The Concept of *Manas* in Jaina Philosophy

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Published online: 31 January 2020
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Abstract The first time Umāsvāti uses the word *manas* in his *Tattvārtha-sūtra* (TAS), the standard work for matters concerning Jaina philosophy, is when he lists the means of knowledge: *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manah-paryāya* and *kevala* (TAS 1, 9). These are the *pramāṇas* (TAS 1, 10). In TAS 1, 14 *mati* or sense perception is said to be caused by *indriya* and *aninindriya*; Pūjyapāda's commentary says that *anin-driya*, *antaḥ-karaṇa* and *manas* are synonyms. This obviously raises questions about the specific role and function of the *manas/anindriya* in *mati*, *manah-paryāya* and *śruta*, and how these retain their exclusivity without reducing the function of any of them to another means of cognition. In the Sāṅkhya system *manas* is seen as both an organ of cognition (*buddhīndriya*) and an organ of action (*karmendriya*, SK 27). It is interesting for a better understanding of the role of *manas* in Jaina thought to compare some aspects of it with the Sāṅkhya system.

Keywords *manas* · Jaina epistemology · Umāsvāti's *Tattvārtha-sūtra* · *mati* · *manah-paryāya* · *śruta* · Sāṅkhya

The concept of the *manas* in Jaina philosophy has hardly been a topic of independent study.¹ Its specific role is acknowledged in Jaina epistemology as is evident in Umāsvāti's *Tattvārtha-sūtra* (TAS), the standard work for matters concerning Jaina philosophy. He uses the word *manas* quite early in his text, the first

¹ See e.g., Kalghatgi (1991), Kobayashi (2010) and Soni (1991). This article is based on the paper presented at the World Sanskrit Conference, Vancouver 9–13 July 2018 in Section 11: Jaina Studies. The word *manas* is usually translated as the 'mind'.

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time when he lists the means of cognition or knowledge, *jñāna* (TAS 1, 9): *mati* (sense perception), *śruta* (scriptural or authoritative source of knowledge), *avadhi* (clairvoyance), *manah-paryaya* (telepathy or communicating without the use of the senses, also written *manah-paryāya*), and *kevala* (omniscience). For our purposes we can ignore two of them: *avadhi-jñāna*, because it is a special case occurring in celestial and infernal beings (TAS 1, 21/22),² and *kevala-jñāna*, because it occurs in *kevalins*, namely those who have overcome the influence of karmas and know things as they really are. We shall also not delve in detail into the actual function of *manah-paryaya* itself either, because it presupposes an advanced stage of asceticism, one that is not affected by the karma that usually hinders the function of *manah-paryāya* in ordinary individuals.³ Here I am interested in the category of the *manas* itself. We need to note that the first two, *mati* and *śruta*, are indirect means (*parokṣa*) and the rest are direct (*pratyakṣa*) means of cognition or knowledge (TAS 1, 11–12), a point that will soon be relevant. We shall see below that according to TAS 1, 14 *mati-jñāna* is caused (*nimitta*) by both the *indriyas* (sense organs) and the *anindriya/manas* (non-sense-organ). It is *mati-jñāna* that will chiefly occupy our deliberations here regarding the role of the *manas*, more than the other means of cognition.

That the *manas* is a crucial term is evident not only through the epistemological role it plays for example in *mati-jñāna* (see TAS 1, 13–14 below) and independently as *manah-paryaya*, but also because of its role in human activity as such. TAS 6, 1–2 say that together with actions of the body and speech (*kāya* and *vāk*), the action of the *manas* as well is responsible for the association or connection (*yoga*) with the *jīva* of fine, invisible, material *pudgala*-particles which then operate as karma. This is the Jaina metaphysical category of influx, *āsrava*, in TAS 1, 4 caused by the threefold activity of the body, speech and *manas* mentioned in TAS 6, 1–2.⁴

Before proceeding with the role of the *manas* in Jaina epistemology, which is the prime reason for the concern here, it might be useful to recall some fundamental facts in Jainism about the term *manas*. For a basic orientation regarding the concept itself and its role, it is helpful to look at the terms *pudgala*, *aṇu* or *paramāṇu* and *vargaṇā/vaggaṇā*, to see how *manas* is directly related to them.

The term *pudgala* is usually translated as ‘matter’ or ‘material atom’ (Jaini 1979, p. 81). Jaini (1979, p. 101) gives its etymology as traditionally “derived from *pum* (joining) plus *-gala* (breaking)”. A few related *sūtras* by Umāsvāti furnish a general idea regarding matter as such, *pudgala*, and how the *manas* is a form of it, together with how *aṇu* or *paramāṇu* (atom) is directly concerned with *pudgala*.

TAS 5, 5/4: *rūpiṇaḥ pudgalāḥ*, “Things which have form constitute matter (*pudgalas*).⁵

² The number after the slash refers to the Śvetāmbara version of the TAS which in some cases is different from the Digambara version. See Tatia (1994) for both versions.

³ See TAS 1, 23–24/24–25 and their commentaries. See also the article by Wiley (2003) for a concise overview of these.

⁴ TAS 6, 1: *kāya-vāṇi-manah-karma yogaḥ* | TAS 6, 2: *sa āsravaḥ* | See Soni (2016) for details.

⁵ All TAS translations based on Jain (1960).

TAS 5, 10: *saṅkhyeyāsaṅkhyeyāś ca pudgalānām*, “(The space-points [*pradeśas*]) of forms of matter are both numerable and innumerable”.⁶

5, 11: *nāṇoḥ (na aṇoḥ)*. Not for the atom (which has space points, *pradeśa*).

5, 19: *śarīra-vaṇ-manaḥ-prāṇāpānāḥ pudgalānām*. “(The function) of *pudgalas* (is to form the basis) of the body, the organs of speech, the *manas* and respiration.”

5, 20: *sukha-duḥkha-jīvita-maraṇopagrahās ca*. “(The function of *pudgalas* is) also to contribute to pleasure, suffering, life and death of living beings.”

5, 25: *aṇavaḥ skandhās ca*. Atoms and molecules (are the two main divisions of matter).⁷

5, 26: *bheda-saṅghātebhya utpadyante* “They (the molecules) are formed by division (fission) and union (fusion) and division-cum-union.”⁸ Evidently quoting this TAS 5, 26 Jaini (1979, p. 101) summarises how the Jainas envision the formation and destruction of matter (*pudgala*), namely “through atomic aggregation (*saṅghāta*) and disjunction (*bheda*)”.

TAS 5, 28: *bheda-saṅghātābhyām cākṣuṣaḥ*, “(Molecules produced) by the combined action of division (fission) and union (fusion) can be perceived by the eyes”.⁹

This random selection of *sūtras* describes matter and its role or functions. For our immediate purposes we need to note 5, 19 above, because *manas* is singled out as one of the categories formed out of matter or *pudgala* and how the terms *aṇu* or *paramāṇu* feature there, namely as a “division” of matter (5, 25), together with molecules. In continuing with the basic understanding regarding the *manas*, we now need to briefly look at the technical term *vargaṇā/vaggaṇā* (Sanskrit/Prakrit) of which the *manas* forms one such group.

The term *vargaṇā/vaggaṇā*, is translated as a “group” (Tatia 1951, p. 65).¹⁰ The 5th part of the *Śatkhaṇḍāgama*¹¹ is about *vargaṇā/vaggaṇā* in which four *anuyoga-dvāra* sections (*sparśa*, *karma*, *prakṛti* and *bandha*) are discussed, namely topics of discussion dealt with in the text. The term therefore seems to be used in the sense of

⁶ TAS 5, 8 is also relevant here: *saṅkhyeyāḥ pradeśāḥ dharmādharmaika-eka-jīvānām*, “There are innumerable points of space in the medium of motion, the medium of rest and in each individual *jīva*”.

⁷ Jaini (1979, p. 101) sees molecules as aggregates of atoms.

⁸ The last part of the translation is taken from the SS commentary to the *sūtra* which says that the “plural is used to include the third, namely, the combined process of division and union” (*bahuvacana-nirdeśas tritaya-saṅgrahārthaḥ*), see also Jain (1960, p. 154). The Śvetāmbara version reads: *saṅghāta-bhedebya utpadyante*, see Tatia (1994, p. 134). Umāsvāti’s commentary also speaks of three causes (*kāraṇa*) whereas Pūjyapāda uses the word *nimitta* (SS commentary to TAS 5, 26 § 576, line 2).

⁹ Tatia (1994, p. 134) translates TAS 5, 28 as: “The visibility of the clusters is produced by the combination of disintegration and integration”. This probably means that the clusters of molecules which are visible arise through a disintegration and integration of these molecules. See below for the conjecture that Umāsvāti seems to summarise his *saṅghāta* and *bheda* from the discussion in the ŚkhĀ, vol. 14, *sūtras* 5, 6, 98–116 (pp. 133–223, including the commentary).

¹⁰ For *vaggaṇā* see also ĀvN 29 (in Leumann p. 7, line 4) and Bhagavaī 1, 19–22, , 14, 79. Reference from Oberlies (1993, p. 142). He notes *vaggaṇā* as a “term[inus], tech[nicus]”. His entry reads: (JSkt. *vārgaṇā*-) “catégorie, classe, division / Klasse, Gruppe / category, class, division”.

¹¹ The ‘Scripture in Six Parts’ is an important Digambara canonical work. See Jaini (1979, p. 51) and also Dundas (2002, pp. 63–65) for interesting details about the discovery of this second century work discovered not long before it was published in 16 volumes between 1896 and 1922.

a division in separate exposition-groups of the *anuyoga-dvāras*.¹² In *sūtras* 5, 6, 98–116 (vol. 14, pp. 133–223, including the commentary), the ŚkhĀ enters into a debate over the terms *saṅghāta* and *bheda* (Pr. *saṃghāda* and *bheda*) of *pudgala*-atoms. In *sūtras* 5, 6, 728–756 of the ŚkhĀ (pp. 546–556, vol. 14) a list of five *vaggaṇās/vargaṇās* is briefly mentioned, in which the *manas* is mentioned. These are called: *āhāra-teyā-*, *bhāsā-*, *maṇa-* and *kammaiya-davva-vaggaṇā*, namely the *dravya-vargaṇās* respectively called *āhāra*, *taijasa*, *bhāṣā*, *manas* (*mano-*) and *kārmaṇa*, from which 23 further types are derived.¹³

Since I am concerned only with the *manas*, as a ‘group’, we can look at the four kinds of the *manas*-substance, *maṇa-davva-vaggaṇa*, given in ŚkhĀ 5, 6, 750–751 (vol. 14, pp. 551–552), so that it is clear that the *manas* is a form of matter and that it directly affects the nature of the sentient principle, *jīva*. The *sūtras* about the *manas* group of matter are:

maṇa-davva-vaggaṇā cau-vvihassa maṇassa gahaṇaṃ pavattadi || ŚkhĀ 5, 6, 750 ||

sacca-maṇassa moṣa-maṇassa sacca-moṣa-maṇassa asacca-moṣa-maṇassa
jāṇi davvāṇi ghattūṇa sacca-maṇattāe moṣa-maṇattāe sacca-moṣa-maṇattāe
asacca-moṣa-maṇattāe pariṇāmedūṇa pariṇamaṃti jīvā tāṇi davvāṇi maṇa-
davva-vaggaṇā ṇāma || ŚkhĀ 5, 6, 751 ||

The text says that the group of *pudgala*-atoms that makes up the *manas* is “active” and becomes transformed into four types of *manas*: true or pure, deceptive, a combination of both and a combination of an untrue and deceptive *manas*. These forms of *manas* cause the sentient principle (*jīva*) to be transformed accordingly in the sense that the *jīva* is obstructed by the form that a particular group of the *manas* substance (*maṇa-davva-vaggaṇā/mano-vargaṇā*) takes on, positively in a pure way or negatively in a deceptive manner, with their respective combinations. This description of the role of *manas* is relevant not only in the context of its role in ethical conduct but also in the context of epistemology in which the *manas* plays a significant function, as we shall see below.

The conclusion we can draw from the ŚkhĀ discussion on *vargaṇā/vaggaṇā* is that the technical term itself, but not the idea behind it, was abandoned by Umāsvāti in his TAS, perhaps for the sake of brevity so as not to have to discuss in any detail

¹² See under Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali, vols 14–15.

¹³ The groups, *vargaṇās/vaggaṇās*, refer to what is constituted of atoms and molecules of *pudgala* and the space-points (*pradeśa*) they occupy. See Tatia (1951, p. 65) for a description of how the groups are formed and pp. 65–69 for *maṇaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*, including how this is distinguished from *avadhi-jñāna*. See also Varṇī (1990) for a summary of 23 *vargaṇās* derived from the basic five types, vol 3, p. 515. As for *kārmaṇa-vargaṇā* in the SS, Jain (1960) mentions it in his index, p. 294 as “molecules of karma matter which fill the universe” and refers to TAS 8, 24/25, but the word neither occurs in the *sūtra* nor in the SS commentary. Although the idea of a group is carried over, Umāsvāti avoids the word *vargaṇā*. See further below. The basic 5 types of *vargaṇās* are distinct from the 5 types of bodies (*śarīrāṇi*) in TAS 2, 36/37.

A debate has arisen about the antiquity of the ŚkhĀ in comparison with the fourth Śvetāmbara *upāṅga*, the *Prajñāpanā-sūtra* (*Paṇṇavaṇā-suttaṃ*). Whatever the final outcome of the ongoing debate about which text is earlier (see Soni 2015, p. 133), it might be of interest to know that judging from the entries of the term *vargaṇā/vaggaṇā* in the index to the *upāṅga*-text, there does not seem to be such an exposition of *vargaṇā* as in the ŚkhĀ. See s.v. vol. 9 of the Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya edition, in two parts, the *Paṇṇavaṇā-suttaṃ* (*Prajñāpanā-sūtra*).

the vast theme of the numerous groups of matter. Umāsvāti took over the idea of a group of atoms that join one another or disjoin (TAS 5, 26 above), omitting the explicit term *vargaṇā/vaggaṇā*, retaining only the idea of *saṅghāta* and *bheda*. The topic of *vargaṇā/vaggaṇā* is interesting in itself, but our concern is only with the *manas* as a group of matter, particularly in the epistemological role it plays in Jainism and especially with reference largely to one of the five *pramāṇas* in Jainism, and briefly mentioning the two other means of cognition: *mati* (sense perception), *śruta* (scriptural or authoritative source of knowledge), *manah-paryaya* (telepathy or communicating without the use of the senses, also written *manah-paryāya*). As already pointed out, we are omitting the remaining means mentioned in TAS 1, 9 *avadhi* (clairvoyance) and *kevala* (omniscience) for the reasons already mentioned. Up to this point we have now seen how the concept *manas* fits into the structure of *pudgalas* as a specific group. Let us now proceed to the role of the *manas* in our cognition.

Cognition is a speedy, split-second, complex procedure involving our entire psycho-somatic structure and the Sāṅkhya system gives a clear presentation of it, which we have learnt early in our studies in Indian philosophy. In Sāṅkhya, cognition through the senses is a process that involves the roles of *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, *manas* and the *indriyas*, where the *manas* has the unique status of being both a *buddhīndriya* as well as a *karmendriya* (SK 26–27).¹⁴ It is generally taught that the role of the *manas* is indispensable in the cognition process, playing an important intermediary function between the external sense organs (the eyes, ears, etc.) and the outer world of objects observed through the *indriyas* or external senses, resulting in the final judgement about the object, that the object of perception is this or that thing. ‘With the split-second speed of thought’ (*manovegena*) *manas* passes on the data provided by the sense-organs to the *buddhi* which then makes the final judgement that the object is this or that thing. It is known that in Sāṅkhya *manas* is an evolute of *prakṛti* or matter as such.

We saw that the Jains also see *manas* as matter, which they call *pudgala*. However, whereas Sāṅkhya has a system of 24 categories which makes up its ontology and metaphysics, Jainism has just the two ontological categories (*dravya*) of *jīva* and *ajīva*, with the latter being a generic term standing for *pudgala*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* and *kāla*. These two, *jīva* and *ajīva*, constitute the basis on which Jainism builds up its metaphysics, adding to these two the five well-known concepts of *āsrava*, *bandha*, *saṃvara*, *nirjarā* and *mokṣa* (TAS 1, 4). To compare the unique status of *manas* as both *buddhīndriya* and *karmendriya* in Sāṅkhya with *manas* in Jainism, is quite instructive because it reveals interesting insights and differences, as we shall see below when we briefly mention the point concerning an advanced state ascetic discipline. Moreover, in the epistemological context, Sāṅkhya accepts only three *pramāṇas* (*drṣṭa*, *anumāna* and *āpta-vacana*, SK 4) whereas Jainism has a different classification of two *pramāṇas* (*parokṣa* and *pratyakṣa*), the first comprising *mati* and *śruta*, and the latter *avadhi*, *manah-paryaya* and *kevala*,

¹⁴ *buddhīndriyāṇi cakṣuḥ śrotra-ghrāṇa-rasana-tvag-ākhyāni | vāk-pāṇi-pāda-pāyūpasthān karmendriyāṇy āhuḥ || SK 26 || ubhayātmakam atra manah saṅkalpakam indriyaṃ ca sādharṇyāt | guṇa-pariṇāma-viśeṣaṇ nānāvṛṇaṃ bhāva-bhedāś ca || SK 27 ||*

making up five in all. It is interesting that *mati*, sense perception, is regarded as *parokṣa*, namely as being indirect, whereas in Sāṅkhya it is a direct form of cognition. Let us look at some details concerning *mati-jñāna* and the role of *manas* in it.

Mati-jñāna

In dealing with the concept of *manas* in Jainism we are compelled to become more precise in our concern with Jaina epistemology. Usually *mati-jñāna* is simply regarded as sense perception, without distinguishing not only the perception of sight from the others (touch, taste, smell and hearing), but also ignoring the four stages involved in the process of *mati-jñāna* (*avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya/apāya* and *dhāraṇā*, TAS 1, 15). This is noteworthy because the *avagraha* stage of *mati-jñāna* does not apply to sight (and the *manas*), as we shall see immediately. Let us recall that *mati*, and *śruta*, are indirect means of cognition and in the case of sense perception, the Jainas draw a perceptive distinction between sight and the other sense-organ perceptions. The significance of this for us is that for the Jainas the functions of sight and the *manas* have to be treated separately.

TAS 1, 14 says that *mati-jñāna* (with its synonyms *smṛti*, *saṃjñā*, *cintā*, and *abhinibodha*, supplied in TAS 1, 13) is caused by the *indriyas* (sense organs) and the *anindriya* (non-sense-organ).¹⁵ A part of Pūjyapāda's commentary on this is directly relevant here. He says that *anindriya*, *antaḥ-karaṇa* and *manas* are synonyms.¹⁶ He adds that the negative particle (*nañ*) in *anindriya* is used in the sense of *iṣat*, meaning that the *anindriya* is not a 'complete' *indriya* as the external senses are, but somehow like them, a sort of *indriya*, a crypto-sense-organ. Further, this *anindriya* or *manas* is not dependent on the *indriyas*: "because it is not seen externally, like the eyes, etc., and because it is independent of the *indriyas* in investigating thoughts of qualities and faults, and for memory, etc., the internal instrument is said to be *antaḥ-karaṇa*."¹⁷ Hence, *manas* has some sort of independence and uniqueness.

Not only is this a clear statement about *anindriya*, *antaḥ-karaṇa* and *manas* being synonymous, and a key one at that, but it is obviously from the specific Jaina perspective: it hints at the *independence* of the category of *manas*, apart from alluding to the particular role it is given in its changed, functional mode as a specific instrument of knowledge or cognition, namely as *manaḥ-paryaya* (telepathy or communicating without the use of the external senses, the eyes, etc.). This independence of *manas* is not of the Vaiśeṣika type where the *manas* and the *ātman* are listed as two of the nine *dravyas* in VS 1, 5.¹⁸ In Jainism *manas* would be a part

¹⁵ TAS 1, 14: *tad [mati-jñānam]-indriyānindriya-nimittam*.

¹⁶ SS on TAS 1, 14, § 186: *anindriyam manaḥ antaḥ-karaṇam ity anarthāntaram. ... iṣad-arthasya nañāḥ prayogāt. iṣad-indriyam anindriyam iti*.

¹⁷ SS on TAS 1, 14, § 187: *guṇa-doṣa-vicāra-smaraṇādi-vyāpāreṣu indriyānapekṣatvāc cakṣur-ādivad bahir-anupalabdeś ca antar-gataṃ karaṇam antaḥ-karaṇam ity ucyate*.

¹⁸ *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* 1, 5: *prthivy-āpas-tejo vāyur ākāśaṃ kālo dig-ātmā mana iti dravyāṇi*.

of *ajīva-dravya* and a type or group of *pudgala*, as we have seen, with *jīva* being the only other *dravya* that the Jaina tradition accepts.

The SS commentary on TAS 1, 14 reveals an interesting aspect regarding the role of *manas*. It is said there that the *manas* is a sign (*liṅga*) of the *jīva* (here referred to as *indra*).¹⁹ Neither the SS commentary nor Umāsvāti's auto-commentary says exactly how the *manas* operates, only that its function implies the existence of a sentient principle, of which the *manas* is a sign. As in the case of *upayoga*,²⁰ *manas* is also related to the *jīva*, and plays a role as a mass of *pudgalas* in *matī-jñāna*, a *pramāṇa* that is described as being an indirect means of cognition. Apart from this, the *manas* plays an independent role in its modified form as *manaḥ-paryaya*, as an autonomous *pramāṇa*, described and functioning now as a *direct* means of cognition.²¹

So what is the problem? It is in the details. On the one hand, *matī* arises through the functions of the *indriyas* and the *anindriya* (TAS 1, 14) and *manaḥ-paryaya* arises without the *indriyas*. Moreover, TAS 1, 19 says that indistinct apprehension (*vyāñjana/avagraha*, see below) does not apply to sight (perception through the eyes) nor to the *anindriya/manas* (TAS 1, 19: *na cakṣur-anindriyābhyām*). This means that the process of perception through sight is different from the perceptions through the other senses, touch, taste, smell and hearing. One arrives at this position through inference as well (apart from the scriptures),²² because the eye 'acts on any object without direct contact with it' (*aprāpya-kāri*) and because it is not intercepted through contact (*sprṣṭānavagrahāt*).²³ This statement gives the impression that in contrast to the other senses, the eyes seem to perceive directly, but is in fact not so. Even with the exclusion of one stage in the cognition process, sight being different from the other senses, is still *matī-jñāna* and, together with *śruta*, it is regarded as being indirect (*parokṣa*), with the others being direct (TAS 1, 11–12).

¹⁹ SS on TAS 1, 14, § 186, last sentence: *na tathā manaḥ indrasya liṅgam api sat-pratiniyata-deśa-viśayaṃ kālāntarāvasthāyi ca* | "Even though *manas* is a 'sign' of *indra* (= *jīva*) it does not cognise objects within a limited space nor remain for long" (tr. based on Jain 1960, p. 23).

²⁰ For *upayoga* also as a 'sign' (*lakṣaṇa*) of the *jīva* see Soni (2007, p. 299). TAS 2, 8 says that *upayoga* is the distinctive characteristic of the sentient principle, *jīva*, namely its 'functions, applications, or faculties' which play a significant role in the cognition process (as *jñānopayoga* and *darśanaopayoga*), in which the function of the *manas* is presupposed.

²¹ It may be said that the functions of all the sense organs as well indicate the presence of sentience (*jīva*), without whose 'presence' the sense organs cannot fulfil their functions. The point here about *manas* and *upayoga* being at the service of *jīva* seems to be concerned with the subtle and crucial level in the 'final process' of cognition, not with the simple functions of the external senses in this process.

²² In quoting an unidentified scripture in his SS commentary on TAS 1, 19, § 203 to support the view that sight is different from smelling, etc., Pūjyapāda says: *āgamatas tāvat "puṭṭhaṃ sunodi saddhaṃ apuṭṭhaṃ ceva passade rūpaṃ | gaṇdhaṃ rasaṃ ca phāsaṃ baddhaṃ puṭṭhaṃ viyānādi ||"*.

²³ SS commentary TAS 1, 19, § 204: *yuktiś ca — aprāpya-kāri cakṣuḥ, sprṣṭānavagrahāt*.

In order to better understand TAS 1, 19, just quoted above, we have to look at both TAS 1, 18 and 19 together:

TAS 1, 18 *vyañjanasyāvagrahaḥ*

TAS 1, 19: *na cakṣur-anindriyābhyām* (as quoted above).

These *sūtras* state that there is a *vyañjana*, (an apprehension/sensation of indistinct things, by all the senses), except (only) in the case of the eye and the *manas* (TAS 1, 19). In order to understand the terms *vyañjana* and *avagraha* here we have to look back at TAS 1, 15 which provides us with the four stages or divisions, of the process of *mati-jñāna* (sensory perception):

TAS 1, 15 says: *avagrahehāvāya-dhāraṇāḥ* (= *avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya* and *dhāraṇā*): apprehension or mere sensation, speculation, perceptual judgement and retention (are the four divisions of *mati*, sense perception).

In other words *mati-jñāna* is not simply *mati-jñāna* because, generally, it involves four stages before the object is completely cognised and, in the particular case of sight and the function of *manas*, these two have a special status because the first *avagraha* stage of *mati-jñāna* is short-circuited. Sight and *manas*, are excluded because the *avagraha* stage in the process of perception does not take place in them: the stage of apprehension, a mere sensation or an indication that there is an object presented to a respective sense organ, but not yet fully grasped, is excluded in sight and the *manas*. Cognition as such would occur in fact in the third and fourth stages of *avāya* (also called *apāya*) and *dhāraṇā*, the final judgement about the object and its retention respectively (the stage of *īhā* or speculation is not yet perceptual judgement or *avāya*). For this technical reason, the functions of sight and the *manas* are treated separately from the other sense perceptions.

What would be reason for excluding the *avagraha* stage in the process of cognition through sight or the *manas*? How is sight or the *manas* different from the other four sense perceptions through touch, taste, smell and hearing? The text teaches us that the four, touch, taste, smell and hearing, presuppose a direct contact between the sense-organ and its respective object: wind, etc., has to be in direct contact with the skin to cause a sense of touch, the tongue has to touch something sweet or sour to register taste, a scent or odour has to enter the nose to smell it, and sound waves have to enter the ear in order for us to hear them. This does not seem to be case with the eyes and the mind, nothing has to ‘enter’ them for the ‘sight’ of the object looked at, or in investigating thoughts of qualities and faults, or for memory. Hence the stage of *avagraha* is short-circuited or omitted, so that the eyes and *manas* directly cognise their respective objects, without the stage of an unspecified object of perception. This is precisely the problem that is being confronted here: *mati-jñāna* (sensory perception) is defined as *parokṣa-jñāna* or indirect perception, so that *seems* to exclude the eyes (and *manas*) which has a special status.

The upshot of these deliberations is that we have to distinguish not only between sight and the other organs of perception, but also between it and the role of the *manas*. Moreover, we have to also distinguish between the *manas* as such, as group of material particles (*vargaṇā/vaggaṇā*), discussed above, and the *manas* in its modified form as *manaḥ-paryāya* which, by definition, is a direct mode of cognition

(*pratyakṣa*). In other words, the role of the *manas-vargaṇā* or *manas-group* in *mati-jñāna* (sense perception) makes sense perception indirect (*parokṣa-jñāna*), through the role of the senses, whereas in its modified form as the *manaḥ-paryāya* means of cognition (telepathy) it is direct (*pratyakṣa-jñāna*) because, as we saw, *manaḥ-paryāya* is a form of communication without the use of the senses. These details are significant in order to uphold the basic Jaina distinction between *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*, as already hinted at above when talking about sight and *manas*. The difference is on account of the role of the senses in perception and their exclusion in the *manaḥ-paryāya* means of cognition, in terms of Jaina epistemology.

The rest of Pūjyapāda's commentary to TAS 1, 19, § 204 in full verifies what was said above. After *sprṣṭānavagrahaṭ* mentioned above, Pūjyapāda goes on to say there:

yadi prāpya-kāri syāt tvag-indriya-vat sprṣṭam añjanam grhṇīyāt, na tu grhṇāt yato mano-vad aprāpya-kārīty-avaseyam | tataś cakṣur-manasi varjayitvā śeṣāṇām indriyāṇām vyañjanāvagrahaḥ | sarveṣām indriyāṇindriyāṇām arthāvagraha iti siddham |

If (the eye) were in contact (with the object) then, like the sense of touch, it would [just as well] perceive the collyrium (*añjanam*, applied to the eye), but it does not perceive it, so it is to be understood that, like the *manas*, the eye is a sense without (physical) contact (with the object). Therefore, apart from the eye and *manas*, the other senses perceive indistinct things (TAS 1, 18 says: *vyañjanasyāvagrahaḥ*). It is thus established that all the *indriyas* and the *anindriya/manas* perceive (their respective) objects [differently].²⁴

Umāsvāti's auto-commentary on TAS 1, 19 says:

cakṣuṣā no-indriyeṇa ca vyañjanāvagraho na bhavati | caturbhir-indriyaiḥ śeṣair bhavatīty arthaḥ | evaṃ etan mati-jñānam dvi-vidham catur-vidham aṣṭa-viṃśati-vidham aṣṭa-śaśasṭhyutara-śati-vidham ṣaṭ-triṃśa-tri-śati ca bhavati |

There is no apprehension of what is indistinct (*vyañjana*) through the eye and *manas*. This means that it (an indistinct apprehension) occurs (only) through the remaining four sense organs (touch, taste, smell and hearing). Thus, this *mati-jñāna* can be twofold, fourfold, twenty-eightfold, one hundred and sixty-eightfold or three hundred and thirty-sixfold.²⁵

What the above brief summary concerning the concept of *manas* has revealed in the case of sense perception or *mati-jñāna*, is the teaching that the function of sense perception through the eyes (and the *manas*) is to be seen in a significantly different way from the other four sense perceptions, through touch, taste, smell and hearing. The reason we saw was that according to the Jainas objects known through sight do not 'enter' the eyes, as is the case with the other sense perceptions where a direct

²⁴ The rest of the SS commentary on TAS 1, 19 merely introduces the next *sūtra*.

²⁵ This is the Jaina classification with reference to numbers: twofold would be: *indriya* and *anindriya*; fourfold would be: *avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya*, *dhāraṇā*; 4X6 senses (5 senses and *manas*) + the 4 senses that have *vyañjanāvagrahaḥ* = 28; etc.

contact with the respective sense organ is necessary: contact with the skin is necessary to cause a sense of touch, the tongue has to touch something sweet or sour to register taste, a scent or odour has to enter the nose to smell it, and sound waves have to enter the ear in order for us to hear them. In other words, we have to separate sight and the *manas* from the others for the sake of precision when talking about the Jaina theory of knowledge.

Śruta-jñāna

There has been an age-old debate in the history of Indian epistemology about the exact and independent nature of scriptural or authoritative knowledge, variously referred to as *śruti*, *śabda*, *āpta-vacana*, or *śruta* in Jainism. Those who regard it as a separate, autonomous *pramāṇa*, do not relegate it to either sense perception or inference. This holds true even if it is accepted that the function of the eyes and/or ears in reading or hearing serve as an aid. The senses by themselves, however, do not yield the essence of scriptural knowledge any more than the eyes alone by themselves yield the cognition of fire by seeing only the smoke. The protracted debate on this will not be reproduced here. Only the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* is being quoted for the Jaina position: TAS 1, 20: *śrutaṃ mati-pūrvam dvy-aneka-dvādaśa-bhedam* “Scriptural knowledge, preceded by sensory knowledge, is of two kinds, which are of twelve and many subdivisions”. This *sūtra* refers to the precedence of sense perception (reading or listening) so that the points mentioned above about *mati-jñāna* would apply to scriptural or authoritative knowledge. The actual grasping of the authoritative teaching is an internal process, after the senses have performed their functions. The question of the occurrence of error in our cognition is a topic for a separate study (see Soni 2018, especially pp. 51–65).

Manah-paryaya-jñāna

The changed mode of *manas* in the form of *manah-paryaya* is direct (by definition) and we saw how *manas* is allied to sight which is *mati-jñāna*, namely indirect.

The five kinds of *pramāṇa* are listed in TAS 1, 9 and Pūjyapāda’s SS commentary on it mentions a point that we can now better understand. It has to do with the specific role of *manas* and shows an awareness of the concern with how *manah-paryaya* is different from *mati-jñāna*. He says there:

parakīya-mano-gato ’rtho mana ity ucyate | sāhacaryāt tasya paryayaṇaṃ parigamaṇaṃ manah-paryayaḥ | mati-jñāna-prasaṅga iti cet; na; apekṣā-mātratvāt | kṣayopaśama-śakti-mātra-vijrmbhitaṃ hi tat-kevalaṃ sva-para-manobhir vyapadiśyate | yathā abhre candramasaṃ paśyati | (SS on TAS 1, 9, §164, pp. 67–68).²⁶

²⁶ See also Tatia (1952, pp. 66–67).

The object connected with the *manas* of another person is said to be the *manas* [of the other person]. *Manah-paryaya* is ascertaining it, encompassing it on account of an association with it. Now, is it *mati-jñāna*? No, because it (*manas*) is merely relative (or related to it). That which is displayed by destruction-cum-subsidence alone is merely spoken of with reference to one's own and another's *manas*, just as we say 'look at the moon in the sky' (here the sky is intended merely as the background) (tr. based on Jain 1960, p. 16).

It is noteworthy that only after many *sūtras* subsequent to TAS 1, 9 which mentions the five *pramāṇas*, *mati*, etc.,²⁷ do we learn that three of them *mati*, *śruta*, and *avadhi* can or may be erroneous as well (TAS 1, 31/32: *mati-śruta-avadhāyo viparyayaś ca*), not *manah-paryaya* and *kevala*! This means that we have to re-read TAS 1, 9 in the light of TAS 1, 31/32 in order to arrive at a proper view of Jaina epistemology and the theory of error couched in it. The point is noteworthy because of the special status given to *manah-paryaya* (and *kevala*). Since they are defined as not being erroneous they are a reliable source of cognition or knowledge for the Jains. As already said *manah-paryaya* as a means of knowledge presupposes an advanced stage of asceticism, one that is not affected by the karma that usually hinders the function of *manah-paryaya* in ordinary individuals. It is in view of this that TAS 1, 23/24 says that the differences between the two kinds of *manah-paryaya* (*rju-vipulamati manah-paryaya*)²⁸ are due only to the degree of purity (e.g., whether the corresponding karmic veil has subsided and not completely removed) and infallibility (TAS 1, 24/25: *viśuddhy-apratipātābhyām tad-viśeṣaḥ*).

Returning now again to Sāṅkhya, we saw that cognition through the senses is a split-second, complex process that involves the roles of *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra*, *manas* and the *indriyas*. We saw that *manas* has the unique status of being both a *buddhīndriya* as well as a *karmendriya* (SK 26–27). This function of *manas* as a *buddhīndriya* in Sāṅkhya is clearly related to the role of *buddhi* that is explicitly stated as being determinative in SK 23, namely to finally determine what the object is and that this function operates optimally when the *sattva* component predominates.²⁹ To consciously train *manas* as a *buddhīndriya* for an operation with an optimum of *sattva* presupposes a special training involving a clear understanding of the difference between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* (as in Yoga). Now, in view of the fact that in Jainism *manah-paryaya-jñāna* also presupposes, as we saw, an advanced

²⁷ To repeat TAS 1, 9 here for the context, the Jaina *pramāṇas* are: *mati* (sense perception), *śruta* (scriptural or authoritative source of knowledge), *avadhi* (clairvoyance), *manah-paryaya* (telepathy or communicating without the use of the senses, also written *manah-paryāya*) and *kevala* (omniscience).

²⁸ In his commentary to TAS 1, 24/25 Pūjyapāda says that *vipulamati* is purer than *rjumati*, § 220: *tatra viśuddhyā tāvat — rju-mater vipulamatiḥ dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāvair viśuddhataḥ* | “First with regard to purity. *Vipulamati* is purer than *rjumati* with regard to the object (subject matter), space, time and nature or condition” (tr. Jain 1960, p. 35). See also the statement that “*rjumati* undergoes downfall or deterioration, as its possessor is of the descending order owing to the rise of passions”, *ibid.*, 36 and other technical details regarding the two kinds of *manah-paryaya*.

²⁹ SK 23: *adhyavasāyo buddhir dharma jñānaṁ virāga aiśvaryaṁ | sātvaikam etad-rūpaṁ tāmāsam asmād viparyastam* || “Intellect is determinative. Virtue, wisdom, non-attachment, the possession of lordly powers constitute its *sātvaika* form (i.e., its form when the constituent *Sattva*, goodness, predominates); the reverse of these are its *tāmāsa* form (i.e., of its nature, when *Tamas*, darkness, predominates)” tr. Sastri (1935, p. 56).

stage of asceticism, I submit that in this particular context *manah-paryaya* can be understood in comparison with the role of *manas* as a *buddhīndriya* in Sāṅkhya that operates ideally with the predominance of *sattva-guṇa*. In both Jainism and Sāṅkhya an advanced stage of development obtained through ascetic discipline is presupposed, making a comparison of the case in point plausible.

Conclusion

It was seen that the term *manas* in Jainism can be traced back to so-called groups (*vargaṇā/vaggaṇā*) of matter (*pudgala*). The ŚkhĀ gives a list of five such groups, of which *manas* is one. Moreover, four kinds of *manas*-groups, namely *manas* groups of matter (*maṇa-davva-vaggana*) are given in ŚkhĀ 5, 6, 750–751. Furthermore, matter was seen as being constituted of atoms and molecules (TAS 5, 25) with their aggregation (*saṃghāta*) and disjunction (*bjeda*) mentioned in TAS 5, 26 and 28. It was also seen that while Umāsvāti does not use the term *vargaṇā/vaggaṇā* he nonetheless retains the idea of atoms and molecules aggregating and/or disjoining.

The role of the *manas* was seen in *mati* (sense perception), *śruta* (scriptural or authoritative source of knowledge), and *manah-paryaya* (telepathy or communicating without the use of the senses (also written *manah-paryāya*), omitting the remaining two means of cognition accepted by the Jainas, *avadhi* (clairvoyance) and *kevala* (omniscience), for the reasons already given. In the case of *mati* the perceptive Jaina view was briefly touched upon, namely of regarding sight (and *manas*) as being different from the other four sense perceptions through touch, taste, smell and hearing, because the objects of sight do not ‘enter, touch or are in direct contact with the eyes’, as is the case with the perception through touch, etc. The modified form of *manas* in its function as *manah-paryaya* was also briefly discussed in order to show its difference from *mati*. *Mati* also plays a role in *śruta*, without the latter means of cognition being reduced to sense perception on account of the involvement of hearing or reading.

It is well-known in the Indian context that each school accepts its own number with regard to the means of cognition. It is assumed that there were logical criteria for accepting specific types of *pramāṇas*. It seems that there are at least four general conditions or criteria for the accepted number of the means of cognition in all the schools, which the Jainas also implicitly accepted. These criteria can be summarised in conclusion as follows:

1. The cognition that each means of cognition or knowledge furnishes must be *new* and *not attainable* by any other means.
2. One means of cognition may aid another in making cognition possible, for example perception may aid the cognition arrived at through an inference, e.g. inferring the seen smoke from the unseen fire, but the means in question should *not be reducible to another*. In Jainism authoritative statements (*śruta*) cannot be reduced to sense perception (*mati*), although hearing or reading plays a role, as we saw.

3. The cognition arrived at through a particular means should not be *contradicted* (*abādhita*) by another means.
4. The accepted means of cognition should *appeal to reason* and in the case of scriptural or trustworthy authority (*śabda*, *śruti* or *śruta*), for example, the truth that is revealed must appear *probable* and be made intelligible in terms of human experience, otherwise the revealed truth would fail in its purpose of being understandable and thereby become useless (see also Soni 1989, p. 119).

Acknowledgements Open access funding provided by University of Innsbruck and Medical University of Innsbruck.

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