Jaina Narrative Refutations of Kum ā rila: Relative Chronology and the History of Jaina-M ī m ā m.s ā Dialogues

Assigning a date to Kuma¯rila is notoriously difﬁcult. Kuma¯rila’s dates are usually assigned through a relative chronology of Brahmanical and Buddhist philosophers with whom Kuma¯rila engages or is engaged. This is a precarious method because the dates of these interlocutors are equally unstable. But what if in considering systematic dialogues ( śā stra ) to be the primary medium for interreligious philosophical debate we have missed a source that does engage with Kuma¯rila, and that can be reliably dated? In this article, I turn to a religious group whom, it has been previously thought, did not respond to Kuma¯rila until the eighth century—Jainas—as well as to a genre that is not typically viewed as a site of systematic philosophical dialogue—narrative. I argue that the Padmacarita , a Jaina Ra¯ma¯yan˙a composed by a Digambara writer called Ravis˙en˙a, contains a narrative refutation of Kuma¯rila’s commentary to M ī m ā ṃ s ā s ū tra 1.1.2. By bringing to light this refutation, and explaining how Ravis ˙ en ˙ a’s Padmacarita can be reliably dated, I assign Kuma¯rila’s terminus ante quem to the date of the Padmacarita ’s composition, 676 CE. Finally, I suggest that Ravis˙en˙a’s Padmacarita is the earliest extant Jaina text to discuss Kuma¯rila’s claims, and that Jainas used narrative to reﬂect on Mı¯ma¯m˙sa¯ before they turned to śā stra as another medium for this dialogue.


Introduction
Kumārila's dates are important for the history of Indian philosophy. His robust epistemological defense of the authorless Veda immediately became a touchstone of philosophical reflection for Brahmanical, Buddhist, and Jaina philosophers alike. To assign a historical date to Kumārila is not only to recover this little-known historical information but to identify a key moment in the history of premodern South Asian philosophy. But Kumārila never assigns a date, location, or order of composition to his works. And there exists no extant material evidence, such as inscriptions, that locates Kumārila in a particular time or place.
In the absence of such historical information, we rely on a relative chronology of philosophical authors. If we can determine who is responding to whom and when, we can estimate the order in which philosophical authors lived. Kumārila developed his discourses through dialogue with Brahmanical and Buddhist philosophers. Equally, Kumārila's ideas immediately became a point of discussion among later Brahmanical and Buddhist authors. 1 The dialogical relations between Kumārila on the one hand and Brahmanical and Buddhist philosophers on the other thus constitute the primary means through which Kumārila's dates are determined. By contrast, Jaina philosophers have proven a less valuable resource because Kumārila does not engage with any specific Jaina philosopher or text, 2 and Jaina philosophers do not begin to refute Kumārila until the middle of the eighth century. 3 On the basis of Kumārila's dialogical relations with Brahmanical and Buddhist authors, Kumārila is broadly assigned to the sixth or seventh century of the Common Era. That said, we lack a single Brahmanical and Buddhist interlocutor who cites a date for their composition with which we can firmly establish Kumārila's terminus post quem or terminus ante quem.
But what if, while considering systematic dialogues (śāstra) to be the primary medium for interreligious philosophical debate, we have missed a source that does engage with Kumārila, and that can be reliably dated? In this article, I turn to a religious group whom, it has been previously thought, did not respond to Kumārila until the eighth century-Jainas-as well as to a genre that is not typically viewed as a site of systematic philosophical disputation-narrative. I argue that a Jaina epic called the Padmacarita (676 CE) targets Kumārila as one of its objects of refutation. The Padmacarita, composed by the Digambara Jaina, Raviṡeṅa, is a Sanskrit Jaina retelling of Vālmīki's Rāmāyaṇa. It is the earliest extant Sanskrit Jaina text to classify itself under the genre category of "purāṇa." 4 If the Padmacarita can be shown to be explicitly reacting to Kumārila, and if we could date the text securely to (Thrasher 1993, pp. 111-128;Tola 1989). 8 With this in mind, we cannot assign Kumārila's dates on the basis of Maṅḋana's dates lest we incur a circular argument. Even less useful are the dates of the oldest Mīmāṁ sā commentator on Kumārila's Ślokavārttika, Uṁ veka. Uṁ veka's terminus post quem relies on the dates of Maṅḋana which, we have now seen, depend on Kumārla's dates. 9 Uṁ veka's terminus ante quem is easier to identify than his terminus post quem because Uṁ veka is cited by the Buddhist writer, Kamalaśīla, who, Dunhuang manuscripts record, was invited to a Tibetan monastery founded in 779 CE. 10 So far, all we can estimate from Kumārila's dialogical relations with Brahmanical philosophers is that Kumārila lived sometime between the sixth and eighth century CE though the upper and lower limits of this estimation remain fuzzy. Turning to Kumārila's relation to Buddhist philosophers proves more useful yet equally frustrating. Kumārila's refutation of the Buddhist thinker, Diṅnāga, provides a more specific terminus post quem for Kumārila. Kumārila must postdate Diṅnāga because the former cites the latter. That said, Diṅnāga's dates have recently been revised from the previously accepted date, 480-540 CE, to the earlier date of 430-500 CE (Deleanu 2019, pp. 12-19), prompting us to revise in turn Kumārila's terminus post quem.
Most attempts to date Kumārila rely on the date of Diṅnāga's commentator, Dharmakīrti. Kumārila and Dharmakīrti are represented as direct contemporaries though there has been debate regarding their exact relation. It is not clear that Kumārila refers to Dharmakīrti, whereas it is clear that Dharmakīrti explicitly refers to Kumārila. Supposing that we could prove that Kumārila and Dharmakīrti were direct contemporaries does not make it any easier to assign a date to Kumārila because, as should by now be predictable, there is no scholarly consensus regarding the date of Dharmakīrti. 11 Accepting the most recent hypotheses that assign Dharmakīrti to 550-650 CE (Franco 2018;Deleanu 2019;Eltschinger 2019a) would restrict Kumārila's dates to 550-650 CE. 12 Each time Dharmakīrti's dates are revised, so too are Kumārila's.
Examinations of Kumārila's dialogical relation to Bhāviveka (Kataoka 2021;Krasser 2012) yields only more fragile evidence on which we can pin Kumārila's dates. Bhāviveka's dates are unresolved. 13 In addition, although Bhāviveka refutes discourses that are found in Kumārila's works, these refutations are interpreted by some scholars as interpolations of another author who postdates Kumārila. The possibility of interpolation complicates the relative chronology of Bhāviveka and Kumārila in ways that have not been concretely resolved. 14 The date of Śāntarakṡita seems to be the most reliable extant evidence we have for determining Kumārila's terminus ante quem. Kumārila is cited verbatim by Ś āntarakṡita, and unlike all other interlocutors that I have discussed so far, Ś āntarakṡita can be reliably dated. Early Tibetan sources record that Ś āntarakṡita travelled to Tibet as a senior monk sometime between 763-775 CE. 15 This external 12 See Yoshimizu (2007a) and (2007b) on the chronology of Kumārila's work vis-à-vis Dharmakīrti. See Franco (2018, pp. 133-134) for reflections on Yoshimizu's arguments. 13 Kataoka states that Bhāviveka can be reliably dated to 510-570 CE based on inscriptional evidence (Kataoka 2021, pp. 279). To be clear, Bhāviveka is not cited in any inscription. Kataoka cites Frauwallner for Bhāviveka's dates and the inscriptional evidence, but Frauwallner (1961, pp. 136) is referring to the date of Sthiramati rather than Bhāviveka. Krasser (2012, pp. 581) follows Kajiyama (whose Japanese article I could not access) in explaining that we can assign Bhāviveka to a contemporary of Sthiramati because Bhāviveka was refuted by Sthiramati. Sthiramati's dates can be roughly confined to the sixthseventh century on the basis of inscriptions. See Kramer (2019, pp. 456).
More importantly, while there exist multiple instances that suggest that Kumārila postdates Bhāviveka, it is not always clear why, in Kataoka's reading, Kumārila's Ślokavārttika ought to presuppose Bhāviveka's rejection of Mīmāṁ sā. For instance, in Bhāviveka's representation of his Mīmāṁ saka opponent, the opponent argues that the Buddhists are similar to the Jainas because the statements of the Jina and the Buddha are apramāṇa. This opponent resembles Kumārila who similarly equates the Jaina view with the Buddhist view regarding omniscient speakers (ŚV 2.126-127). Mīmāṁ sā commentators before Kumārila do not discuss, much less reject the validity of the Buddha's and Jina's words. Therefore, it is likely that Bhāviveka is responding to Kumārila. Yet, Kataoka reads this in the opposite way, namely that Kumārila is responding to Bhāviveka. It is not clear that Kataoka justifies this direction of dialogical engagement. This is just one of several instances in which Kataoka does not fully justify how the claim that Kumārila is responding to Bhāviveka bears more weight than the claim that Bhāviveka is responding to Kumārila. 14 Deleanu (2019, pp. 23) cites two Japanese articles by Kajiyama and Ejima that I have not been able to consult. Most scholars, including Deleanu, agree that Bhāviveka lived in the sixth century. According to Deleanu (2019, pp. 23) and Krasser (2012, pp. 568), Ejima argues that Bhāviveka predates Diṅnāga and that parts of Bhāviveka's commentary are the product of a later author with a similar name in the eighth century. Krasser agrees with Ejima's position insofar as he takes Bhāviveka's discussion of omniscience and the validity of the Veda to be an interpolation that postdates Kumārila. On the difficulty of Krasser's argument, see Franco (2018, pp. 124-126). Recently, Kataoka (2021) argues that Bhāviveka predates Kumārila but does not acknowledge earlier arguments surrounding the redaction of Bhāviveka's text. This means that the similarities between Bhāviveka and Kumārila are not easily explained away by Kataoka's purely conceptual argument. 15 Nakamura (1983, pp. 84-85) assigns Ś āntarakṡita to 680-740 CE and subsequently dates Kumārila to 650-700 CE. But it is unlikely that Ś āntarakṡita lived at such an early date as Nakamura proposes. The most commonly accepted date for Ś āntarakṡita is 725-788 CE, first given by Frauwallner (1961, pp. 141-143). This date is accepted on the grounds that external historical records record a date for Ś āntarakṡita's visit to Tibet. See also Eltschinger (2019b, pp. 383-384).
Matthew Kapstein notes that the precise dates that Frauwallner provides for Ś āntarakṡita's birth and death are not certain. Ś āntarakṡita came to Tibet around 763-75 CE when he was a well-known senior evidence for Ś āntarakṡita's date leads to the concrete claim that Kumārila lived before the early-to mid-eighth century. 16 This brings us to the final source deemed relevant for assigning a date to Kumārila: Tibetan histories. In the seventeenth century, a Tibetan monk named Tāranātha composed A History of Buddhism in India. 17 Some have claimed that Tāranātha connects Kumārila with the reign of a Tibetan ruler, Gyo-ba-brtan-pa, 627-650CE (Verpoorten 1987, pp. 22;Sharma 1980, pp. 13-14). Yet no such claim is found in Tāranātha's text. Tāranātha cites several kings (including Gyo-ba-brtanpa's heir) before introducing Kumārila. This makes it unclear whether Tāranātha is, in fact, assigning Kumārila to the reign of Gyo-ba-brtan-pa, the reign of Gyo-babrtan-pa's son, or indeed the reign of other kings cited in the same passage. What Tāranātha does explicitly state is that Kumārila defeated Diṅnāga. 18 Taking seriously Tāranātha's representation of Kumārila as contemporaneous not only with Dharmakīrti, 19 but also with Diṅnāga would force us to reevaluate Diṅnāga's date. Underlying all these readings of Tāranātha's text is a broader methodological critique first highlighted by Frauwallner (1961, pp. 125-126): We cannot read a seventeenth century "history" (whatever "history" signifies for Tāranātha) as a mimetic representation of first millennium South Asia. 20 So, what are we left with? The reconstruction of the vast network that connects Kumārila with Brahmanical and Buddhist philosophers leads to an estimate that Kumārila lived sometime between the sixth to the early-to mid-eighth century. The date of Ś āntarakṡita's arrival in Tibet (763-775 CE) furnishes the only reliable external evidence we have for Kumārila's terminus ante quem. If we try to specify that Kumārila lived in the sixth to seventh century because of his dialogical relations Footnote 15 continued monk. For further discussion on Ś āntarakṡita's visit to Tibet, see Kapstein (2000, pp. 41-44). The Tibetan source that cites Ś āntarakṡita's visit is the Testament of Ba. For further discussion on the reliability of this source, and the likelihood that it was written on the basis of much earlier documents, see Kapstein (2000, pp. 24-25). According to Kapstein, it seems likely that Ś āntarakṡita was born sometime between 715-30 CE and that he died sometime in the mid or late 780's, but the precise dates remain uncertain. (Personal communication with Matthew Kapstein: 23/2/22). 16 Yoshimizu (2015, pp. 43-44, fn.1) suggests that Kumārila's dates can be established through the Buddhist poet, Subandhu, who writes in his Vāsavadattā kathā, "Some were like the followers of Jaimini's thought who have driven out the thought of the Tathāgata" (Vāsavadattā kathā 24.7-8: "kecit jaiminimataśrāviṇa iva tathagata[mata]dhvaṃsiṇaḥ") Yoshimizu infers that "followers of Jaimini" (jaiminimataśrāviṇa) refers to Kumārila because of the significant critiques that Kumārila launched against Buddhists. While it is certainly possible that Subandhu is implicitly referring to Kumārila, such a generic reference to a group of followers of Jaimini's school is not sufficient to establish that the compound signifies Kumārila alone. This is not to mention that Yoshimizu concedes the difficulty in assigning a date to Subandhu. 17 See chapter 26 of Tāranātha's History of Indian Buddhism. (Tāranātha 1990, pp. 224-248). to those who lived before Uṁ veka and Ś āntarakṡita-such as Maṅḋaṅamiśra and Dharmakīrti-we must know that we are doing so in the absence of established dates for these interlocuters. Ultimately, to confine Kumārila's dates to the seventh century requires us to play an elaborate game of who knows whom because none of these philosophers, who are chronologically more proximate to Kumārila than Ś antarakṡita, cite a date for their compositions. If only, as scholars of Mīmāṁ sā opine, we could establish Kumārila's date independently of Brahmanical and Buddhist śāstra (Taber 2005, pp. 163, ft 2;Freschi 2014 21 ).

Jaina Tales of Rāma
One would be forgiven for having never considered the possibility that Jaina Rāmāyaṅas include dialogues with Kumārila's Mīmāṁ sā. Jaina tales about Rāma have, until now, always been examined in relation to Vālmīki's Rāmāyaṇa or with other Jaina tales of Rāma. This methodological perspective makes sense in light of the history of Jaina Rāmāyaṅa retellings. 22 From the fifth century of the common era, Jainas began to compose tales about Rāma, whom they call "Padma." The earliest extant Jaina text to be dedicated to the tale of Rāma is Vimalasūri's Paümacariya, composed at the beginning of the Common Era. 23 Vimalasūri presents his Paümacariya as a literary and theological refutation of Vālmīki's Rāmāyaṇa by retelling the Rāma's tale in such a way that rectifies what he views as hermeneutical or theological problems in Vālmīki's text. 24 Vimalasūri's Prakrit Paümacariya is retold for the first time in Sanskrit by Raviṡeṅa's Padmacarita. Raviṡeṅa-as with all Jaina authors of Sanskrit purāṇascites a date for his composition. In the closing verses of the text, Raviṡeṅa states that he completed the Padmacarita 1203 years and six months after Mahāvīra attained the final liberation through death. 25 The date of the Padmacarita depends on the date of Mahāvīra's death. This fact is less problematic than it might initially appear because Jaina sources from the first millennium of the common era are relatively consistent in assigning Mahāvīra's death to 605 years and 5 months before Ś aka's 21 "Establishing independently Kumārila's date would thus lead one to important conclusions regarding Dharmakīrti's date, too (and vice versa)." Freschi (2014). 22 For more on the history of Jaina Rāmāyaṅa retellings, see Clines (2022), De Clercq (2004, and Kulkarni (1990). 23 On the date of Vimalasūri's Paümacariya, see Dundas (2022). Vimalasūri states that it was composed 530 years after Mahāvīra's liberation (Paümacariya 118.103). This would locate the Paümacariya sometime in the first half of the first century CE. Dundas explains that the contents of the Paümacariya suggest that the text could have been written in later centuries. Nevertheless, it is difficult to concretely establish this claim without further examination of the Paümacariya's manuscript transmission(s). 24 PCV 3.15. 25 dviśatābhyadhike samāsahasre samatīte 'rdhacaturthavarṣayukte // jinabhāskaravardhamānasiddheś caritaṃ padmamuner idaṃ nibaddham // PC 123.182 "This tale of Padmamuni (Rāma) was completed 1203 years and 6 months after the liberation of [Mahāvīra] Vardhamāṅa, the sun among the Jinas." In this verse, "ardhacaturtha" signifies "three and a half." See Gvozdanović (1992, pp. 284) for attestations of this compound across Sanskrit, Prakrit and Pali literature. reign, which would place Mahāvīra's death in 527 BCE. 26 The frequency with which Digambara and Ś vetāmbara sources before the seventh century of the common era assign Mahāvīra's liberation to specifically 605 years and 5 months before Ś aka's reign gives us strong reason to believe that Raviṡeṅa is operating with this traditional date. Based on this traditional date for Mahāvīra's death, 527 BCE, we can calculate that Raviṡeṅa completed his Padmacarita in 676 CE. 27 As a retelling composed several centuries after Vimalasūri's Paümacariya, Raviṡeṅa recasts the tale of Rāma to engage in contemporaneous Brahmanical discourses. This is most clearly seen in Raviṡeṅa's retelling of the tale of King Marutta and his priest, Saṁ varta, for it is through this subtale, I argue, that Raviṡeṅa discusses Kumārila's Mīmāṁ sā.
According to book 7 of Vālmīki's Rāmāyaṇa, King Marutta sponsors a nonviolent sacrifice that is officiated by the Brahmin, Saṁ varta. 28 The demon Rāvaṅa interrupts King Marutta's sacrifice and demands that the king either fight him or acknowledge his defeat. Saṁ varta restrains his King and says, "If you want my advice, battle is not appropriate for you. A sacrifice to Maheśvara left incomplete will destroy your dynasty. How could one who is consecrated for sacrifice engage in battle? How can one engage in violent acts while they are consecrated?" 29 Saṁ varta defers to Vedic ideology to explain to King Marutta that the agent of sacrifice will no longer be fit to complete the sacrifice if he engages in battle. Implicit here is a Vedic belief that sacrifice guarantees the preservation of the cosmos and the continuation of the King's lineage. 30 Marutta thus cannot fight Rāvaṅa without violating his ritual consecration and by extension, forfeiting the personal, social, and cosmic effects of his sacrifice. King Marutta presses ahead with the sacrifice to ensure its completion. Rāvaṅa tries to disrupt the rite. He devours the Brahmins who assembled for the sacrifice, but Marutta's sacrifice is nevertheless completed, and the gods praise Marutta.
Valmīki's Rāmāyaṇa paints King Marutta as an ideal patron of Vedic sacrifice because he abides by Vedic prescriptions. By contrast, Vimalasūri's retelling of this tale undermines the validity of Vedic sacrifice. According to Vimalasūri's 26 On the traditional dates cited by Jaina texts in the first millennium, see Jain (1998, pp. 106-107). 27 My sincere thanks to Christopher Z. Minkowksi for clarifying the calculations (personal communication 18/02/2022). If we accept, as the pre-seventh century Jaina sources do, that Mahāvīra attained liberation in Kārttik (November) 527 BCE, then we can calculate that the Padmacarita was composed in 676 CE. To arrive at this date, the following calculations have been undertaken: 1203;6 -605;5 = 598;1 for the interval from the Ś aka epoch ( Paümacariya, King Marutta and his priest, Samvarta, undertake a Vedic sacrifice that involves the slaughter of animals. 31 The Jaina sage, Nārada, interrupts the sacrifice, rebukes the violence that Marutta and Saṁ varta inflict onto living beings, and reinterprets the Vedic sacrifice as a metaphor for Jaina asceticism. Saṁ varta and his Brahmin attendants reject Nārada's arguments. But rather than dismissing Nārada through dialogue, the Brahmins forgo further discussion and beat Nārada within an inch of his life. News of Nārada's plight reaches Rāvaṅa, who is represented by the Paümacariya as a demi-god (vidyādhara) and an adherent of the Jina's teaching of non-violence. Rāvaṅa saves Nārada and frees the animals being prepared for sacrifice. We can read the Paümacariya's retelling as an inversion of that of Vālmīki's Rāmāyaṇa. In Vālmīki's Rāmāyaṇa, Marutta maintains the stability of his lineage and the cosmos through the performance of Vedic sacrifice while Rāvaṅa's rampage aims to disrupt social and cosmic order. But in Vimalasūri's Paümacariya, Marutta's Vedic sacrifice, and the violence it ensues, disrupts the Jaina order of the kingdom while Rāvaṅa saves the animals as a way of restoring order to the Jaina kingdom. In the broader context of Jaina texts, the Paümacariya's tale of Marutta resembles earlier and contemporaneous Jaina representations of Vedic Brahmins. 32 Just as Jaina suttas homogenize the diverse justifications underlying Vedic sacrifice into a single representation of Brahmins as violent humans who cannot be reasoned with, so too does Vimalasūri's Paümacariya caricature King Marutta and Saṁ varta as barbaric Vedic practitioners without ever discussing the breadth and specificity of Vedic beliefs and practices that were being enjoined by contemporaneous Brahmanical texts.
Raviṡeṅa's retelling in the seventh century Padmacarita follows the sequence of events as told earlier by Vimalasūri's Paümacariya. King Marutta and Saṁ varta perform an animal sacrifice that is interrupted by Nārada who proclaims that animal sacrifice will lead to hell. And once again, Nārada is beaten to pulp by the Brahmins. The difference between Raviṡeṅa's Padmacarita and Vimalasūri's Paümacariya lies less in the plotline of this subtale than in the content of the characters' dialogue. Raviṡeṅa inserts a lengthy conversation between Marutta's Vedic officiant, Saṁ varta, and the Jaina sage, Nārada, that is absent in earlier versions of this tale. Through this dialogue, which spans over a hundred verses, Nārada and Saṁ varta debates claims that, I argue, are voiced by Kumārila in his Ślokavārttika. Let me be transparent here. Nowhere in Raviṡeṅa's subtale or in the Padmacarita entire does Raviṡeṅa label Saṁ varta a "Mīmāṁ saka" or a follower of Kumārila. In fact, Raviṡeṅa never identifies any of the tradition(s) or intertext(s) that are discussed by Nārada and Saṁ varta. This textual practice contrasts with later Jaina narratives from the eleventh century onwards, such as Amitagati's Dharmaparīkṣā (1014 CE), which explicitly identifies one of the antithetical positions as 31 PCV chapter 11. 32 See Uttarajjhayaṇasutta 12 which narrates the tale of the Jaina ascetic, Harikeśa. Harikeśa interrupts a Vedic sacrifice and criticizes the sacrifice of animals. He reinterprets the sacrifice as a metaphor for Jaina renunciation but is beaten by the Brahmin officiants as a result. The structural similarities between the plotline of Paümacariya's the tale of Marutta and Nārada and that of the Uttarajjhayaṇasutta's tale of Harikeśa suggest that the former is modelled on the latter. "Mīmāṁ saka". 33 The absence of such explicit identifications means that we need to prove through a close reading of the dialogue that Saṁ varta's position voices Kumārila's Mīmāṁ sā.

Nārada's refutation of Saṁ varta in Raviṡ eṅ a's Padmacarita
In the Padmacarita, the debate between Saṁ varta and Nārada arises because Nārada rejects the validity of Vedic animal sacrifice. Nārada, witnessing the animals being lined up for slaughter, interrupts the sacrifice in a bid to save the animals. He declares that the omniscient Jinas have previously taught that the violence inflicted on animals during Vedic sacrifices leads to undesirable results on the part of the sacrificer. Such results include the attainment of hell. 34 Saṁ varta, the Brahmin officiant of the sacrifice, is outraged. He explains his position on the validity of the Veda and its sacrificial injunctions through the following verses.
In the above verses, Saṁ varta justifies the validity of the Vedic injunctions to perform animal sacrifice. First, he rejects the possibility that an omniscient speaker exists by calling out what he sees as a logical contradiction in the definition of the Jina as an omniscient speaker. An omniscient being cannot engage in the act of speaking because all activity, including speaking, is predicated on a desire. The Jina must either be an omniscient being who does not teach on account that he has no desire to do so, or else the Jina teaches but the presence of a desire to act renders him susceptible to error. For Saṁ varta, this means that the Jina's words, and indeed all authored testimony, is fallible. By contrast, Saṁ varta understands the Veda to be infallible because it is authorless. Without an author, there is no locus to which one could attribute any fault. Thus, on Saṁ varta's reading, the authorless Veda is infallible. More precisely, the Veda is the valid means of knowing (pramāṇa) with respect to "that which lies beyond the sense faculties"-a phrasing that, as we will later see, Mīmāṁ sakas use to define "dharma." Establishing the validity of the Veda is paramount for justifying the validity of animal sacrifice. If Saṁ varta can prove that the Veda is authoritative, then he can justify the belief that animal sacrifices enjoined by the Veda lead to the attainment of heaven. Therefore, having demonstrated the validity of the authorless Veda over the Jina's words, Saṁ varta explains that there is no reason to believe that animal sacrifices will lead to undesirable results. The Veda enjoins animal sacrifice for the attainment of heaven. Since the Veda is authoritative and there is no forthcoming cognition that reveals the effects of vedic sacrifice to be otherwise, we are justified in believing that Vedic animal sacrifice leads to the attainment of heaven.
The above arguments recall those that Kumārila advances in his commentary on Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.2 in the Ślokavārttika. For instance, Saṁ varta's definition and rejection of omniscient speakers run parallel to those of Kumārila. According to Kumārila, an omniscient speaker is one who simultaneously has no desires (rāgādirahita) and who does not engage in any activity (nirvyāpāra). 36 Kumārila applies the premise that all action is preceded by a desire to his definition of omniscience speakers to bring into relief the logical contradiction in the definition of the Buddha and the Jina as a speaker who engages in the act of teaching while remaining desireless. The Buddha and the Jina cannot teach (deśanā) without a desire because all actions are predicated on a desire. Yet the Buddha and the Jina cannot be devoid of desire because they engage in the act of teaching. In both cases, the existence of an infallible omniscient speaker is, on Kumārila's account, impossible. As we can see, Kumārila's definition of omniscient speakers is identical with that of Saṁ varta.
That Kumārila's discussion of omniscient speakers departed from earlier extant Mīmāṁ sakas further substantiates the claim that Saṁ varta is voicing Kumārila rather than any other author. Kumārila's discussion of omniscient beings arises precisely because his predecessor, Śabara, never addresses the topic. Śabara claims that the testimony of reliable men is valid when it pertains to perceivable objects. In Kumārila's reading, Ś abara's claim leads to an undesirable consequence, namely that Buddhist and Jaina scriptures can be taken as valid since their authors, the 36 ŚV 2.137. Buddha and the Jina, are believed by Buddhists and Jainas respectively to be omniscient and, by extension, reliable speakers. Kumārila includes a rejection of omniscient speakers to curtail the possibility that Jaina and Buddhist scriptures constitute a valid means of knowing over and above the authorless Veda. The conceptual parallels between Kumārila's and Saṁ varta's discussion of omniscient speakers, combined with the claim that Kumārila is the earliest extant Mīmāṁ saka to reject omniscient speakers further suggests that Saṁ varta is a mouthpiece for Kumārila's ideas.
Second, Saṁ varta's contrast between the invalidity of authored texts and the validity of the authorless Veda (PC 11.166-167) is suggestive of the same contrast that is introduced by Kumārila. Kumārila rejects the possibility that omniscience and authorlessness constitute equally valid reasons for establishing a scripture as valid. 37 To claim that an omniscient speaker exists is to postulate something unseen. But to claim that the Veda is authorless does not require one to postulate something unseen. We observe the Veda being transmitted from teacher to student across multiple generations. Based on this perception, we can justifiably believe that the Veda has been transmitted from teacher to student ad infinitum. There is no forthcoming cognition of the Veda's creation to suggest otherwise. In this way, the Veda's authorlessness is established through perception, unlike the existence of an omniscient speaker which goes unseen. Kumārila's contrast between the postulation of omniscient speakers and the postulation of the authorless Veda lies in the background of verses 166-167 of Saṁ varta's discussion, which contrast the authored, fallible teachings of the Jina with the authorless, infallible Veda, though it is left undeveloped. Nevertheless, Saṁ varta follows the order of arguments given in Kumārila's commentary. Just as Kumārila shifts from a rejection of omniscient speakers to a justification of the Veda's validity, so too does Saṁ varta. Saṁ varta synthesizes Kumārila's claim that the absence of an author means that there is no locus (i.e a speaker) to whom we could attribute any faults (PC 11.167; ŚV 2.169). They both conclude that the Veda is the only valid means of knowing dharma because dharma, defined as that which lies beyond sense faculties, can only be grasped by the authorless injunctions that constitute the Veda.
Saṁ varta's final comments regarding the justification to slaughter animals in Vedic sacrifice is one of the few arguments that does not align exactly with Kumārila's Mīmāṁ sā. Saṁ varta's summary of "apūrva dharma" resonates with older Mīmāṁ sā ideas just as much as it does with contemporaneous Naiyāyikas. Saṁ varta's final claim that God created animals for the sake of sacrifice contradicts Kumārila who vehemently rejects the existence of a creator deity. 38 Although these broader arguments are not found in Mīmāṁ sā or Kumārila's Ślokavārttika, they nevertheless lead to Kumārila's idiosyncratic commitment to animal sacrifice and his belief that Vedic sacrifice constitutes a distinct context in which violence is justified.
Ś abara briefly contends that sacrifices such as the Ś yena sacrifice, which is performed to bring harm to the agent's enemies, leads to negative effects. But Ś abara never addresses the validity of animal sacrifice at large. Kumārila not only engages with the question of violence in animal sacrifices, but he defends it. Immediately after justifying the validity of the Veda, Kumārila claims that animal sacrifice in the specific context of Vedic ritual leads to beneficial results. This unique defense of animal sacrifice and the position in which this argument appears in Kumārila's commentary once again mirrors that of Saṁ varta from verse 169. While Saṁ varta's claims about "apūrvadharma" and a creator are not found in Kumārila's commentary, they nevertheless support Kumārila's overarching commitment to animal sacrifice. Indeed, as I later explain, Saṁ varta's discussion of "apūrva dharma", though different from Kumārila's rendition, is located in the same position that Kumārila discusses "apūrva" rather than in the position that Ś abara discusses "apūrva".
Despite the brevity of Saṁ varta's arguments, there are conceptual and sequential parallels between Saṁ varta's claims in the Padmacarita and Kumārila's commentary on MS 1.1.2. Saṁ varta articulates innovations that Kumārila uniquely made to Ś abara's commentary-the rejection of the existence of omniscient beings, the contrast between omniscient beings and the authorless Veda, and the justification to perform animal sacrifice.
We find further evidence for this intertextual relation when we turn to Nārada's refutation. 39 Nārada responds to specific subordinate claims that can be found in Kumārila's discussion of omniscient speakers, the Veda, and animal sacrifice, following the same order in which those arguments are presented by Kumārila in his commentary on MS 1.1.2.
Nārada introduces his response by criticizing Saṁ varta's first claim that there exists no omniscient speaker. He begins with a linguistic argument. An omniscient being (sarvajña) must exist because the word "sarvajña" would not yield a cognition unless there existed a referent-an actually existing omniscient speakerto whom the term refers. For Nārada, cognitions correspond to the actual state of affairs in the world. Speech would be impossible if linguistic expressions (śabda) and cognitions (buddhi) did not depend on the existence of a referent (artha), external to cognition, to which words and cognitions refer. 40 For instance, the linguistic expression "go" results from having a cognition of a referent, a cow, that exists in the world. Similarly, Nārada explains, the linguistic expression "sarvajña" depends on a perceptual cognition of an omniscient being, the Jina, who exists in the world. 41 In the context of the Padmacarita's narrative, Nārada's argument ought to be taken literally because Nārada, unlike the readers of the Padmacarita, inhabits an era in which the Jinas exist.
Read in the context of the Ślokavārttika, Nārada's argument seems to target Kumārila's claim that no pramāṇa establishes the existence of an omniscient  speaker (ŚV 2.117-155). We do not have a perception of an omniscient speaker in our era. We cannot infer the existence of an omniscient being since there are no inferential marks. And, there is no scriptural testimony that attests to the existence of omniscient beings. 42 Kumārila's claim that no pramāṇa can establish the existence of omniscient beings seems to be the target of Nārada's rejoinder in PC 11.172-178 because Nārada brings to light the ways in which the pramāṇa of Vedic testimony does establish the existence of an omniscient being.
Nārada cites a verse from Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad that affirms the existence of an omniscient being (sarvajña). 43 This citation is provocative when read in the context of ŚV 2.118-119 where Kumārila claims that there exists no Vedic passage (āgamābhāva) that refers to the existence of omniscient beings. 44 Kumārila explains that we cannot defer to scriptural passages that are written by omniscient beings, including the Jina, because this would incur the fault of mutual reliance (ŚV 141-142ab). The sole scripture that is authoritative is the Veda on account of its authorlessness. But according to Kumārila, no Vedic passage expresses the existence of an omniscient being (ŚV 2.119ab). 45 Read in the context of this argument, Nārada's citation of the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad is not fortuitous. He exposes a contradiction in his opponent's reasoning (PC 11.178ab). The opponent's claims about the Veda do not accurately capture what is expressed by those very scriptures. 46 And in citing a Vedic text over a Jaina text, Nārada circumvents the fault of mutual reliance and proves his argument through a scripture that his opponent deems valid.
Nārada moves on to the question of whether an omniscient speaker can engage in action if that speaker is, by definition, devoid of desire. As seen earlier, the opponent's definition of omniscient speakers  parallels that of Kumārila in the Ślokavārttika (ŚV 2.137-140). Nārada responds to this definition in PC 11.179-186 with the rejoinder that there exists no contradiction between being 42 ŚV 2.116-20. 43 PC 11.117-18. The verse Nārada cites is not credited to a particular Vedic text. However, the verse is nearly verbatim with Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 2.2.7a. sarvajñaḥ sarvadṛk kvāsau yasyaiṣa mahimā bhuvi / divi brahmapure hyeṣa vyomātmā supratiṣṭhitaḥ // PC 11.117 "Where is he who knows all, who observes all, to whom belongs greatness on earth? He is well established as the self in the sky, in the divine fort of Brahman." yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvavit bhuvi yasyaiṣaḥ mahimā /. eṣaḥ ātmā divye brahmapure vyomni pratiṣṭhitaḥ hi // Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 2.2.7a.
"He who knows all, who observes all, to whom belongs greatness on earth-He is the self in the divine fort of Brahman, having a secure footing in the sky." Translated by Patrick Olivelle (1996, pp. 273). 44 ŚV 2.119-20. 45 ŚV 2.118cd-119ab. 46 Following his own citation of Vedic passages that proclaim the existence of omniscient beings, Nārada elaborates: "And if the object (artha) to be proven (sādhya)-the impossibility of an omniscient speakeris not exclusive (anekānta), [insomuch as there exist claims that establish and claims that refute the existence of omniscient speakers] then it would prove something that is already established." (anekānte ca sādhye arthe bhavet siddhaprasādhakam // (PC 11.178cd) No further elaboration is given. I assume that "siddhaprasādhaka" refers to the existence of an omniscient speaker, which is to say Nārada is suggesting that if the Veda does convey the existence of an omniscient speaker, then it (the Veda) proclaims something that Nārada already accepts. omniscient and being a speaker. In Nārada's definition, an omniscient individual must be a speaker. He contends that we cannot equate omniscient speakers such as the Jina with non-omniscient speakers, such as Devadatta, because the former, being omniscient, does not possess the faults (doṣa) that arise from not possessing omniscience. 47 As we can see so far, Nārada's arguments regarding the existence of an omniscient speaker follow the order and content of claims that are forwarded by Kumārila in ŚV 2.117-140. Nārada continues to address the opponent's arguments on his terms. He argues that the Vedas' authorlessness cannot be established through an absence of proof.
The claim that the Veda has no author is not established through the absence of proofs. On the contrary, the claim that the Veda has an author can be proven in the same way we prove perceptible objects.
[189] Moreover, the fact that the Veda has a particular arrangement of words and expressions, which make it possible [for it to express] the meaning of injunctions and prohibitions, is proof that the Veda has an author; just as in the case of the poetry of Maitra. [190] Furthermore, some say that the Veda was created by men such as Brahmā-Prajāpati. It is not possible to shrug off this belief. [191] If you think that they are not authors but reciters of scripture, even then, reciters possess faults such as attachment and aversion. [192]. If they are truly omniscient, then why would they author a teaching of the text in one way and an explanation of its meaning in another way given that their teaching is considered a pramāṇa? [193] 48 As I explained earlier, Kumārila concludes that we can take seriously our initial perception that the Veda has been transmitted from teacher to student ad infinitum unless or until there is a forthcoming perception that proves the Veda to have been created at a particular point in time. 49 That said, no such perception is forthcoming because we cannot ever perceive the creation of the Veda. Narada rejects these arguments. Contrary to Kumārila's claim that the Veda's authorlessness is established through an absence of proofs, Nārada highlights two proofs that establish the existence of the Veda's authorship. In the first case, the arrangement of words into expressions that convey meaning would not be possible without an author to arrange the words in such a way. 50 Even if this argument is dismissed, as 47 PC 11.180-181. 48 kartrabhāvaś ca vedasya yuktyabhāvān na yujyate / kartṛmattve tu saṃsādhye dṛśyavaddhetusaṃbhavaḥ // PC 11.189 yuktiś ca kartṛmān vedaḥ padavākyādirūpataḥ / vidheyapratiṣedhyārthayuktatvān maitrakāvyavat. // PC 11.190 brahmaprajāpatiprāyaḥ puruṣebhyaś ca saṃbhavaḥ / śrūyate vedaśāstrasya nāpanetuṃ sa śakyate // PC 11.191 syāt te matir na kartāraḥ pravaktāraḥ śruteḥ smṛtāḥ / tathā nāma pravaktāro rāgadveṣādibhir yutāḥ // PC 11.192 susarvajñāś ca kiṃ kuryur anyathā granthadeśanam / arthasya evānyathā ākhyānaṃ pramāṇaṃ tanmataṃ yataḥ // PC 11.193. 49 ŚV 2.149-151. 50 PC 11.190. incidentally it is by Kumārila in ŚV 2.170, 51 Nārada notes that not everyone who subscribes to the authority of the Veda accepts that the Veda is authorless. Some believe that the deity, Brahmā-Prajāpati, authored the Veda (PC 11.191). 52 Nārada is not wrong to point out the existence of these alternative beliefs. The Veda, as well as in Brahmanical epics and purāṇas, narrate stories about Brahmā's creation of the Veda. 53 Nārada could be citing Vedic scripture as evidence for the claim that the Veda was authored. But the literary context-that is, the narrative world that Nārada and Saṁ varta inhabit-suggests that verse 191 is referring to perceptual evidence. Prior to meeting Saṁ varta, Nārada chastises a character who goes by the name of "Brahmā" and who authors the Veda. 54 Nārada's argument in verse 191 relies on perception because he, along with the rest of the kingdom, has witnessed the Vedas' authorship. According to Kumārila's epistemology, such a perception invalidates the belief that the Veda is unauthored. Raviṡeṅa's narrative framing therefore allows him to jettison the Mīmāṁ sā claim that we can never perceive the Veda's creation. The characters can employ perceptual evidence for the Veda's authorship that is impossible on the part of Raviṡeṅa himself. Nārada's clarification in PC 11.192 that "Brahmā" is subject to attachments and aversions is again based on perceptual evidence. Nārada and the kingdom have seen that "Brahmā" is none other than a demon who desires to delude the Jaina kingdom. 55 The final section of Nārada's refutation responds to the justification to perform animal sacrifice. Broadly speaking, Nārada questions the Mīmāṁ sā definition of "dharma" as a ritual act enjoined by the Veda for the sake of producing beneficial results (artha), including the attainment of heaven. 56 Nārada begins by challenging the claim that the result of Vedic sacrifice is not immediately perceptible (apūrva).
The dharma known as "apūrva" cannot manifest as an effect of ritual action if it is eternal, like the sky. If it manifests then it is impermanent, just as in the case of a pot. 57 [206] Just as the discrimination of forms is an effect that is perceived after light has manifested, in the same way, the result (of performing sacrifices) should be perceived here in the world after apūrva dharma has manifested. [But it is not.] [207] 58 51 Kumārila counters the claim that the arrangement of words in the Veda is predicated on the existence of an author. The relation between words and their referents is eternal and therefore there is no reason to posit the existence of an author who constructed the relation between words and their meaning. ŚV 2.170.  For instance, see ŚB 11.5.8.1-7; 6.1.1.5-10, Mbh 12.335.18-67; ViP 1.5.52-66. 54 PC 11.83. 55 In the Bṛhaṭṭīkā, Kumārila rejects the claim that Brahmā authored the Veda. See Kataoka (2021, pp. 292). 56 On the definition of dharma, see MS 1.1.2. Ś abara and Kumārila gloss "artha" as "sreyaskara", "that which brings about the supreme end." They include the attainment of heaven as one of the primary results of Vedic sacrifice. 57 The pot is a standard example of a substance that manifests and is, by extension, impermanent. 58 apūrvākhyaś ca dharmo na vyajyate yāgakarmaṇā / nityatvād vyomavad vyakter anityo vā ghaṭādivat // PC 11.206. phalaṃ rūpaparicchedaḥ pradīpavyaktyanantaram / dṛṣṭaṃ yatheha cāpūrvavyaktikālaṃ phalaṃ bhavet // PC 11.207. The opponent's understanding of "apūrva" recalls ideologies that circulated as the mainstream among Mīmāṁ sakas prior to Kumārila. 59 For instance, Ś abara defines "apūrva" as a "dharma" that manifests as something new. 60 This definition armed Mīmāṁ sakas with a unique defense of the efficacy of Vedic sacrifice. To any opponent who claimed that we do not perceive the beneficial effects of Vedic sacrifice, Mīmāmṡakas could simply respond with the rejoinder that such effects had not yet come into fruition.
Kumārila departs from his predecessors on the definition of "apūrva". 61 , which commences Kumārila's commentary on "artha," Kumārila agrees that the effects of Vedic sacrifice are not immediately perceived but redefines "apūrva" as "a mere capacity of a sacrifice that operates towards a fruit." 62 This new definition circumvents the ontological criticisms that arise from understanding "apūrva" as a substance which Nārada articulates.
For Nārada, apūrva dharma must be an impermanent substance that manifests at a particular place and time. This definition allows Nārada to reject the purportedly beneficial results of animal sacrifice. If apūrva dharma is an effect of Vedic sacrifice that arises at some place and time, then the fact that we never perceive these effects, such as the attainment of heaven, constitutes proof that Vedic injunctions are inefficacious. Nārada's argument targets the mainstream definition of "apūrva" voiced by pre-seventh century Mīmāṁ sakas rather than Kumārila's innovation. 63 Nevertheless, the location in which Nārada addresses "apūrva" is the same as in Kumārila's discussion. 64 Ś abara defines "apūrva dharma" outside his commentary to MS 1.1.2. whereas Kumārila sandwiches his discussion of apūrva between his discussion of the authorless Veda and his discussion animal sacrifices in MS 1.1.2. Though Nārada does not deal with Kumārila's unique definition, the positionality of his argument still strongly suggests that Raviṡeṅa is following the sequence of Kumārila's arguments as they develop in the commentary to MS 1.1.2.
The remainder of Nārada's arguments do counter Kumārila's unique defense of animal sacrifice. According to the Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.2, dharma is defined as a ritual act enjoined by Vedic injunctions for the sake of beneficial results (artha). At stake is understanding the extent to which violence (hiṃsā) is justifiable in the context of 59 Kataoka (2000). 60 For a summary of Ś abara's discussion with a full list of references, see Yoshimizu (2000, pp. 149-150). 61 ŚV 2.196-200. 62 ŚV 2.199. Yoshimizu (2000, pp. 154-155) notes that commentators of Kumārila elaborate on the distinction between Kumārila's views and those of older Mīmāṁ sakas. 63 It is not clear whether Nārada's representation of "apūrva dharma" could be drawing on Prabhākara's ideas about "apūrva" because Prabhākara's remarks are terse and somewhat ambiguous. Halbfass (1980, pp. 275) argues that Prabhākara remains ambiguous over the ontological status of "apūrva", whereas Kataoka (2000) suggests that Prabhākara is explicit in identifying "apūrva" as a dharma. Certainly, Kataoka's survey (2000) of "apūrva" among Mīmāṁ sakas and their opponents suggests that the representation of "apūrva" as a "dharma" was the mainstream Mīmāṁ sā position from which Kumārila diverged.
Vedic ritual. 65 Kumārila defends animal sacrifice against Sāṁ khya writers, Buddhists, and Jainas who prohibit all violent acts on the grounds that they incur negative results on the part of the agent. 66 He achieves this through reference to his justification that the Veda is the exclusive means of knowing dharma. The Veda, constituted by authorless injunctions, uniquely conveys the future effects of Vedic sacrifice in a way that all other forms of expression cannot. Kumārila takes this a step further by distinguishing between different Vedic commands. Injunctions express Vedic rituals that lead to beneficial results whereas prohibitions express actions that lead to negative results (ŚV 2.214-216). Therefore, if animal sacrifices were to incur negative results, the Veda would convey this effect through a prohibition. The fact that the Veda enjoins animal sacrifice demonstrates, on Kumārila's reading, that animal sacrifice produces beneficial results. Moreover, Kumārila contends, we never perceive a negative result after a Vedic sacrifice is completed (ŚV 2.232-6). In the absence of a forthcoming perception of a negative effect of Vedic sacrifice, we are entitled to believe that animal sacrifice leads to beneficial results. Note that Kumārila's argument does not, justify violence in all contexts. He distinguishes violence performed in Vedic sacrifice from violent rituals undertaken outside of Vedic contexts. Violent acts undertaken outside the context of Vedic ritual leads to demerit precisely because it is not enjoined by Vedic injunctions (ŚV 2.260-268). 67 Kumārila's defense of animal sacrifice, synthesized by Saṁ varta in verse 169, is unpacked by Nārada. For instance, Kumārila's distinction between injunctions and prohibitions, while not explicitly stated by Saṁ varta, is presupposed in Nārada's response. Nārada cites a Vedic text, the Chāndogya Brāhmaṇa, that enjoins expiation rites (prāyaścitta) to remove the sin incurred through animal sacrifice. 68 Such expiation rites furnish evidence that the Veda does enjoin rites that incur negative results for why else would an expiation rite be enjoined if not to expiate the negative result incurred through animal sacrifice? 69 By referring to Vedic expiation rites, Nārada overturns Kumārila's claim that Vedic injunctions do not enjoin rituals that incur negative results.
Next, Nārada addresses the distinction between killing animals in the context of Vedic sacrifice and killing animals in non-Vedic contexts. Once again, this argument presupposes Kumārila's attempt to distinguish the two contexts. Nārada contends that the context does not impact the result of an action. Killing animals, 65 As I previously explained, Ś abara only addresses the possibility of violence with reference to Ś yena sacrifices-a ritual performed with the intent to kill one's enemy. In his commentary to MS 1.1.3, Ś abara argues that rituals such as the Ś yena sacrifice are described rather than explicitly enjoined by the Veda. He never examines the violence that is concomitant with animal sacrifices at large. It is Kumārila who takes up this discussion in ŚV 2.214-287. 66 ŚV 2.231-232. Kataoka (2011a, pp. 481, ft. 675) adds that in Tantravārttika 1.3.3-7, Kumārila contextualizes his defense of animal sacrifice in his critique of schools such as Saṁ khya, Yoga, Buddhists and Jainas who are committed to non-violence. 67 ŚV 2.260-268. 68 PC 11.214 is, I believe, a citation from Chāndogya Brāhmaṇa 2.2.8. Nārada continues to give other examples of Vedic rites that produce negative results in the following four verses .  whether in Vedic sacrifices or in hunting, leads to the same negative results, the accumulation of sin, because in both cases violence is inflicted onto an animal (PC 11.216). Here, Nārada implicitly leans on the Jaina theory of karma to collapse the distinction between Vedic and non-Vedic actions. For Nārada, the laws of karmic causality are universal. This universality means that violence inflicted on animals will always result in the accumulation of sin on the part of the agent irrespective of the context in which the act is performed.
Finally, Nārada tackles an argument that is accepted by Ś abara and Kumārilanamely, that there is no forthcoming perception of any negative effects of Vedic sacrifice. 70 Nārada asks, "If we accept that humans go to heaven as a result of performing animal sacrifice, then why did Vasu fall to hell?" 71 Nārada recounts how King Vasu entered hell because he enjoined the sacrifice of animals rather than the offering of rice seeds to the Jina. 72 The tale of King Vasu is told and retold by Brahmanical texts such as Vyāsa's Mahābhārata. 73 So, we might understand Nārada to be citing scriptural testimony. But once again, Nārada is, in fact, employing perceptual evidence. At the beginning of Chapter 11, just prior to the narration of Nārada's debate with Saṁ varta, the Padmacarita describes the lives of Nārada and his childhood friend, King Vasu. 74 The two characters grew up together under the same Jaina teacher. As adults, Nārada and Vasu interpret the Jina's teaching differently. Vasu proclaims that the Jina enjoined the sacrifice of animals while Nārada argues that the Jina enjoins offerings of rice seeds. Vasu's interpretation of the Jina's words, and his subsequent performance of animal sacrifice, cause him to fall to hell. This is witnessed by the entire kingdom including Nārada. Therefore, Nārada's reference to King Vasu constitutes perceptual evidence. Nārada and the kingdom have a perception that invalidates the claim that Vedic animal sacrifice leads to heaven. The storyworld in which Nārada's dialogue is embedded allows Raviṡeṅa to challenge the Mīmāṁ sā claim that we never perceive negative effects of Vedic sacrifice on epistemological grounds that Mīmāṁ sakas accept.

Conclusion: Relative Chronology and the History of Jaina-Mīmāṁ sā dialogues
In sum, there is good reason to believe that Saṁ varta's pūrvapakṣa position, which is summarized by Saṁ varta and unpacked by Nārada, voices Kumārila's commentary to MS 1.1.2 in the Ślokavārttika. In the Padmacarita, the opponent's arguments align with those that Kumārila introduced into Mīmāṁ sā. Most notably, Kumārila's rejection of omniscient speakers and his defense of animal sacrifice are summarized 70 ŚV 2.232-233. 71 yadi prāṇivadhād brahmalokaṃ gacchanti mānavāḥ / tasyānumananāt kasmāt patito narake vasuḥ // PC 11.237. 72 PC 11.237-9. 73 For instance, see Mbh 14.94; 12.322-323. 74 PC 11.10-74. by Saṁ varta. Furthermore, the order in which the opponent's arguments proceed in the Padmacarita follows the same order of arguments found in Kumārila's commentary. We can see this at the macro-level of the debate overall. Saṁ varta tackles the existence of omniscient speakers, the validity of the authorless Veda, the concept of apūrva, and the validity of animal sacrifice in that order. This is same sequential order in which these arguments are laid out in Kumārila's commentary to MS 1.1.2. To take a counter example, Ś abara does not discuss the validity of omniscient speakers or the violence in sacrifices, and he locates his discussion of "apūrva" outside the commentary to MS 1.1.2. At the micro level of Nārada's position, most clearly seen in Nārada's discussion of omniscient speakers, Nārada's responses tend to follow the content and order of subordinate arguments that unfold in Kumārila's commentary to MS 1.1.2. Of course, there are points where the opponent's arguments diverge from Kumārila's commentary. My point is not that Kumārila's Ślokavārttika constitutes the sole intertext for Saṁ varta's position. Rather, my point is to highlight that Kumārila's commentary to MS 1.1.2 is a significant and consistent primary source that Raviṡeṅa draws upon to frame Saṁ varta's Vedic position.
Identifying Kumārila as one of the primary targets of the Padmacarita impacts the terminus ante quem that we assign to Kumārila. Raviṡeṅa-as with all Jaina authors of Sanskrit purāṇas-cites a date for his composition of the Padmacarita. Raviṡeṅa completed the Padmacarita in 676 CE. If we accept that Raviṡeṅa's Padmacarita engages in a dialogue with Kumārila's thesis, then the year of the Padmacarita's completion marks the terminus ante quem for Kumārila.
Equally important is that the Padmacarita revises our understanding of the history of Jaina-Mīmāṁ sā dialogues in the first millennium of the Common Era. Reconstructing Jaina-Mīmāṁ sā dialogues solely through the study of Jaina śāstra leads to the presumption that Jainas did not respond to Kumārila until sometime in middle of the eighth century, when Akalaṅka and Haribhadra composed śāstric refutations of Kumārila. 75 But when we turn to Jaina narratives, which lie outside the strict confines of śāstra, we can see that Jainas were far quicker to react in writing to Kumārila's discourses than has been initially thought. The Padmacarita, a self-proclaimed "purāṇa" and "carita," is the earliest extant Jaina text across any genre to discuss Kumārila's discourses. This claim is liable to change as research into understudied Jaina texts continues. Nevertheless, the Padmacarita impels us to recast narratives as a site in which Jainas reflected on Mīmāṁ sā thought.