma movement. The chain of transmission based on Kundakunda proceeds further to the poet Dyānatrāy (1676–1726), Paṇḍit Ṭoḍarmal (1720–1767), Paṇḍit Daulatrām (1798–1866), and, finally, Śrīmad Rājacandra (1867–1901), even if he does not directly quote Kundakunda. In the 20th century, as already pointed out, the Kāñjī Svāmī Panth revived and further emphasised Kundakunda's significance.

We began with the conundrum of why was Kundakunda's use and meaning of the Prakrit form of *syāt*, *siya*, in his *saptabhaṅgī* neither listed nor hinted at by Pūjyapāda who only very indirectly refers to father, son, etc., obviously in Kundakunda's sense of *siya*? We then traced several other puzzles in the different sections of this study, some of which are of a technical nature, but highlighting the problem about Kundakunda's status in the Digambara tradition. At the present stage of Jaina studies and research no definite answer can be provided. Nonetheless, an awareness of these problems might later lead to reliable suggestions.

In addition to these selected puzzles, it is further revealing that there is no preeminent Śvetāmbara intellectual who evinces any sympathy for Kundakunda's contributions and who would be sympathetic to his two-truths schema and its implications for Jaina philosophy. Indeed the two-truths schema was vigorously criticised, for example by the 17th century polymath Yaśovijaya. Nonetheless, it is stroke of providential fortune that Kundakunda's name and fame have remained indelible in the history of Jaina philosophy throughout the medieval and modern periods (see also BEJ p. 902).

It is telling to note what K.K. Dixit said in 1971 because he captures Kundakunda's status in the Digambara tradition precisely and what he says may in many ways resolve the conundrum of his status. He says:

In the case of Kundakunda it will be advisable to dispose of his treatment of the traditional Jaina philosophical views — not only because such a treatment

<sup>28</sup> Bhatt accepts Upadhye's dating of Kundakunda as belonging to the beginning of era, and mentions Schubring's view that Kundakunda lived in the 2nd–3rd century A.D.

is not a characteristic activity of the age of Logic<sup>29</sup> but also because it is not a characteristic activity of Kundakunda himself. For Kundakunda deserves attention chiefly because of *the special trend of thought he developed in his Samayasāra, a text which markedly deviates from the usual manner of Jaina's presentation of his philosophical views*. But before writing the Samayasāra Kundakunda wrote Pañcāstikāyasāra and Pravacanasāra and in these texts he stands much close to the orthodox positions (Dixit, 1971, p. 132, emphases mine).

Then adds this a bit later:

Kundakunda was well acquainted with the traditional Jaina philosophical views and also with the tendency towards *Anekāntavāda* that had *lately emerged*. And yet he also thought it proper to *thread a somewhat new path on which he virtually remained a lone traveller* (Dixit, 1971, p. 133, emphases mine).

What “had *lately emerged*” is the crucial point in Dixit's statement, with a significant impact of Kundakunda's date that we are unable to reconcile.<sup>30</sup>

In conclusion it may be said that it is indeed fortunate that Kundakunda's works have been preserved for posterity, a fact of historical providence that cannot be taken for granted. We have tried to show that despite all the conundrums and enigmas Kundakunda's works present him as a thinker who has contributed tremendously towards an understanding of basic Jaina thought and, in many respects, gave us specific insights into Jaina philosophy in ‘early’ times.

<sup>29</sup> According to Dixit Kundakunda belongs to first of his so-called three stages of logic (in contrast to the Age of the Āgamas (pp. 12–87), Chap. 3, pp. 88–164. The first stage of logic is dealt with from pp. 110–139.

<sup>30</sup> See BEJ p. 898 for a discussion on “one of the ironies in the history of Jain philosophy that there is no general consensus about the date of Kundakunda ...” with a summary of his dates ranging from the second to the eighth centuries. In BEJ 837 Balcerowitz remarks with regard to the dating of an author or authors named Kundakunda: “Kundakunda (Digambara; a range of authors flourished under this name between the 3rd and the 7th/8th cents.)”. Since there are no references to the identity and works of these putative authors bearing the same name, the conundrum of any definite conclusion regarding Kundakunda is intensified. See also the observation by Johnson (1995, p. 95), who says that Kundakunda's *Samayasāra*: “indicates a relatively late date (early fifth century or later) for that text.” It is also relevant that Johnson's remark in the very next page (p. 96) adds to the conundrum of Kundakunda's date: “This leaves as open questions the identity and date of the ‘original’ Kundakunda.” On p. 91 Johnson's remark highlights the conundrums pointed out in this paper. He notes there: “the nature of Kundakunda's texts is such - they are clearly compilations of older material held together by new philosophical and soteriological strategies—that it is difficult to remain confident that all or even any of them should be ascribed to a single author or redactor.” It may be added here that an anonymous reviewer refers to the publication of *Pure Soul. The Jaina Spiritual Traditions* (ed. Flügel et al., 2023), particularly the article by Piotr Balcerowitz: “Kundakunda, a ‘Collective Author’: Deconstruction of a Myth”, pp. 119–125. The volume was published on the occasion of this Annual Lecture and in conjunction with an exhibition of Jaina artefacts. In this article Balcerowitz notes with regard to the concerned problem, that “Kundakunda could be called a personage shrouded in complete mystery (p. 119) and that the “lifespan of the celebrated Jaina thinker and the author of these texts [like the *Pravacanasāra*, *Samayasāra*, etc.] known as ‘Kundakunda’ would extend over four centuries”, with the conclusion that “the historical person Kundakunda *may* have been an author of one of the historical layers, but we *may* not even know which” (p. 121 with my own emphasis of “may”). In short, Balcerowitz's statement “it is virtually impossible to expect a homogeneous ‘philosophy of Kundakunda ...’ (p. 122) corroborates my views above about the conundrums of Kundakunda.

**Funding** Open access funding provided by University of Innsbruck and Medical University of Innsbruck.

## Declarations

**Conflict of interest** The author states that there is no conflict of interest.

**Open Access** This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>.

## Abbreviations and Literature

ĀM: *Āptamīmāṃsā*, see Samantabhadra.

Balcerowicz, P. (2014). On the relative chronology of Dharmakīrti and Samantabhadra. *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 44(3), 437–483. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-014-9270-3>

Balcerowicz, P. (2020). Jain epistemology. In BEJ, pp. 837–856.

BEJ (2020). *Brill's Encyclopedia of Jainism (Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 2 SouthAsia)*, edited by K. Jacobsen, J. A. Cort, P. Dundas and K. L. Wiley. Brill.

Bhatt, B. (1974). Vyavahāra-Naya and Nīścaya-Naya in Kundakunda's Works. ZDMG.S 2/18, 279–291.

Dixit, K. K. (1971). *Jaina ontology*. Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series No. 31. L.D. Institute of Indology.

Dundas, P. (2002). *The Jains* (2nd ed.). Routledge.

Flügel, P., De Jonckheere, H., & Söhnen-Thieme, R. (2023). *Pure soul. The Jaina spiritual traditions*. Centre of Jaina Studies.

Jacobi see TAS below.

Johnson, W. J. (1995). *Harmless souls: Karmic bondage and religious change in early Jainism with special reference to Umāsvāti and Kundakunda*. Motilal Banarsidass.

Kundakunda. (2022). Retrieved from April 19, 2022, from <https://jainpedia.org/themes/principles/sects/digambara/kundakunda/>

Mukhtar, J. (1933–1934). Samantabhadra's date and Dr. Pathak. *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, XV, pp. 67–88.

NS: Kundakunda's *Niyamasāra* (Essence of Restraint): ed. U. Sain, The Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. IX, Lucknow, 1931.

Pathak, K. B. (1930). On the date of Samantabhadra. *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, II(2), 149–154.

Petit, J. (2014). Absolute and conventional points of view in Jainism: A historical perspective. In J. Soni, M. Pahlke & C. Cüppers (Eds.), *Buddhist and Jaina studies. Proceedings of the conference in Lumbini, February 2013* (pp. 387–402). Lumbini International Research Institute.

PS: Kundakunda's *Pañcāstikāyasāra* (Essence of the Five Entities): ed. A. N. Upadhye. Bharatiya Jnanpith Publication, 1975.

PrS: Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra* (*Pavayaṇasāra*, (Essence of Scripture)): ed. A.N. Upadhye, Shrimad Rajachandra Ashrama, Agas, Gujarat, 1984, 4th edition (of Upadhye's 1935 ed.).

Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali (ca. 2nd c. CE), 1992–1995 ed., *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* with Vīrasena's *Dhavalā-ṭikā* and Hindi tr. in 16 volumes. Solāpura: Jaina Saṃskṛiti Saṃrakṣaka Saṅgha.

Samantabhadra (ca. 6th century), *Āptamīmāṃsā*, edited with Introduction, Translation, Notes and An Original Commentary in English by Saratchandra Ghosal, *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā of Āchārya Samantabhadra*. New Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanpith 2002 (the Introduction is dated June, 1944). This ed. has been used here. See also Nagin J. Shah, *Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṃsā. Critique of an Authority* (along with English tr., Introduction, Notes and Akalaṅka's *Aṣṭaṣaṭī*. Ahmedabad: Saraswati Pustak Bhandar (Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamālā 7) 1999.

*Sammai Suttam*. See Siddhasena Divākara.

Śaṅkara (8th c.): Bādarāyaṇa/Brahmasūtra with Śaṅkara's Śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣya (GRETEL): <http://gretel.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretel.html>

SAS: *Sarvārthasiddhi* by Pūjyapāda, a commentary on the TAS. Ed. and tr. by Phūlacandra Śāstrī, Delhi: Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha Prakāśana, 5th ed. 1991 (the §§ numbers are from this edition).

Schubring, W. (1935). *Die Lehre der Jainas*. Walter De Gruyter. Translated into English by W. Beurlen, 2nd revised ed. with indices enlarged and added by W. Bollée and J. Soni. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2000.

Shaha, S. M. (1975). Kundakunda's concept of Vyavhāra Naya and Nīścaya Naya. *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, 56(1/4), 105–128.

Siddhasena Divākara ca. 5th century, *Sammai Suttam*, ed, Devendra Kumār Śāstrī (with Hindi tr., Explanatory Notes, Introduction, Appendices and Index). Neemuch (M.P): Gyanodaya Grantha Prakashan, 1978. See also *Sammatitarka-Prakaraṇam* by Siddhasena Divākara (with Abhadayadevasūri's Commentary, Tattvabodhavidhāyinī. Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co. 1984 in 2 volumes.

ŚKhĀ = Śaṭ-khaṇḍāgama. See Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali.

Soni, J. (1991). *Dravya, Guṇa and Paryāya* in Jain thought. *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 19, 75–88.

Soni, J. (1996). *Aspects of Jain philosophy*. Three lectures on Jainism published on behalf of the University of Madras, Department of Jainism, by the Research Foundation for Jainology, Madras. Annual Lecture Series 1994–95. Contents: The Karma Theory and Jain Ethics; *Syādvāda* is not *Samśayavāda*; and Vidyānandin on Umāsvāti's *pramāṇa-nayair adhigamaḥ*, (*Tattvārthasūtra* 1, 6), 60 pp.

Soni, J. (2001). A note on the Jain *tattva/padārtha*. In J. Soni (Ed.), *Vasantagauravam. Essays in Jainism. Felicitating Professor M. D. Vasantha Raj of Mysore on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday* (pp. 135–140). Vakils, Feffer and Simons Ltd.

Soni, J. (2003). Kundakunda and Umāsvāti on *Anekāntavāda*. In P. Balcerowicz (Ed.), *Caturānaya-acakram. Essays in Jain philosophy and religion*. Warsaw Indological Studies (ed. P. Balcerowicz and M. Mejer) Vol. 2, 2002, pp. 25–35. Printed in Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (Lala Sundarlal Jain Research Series, general editor: Professor Satya Ranjan Banerjee, Volume XX). Proceedings of the international seminar 'Aspects of Jainism' at the University of Warsaw, Poland, 8–9 September 2000.

Soni, J. (2007a). *Anekāntavāda* Revisited—for doṣas. In *Indica et Tibetica. Festschrift für Michael Hahn zum 65. Geburtstag* (pp. 477–490). Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien, Universitaet Wien.

Soni, J. (2007b). *Upayoga*, according to Kundakunda and Umāsvāti. *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 2007 (35), 299–311.

Soni, J. (2016). Yoga in the *Tattvārthasūtra*. In C. K. Chapple (Ed.), *Yoga in Jainism* (pp. 29–36). Routledge.

Soni, J. (2020). Four articles in *Brill's Encyclopedia of Jainism (Handbook of oriental studies. Section 2 South Asia)*, K. Jacobsen, J. A. Cort, P. Dundas and K. L. Wiley (Eds.). Brill Academic Publication: 1. "Emergence of a Jain Philosophical Identity", pp. 821–836; 2. Akalaṅka, pp. 883–886; 3. Kundakunda, pp. 898–903; 4. Umāsvāti, pp. 912–917. ISBN-10: 9004297464, ISBN-13: 978-9004297463.

SS: Kundakunda's *Samayasāra* (Essence of the Doctrine): ed. J. L. Jaini, *The Sacred Books of the Jainas* (SBJ), Vol. VIII, Lucknow, 1930. Also: Śrīmad Rājachandra Āshrama, Agāsa, Gujarat, 1997, with Amṛtacandra's commentary *Ātmakhyāti*, etc. 1996 4th ed. (first published *vikrama samvat* 1974 = 1918 CE).

TAS: *Tattvārthasūtra* by Umāsvāti as given in its SAS commentary. See also S.A. Jain Reality. *English Translation of Śrīmat Pūjyapadacharya's Sarvārthasiddhi*, Madras: Jwalamalini Trust, 1992, and the German tr. by Herman Jacobi in ZDMG (*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*), 1906, Vol. 60, pp. 287–325 and pp. 512–557.

Yogindu (Joindu, Yogindu, ca. 6th century), *Paramappapayāsu* (Skt. *Paramāmaprakāśa*), an Apabhramśa work on Jain Mysticism, ed. A.N. Upadhye together with Yogindu's *Yogasāra*, Shrimad Rajachandra Ashrama, Agas, Gujarat, 1988 (5th revised and enlarged ed., first published 1937). (Upadhye's most informative introduction in English is on pp. 1–104.)