Fragments from the Ājīvikas

The paper examines available references to the Ājīvikas that are often identified by scholars, notably by Basham (1951), as genuine quotations from Ājīvikas’ lost works. In addition, the paper analyses some additional material not previously indentifed as possible quotations relevant to Ājīvikism. Unfortunately, none of such references seem to be genuinely derived from an Ājīvika source: All of such passages or verses previously considered genuinely taken from Ājīvika literature turn out to have been composed by non-Ājīvika authors and usually derive either from Jaina works or from fables and narrative literature. There is no clear proof that the Ājīvikas developed their own Sanskrit literature (in addition to Prakrit works), much less philosophical literature in Sanskrit. Further, the faithfulness and reliability of reports of the Ājīvikas and paraphrases of their views cannot be assessed with any certainty.


1.
Very little is known about the ancient Indian religion and philosophical system of the Ā jīvikas. The doctrine, which predates the emergence of Jainism and Buddhism, albeit by only a slight margin, flourished between the fourth and second centuries BCE. In the period between the fourth and second centuries BCE, it was perhaps one of the most influential non-Brahmanical religions in India, second to Buddhism. 1 Despite attempts having been made by a number of scholars 2 we still have an impression that we know very little of Ā jīvikism. The sources at our disposal for reconstructing their doctrine are both very limited and unreliable.
Any attempt to reconstruct the views propounded by the Ā jīvikas and the founders of the system, one of them being Makkhali Gosāla, will face two major difficulties. First, there are no extant complete texts (except one alleged candidate, see below), or even fragments, which can be claimed reliably to have been written by the Ā jīvikas or which have been identified beyond doubt as directly stemming from sources known as both closely linked and faithful to the Ā jīvikas. This is because there are no such sources; indeed, all references to the Ā jīvikas in the whole history of Indian philosophy originate from rather hostile environment. Secondly, the process of a possibly reconstructing the views of the Ā jīvikas must be based on our decision about which of the preserved fragments (quotes, paraphrases etc.), again from these hostile environments, that we encounter is original or faithfully reproduces Ā jīvika views. Our decision as to which of the preserved fragments we are considering is original or faithfully reproduces Ā jīvika views is necessarily based on our knowledge of what the real doctrine of the Ā jīvikas actually was (in order to be able to ascribe a fragment to the Ā jīvika school or not), which in turn is based on the process of the reconstruction of authentic views of the Ā jīvikas. And this is clearly a vicious circle. There is, unfortunately, no logical and methodologically satisfactory way out except through a process of gradual approximation, something that treads on the vicious circle itself. All we can do is to examine (or reexamine) the material which was produced by authors and traditions inimically 1 Its followers are mentioned three times in two Aśokan edicts. Two of these are inscriptions from Barābār Hill in Bihar (BLOCH (1950, p. 159): 1. lājinā piyadassinā duvā-ḍasa-vassâbhisittenā iyaṁ niggoha-kubhā dinnā ājīvikehi.-'This Banyan Cave was donated to the Ā jīvikas by [the king Aśoka] Favourably Disposed, who was consecrated twelve years [ago].'; 2. lājinā piyadassinā duvā-ḍasavassâbhisittenā iyaṁ kubhā khalatika-pavvatassi dinnā ājīvikehi.-'This cave of the Khalatika mountain was donated to the Ā jīvikas by [the king Aśoka] Favourably Disposed, who was consecrated twelve years [ago].'). They are also mentioned in the seventh pillar edict from Toprā in Haryana (BLOCH (1950, p. 170): saṁghaṭṭhassi pi me kaṭe, ime viyāpaṭā hohaṁti ti. hemeva bābhanesu ājīvikesu pi me kaṭe, ime viyāpaṭā hohaṁti ti.-'Also with respect to the matters of the [Buddhist] community, I decided that these [high officers (mahā-mātra)] are occupied [with them]. Likewise, with respect to Brahmins and Ā jīvikas, I decided that these [high officers] are occupied [with them].'). In comparison, the Jainas are mentioned only once in the latter inscription (BLOCH (1950, pp. 170-171): nigaṁṭhesu pi me kaṭe, ime viyāpaṭā hohaṁti. nānā pāsaṁḍesu pi me kaṭe, ime viyāpaṭa hohaṁti ti.-'Also with respect to the Jainas, I decided that these [high officers] are occupied [with them]. Also with respect to various heretics, I decided that these [high officers] are occupied [with them].'). The sequence reveals the hierarchy of importance: the Buddhists (saṁgha), the Ā jīvikas, the Jainas, followed by all the remaining heretics. The Buddhists and the Ā jīvikas, in precisely this order (which is the same as in the two Aśokan inscriptions), are mentioned by Kauṫilya (AŚ 3.20.16: śākyâjīvakâdīn vr ṣala-pravrajitān…), who is conspicuously silent on the Jainas (Nirgranthas). 2 GHOSAL (1979) and (1980), Pranabananda JASH (1982a) and (1982b, Gustav ROTH (1993), Johannes BRONKHORST (2000), (2003) and (2007). The latest in the series is: Piotr BALCEROWICZ (2016). disposed to the Ā jīvikas in the hope that a careful comparison and assessment of such sources may reveal some dependable threads from which we will little by little weave a fabric of more definite and tangible texture. In this way we may give a fresh look to a source which we originally considered not quite related to Ā jīvikas to throw more light on the history of the system. A way to approach the extant material is to first determine certain terminology or concepts which were traditionally associated by other systems with the Ā jīvikas and then, with the help of these technical terms and notions, we may proceed to detect possible new sources for further examination.
That the Ā jīvikas had their early canon known as the eightfold Mahā-nimitta is attested in Jaina canonical literature. 3 But we also have evidence that the Ā jīvikas developed their canon containing 22 sūtras, with divisions rather similar to Jaina canon. A reference to it is found in the Jaina Naṁdi-sutta: Twenty-two sūtras are accepted to be the sūtras in the arrangement of the Ā jīvika sūtras, the sections of which are dependent [for meaning] on each other. 4 We may also suspect that they probably developed some literature in Sanskrit. The question, however, is whether anything of this remains, preserved either in exact citations, loose quotes paraphrases or references.
In this paper I will first re-examine the material which has already been analysed by some scholars heretofore and determined to not only to be related Ā jīvikism but to represent genuine quotations from Ā jīvika sources. Incidentally, I will also evaluate the methodology so far applied by scholars in their ascribing the authorship of certain passages to the Ā jīvikas. Then, I will search for additional passages so far overlooked by scholars and attempt to assess to what extent these can be considered genuine quotations or faithful paraphrases. My intention is to establish a pool of Ā jīvika fragments, preferably citations, that is as broad as possible. In my analysis I will concern myself primarily with Sanskrit passages that are possible candidates for original quotations from Ā jīvikas' lost sources. The aim of this paper is not to reconstruct the doctrine of the Ā jīvikas. However, such reconstructory attempts will be occasionally undertaken if they are necessary to judge whether a particular fragment may be considered authentic or not.
Makkhali Gosāla' (Makkhali-gosāla-vādo). While it is clearly not a citation, it does seem to reveal certain terminological peculiarities characteristic of the Ā jīvikas: There is no deed [performed by the agent] himself, there is no deed [performed by] someone else [than the agent], there is no deed [performed by] humans [which could influence future births or determine the course of their lives], there is no strength, there is no vigour, there is no human aptitude, there is no human prowess [which could influence future birth or determine fate]. All animate beings, all breathing things, all living beings, all souls are without power, without strength, without vigour; [instead] they are developed by destiny, predetermined concurrence of factors and [own] nature, [and] they experience pleasure and suffering in the six classes [of existence]. … The following is not the case: on account of this virtue, or on account of this vow, or on account of this austerity, or on account of this pure conduct, I will ripen the unripened karman or will bring ripened karman to destruction by gradually working on [it through such practices]. This is not the case. Happiness and unhappiness are meted out with a measure, their final end is done in (i.e. through) the cycle of rebirths; there is neither [their] diminishing nor expanding, there is neither [their] increase nor decrease. Just like a ball of thread, when thrown, exhausts itself, [simply] unwinding, exactly in the same manner both the fool and the wise-having transmigrated, having gone through the cycle of rebirths-will put an end to unhappiness. 5 On the basis of this passage-followed in the Sāmañña-phala-sutta with a detailed list of divisions of the world, living beings etc.-and a comparison of its vocabulary with a number of other passages generally associated by Indian tradition and scholars with the Ā jīvikas we can tentatively identify four such 'Ā jīvika keywords': vāda ('the doctrine of intrinsic nature'), or daiva-vāda ('the doctrine of fate', or fatalism), which suggest that the usage of these terms is not casual but refers to some kind of world view-will also be the terms which I will use in order to unearth possible 'concealed citations' from the Ā jīvikas or at least to identify passages that may closely be linked to them, and then I will critically evaluate such passages with an attempt to discard those which do not betray any closer link to Ā jīvika doctrine despite the use of one of the above technical terms. In addition, I will follow an obvious procedure: I will examine the passages which are identified by Indian authors with the Ā jīvikas, either as describing (paraphrasing) their views or as citing them verbatim.
In my critical enquiry I will make liberal use of a selection of passages listed by BASHAM (1951) in his History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas, especially a chapter section 'Quotations by the Commentators', which he considers genuine quotes from Ā jīvika sources. He concludes his selection of quotations from allegedly original Ā jīvika Sanskrit sources 8 as follows: These verses indicate that, beside their early literature in Prakrit, and the Tamil scripture Oṉpatu-katir, the Ā jīvikas possessed a later literature in Sanskrit, containing much philosophical poetry. It might be suggested that these verses were composed by the commentators themselves, to illustrate the views they were discussing. Yet here are eight verses, quoted by different commentators in different centuries, and all attributed to Ā jīvikas or niyativādins. It is more probable that some at least are genuine, than that all are spurious. 9 3. With respect to these eight verses mentioned by BASHAM, I will start my critical enquiry with a passage found in Guṅaratna-sūri's commentary Tarka-rahasya-dipikā (TRD) to Haribhadra-sūri's Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya (Ṡ DSa) which describes a fourth view out of various theories of 'what makes the world go round' and which contains two such verses: Two layers are distinguishable at first glance in Guṅaratna-sūri's commentary: Section {A} is Guṅaratna-sūri's own paraphrase or account of the views of Ā jīvikas the way he knew or understood them, whereas Section {B} seems to be a quotation of two verses. These appear to be genuine, especially due to how they are introduced: tathā côktam. However, upon closer inspection of Guṅaratna-sūri's introduction to the verses-Section {A}-it becomes obvious that he does not go beyond the contents the two verses: Section {A} is basically their paraphrase and does not bring in any new material or information. BASHAM (1951, p. 222) introduces the two above-mentioned verses as follows: 'Guṅaratna … quotes further verses which he attributes to the niyativādins'.
First, the exposition of the theories kāla-vāda, svabhāva-vāda, niyati-vāda, kālâdi-sāmagrī-vāda has its own specific argumentative structure, e.g. Ś VS 1 2.171 (exposition of the svabhāva-vāda) rejects the kāla-vāda, whereas Ś VS 1 2.173 (exposition of the niyati-vāda) in turn discards the svabhāva-vāda, which is then rejected in Ś VS 1 2.180. Second, in the exposition of the four respective theories the same patterns occur as a kind of refrain. I have indicated the recurrent similar patterns in bold. For instance, the refrain phrase mudga-paktir apîṣyate, with a variant apîkṣyate (167b, 171b, 175b, 179b), or merely apîkṣyate (192b), occurs in the exposition of each of the theories, and always in the same metrical pattern in pāda b; a range of verses of all the subsections end with nôpapadyate (179,186,189) in pāda b; the expositions of two theories contain the same phrase garbha-bāla-śubhâdikam (165b, 169b), which is, in addition, in two cases (out of three) compounded with°vyatirekeṇa or°â tirekeṇa (165, 169, 177) always in the same position in pāda a; the pāda c of the exposition of two theories contains sthāly-ādi°(167c, 179c); the pādas cd of the exposition of two theories have the same pattern°bhāve 'pi nâ°………°ā yataḥ (171cd, 175cd); and a whole hemistich yat kiñcij jāyate loke tad asau kāraṇam kila (165cd, 169cd) ) appears twice. It is for all practical reasons impossible for these verses to be quotes from original sources, for it hard to imagine that the proponents of different theories would use the same phrases or even identical hemistiches or phrasal patters.
Third, in some arguments (e.g. Ś VS 1 2.176) we have a clear use of the argument of anyathânupapatti ('inexplicability otherwise'), a specifically Jaina invention of later times: 15 had Haribhadra quoted from earlier sources, it would imply that the opponents had known the Jaina argumentative structure before the Jainas! Fourth, the structure of Haribhadra's work is to present 'a summary of the accounts of (or colloquies among) [various] systems of teaching' (Śāstra-vārttāsamuccaya), somehow along the lines of the doxographical text of his Ṣaḍ-darśanasamuccaya. Indeed the exposition of the theories of kāla-vāda, svabhāva-vāda, niyati-vāda, karma-vāda, kālâdi-sāmagrī-vāda follows such a discursive pattern: each subsequent theory serves to refute the former. It seems most probable that it was Haribhadra's own design to juxtapose all the theories in a dialectical structure and explain them in his own words.
The question remains whether he had access to any original sources of the Ā jīvikas (svabhāva-vāda?, see below p. 30 ff.; niyati-vāda) and the exponents of the other theories (kāla-vāda, karma-vāda, kālâdi-sāmagrī-vāda), or whether he succumbed to, or delved on some hypothetical descriptions of certain theories which one might entertain by way of a mere theoretical exercise. If this were the case, Haribhadra's account would be of no descriptive character (i.e. it would present no description of actual views) and would have no actual value for our study of the system of the Ā jīvikas. Last but not least, we know that his versified works, the most acclaimed being the Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya, Haribhadra as a rule restricts himself to his own paraphrases of the views he discusses without quoting original sources. His Śāstra-vārttā-samuccaya does not appear to be an exception in containing no quotations from external sources. For the above reasons it is quite unlikely that the two verses are actual quotations from Ā jīvika sources. V 2: Whatever thing is to be gained, it-whether happy or unhappy-happens to people in a necessary manner on account of the force of destiny. For even if living beings make great effort, that which is not to be does not happen, and there is no destruction of that which is to be. 16 BASHAM (1951, p. 221, n. 1)  The propounder of destiny [as the sole determining force] reveals his own intention: Predetermined concurrence of factors, i.e. destiny, is that whose course leads to a particular (yat) experience of happiness of unhappiness for a particular person (yasya), at a particular time (yadā), place (yatra) due to a particular transformation of righteousness (samyaktva) 17 ; its condition is the state of being determined. Further, in this way that due to which happiness and unhappiness etc. are not caused by personal agency etc. is these living beings' state of being determined, i.e. caused by destiny. So, accordingly, it is said… 18 The above passage is, in fact, a part of the comment on two verses of the Sūyagaḍaṁga, 19 which in themselves might at first glance be considered as genuine quotes from Ā jīvikas: 16 BASHAM's (1951, p. 221): prāptavyo niyati-balâśrayeṇa yo 'rthaḥ so 'vaśyaṁ bhavati nr ṇāṁ śubho 'śubho vā / bhūtānāṁ mahati kr te 'pi hi prayatne nâbhāvyaṁ bhavati na bhāvino 'sti nāśaḥ // 17 This is a typically Jaina understanding of the saṁsāra and its mechanism. However, we cannot exclude that the Ā jīvikas maintained the same opinion, which is however rather unlikely. 18 SūyVr 1.1.2.30,p. 38.36 ff.: niyati-vādī svâbhiprāyam āviṣ-karoti-"saṁgaiyaṁti" samyak-kha apariṇāmena gati yasya yadā yatra yat sukha-duḥkhânubhāvanaṁ sā saṁgati niyatis tasyāṁ bhavam sāṁgatikaṁ, yataś câivaṁ na puruṣa-kārâdi-kr taṁ sukha-duḥkhâdi atas tat teṣāṁ prāṇināṁ niyati-kr taṁ sāṁgatikam ity ucyate. tathā côktam.
a Recte: samyaktva? V 3: But misery (and pleasure) is not caused by (the souls) themselves; how could it be caused by other (agents, as time, &c.)? Pleasure and misery, final beatitude and temporal (pleasure and pain) are not caused by (the souls) themselves, nor by others; but the individual souls experience them; it is the lot assigned them by destiny. This is what they (i.e. the fatalists) say. (2,3). 20 However, despite the initial impression of being genuine quotes, these two Prakrit verses (V 3) are rather a paraphrase at most, not a direct quote. This is because of the reference to 'those some [thinkers] who proclaim such [a theory]' (iham egesi āhiaṁ). The directly following verse of the Sūya-gaḍaṁga, critical of the fatalists, also confirms such a conclusion: personal agency with respect to happiness and unhappiness etc. is the basis. That one is struck dead is the fruit on account of an action, but the action proceeds as dependent on the agency of the person. So, accordingly, it is said: V 5: "Thinking that [things are caused by] fate, one does not renounce his own exertion. How could one get sesamum oil from sesamum seeds without exertion?" 22 On the one hand, this view of 'compromised determinism'-viz. some things are determined by destiny, whereas some are not-seems to be principally in agreement with what we think we may actually know of Ā jīvikas. 23 On the other hand, the verse quoted by Ś īlāṅka serves as an illustration of a view which modifies the theory of strict determinism generally ascribed to the Ā jīvikas; it is the view attributed to those who claim that things are determined by destiny with the participation of other factors, such as the soul, personal agency 24 , god etc. (ātma-puruṣa-kārêśvarâdiprāpitaṁ sat niyati-kr tam ekāntenâśriyanti). It seems, therefore, that Ś īlāṅka himself did not take the verse to stem from an Ā jīvika source: neither the authors of the Sūya-gaḍaṁga nor Ś īlāṅka himself establish any connection between the views expressed in V 4 and V 5 to the Ā jīvikas and do not use the 'key word' niyati-vāda, generally associated with the Ā jīvikas in Indian tradition, in the context of the 'compromised determinism'. It seems that the description of the 'compromised determinism', which in some ways may indeed better correspond to what the Ā jīvikas really claimed, cannot be attributed to Ś īlāṅka (and of the authors of the Sūya-gaḍaṁga) having real 22 SūyVr 1.1.2.31, p. 39.3 ff.: etāni pūrvôktāni niyati-vādâśritāni vacanāni … bālā ajñāḥ … yato niyayâniyayaṁ saṁtam iti sukhâdikam kiṁcin niyati-kr tam-avaśyaṁ-bhāvy-udaya-prāpitaṁ tathā aniyatam-ātma-puruṣa-kārêśvarâdi-prāpitaṁ sat niyati-kr tam eva-kāntenâśriyanti a , ato 'jānānāḥ sukha-duḥkhâdi-kāraṇam abuddhikā buddhi-rahitā bhavantîti, tathā hi ārhatānāṁ kiñcit sukha-duḥkhâdi niyatita eva bhavati. tat-karaṇasya karmaṇaḥ kasmiṁścid avasare 'vaśyaṁ-bhāvy-udaya-sadbhāvān niyati-kr tam ity ucyate, tathā kiñcid aniyati-kr taṁ ca-puruṣa-kāra-kālêśvara-svabhāva-karmâdi-kr taṁ, tatra kathañcit sukhaduḥkhâdeḥ puruṣa-kāra-sādhyatvam āśrīyate, hataḥ kriyātaḥ phalaṁ bhavati, kriyā ca puruṣa-kārâyattā pravartate, tathā côktam: na daivam iti saṁcintya tyajed udyamam ātmanaḥ / anudyamena kas tailam tilebhyaḥ prāptum arhati? // a Recte: niyati-kr tam ekāntenâśriyanti (not evâikāntenâśriyanti, another option). 23 See BRONKHORST (2003, p. 163): 'The Jaina ascetic, by practising immobility, aspired to bring about a twofold effect: the annihilation of former actions, and the non-performing of new actions. The inactivity of the Jaina ascetic was not only meant to avoid producing karmic effects in the future, but also to destroy actions carried out in the past. The Ā jīvika denied that present inactivity can destroy actions carried out in the past. For him these former actions will carry fruit whatever one does. However, there is no reason to believe that he rejected the possibility of non-performance of new actions. We may therefore formulate the hypothesis that both Jainism and Ā jīvikism interpreted the doctrine of karman in the same way, believing that bodily and mental movements were responsible for rebirth. But whereas the Jainas believed that motionlessness might destroy past karman, the Ā jīvikas did not think so.' 24 I deliberately stray from taking the term puruṣa in the standard Sāṁ khya way 'the conscious principle' because although often Sāṁ khya view is implied in the discussions on the prime cause of the world, this is not necessarily always the case. knowledge of or first-hand acquaintance with the tradition of the Ā jīvikas but is merely a result dictated by a dialectical structure of the argument along the lines of typically Jaina strategy of the Anekānta-vāda: we first analyse the pure niyati position, then the 'compromised' version of niyati-aniyati, then the aniyati position etc.
The only thinkable link of verse V 5 to the Ā jīvika tradition could perhaps be the mention of the production of sesamum oil (taila) from sesamum seeds (tila). It is the precisely the story of the sesamum shrub (tila-thaṁbha) 25 that provides the legendary setting for Gośāla to formulate an obscure theory of 'discontinuance / stoppage [of a subsequent birth in a new body] through / due to continuation [in the same re-animated body]' (pauṭṭa-parihāra) 26 in defiance of Vardhamāna Mahāvīra' prediction of the future fate of the sesamum shrub, which had been uprooted by Gośāla to prevent the future birth of its flowers and seeds. However, just as not every mention of fire and smoke in India has to be treated as a direct hint to the classical model of inference, so should the innocuous mention of sesamum not necessarily be understood as a reference to Ā jīvikism. Furthermore, in the story of the sesamum shrub there is not mention of the sesamum oil or of its production from the seeds. The story exemplifies a belief that one-sensed living beings will necessarily be reborn. Now, the question arises as regards Ś īlāṅka's reliability as the source on the Ā jīvikas with respect to verse V 2 (prāptavyo niyati-balâśrayeṇa…). We may verify his credibility, reliability or accuracy by comparing what he writes about the Ā jīvikas, or actually the propounders of determinism, with how he describes systems better known to us. In his commentary (SūyVr 1.1.2.28, p. 37) he provides a short account of other śrāmaṇas, including the Ā jīvikas and the Buddhists. This is what he has to say about the former: In the opinion of the propounders of destiny there exists no bondage of the sort that one would reflect on it and would destroy it. 27 For the propounders of the fourfold diminution of the karman through the knowledge of those ignorant of destiny (?) the very same desire for [a new] birth in the transmigration in the cycle of rebirths is established, [as for the Buddhists]. 28 The compound niyaty-ajñāni-jñāna-catur-vidha-karmâpacaya-vādin clearly is an extension of the typical phrase niyati-vādin ('the propounder of the doctrine of destiny'), especially in view of the fact that the whole passage is an introduction to 25 See [55][56][702][703] for the translation, see: BALCEROWICZ (2016, pp. 23-26); for the discusison of the passage, see: BASHAM (1951, pp. 47-49) and BALCEROWICZ (2016: 27 ff., 80-82). 26 See: BASHAM (1951, pp. 48-49, 57-58, 250-252), SCHUBRING (1954SCHUBRING ( , p. 258) = (1977, BALCEROWICZ (2016, pp. 23-28, 45-46). 27 SūyVr 1.1.2.28, p. 37.5-6: 'bandhanaṁ buddhyeta tac ca troṭayed" iti tad eva ca bandhanaṁ niyativādy-abhiprāyeṇa na vidyate… 28 SūyVr 1.1.2.28, p. 37.13-14: niyaty-ajñāni-jñāna-catur-vidha-karmâpacaya-vādināṁ tad eva saṁsāracakra-vāla-bhramaṇa-garbhânveṣaṇaṁ pratipādyate. the niyati-vāda ('the doctrine of destiny'). This extended phrase may contain a clue to some doctrinal elements of the Ā jīvikas, but the actual resolution of the compound cannot be conclusive, for it allows for other interpretations as well. However, if we suppose that it is a credible reflection of an authentic belief, the compound would suggest that the Ā jīvikas may have accepted four kinds of decrease of karman (of which other sources, e.g. the Sāmañña-phala-sutta, are silent) through which one could somehow mitigate the influence of destiny. Now, this is what Ś īlāṅka has to say about the Buddhists: The propounders of the five aggregates (skandha) of elements (bhūta), with their inner self obstructed by a false view of reality (mithyātva)-being attached to unreal apprehension [and entertaining] a concept of an awakening to ultimate reality, go to high and low states in the cycle of rebirths characterised by a multitude of disease, death and old age-desire or seek a [new] birth innumerable times. 29 The terminology in the above passage is certainly not quite Buddhistic, but does not contain anything which goes directly counter the Buddhist doctrine either, except for a strange claim the Buddhists desire new birth (garbham eṣyanti). The passage does contain some typically Buddhist expressions, e.g. 'disease, death, old age' (vyādhi-mr tu-jarā), or echoes certain Buddhist expressions (pañca-bhūta-skandha, paramârthâvabodha), but are not identical with those used in Buddhist texts (*pañca-skandha; *yathā-bhūtârthâvabodha (ABhK, Naiṣkarmya-siddhi)). However, the passage could hardly be maintained to faithfully represent what the Buddhists said. In addition, it contains some typically Jaina terms, e.g. mithyātva.
The author does not refer to Buddhists directly but as the exponents of a particular doctrine (pañca-bhūta-skandhâdi-vādinaḥ). Further, both accounts, of the Ā jīvikas and of the Buddhists, contain similar expressions (saṁsāra-cakra-vāla-bhramaṇa / saṁsāra-cakra-vāle … gacchanto, garbhânveṣaṇaṁ / garbham … anveṣayanti), which may imply what Ś īlāṅka thinks of both these groups: despite their beliefs and practices, what they actually achieve is in effect a continuous circle of rebirth. In view of the above comparison, it would not be too wise to grant Ś īlāṅka much credibility with regard to accuracy as a source of information, and we cannot rely on what he says about the niyati-vādins, i.e. most probably the Ā jīvikas.

4.2.
The second source for BASHAM's (1951, p. 221, n. 1) identification of verse V 2 is Jñānavimala and his Praśna-vyākaraṇa 7. Since the work dates from the time around 1688 (?), we may safely assume, that the author no longer had any first-hand acquaintance of the Ā jīvikas, and he merely reproduced a verse from earlier sources without probably any knowledge of who the Ā jīvikas actually were. For the same reason we can safely dismiss the usefulness of another source of the verse, i.e. Yaśovijaya-gaṅi's Śāstra-vārttā-samuccaya-ṭīkā (Ś VSV ad Ś VS 2 2.62, vol. 2, p. 79.7-8 = Ś VS 1 2.174), for the author belongs to the same late period of 17th century. Both Jñānavimala and Yaśovijaya-gaṅi postdate Ś īlāṅka by eight centuries. For similar reasons we can also disregard the testimony of Abhayadeva-sūri (11th century) who quotes verse V 2 at least twice: in his commentary on the Uvāsagadasāo (UvDVi 166, p. 57) and in his Tattva-bodha-vidhāyinī (TBV 3.53 ad niyati, p. 714.11-27), as well as the testimony of another very late commentator Vijaya Darśana-sūri, who quotes the verse in his Saṁmati-tarka-mahârṇavâvatārikā (STPMAA, p. 352).

4.3.
All other sources for verse V 2 postdate Ś īlāṅka, and there seems to be just one which predates him. It is Haribhadra-sūri (8th century), who mentions the verse in his auto-commentary Yoga-bindu-ṭīkā (YBiṪ 313, p. 130.7-10). The verse is introduced, and rounded up, as follows: "Whatever thing is to be gained…" Also [the world's] being determined by destiny is nothing but dubious. In order to show that, it is said… 30 The context of verse V 2 mentioned in the Yoga-bindu (YBi 313) is the discussion of the causality of god (īśvara), primordial factor (prakr ti), souls (ātman) etc. Except for this passage, the term niyati otherwise does not occur in the text of Haribhadra's Yoga-bindu-ṭīkā.
What is striking in the description of determinism associated with the Ā jīvikas is the quadruplet of substance (dravya), place (kṣetra), time (kāla) and condition (bhāva), which are known to be standard parameters used by the Jainas, mostly in the context of sapta-bhāṅgī. 32 Therefore, it is rather unlikely that the paraphrase of determinist doctrine actually rests on genuine Ā jīvika terminology. It is equally unlikely that the one who reproduces Ā jīvika ideas does it both faithfully and with full knowledge of them.
Further, as a rule, in the Yoga-bindu and the Yoga-bindu-ṭīkā, Haribhadra does not quote from non-Jaina sources. In those rare cases where he apparently does, he seems to quote quite consistently by specifically introducing the verses which he draws from other sources. 33 In addition, the principle seems to be that Haribhadra does not specifically introduce his own verses, i.e. composed by him, in any particular way, except for occasional (but not obligatory) tathā or iti at the end.
A similar case to the one currently discussed (V 2 quoted by Haribhadra) is Yogabindu-ṭīkā 290, in which a pratīka of Yoga-bindu (YBi 290a: saṁvignaḥ) is directly followed by (Haribhadra's own?) verse. 34 There is still one more very similar case (YBiṪ 78, vide infra, p. 50, n.73) of the same structure (a pratīka followed by a verse, with no iti), which however moderates our findings: that verse is an attested quotation from an earlier source.
Nevertheless, considering all the above, it would seem quite likely that verse V 2 found in the Yoga-bindu-ṭīkā is not a genuine quotation from a lost Ā jīvika source but rather Haribhadra's own paraphrase of deterministic ideas entertained by the Ā jīvikas the way he understood them.
[Suppose] there is an agent …, but it [again] is unconscious. The cause necessarily has to put into effect this constraint, because these [causes (?)] are either such or otherwise; therefore there is only one agent, namely destiny, for occasional and random diversity of its aims is not a defeating argument against the singularity of this [destiny as a single cause]. And it is said in support: "Whatever thing is to be gained…". 35 The introduction to the verse is phrased in the context of a discussion on causality in the world and contains a reference, cryptic in many ways (perhaps also due to insufficiencies of the available text of the Dvādaśâra-naya-cakra restored on the basis of the commentary, from which its portions were extracted), to destiny as the only cause of world events. It is used as an argument against the causality exercised by the conscious principle (puruṣa). It is well known that Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṅa copiously availed himself of various works which he criticised but also quoted. the best known case is his use of large portions of Diṅnāga's Pramāṇa-samuccaya. It is very unlikely that the verse in question was a product of Mallavādin who, in his prose text, normally refrains himself from composing his own verses, and the verses found in his work are generally taken from other sources.
Interestingly, in all the above references verse V 2 is quoted without any modification or variant. In a number of other cases which are analysed in this paper the alleged Ā jīvika references are often found with some variants. It would, therefore, seem plausible that verse V 2 could be a genuine Ā jīvika verse due to the lack of any contrary evidence (I have not traced the verse in any other earlier work, e.g. of Jaina authorship).
However, it is most probably not the case. The source of the verse seems to be fable tradition, from which the Pañca-tatra derives or a version of the Pañca-tatra itself. The whole complete verse is found in one of the editions of the Pañca-tatra with a slight modification (in bold), whereby the verse is adopted to the contents of a story: Whatever thing is to be gained, even a person who is unconscious lying in bed will obtain it on account of the force of destiny. For even if living beings make great effort, that which is not to be does not happen, and there is no destruction of that which is to be. 36 35 DNC, nanu taj-jñatvâdy-ayuktatâivâiṣā samarthyate, yuktatvâbhimatatve 'pi câyam eva niyamaḥ kartr-antaratvâpādanāya. bhavati kartā ******** acetano 'pi bhavati. tan-niyama-kāriṇā kāraṇenâvaśyaṁ bhavitavyaṁ, teṣāṁ tathā-bhāvânyathā-bhāvād iti niyatir evâikā kartrī. na hi tasyāṁ kadācit kathañcit tad-arthânyarūpyam ekatva-vyāghāti. anvāha ca: prāptavyo niyati-balâśrayeṇa yo 'rthaḥ so 'vaśyaṁ bhavati nr ṇāṁ śubho 'śubho vā / bhūtānāṁ mahati kr te 'pi hi prayatne nâbhāvyaṁ bhavati na bhāvino 'sti nāśaḥ // 36 PañcT 1 2.7, verse 2.152, p. 163: prāptavyo niyati-balâśrayeṇa yo 'rtho niśceṣṭaḥ śayana-gato 'py upāśnute tam / bhūtānāṁ mahati kr te 'pi hi prayatne nâbhāvyaṁ bhavati na bhāvino 'sti nāśaḥ // One may justifiably argue that the case is actually the other way round: a genuinely Ā jīvika verse found its way into the narrative literature and fables, and a verse of originally philosophical pertinence was used and modified to serve fables. However, that counter-argument is somehow weakened (albeit not overturned) by the fact that portions of verse V 2 are found as parts of other verses of the Pañca-tantra. 37 It would rather seem more justified to assume that a repository of fable verses were freely used, recycled and modified as building blocks to serve the needs a of particular story, and such originally narrative verses were later used by philosophical authors, such as Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṅa, Haribhadra-sūri and others, to illustrate certain points they wanted to make in their own philosophical works.
There are a number of verses found in the Pañca-tantra which are meant to illustrate 'worldly wisdom', often with a fatalistic turn, such as this one: On the other hand, in the world the fruition-earned through one's life-of the own deeds of humans, who always resort to each other, whose actions are sinful, one is randomly happy or unhappy. Whatever is to be happens, there is no reason to deliberate over it. 38 This and similar verses (vide infra) were to illustrate the idea that one cannot really influence the course of one's life, that things are in a way predetermined; the poor will remain poor, if they manage a change in their lives, this does not happen through their work or effort but only by chance. In a way, such a pessimistic view is 'common-sense wisdom' that is encountered not only in India. It cannot in any way be directly linked to a systematic deterministic thought of the Ā jīvikas. Any resemblance such fable verses bear to real characters of the Ā jīvikas is therefore purely coincidental.
That is why we should eventually dismiss verse V 2 as a genuine passage which stems from the Ā jīvika philosophical or religious literature, but is just a verse taken from the Indian fable lore. dvīpād anyasmād api madhyād api jala-nidher diśo 'py antāt / ānīya jhaṭ iti ghaṭayati vidhir abhimatam abhimukhī-bhūtam // 1.6 // The third of these verses, i.e. V 5, is partly (pādas cd) found in at least two different sources, with various modifications adopted to different contexts. One of them is the alchemic Rasârṇava:

5.
What happened, what is to happen now and what will happen in the whole triple world, this [apprehension] would tell. [These are] his allies in the form as they must be. 42 The other source is the Advaitic Bhāmatī (Bhām) of Vācaspatimiśra, who quotes a part of the verse (pādas cd) in a very different context: But since this created world is fictional, there is its another ally made of illusion, as they say: "[Its] allies are precisely of such a form as they must be." 43 We can observe here a case very similar to the one noticed in the instance of the Pañca-tantra and fables: the use and recycling of the same versified material in different contexts. Jñānavimala's commentary to the canonical Praśna-vyākaraṇa is a patchwork in which various patterns are interlaced and adapted to serve his needs in order to illustrate the rather vague thesis that 'some [people] say that that the world is brought to existence through destiny'. But this is not necessarily the same theoretical concept which was expressed by the Ā jīvikas; it might equally be the 'common-sense wisdom' so frequently expressed in narrative tales and fables. In addition, these three verses in no way form a uniform whole, either in terms of contents or style, and the points of reference in each of them is quite different. As with verse V 2, there is therefore no reason to ascribe any of the verses quoted by Jñānavimala to the Ā jīvikas. Jñānavimala apparently draws from fables and tales.
6. Let us now turn our attention to another verse alleged by BASHAM (1951, p. 222) to genuinely belong to Ā jīvika literature. However, precisely this verse in precisely the same reading is also found in the Pañca-tantra. 45 Again, as in similar cases discussed so far, there is no reason to believe that the original source was an Ā jīvika text.

7.
Another verse BASHAM (1951, p. 222) draws our attention to is the following, which is preceded with an introduction explicitly ascribing the view expressed in the verse to the Ā jīvikas: 'For instance, the followers of the Ā jīvika theory say: Indeed, this verse is quite peculiar in many ways, including the fact that it to any other text and is thus seemingly unique. Malliṣeṅa-sūri's Syād-vāda-mañjarī, dating to 1229, is one of two works which refer to an idea of a return of Ā jīvika (apparently) liberated saints to mundane existence. The verse is, however, ambiguous and somewhat eccentric, which might make it a bit doubtful whether Malliṣeṅa-sūri flourishing in the 13th century Gujarat (where there had been no community of Ā jīvikas for centuries any longer) had any sound knowledge of the system of the Ā jīvikas.
However, the obscure idea has its predecessor in a passage found in Haribhadrasūri's Lalita-vistarā (LV), a commentary on the Caitya-vandana-sūtra, belonging to the eighth century. 48 There we find the sentence, introduced as a reference to a source: tīrtha-nikāra-darśanād āgacchanti, and quoted with reference to the Ā jīvikas, which conveys a very similar idea: ' [Ā jīvika cognoscenti]  In Haribhadra's interpretation the idea of the return must imply that the Ā jīvika liberated teachers are never liberated, inasmuch as they have never got rid of the binding karman. This is the idea taken further up by Malliṣeṅa. 51 As with Malliṣeṅa's verse, it is difficult to assess with certainly to what extent Haribhadra's sentence is a genuine quote from Ā jīvika sources.
The appellation 'the makers of the passage (ford) to the moral law' (jñānino dharma-tīrthasya kartāraḥ), found in Malliṣeṅa's verse (SVM), may seem at first atypical. From Buddhist and Jaina sources, if we can trust them, we know that the Ā jīvikas apparently used the term tīrthaṁ-kāra to refer to their founders and saints, in the very same way as the Jainas did. The Jainas themselves also used the appellation dharma-tīrtha-kāra since canonical times 52 ; it is also found in their Sanskrit philosophical literature. 53 It would therefore not be particularly surprising to find the same term or idea-dharma-tīrthasya kartāraḥ, dharma-tīrtha-kartr , dharma-tīrtha-kāra, etc.-being used by the Ā jīvikas from early times, and being used in the sense of 'a fully liberated religious founder'.
The second ambiguity is the expression tīrtha-nikārataḥ (following the earlier tīrtha-nikāra-darśanād), which could be understood in a variety of ways: (1) because there are obstacles to the pathway, or as BASHAM (1951, p. 222) translates: 'when the faith suffers injury'; (2) 'because the pathway (i.e. religious tradition) is diminished', i.e. people themselves gradually neglect the pathway and it becomes obsolete and in need of revitalisation; (3) 'because there is opposition to the pathway', i.e. non-believers abuse, or maltreat pious followers and oppose the creed, etc.; (4) 'because of the bringing down of the pathway [by the cognoscenti]', i.e. they themselves depart from or bring down the pathway. In any case, the verse does not allow for the translation of F.W. THOMAS (1960, p. 11): 'they come again into existence for the overthrow of heresies', albeit this is what BASHAM's understanding implies.
One of the interpretations of the compound tīrtha-nikārataḥ would suggest that the liberated beings would return as some sort of Bodhisattvas, who-untainted by karman and mundane world-reappear in the material world in order to rectify it and to show suffering humans the correct path anew. That such an interpretation of Ā jīvika's original idea behind these two reports (LV and SVM) could in fact be correct may be implied by the way Haribhadra later discusses the Mahāyāna idea of Bodhistattvas, and characterises them as 'standing (suspended) by giving up both mundane existence and liberation' 54,55 It is rather unlikely that this was an ancient idea of the Ā jīvikas; it is more probably a later development prompted by parallel developments in Buddhism and, perhaps, Viṣṅuism. Another interpretation could be that the Ā jīvika tīrtha-kāras depart from the mundane world and attain liberation (paramaṁ padam), whereas new teachers reappear in the world to continue the mission; that would point in a direction of a series of tīrtha-kāras, one succeeded by another, well-known from Jainism or Buddhism. Still another possibility would be -even though at first much less likely, but still possible in view of our extremely limited knowledge of the Ā jīvika doctrine-that even the liberated beings themselves could overstep certain limits and abuse the pathway, and in the end they would have to go through the whole cycle of saṁsāra anew, resulting in their having to go through the whole cycle of saṁsāra again. This interpretation would point to a ceaseless cycle of rebirths, at least in some cases. In fact, such an interpretation, or similar, may turn out to be most plausible in view of the context in which it occurs, namely the discussion of the qualities of a real tīrtha-kāra, who is of infinite knowledge (ananta-vijñāna) and whose faults have been eliminated (atīta-doṣa); Malliṣeṅa refers to a counter-argument, which incorporates Ā jīvikas as an example and embeds the above-quoted verse V 7: With regard to these [qualities of a tīrtha-kāra mentioned in the main text], an opponent says: "It is enough to says that [a real tīrtha-kāra] must be just someone of infinite knowledge, but not someone whose faults are eliminated", 54 LV 1 p. 394 = LV 1 p. 343: ete ca saṁsāra-nirvāṇôbhaya-parityāgena shitavantaḥ kaiścid iṣyante. inasmuch as the meaning [of the latter] is included [in the former], because without a destruction of faults infinite knowledge is not possible." We reply to this as follows: this [mentioning that a tīrtha-kāra must be, in addition, someone whose faults are eliminated] serves the purpose of excluding an authority conceived by followers of mistaken theories. For instance, the followers of the Ā jīvika theory say: V 7: "The cognoscenti who are the makers of the passage (ford) to the moral law, having reached the highest destination, return again to existence on account of the abuse (maltreatment) of the pathway (ford).
Therefore these [makers of the passage] are not those whose faults are eliminated. How could otherwise their descent (return) back to existence be possible, even if one sees the abuse of the pathway?" 56 The framework for the verse, perhaps authentic, is what Malliṣeṅa says; he indeed explains tīrtha-nikārataḥ as tīrtha-nikāra-darśane 'pi, which does not really fit grammatically into what we have in the verse. In any case, the idea which transpires, also supported by Haribhadra's reading, is that the liberated teachers of the Ā jīvikas fall back because their faults and karmic blemishes are never completely eliminated. That would ultimately render the whole idea of liberation meaningless, and would also contradict the image of a determined way to liberation, explicated in the Sāmañña-phala-sutta above: Just like a ball of thread, when thrown, exhausts itself, [simply] unwinding, exactly in the same manner both the fool and the wise-having transmigrated, having gone through the cycle of rebirths-will put an end to unhappiness.
Had this 'return' theory really been maintained by the Ā jīvikas, at least at some point of time, their opponents would not have hesitated to immediately point out the actual impossibility of liberation in their theory: the Ā jīvikas would be an easy prey for sharp criticism from all sides. However, we do not find such evidence from their critics, except for Haribhadra and Malliṣeṅa. Of course, we deal here with two equally unreliable sources-an early Buddhist and a late Jaina-and without access to more reliable data it is impossible to decide what the Ā jīvikas really believed in.
Here is precisely the methodological vicious circle mentioned at the outset: as long as we do not have a reliable picture of reconstructed doctrine of the Ā jīvikas, we cannot assess whether the above verse V 7 is compatible with what the Ā jīvikas claimed, ergo can be admitted as genuinely Ā jīvika, or whether it contradicts their doctrine, ergo has to be dismissed as inauthentic.
In addition, we must also take into account that the doctrine of the Ā jīvikas certainly evolved. It is possible that they did admit an everlasting liberation in the beginning, but in the course of time they (or some of their adherents) adopted another idea, namely that the liberation is never permanent.
Of course, an idea of transitory liberation is a contradiction in terms, because such a picture relegates 'the highest goal' to being merely to one of heavenly abodes from which one falls back to earth. Thus it is never liberation. Further, such an idea is incompatible with the determinism according to which the cycle of rebirths ends at a fixed moment after the lapse of a particular, though myriad, number of births and deaths. If we accept that one falls back from such 'limited liberation', there is no need to speak of a path to it determined by destiny, because 'limited liberation' becomes merely one of innumerable existences. Its only difference might be that it would be incorporeal, which would not be logical. But of course logic is hardly ever at work when it comes to religion and belief.
However, such a position of the Ā jīvikas would be so peculiar-even more peculiar than the idea of strict determinism-that it would certainly lead a number of critical comments and ridicules from other schools. That was however not the case: we do not hear such reports that the Ā jīvikas admitted of a fallible and temporarily 'limited liberation'.
For precisely these reasons I would be tempted to reject the above verse V 7 as not genuinely Ā jīvika, but merely a hearsay reference to their doctrine, which does not faithfully reproduce it. In the first place, since the passage is introduced as kecit … manyante, it can only be a paraphrase of an idea. In fact, it is quite likely that it is not even a genuine report but-due to the standard, almost mechanical phrase which Jñānavimala uses (n. 50) -a rephrasing of one of possible views about the origins of the world: kecit svabhāva-bhāvitaṁ jagad manyante, svabhāvenâiva sarvaḥ sampadyate. kecin niyati-bhāvitaṁ jagad iti jalpanti, bhavitavyatâiva sarvatra balīyasîti.
We therefore cannot attach any value to such and similar references because their informational value is actually tautological, and they certainly say nothing about the Ā jīvikas.
9. In fact, in many sources where the idea of determinism and destiny (niyati)-closely related to the Ā jīvikas-occurs, a range of similar causal factors are discussed (either all or most of them): (1) time (kāla), (2) intrinsic nature (svabhāva), (3) primordial factor (prakr ti), (4) destiny (niyati), (5) personal agency (puruṣa), (6) former deeds (pūrva-kr ta), i.e. karmic retribution (karman) and (7) god (īśvara), etc. 58 Since this list covers some of the factors sometimes associated with the Ā jīvikas, one may, it seems, justifiably entertain a suspicion that the list systematically reflects a set of causes which includes also causes which, at a certain point in the evolution of their doctrine to explain the causality of the world and auxiliary factors assisting the main force of destiny (niyati). Especially two would seem, at least in theory, good candidates to complement niyati, i.e. kāla (time) and svabhāva (intrinsic nature). At the same time we can safely exclude puruṣa (personal agency) and īśvara (god, creator) as causal complements of niyati: clearly the doctrine of destiny the way it was conceived in India did not allow for either god or creator as an external factor over and above destiny. The same was also the case with former deeds (pūrva-kr ta), because that would contradict the force of destiny, or with puruṣa, understood either as human agency, or as the active soul (ātman) or conscious inactive principle of the Sāṁ khya, since in both these meanings puruṣa was either incompatible with or, respectively, contrary to niyati.
If niyati-vāda can indeed be taken as a 'indicator' reference to the Ā jīvikas, and we know of no other system so strongly associated with this notion, the Śvetâśvatara-upaniṣad is the earliest Sanskrit reference to the doctrine of niyati, ergo to the Ā jīvikas.
Since both time and instrinsic nature are not necessarily incompatible with destiny, and may be conceived of as complementary to or supplementing the power of niyati, in the sense that they merely emphasise two aspects of destiny over which no one has any control and which override all individual actions and decisions, we should also consider whether they could be used as 'Ā jīvika indicators', i.e. whether we have any evidence that they were indeed conceived as corollaries of destiny and whether there are any verses referring to time and instrinsic nature that can be classified as genuinely Ā jīvika.
Another good example of such a list, dated slightly later, is that provided by the Jaina commentator Ś īlāṅka. In his discussion of various causes of the world and of happiness and unhappiness (SūyVr 1. 1.2.28-34, p. 37-40), Ś īlāṅka mentions four causes: destiny (niyati), personal agency (puruṣa), time (kāla) and god (īśvara). 61 Sau 16.17: pravr tti-duḥkhasya ca tasya loke tr ṣṇâdayo doṣa-gaṇā nimittam / nâivêśvaro na prakr tir na kālo nâpi svabhāvo na vidhir yadr cchā // 62 Despite the fact that BC 9.63cd does not seem to be related to BC 9.63ad, still BC 9.63 allows for some ambiguity, for it says: sargaṁ* vadantîśvaratas tathânye tatra prayatne puruṣasya ko 'rthaḥ / ya eva hetur jagataḥ pravr ttau hetur nivr ttau niyataḥ sa eva // 9.63 // 'Similarly others claim that the world* is due to god, and as far as this [world] is concerned, what would be the purpose of any effort on the part the human being? Only that which is the cause of any activity in the world is also determined to stop it.' * In the particular context of the discussion on how to achieve liberation and what is the driving force in the world, sarga cannot mean 'creation [of the universe]' but rather 'the world' or 'what happens in the world'. Ś īlāṅka explicates the doctrine of destiny, normally associated with the Ā jīvikas, but does not ascribe it to them in the passage: [The world is caused] only by destiny. This is what is said at the end of the second verse, namely that time is not the agent either, because-since this [time] is uniform-it would not be possible to explain the manifoldness of results (forms) in the world. For [the rule is that] there are a variety of effects if there are a variety of causes, but not if there are no variety of causes.… 63 The list does not, however, include instrinsic nature (svabhāva), which may indicate, that time and intrinsic nature were not, in fact, corollaries of destiny (niyati) as associated with the Ā jīvikas, but were independent causal factors postulated by schools other than the Ā jīvikas.
The rejoinder to the above verse does not represent Ś īlāṅka's own view but a tentative objection or uttara-pakṣa, which-in a complex argumentative structuremight be considered, perhaps, representing a genuinely Ā jīvika response: It has been criticised: "Since time is uniform, the manifoldness of the world is not be possible." This is not a [proper] criticism for us, because we do not accept time as the only one agent, but also karman. Therefore [the argument based on] the manifoldness of the world is not a [proper criticism]. Similarly, god is an agent as well… 64 After the discussion, when speaking of 'the doctrine of destiny (niyati-vāda) and other [doctrines]' 65 , Ś īlāṅka explicitly keeps destiny separate from the other causal theories discussed (time, god etc.) making it clear that the propounders of destiny (the Ā jīvikas?) did not combine it with other explanatory factors responsible for the change and causality in the world. Therefore it is extremely unlikely that the Ā jīvikas integrated in their belief a complex of causal factors, such as destiny, time, human agency and god taken jointly as a variegated whole. What actually remains as an 'Ā jīvika indicator' of later period (after approx. 1 century CE) and Sanskrit literature is niyati only.
Nowhere in the section on niyati begining at NĀ A 192.25-205.11 do we find the name of a particular school; the discussion is abstract, with nor reference to any existing thinker or philosophical current. 71 NĀ A 191.20-22: svo bhāva ātmanâiva svena rūpeṇa bhavanāt svabhāvaḥ. yathâhur eke: kaḥ kaṇṭakānāṁ prakaroti taikṣṇyaṁ vicitra-bhāvaṁ mr ga-pakṣiṇāṁ vā / svabhāvataḥ sarvam idaṁ pravr ttaṁ na kāma-cāro 'sti kutaḥ prayatnaḥ // 72 BASHAM translates the verse as follows: 'What makes the sharpness of thorns and the varied nature of beasts and birds? All this comes about by Svabhāva. There is nothing which acts at will. What is the use of effort?' and traces the source: 'Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā to Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, p. 13. V. also Abh. Rāj. s.v.' (BASHAM (1951, p. 226, n. 2)). 73 YBiṪ 78, p. 36.21-24, where its it is introduced with the phrase: svabhāva-vādâpattiḥ: kaḥ kaṇṭakānāṁ…, the phrase being merely a pratīka of YBi 78a. Apparently, while composing YBi 78, Haribhadra had in mind the original verse V 8 on which he makes a pun. 74 See KAVIRAJ (1966: 52-53). 75 TRD 1 § 23,p. 20: kaḥ kaṇṭakānāṁ prakaroti taikṣṇyaṁ vicitra-bhāvaṁ mr ga-pakṣiṇāṁ vā / svabhāvataḥ sarvam idaṁ pravr ttaṁ na kāma-cāro 'sti kutaḥ prayatnaḥ // badaryāḥ kaṇṭakas tīkṣṇa r jur ekaś ca kuñcitaḥ / phalaṁ ca vartulaṁ tasyā vada kena vinirmitam // V 9: Who beautified the eyes of does? And who endowed peacocks with so radiant tail plumage? Who makes the buds of petals in blue lotuses? Or who establishes good conduct among well-born men? 76 The verse strikes a familiar note with a range of similar verses found for instance in the Tattva-saṅgraha: What makes the diversity of filaments of a lotus flower? What has fashioned the variegated eyes in a peacock 's tail? 77 or in the Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha, What would colour peacocks? What would make cuckoos coo? In these cases, there is no other cause except intrinsic nature. 78 These views and verses are ascribed to the Lokāyatas / Cārvākas. 79 Also Ś īlāṅka combines the two images-that of sharp thorns and that of colourful tail plumage of peacocks-and explicitly establishes a connection with the materialists: Thus arises the multiform appearance of the world due to intrinsic nature, as it has been said: "The sharpness of thorns, colourful appearance of peacock, the colours of pheasants all occur indeed due to instrinsic nature." Thus the view of those who say that the soul is the same as the body (sc. materialists) has been described. 80 In the very same spirit Siṁ ha-sūri links the image of 'thorny things' and intrinsic nature to the materialists: As they say: One sees that the origin [of consciousness] depends solely on a complex configuration of material substances such as earth etc., so since [consciousness] is seen to originate in dependence on these [material elements] and because there is no deviance from instrinsic nature (i.e. 76 DNC, kenâñjitāni nayanāni mr gâṅganānāṁ ko vā karoti rucirâṅga-ruhān mayūrān / kaś côtpaleṣu dala-sannicayaṁ karoti ko vā karoti vinayaṁ kulajeṣu puṁsu // 77 TSa 111: As the above examples which consistently link the queries for the cause of the beauty of nature and animals to the materialists, 82 also verse V 9 can be easily dismissed as non-Ā jīvika. Since the sectarian source of V 9 is connected with that of V 8, we can be justified in also dismissing V 8 as a verse of Ā jīvika origin. And there are more reasons to dismiss this verse as authentically Ā jīvika. Again Bhattacharya (2012, p. 602) draws our attention to three other variants of verse V 8. In fact, there is yet another variant quoted by Vijaya Darśana-sūri in his Saṁmatitarka-mahârṇavâvatārikā. 83 All of these cases are associated with svabhāva-vāda and none of these cases is related to the Ā jīvikas in any way whatsoever.
The sources for both verses V 8 and V 9 are quite clear: V 8 (kaḥ kaṇṭakānāṁ prakaroti…) is from Aśvaghoṣa's Buddha-carita (BC 9.62), whereas V 9 (badaryāḥ kaṇṭakas tīkṣṇa…) from Haribhadra-sūri's Loka-tattva-nirṇaya (LTN 2.22). Both passages are associated with the doctrine of intrinsic nature (svabhāva-vāda). In fact, all of the above-mentioned cases when V 8 is quoted are associated solely with svabhāva-vāda; in none do the authors mention the Ā jīvikas. On the contrary, usually-albeit not always-the context makes it clear that the Cārvākas / Lokāyatas are meant. This confirms the observation of Gopinath Kaviraj (1966, pp. 46-54) who considers the svabhāva-vādins in some contexts as a branch of the Lokāyatikas.
svabhāva and the Ā jīvikas. They also make no link between svabhāva and niyati, seemingly being unaware of this possibility.
Still, the lack of any established links between svabhāva-vāda and niyati-vāda does not provide sufficient ground to criticise BASHAM (1951, p. 226) for maintaing that '[t]hese ideas have much in common' or for suggesting that svabhāva-vāda was 'a small sub-sect of Ā jīvikism', as does BHATTACHARYA (2012, p. 598), who adds: Basham's total involvement with the Ā jīvikas led him to include every heretical view as a part of Ā jīvikism. There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that the doctrine of svabhāva was adopted by any community, religious or secular. If the evidence of the ŚvUp (i.e. Ś vU-P.B.) and the Sau (i.e. Aśvaghoṣa's Saundarānanda-P.B.) is to be believed, svabhāva, along with but distinct from the doctrines of time, destiny, etc., was proposed by a set of philosophers whom the author/s of the ŚvUp did not approve of. Svabhāva is mentioned there only in connection with the origin of the universe, "the first cause", so to say.
First, contrary to BHATTACHARYA's claim, there is some evidence to suggest that the doctrine of svabhāva was adopted by some community/ies, in exactly the same way as niyati-vāda, karma-vāda, īśvara-vāda, puruṣa-vāda, etc., were. Svabhāva did not have to be a term that was linked to a particular religious community in one-to-one relationship, as e.g. anekānta-vāda is connected to Jainism and Jainism to anekāntavāda, or as Buddhism and kṣaṇika-vāda are so connected. One and the same term, through its different shades, could relate to various schools of thought at the same time. This was noted by Indian thinkers themselves, one of them saying that 'there are five kinds of the propounders of the doctrine of intrinsic nature.' 84 The proven connection of svabhāva-vāda to the materialists or to the Sāṁ khya 85 does not exclude its being related also to the Ā jīvikas, albeit we would require more solid prove to substantiate this link.
Second, 'a community' does not have to be a strictly religious community with a well-established social structure and interlinking network to be a community. Indeed, when we deal with certain ideas and doctrines in Indian tradition, they are professed by some philosophical schools, philosophical-religious sub-currents, subsects, etc. Adopting Bhattacharya's understanding, we could equally dismiss the ideas of, say, sat-kārya-vāda or īśvara-vāda, because it is neither strictly related to a particular religious group, being primarily upheld by philosophers and theoreticians, nor to religious followers, these being generally quite unconcerned about such debates.
Third, contrary to BHATTACHARYA's claim, there is no doubt some evidence to suggest that of the communities that possibly had some representatives subscribing to svabhāva-vāda, one could have been the Ā jīvikas. The idea of svabhāva is apparently present as early as the Sāmañña-phala-sutta, found as the third element (bhāva) in the compound: niyati-saṅgati-bhāva-pariṇatā ('they are developed by destiny, predetermined concurrence of factors and [own] nature'). The term svabhāva also features in the Niyati-dvātriṁśikā (NiDv 1, 10, 26, see below), which provides an account of the Ā jīvikas.
Having said that, V 8 and V 9 as candidates for a genuine survivors of Ā jīvikas' verses must both be rejected as being clearly related to materialists. 11. There is also some evidence that fate (daiva) as a determining cause was a concept associated with the Ā jīvikas and that at least sometimes was identified with niyati. In the section on 'the refutation of absolute admission of fate and human causality' (daiva-puruṣa-kārâikānta-nirāsaḥ) in his Aṣṭa-sahasrī-tātparya-vivaraṇa, Yaśovijaya-gaṅi cites two verses and provides a commentary establishing the link between daiva and niyati and the Ā jīvikas. A Prakrit verse illustrating his longer discourse on fate (AṣSTV 90, p. 913.21 ff.) runs as follows: V 10: 'Former deeds (pūrva-kr ta), karmic retribution (karman) In the interpretation of the verse I follow the context set by Yaśovijaya-gaṅi, who explains that 'everything is caused by fate' (sarvaṁ daiva-kr tam), 'because it has been established that even human effort, in the form of a transformation of the fruition of karman under the influence of time etc., is in fact an operation of fate' (kālâdi-kr ta-karma-vipāka-pariṇāma-rūpasya puruṣa-kārasya tattvato daiva-vyāpāratva-siddheḥ). The verse understood in this way could in theory be taken as originating from a Prakrit work by an Ā jīvika author. Such interpretation would, however, be too hasty. Without knowing the original context, the verse allows for at least two more interpretations, both of which are more plausible, and can be taken either (1) as an enumeration of six causes of the world: [The primary cause] is called: former deeds (pūrva-kr ta), karmic retribution (karman), diverse fruition [of past deeds], fate (daiva), the influence on this [karmic fruition] on the part of time etc. and human effort; or (2) as three separate definitions of karman, daiva and puruṣa-kāra: Former deeds (pūrva-kr ta) are called karmic retribution (karman); diverse fruition [of past deeds] is called fate (daiva); human effort (puruṣa-kāra) is the influence on this [karmic fruition] alongside time etc.
We may be well justified in suspecting that the context set by Yaśovijaya-gaṅi is not the original one, and that one should rather subscribe to either of the two alternative interpretations, none of which could be regarded as advancing the Ā jīvika claim that fate (daiva), or destiny (niyati), is the ruling factor in all that befalls the man.
Whatever the case may be, the information provided by this 17th-century author appears to be quite enlightening in being apparently the first tangible information about the Ā jīvikas. Thus we might hail the first success: what we have here at last is both a direct quotation as well as a title of an unidentifiable Ā jīvika work.

12.
What is disturbing about the above seemingly successful conclusion is that the source of the verse is a work ascribed to a Jaina Ś vetāmbara author, Siddhasenasūri: it is verse 16 of his Niyati-dvātriṁśikā. And that itself raises a range of questions.
Olle Qvarnström, in a paper 'Siddhasena Divākara on Ā jīvika' presented during 11th Jaina Studies Workshop at SOAS on 12th March 2009 devoted primarily to the Niyati-dvātriṁśikā, believes this hymn is of great historical importance because he thinks it may be an original Ā jīvika text that was edited by the compiler of the Dvatriṁśika and thus is an impartial account of their philosophy. 89 For various reasons-including structural, conceptual, terminological, thematic, vocabulary, lack of any overlap-one can not only endorse Qvarnström's claim that 'it is highly probable that the different hymns neither have a common authorship nor are composed by Siddhasena Divākara' 90 , but it may justify venturing much further and maintaining that a range of works ascribed to Siddhasena Divākara do not stem 89 Jaina Studies, Newsletter of the Centre of Jaina Studies 5 (2010) 12. from one and the same author. Indeed, the two best known-Saṁmati-tarkaprakaraṇa and Nyāyâvatāra-are separated by about 250 years. 91 In his paper 'The Niyativādadvātriṁ śikā ascribed to Siddhasena Divākara', into which his original London paper developed and in which he provides a collated reproduction of the text based on three editions and two manuscripts (not really present in the actual apparatus found in the manuscript OF QVARNSTRÖM's paper), QVARNSTRÖM gives a closer look at The Hymn on Destiny in 32 Stanzas (Niyati-dvātriṁśikā), which he incorrectly titles Niyati-vāda-dvātriṁśikā, 92 and maintains that The Niyatidvātriṁśikā may turn out to be such an Ā jīvika Sanskrit text, i.e. an emic portrayal of Ā jīvika doctrine-including certain polemical elementsreflecting a fully elaborated doctrinal system whose logic and epistemology resembled that of the Jains.
It is not clear to me what 'emic portrayal', or 'insider's perspective', really means. Would be a genuine text written by Ā jīvikas or not? And this is not a genuine text written by Ā jīvikas, how would it differ in essence from a typical doxographical work written by an outsider, i.e. a Jaina author?
In addition, if we only focus on the Niyati-dvātriṁśikā (NiDv), in this work there are some expressions that are identical (or almost identical) to those used in the other texts of the group, and these identical expressions are in metrically exactly (or almost exactly) the same positions: (1) NiDv 6cd: animittaṁ nimittāni nimittānîty avāritam // 6 // Dvātriṁśikā 17.1ab: deśa-kāla-nimittāni nimittāny aniyogataḥ / The above speaks, in my opinion, strongly against an independent, allegedly Ā jīvika origin of the Niyati-dvātriṁśikā, and instead supports a thesis of this and the other four short versified texts having a common author. This does not preclude, however, a possibility that the author (pseudo-Siddhasena Divākara) was sufficiently well informed about the school and his information is reliable. However, as long as we do not have a clear picture of what the Ā jīvikas actually maintained, we are not able to fully assess the faithfulness of the account found in the Niyati-dvātriṁśikā or to judge how far the account is that of a reflection in a distorting mirror. What is important in this context is that none of the verses of the Niyati-dvātriṁśikā is found to be quoted or referred to anywhere else, other than the very late quote by Yaśovijaya. If the work was indeed penned by an Ā jīvika author and was preserved as such by the Jainas, being then incorporated with some changes into a doxographical collection of short versified texts, one would expect to find the text quoted also in other sources as an illustration of the Ā jīvika doctrine, at least by Jaina authors. Another problem is the actual dating of this selection of the dvātriṁśikās, alongside the Niyati-dvātriṁśikā, and whether they indeed come from around 6th century. It must also be asked whether they can be ascribed to Siddhasena Divākara. However, there is a strong evidence that Siddhasena Divākara composed his Saṁmati-tarka-prakaraṇa before Diṅnāga, i.e. before ca. 480. 93 A close analysis of the textual material is necessary to determine the probable date of the dvātriṁśikās and their relation to Saṁmati-tarka-prakaraṇa.
Examining the vocabulary found in the Niyati-dvātriṁśikā also does not help us much to determine the work's authenticity. We can distinguish three lexicographic categories: 93  What conclusions can be drawn for this comparison? The presence of specifically Jaina terms (category 2), provided they were indeed not shared by the Ā jīvikas (and that we cannot know with certainty, given the extant material) would rather speak against genuinely Ā jīvika origin of the text, whereas the presence of typically Ā jīvika technical terms (category 3) would support a thesis that the Niyatidvātriṁśikā is actually based on Ā jīvika texts and recapitulates their doctrine second-handedly using the Ā jīvika lexicographic material. If it is indeed the casethat the text is a recapituation, albeit not necessarily an objective and non-partisan one-then the above supposition ( § 11, p. 33) that verse NiDv 16, quoted by Yaśovijaya (AṣSTV 91, p. 615.17-18) as V 11, must be interpreted as authentic criticism against the Ā jīvikas. 96 Nonetheless, the whole text of the Niyatidvātriṁśikā can be treated as a highly useful source, albeit biased, of information on the Ā jīvikas, their doctrine, certain concepts and terminology, especially when compounded with other similarly weak evidences.
13. There are some more stray references to niyati (destiny) and its propounders.
13.1 One is found in Ḋ allana's commentary on the Suśruta-saṁhitā of 13th century: 97 The propounders of destiny [claim] that "Destiny is [operative] with respect to righteousness and unrighteousness, which are earned through previous births, and only this [destiny] is the cause of everything".
It is most unlikely that it is an independent statement deriving from an authentic Ā jīvika work, because it almost identical in wording with the view expressed in Bhat˙ṫotpala's commentary on Varāhamihira's Br hat-saṁhitā 1.7: The same karman which is earned through previous births and which is people's fortune and misfortune is also the cause of origination and destruction of all living beings. 98 There the view is ascribed to the Mīmāṁ sakas. Further, to take the third person (iti niyati-vādinaḥ) as an auto-reference of the Ā jīvikas is impossible.

13.2.
There are a number of references to niyati found in the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha (YVā). 99 Metrically and stylistically speaking, the verses belong to the texture of Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, of which they are an integral part. Further, the expressions, terms and names used and the ideas (e.g. the beginning of the world or its creation, which presupposes a creator) found in the verses make it highly unlikely that the verses are either quotations from Ā jīvika sources or even faithful paraphrases, and they can safely be dismissed as candidates for quotes from Ā jīvika sources or even as reports or references to genuine Ā jīvika ideas.
another] human perseverance, then the perseverance of all living beings should consistently be [successful]. 100 These verses somehow echo a criticism against the idea of niyati, but they do not really refer to any concrete system, it seems. In Samantabhadra's work they are merely a rhetorical and argumentative device: fate is mentioned only as a vague idea in order to establish the overwhelming influence of karman, which must be eliminated through the path proffered by the Jinas. In addition, these verses seem to be genuine creations of Samantabhadra, who does not quote from other works in his Āpta-mīmāṁsā. They are also found nowhere else.

15.
To conclude, of the verses and passages that have been previously identified by BASHAM and other scholars as most probably genuinely Ā jīvika, none turns out to be derived from an Ā jīvika source. New material brought to our attention in the paper has produced some passages that at first seemed possible to qualify as genuinely Ā jīvika, however after some analysis they must also be dismissed. All the verses previously considered genuinely Ā jīvika have been composed by non-Ā jīvika authors and usually derive either from Jaina works or from fables or narrative literature. In other words, there is no single genuinely Ā jīvika verse or passage to be found.
Even those few that at first seemed uncontested after a preliminary analysis have also been shown to be spurious for a couple of reasons, primarily because until now they have been found to be quoted only in a single work, whereas generally alleged Ā jīvika verses are found in several works. That is why they have to be considered the product of later non-Ā jīvika authors.
Further, there is no proof that the Ā jīvikas developed their own Sanskrit literature, much less philosophical literature in Sanskrit. On the other hand, there is no evidence disproving their having such a body of texts.
Conspicuously, references to the Ā jīvikas and possible quotes from Ā jīvika sources in Sanskrit seem to be found almost exclusively in Jaina sources, with only a few suspicious exceptions (e.g. Yoga-vāsiṣṭha). Apparently it was mostly Jaina authors who engaged in discussions of the doctrinal elements of the Ā jīvikas. This may in itself be quite puzzling.
A probable explanation for that is that both religious groups shared the same historical origins. Perhaps when the Jaina authors composing in Sanskrit were still commenting on selected philosophical ideas of the Ā jīvikas, the religious movement had already lost its philosophical impact and become extremely marginal, to the extent that it was generally ignored by all, except for the Jainas who had had direct sectarian affiliation with them. That would further suggest that while the Jaina authors were referring to the ideas of the Ā jīvikas, there were no more any Sanskrit sources. The Jainas thus had to compose all such verses, pretending that they were authentic.
Last but not least, the faithfulness and reliability of reports of the Ā jīvikas and paraphrases of their views cannot be assessed with any certainty due to the vicious circle mentioned at the outset. Still, the stray fragments that we do have at our disposal, regardless of their actual reliability and accuracy, is all we have to reconstruct the doctrine of the Ā jīvikas.
It is also very difficult, if at all possible, to develop any consistent methodology to assess which of the material at our disposal relies on genuine knowledge of the Ā jīvikas' doctrine on the part of the reporter, which is solely based on hearsay and second-or third-hand knowledge, and which is merely imagining what would it be like if one assumed a deterministic theory of the world. My fear is that in many cases it is the third case, which is the least interesting option for a historian of ideas.
BASHAM's (1951) reconstruction of the doctrine of the Ā jīvikas, notwithstanding its merits, seems overoptimistic: in fact, it seems we know much less of that tradition than BASHAM thought we did. Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creative commons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.