Vidyānandin's Discussion with the Buddhist on *Svasaṃvedana*, *Pratyakṣa* and *Pramāṇa*

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Abstract Two of the terms in the title are from Vidyānandin's *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika* (TAŚV, 1, 6, 11), which is his commentary on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārtha-sūtra* (TAS). *Sūtra* 6 of the TAS states the following: *pramāṇa-nayair adhigamaḥ*, 'knowledge—of the seven categories—is obtained through the *pramāṇas* and the *nayas*'). Vidyānandin's commentary on this *sūtra* 6 entails a total of 56 *ślokas*, with his own prose *vārttika* on each of them in varying lengths. TAŚV 1, 6, 1–8 deal with particulars and universals, for which he uses the synonymous pairs *aṃśalaṃśin* and *avayavalavayavin*. That he is attacking the Buddhist position regarding this age old theme in Indian philosophy, is evident also in that he quotes Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-vārttika*. By the time he comes to his TAŚV 1, 6, 6, he establishes that an object as a whole is open to perception and that the Buddhist also accepts perception as a valid means of knowledge, but does not accept the perception of an object as a whole. From TAŚV 1, 6, 11 onwards Vidyānandin continues with the same theme, elaborating his attack of the Buddhist view even further, doing so in terms of *svasaṃvedana*, *pratyakṣa* and *pramāṇa* (self-awareness, perception and valid means of knowledge). The presentation will attempt to deal with these concepts in order to see how Vidyānandin vindicates the Jaina position vis-à-vis the Buddhist one. This presentation will continue from my previous study of Vidyānandin's TAŚV 1, 6, 1–10.

Revised from the short version presented at SOAS, London, Centre of Jaina Studies Workshop "Jainism and Buddhism" on 18 March 2017. See the video of the talk archived here: <https://www.soas.ac.uk/jainastudies/events/18mar2017-19th-jaina-studies-workshop-jainism-and-buddhism.html> OR https://www.youtube.com/watch?list=PL1z_PGhPjwco-4L-LYhOB7CEd0QBzLNtk&time_continue=25&v=ZmPXuDrxFw (accessed 24 February 2019).

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This article is a an ongoing inquiry based on an earlier short study that in 1999 was one of the earliest, albeit brief, textual studies on the Digambara scholar-monk Vidyānandin (10th c.). It was based on a small section of his commentary, the *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika* (TAŚV), on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārtha-sūtra* (TAS), namely his commentary on TAS 1, 6: *pramāṇa-nayair adhigamaḥ*, 'knowledge (of the seven categories, *tattvas*, *jīva*, *ajīva*, *āsrava*, etc.) is (obtained) through the *pramāṇas* and the *nayas*'. The title was "Aspects of Jaina Epistemology with Special Reference to Vidyānandin" and dealt mainly with Vidyānandin's rejection of the Buddhist view that only parts of an object are directly open to perception and that the object as a whole cannot be cognised directly. In order to better follow the context in which Vidyānandin dealt with the theme of universals and particulars I had briefly considered some aspects of the problem with reference to Dharmakīrti because Vidyānandin quoted him. Dharmakīrti is unthinkable without Dignāga and, further, when dealing with universals and particulars, the views of these two Buddhist giants had also to be briefly contrasted with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika perspective.

Vidyānandin's commentary on this TAS 1, 6 entails a total of 56 *ślokas* with a prose *vārttika* on each in varying lengths, from a line or two to a couple of pages, sometimes combining *ślokas*, mainly two of them together.¹ The paper in 1999 dealt with the first ten *ślokas* and their *vārttikas*. The *sūtra* that Vidyānandin is commenting on, as already said, is TAS 1, 6: *pramāṇa-nayair adhigamaḥ*, where the *pramāṇas* and *nayas* are seen as respectively yielding a knowledge of the universal and the particular (more on this interesting view below). Let us remember that the two preceding *sūtras*, TAS 1, 4–5, state that the seven categories (*tattvas*) are *jīva*, *ajīva*, *āsrava*, etc., (TAS 1, 4) and that these can understood not only by representing or setting them down (*nyāsa*) as name, representation, substance and actual state (*nāma-sthāpanā-dravya-bhāvas tan nyāsaḥ*, TAS 1, 5),² but that they can also be known through the *pramāṇas* and *nayas* (TAS 1, 6), the *sūtra* we are concerned with here.

Vidyānandin begins his commentary on this *sūtra* with a debate on the question of particulars and universals, for which he uses the synonymous pairs *aṃśa/aṃśin* and *avayava/avayavin*. He wants to show that an object as a whole is no less real than the parts out of which it is constituted. The two quotations from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-vārttika* which I had identified clearly show that he is attacking the Buddhist view of particulars and universals. I had shown that despite some differences between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (e.g. Dharmakīrti's momentariness

¹ TAŚV 1, 6, 9–10, 16–17, 19–20, 22–23, 24–25, 26–27, 28–29, 33–34, 40–41, 42–43, 44–45, 47–48, 49–52.

² This is noteworthy because, as we shall see below, Pūjyapāda refers to the first three which are to be known "through the *dravyārthika* standpoint, because they have the nature of the universal/ general", and the actual state (*bhāva = paryāya*) "is to be known through the *paryāyārthika* standpoint" (SS on TAS 1, 6, p. 15) . See for further details on this and related issues: Soni (1991, 2003, 2007 and 2009).

does not feature in Dignāga) the general Buddhist view is that universals in fact do not exist, because universals are mere names without any content at all and can be seen as bare words which serve the function only of discourse in the world (Soni 1999, p. 141). I am now limiting myself here to some aspects related to the concept of *svasaṃvedana*, *pratyakṣa* and *pramāṇa* appearing in his commentary to TAS 1, 6. I am particularly keen on knowing where Vidyānandin obtained his basic ideas from, which allowed him to effectively direct them against the Buddhists.³

It is known that several ideas are not uniform in the Buddhist tradition, such as the concept of *svasaṃvedana* (Paul Williams, quoted in Kellner 2010b, p. 205), the definition of *mano-vijñāna* (Nagatomi 1979, p. 247) and its relation to *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, to name but just two. The concept of *ālaya-vijñāna* in Yogācāra is an added subject. To obtain a clear picture of the development of these ideas and other intricate details in Buddhism, and to back them by textual evidence is even for a Buddhist scholar a major task; it demands a thorough study not only of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, but also of Vasubandhu and Sautrāntika influences. With a basic acquaintance of Buddhist ideas I am trying to follow Vidyānandin's main line of argument. What I am attempting here is to see how he interprets specific Buddhist ideas, and not to investigate how his presentation of them may or may not correspond to a Buddhist text or tradition he might be referring to. It is well-known that in traditional Indian scholarship ideas are often mentioned just for the sake of argument, and are not necessarily direct quotations. The satisfaction is all the more immense if one can by chance trace a quotation back to some text on the opponent's side, as in some cases where Vidyānandin quotes a source, like Dharmakīrti, making it clear whom the idea is pointed at. Moreover, it seems that at times Vidyānandin springs quickly between the major ideas of Mādhyamika and Yogācāra, perhaps even including Sautrāntika nuances. Further, the shades of differences among them, without specific references, makes the task of following Vidyānandin all the more difficult and complicated. Once again I am confronted with the thought that Jaina philosophy without an insight into the other schools is incomplete and indeed vice versa, that a study of the other schools will be incomplete without also stating Jaina ideas either as a contribution or as a critique.⁴

In TAŚV 1, 6, 3–4, Vidyānandin repeated the meaning of TAS 1, 6, namely that a *pramāṇa* furnishes a cognition that is comprehensive (it can perceive the object as a whole) and *naya* is limited or partial (it perceives only a part of an object). In vindicating the statement of the *sūtra* he is commenting on, Vidyānandin emphasises

³ Further research is needed to collect together Vidyānandin's criticism of Buddhism in his various other works and to identify a repetition of his ideas, and quotations, as for example in his *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*, *Āpta-parīkṣā*, *Pramāṇa-parīkṣā*. His *Satya-sāsana-parīkṣā* could be a good starting point because he deals with various schools in order to find out the 'true teaching' and his main objections are compactly put together in it. Insightful attempts for the intricacies of his debate have already been made by Borgland (2010) and Trikha (2015). Shah (1967) on Akalaṅka and Dharmakīrti is also useful in this regard.

⁴ See also Matilal (1981, p. 125) quoting Sukhlalji: "I became firmly convinced that a study of any philosophical system inevitably demands certain prerequisites and that these prerequisites include a fairly accurate understanding of the historical inter-relationship obtaining between the various philosophical systems in India" For further relevant matters concerning the Jaina and Buddhist positions see: Bronkhorst (2000), Dundas (2002), Granoff (1992), Gorisse (2015), Kapstein (1988), Koller (2003), Qvarnström (2003) and Upadhye (1943).

the point that a *pramāṇa* is not a *naya*, because both serve two separate epistemological functions. He seems to be implying that just as the cognition of an elephant's trunk or ear is not a cognition of the entire elephant as a whole, the cognitions furnished by the *pramāṇas* and *nayas* are correspondingly different, that *pramāṇas* and *nayas* are related to universals and particulars. Indeed, the trunk or ear of the elephant can be cognised as a whole in itself, but the cognition entails a part of the whole object (the elephant), and about which particular details can be dealt with from the standpoint of one or the other *naya*. If the elephant's trunk or ear is separately considered to be an object itself, as a whole with its own parts, then this view is an extension of the basic point concerning parts and wholes.

In objecting to the Buddhist view that an object as a whole cannot be cognised, Vidyānandin seems to clinch the argument in TAŚV 1, 6, 7 by appealing to perception (which the Buddhist also accepts as a *pramāṇa*), saying in summary that perception furnishes a cognition of both the object as a whole and of its parts (namely of the universal and the particular):

nāṃśebhyo 'rthāntaram kaś cit tattvato 'mśīty ayuktam |
tasyaikasya sthaviṣṭasya sphuṭam dṛṣṭes tad-amśavat || TAŚV 1, 6, 7 ||

To say that in fact an object as a whole can never be an object, different from its parts, is unreasonable because it [the object as a whole] is clearly perceived as a single gross [object], like its parts.

Vidyānandin immediately then goes on to tell the Buddhist that the notion of an object as a whole is not a superimposed conceptual or mental construction (*kalpanā*), meaning thereby that the object as a whole really exists (TAŚV 1, 6, 8, see Soni 1999, p. 149). His lengthy *vārttika* to this stanza is about two pages long in the 1918 printed edition (pp. 118–120), where I located two quotations from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-vārttika* (Soni 1999, pp. 155 and 157).

It is clear that in his commentary Vidyānandin adopts a position that became traditional about *pramāṇa* furnishing a cognition that is comprehensive and *naya* one that is limited in determining its object only partially.⁵ Indeed, he is indebted to his predecessors for this insight, and such a debt is not unique to Vidyānandin because it is found in practically all the Indian traditions. This debt, however, takes on a special significance when in the spirit of discussion and debate it is further developed and/or used effectively to contest an idea or an opponent, and not merely utilised to simply explain a concerned point. In his introduction (*prastāvanā*) to Vidyānandin's *Āpta-parīkṣā* (ĀP pp. 16–20), Koṭhiyā describes Vidyānandin's impressive acquaintance with all the systems of Indian philosophy, including his traditional training in the Jaina texts and his extraordinary acuteness in matters concerning philosophy. Among the special influences of various previous teachers on Vidyānandin Koṭhiyā's list includes, apart from Umāsvāti (before 5th c.), Pūjyapāda (6th c.), and Akalaṅka (8th c.), also Samantabhadra, Śrīdatta, Siddhasena, Pātrasvāmī and Kumāranandi Bhaṭṭāraka (ĀP p. 20).

⁵ See especially his *vārttika* to TAŚV 1, 6, 4 and the next 2 *ślokas* (1, 6, 5–6) in Soni 1999, p. 147, including the Sanskrit.

At this point it is interesting to highlight Vidyānandin's scholarship and learning for the specific Jaina meaning when commenting on Umāsvāti's TAS 1, 6, because in their commentaries to it his predecessors do not explicitly debate with the Buddhists in any significant detail. In utilising the views of his predecessors Vidyānandin seizes the opportunity to apply some of their insights with specific reference to Buddhism. It is useful for our purposes now, to briefly deal with his immediate predecessors Umāsvāti, Pūjyapāda and Akalaṅka on TAS 1, 6, in order to set the record straight with regard to Vidyānandin's reliance on his them.⁶

In his own commentary to his TAS 1, 6, Umāsvāti says that both the twofold *pramāṇas* (*parokṣa* and *pratyakṣa*) and the *nayas* (*naigama*, etc.) will be dealt with later (*vakṣyate/vakṣyante*). Hence, Umāsvāti's own commentary to his TAS 1, 6 can be omitted here.

Pūjyapāda is a bit more specific in his SS (*Sarvārtha-siddhi*) commentary to TAS 1, 6 in which he strives in a brief way to draw a clear distinction between the two crucial terms in the *sūtra*, the *pramāṇas* and the *nayas*. Pūjyapāda begins by saying that '*pramāṇa*' is mentioned first in the *sūtra* because it is more important than the word *naya* with lesser syllables. He then makes a special effort to clearly distinguish between their roles, saying that *pramāṇa* cognises an object as a whole and *naya* only its specific state, namely a part of it. So, it is clear that Vidyānandin utilises this point against the Buddhist. Pūjyapāda says in a part of his SS commentary to TAS 1, 6:⁷

evam hy uktam "pragṛhya pramāṇataḥ pariṇati-viśeṣād arthāvadbhāraṇam nayah" *iti* | *sakala-viśayayatvāc ca pramāṇasya* | *tathā coktam* "sakalādeśaḥ pramāṇādhīno⁸ vikalādeśo nayādhīnaḥ" *iti* | *nayo dvividhaḥ dravyārthikaḥ paryāyārthikaś ca* | *paryāyārthika-nayena bhāvatvam adhigantavyam* | *itareṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ dravyārthika-nayena, sāmānyātmakatvāt* | *dravyam arthaḥ prayojanam asyety asāu dravyārthikaḥ* | *paryāyo 'rthaḥ prayojanam asyety asāu paryāyārthikaḥ* | *tat-sarvaṃ samuditam pramāṇenādhigantavyam* | (SS on TAS 1, 6, p. 15.)

⁶ Vidyānandin's debt to his predecessors was omitted in my 1999 paper. The details might be useful for their possible hint concerning the development and history of ideas within the tradition.

⁷ Pūjyapāda's statement about *pramāṇa* being *svārtha* and *parārtha* is omitted here because it is not directly related to the topic, namely that all the *pramāṇas* are *svārtha*, except *śruta-pramāṇa* which can be both *svārtha* and *parārtha*. Akalaṅka interestingly relates *śruta-pramāṇa* to *sapta-bhaṅgī* in TASRV 1, 6, 4 (p. 33). Vidyānandin also deals with the seven perspectives in following Akalaṅka here. Akalaṅka deals with *sapta-bhaṅgī* also in his TASRV commentary to TAS 4, 42, which sounds like an odd place because the *sūtra* deals with celestial beings (TAS 4, 42: *laukāntikānām aṣṭau sāgaopamāṇi sarveṣāṃ*, 'eight sāgaropamas for all Laukāntikas). In his *bhāṣya* to *vārttika* 15 on TAS 4, 42 (p. 253, line 3) Akalaṅka says: *tatrādeśavaśāt sapta-bhaṅgī pratipadam*, 'here [in grasping an object completely, it is] on every occasion sevenfold depending on the intention'. His use of the particle *eva* with each predication (which Vidyānandin also mentions) is noteworthy (see Soni 1996, p. 42).

⁸ Himālik Trikhā has compiled a valuable resource called the 'Digital Corpus of Vidyānandin's Works', enabling a search for a word, a phrase or parts of them and made the search function generously available online (<http://dipal.org/dcvw>). I thank him very much for attesting the fact that the words *sakalādeśa* and *pramāṇādhīno* appear in the same context in several other places of Vidyānandin's works, apparently related to the quotation here (perhaps from an Āgama). According to the DCVW, these words appear (in Trikhā's system of identification) in: AS 138, 7; TASVA 123, 23; TASVA 136, 7; YAT 109, 7 and YAT 110, 1. Further investigation needs to be done to find out whether Pūjyapāda is indeed quoting from an Āgama.

This has been said [in the Jaina tradition]: ‘after having grasped [an object] through *pramāṇa*, *naya* determines the object accurately (*avadhā°*) from its specific state (*pariṇati* = transformation). Further, a *pramāṇa* grasps (the object) as a whole. Thus it has been said [in the Jaina tradition]: ‘pointing out the whole rests on a *pramāṇa*, pointing out a part of it rests on a *naya*’. *Naya* is twofold, pointing out the object from the standpoint of its substance and its present state (*dravyārthika* and *paryāyārthika*). The actual state (*bhāva* = *paryāya*) is to be known through the *paryāyārthika* standpoint. The remaining three (*nama*, *sthāpanā* and *dravya* in TAS 1, 5) through the *dravyārthika* standpoint, because they have the nature of the universal/general. The application which is concerned with the object as a substance, is *dravyārthika*. The application which is concerned with the object in its present mode is *paryāyārthika*. All these together (*dravya*, *paryāya* and the aspects related to them) are to be known through *pramāṇa*.

Vidyānandin obviously relies on Pūjyapāda for the basic view that not only are the *pramāṇas* and *nayas* different in their roles (as the *sūtra* itself implies), but also that these roles can be insightfully associated with the knowledge of universals and particulars respectively. It is significant to note that the word *pramāṇa* is initially used in a general way, without specifically referring to any particular *pramāṇa*, of which there are five, as we know from TAS 1, 9 where *matī*, *śruta*, etc. are mentioned. It seems that in this context Vidyānandin is particularly referring to *matī-jñāna*, the cognition derived through the senses. It is interesting that in his SS commentary Pūjyapāda speaks above of the two *nayas*, *dravyārthika* and *paryāyārthika*, and the question is how to relate these to universals and particulars: what is the difference between *pramāṇa* grasping the object as a whole and the *naya* called *dravyārthika*? At the end of the quotation above Pūjyapāda says that the *nayas*, *dravyārthika* and *paryāyārthika*, “are to be known through *pramāṇa*”. We know that in Jainism a substance (*dravya*), its quality (*guṇa*) and the actual mode or modification (*paryāya*) the substance takes on because of the qualities which enable it to do so, thematically belong together. Pūjyapāda takes these into consideration when commenting on the *sūtra* and it is a moot question when this epistemological view about *pramāṇas* and *nayas* was first mentioned. The statements attributed to the Āgamas have not been identified yet.

When one cognises an object, say a pot, this occurs through a *pramāṇa*. As soon as one is concerned with the substance out of which the pot itself is made, say out of brass or clay, then although one approaches this aspect of the object through a *pramāṇa*, one is rather going into the particularities of the object from the standpoint of its cognised substance and the mode it now takes on. Hence, *pramāṇa* and *naya* epistemologically belong together, they are different in their roles and the ‘knowledge of reality as such’ (i.e. the seven categories, *tattvas*, *jīva*, *ajīva*, *āsrava*, etc.) is obtained through both *pramāṇas* and *nayas*, as the *sūtra* TAS 1, 6 says. There seems to be no indication here, as the Buddhist might say, that perception yields a cognition only of a particular and that inference (in applying *apoha-vāda*, or *anyāpoha-vāda*) designates the object as what it is not. “For example the word “cow” simply means that the object is not a non-cow. As such a word cannot denote

anything real, whether it be and individual (*vyakti*), a universal (*jāti*), or any other thing" (Hattori 1968, p. 12, quoted from Soni 1999, p. 142).

Pūjyapāda is concerned with what precisely the *sūtra* aims at, namely clearly demarcating the functions of the *pramāṇas* and *nayas*. Vidyānandin refers to all the *pramāṇas* in his commentary to TAS 1, 6; *mati, śruta, avadhi, manaḥ-paryāya*, in 1, 6, 24, and *kevala* in 1, 6, 26–27. The free Hindi translation says that Pūjyapāda's two quotations in the above part of his commentary are from some Āgama which, as said, have not yet been located. We shall see that Akalaṅka repeats one of them and Vidyānandin follows him in directly referring to it in commenting on the same *sūtra*. Since the Āgama source seems unidentifiable, it is moot question whether Pūjyapāda himself is the source of the idea that *pramāṇa* and *naya* respectively yield a knowledge of the universal and the particular. So much for Pūjyapāda.

Akalaṅka's commentary, the *Tattvārtha-vārtika* (also called *Rāja-vārtika*, TASRV) to TAS 1, 6, is in 5 pages of the critical edition used here and is thus more elaborate than Pūjyapāda's. His commentary to this *sūtra* 1, 6 is in 14 sections and follows the same method as for the other *sūtras* of the TAS: Akalaṅka first uses *sūtra*-like key words and then comments on them in order to elaborate what he thinks is necessary for understanding TAS 1, 6. In section 3 Akalaṅka repeats Pūjyapāda's second quotation ("sakalādeśaḥ *pramāṇādhīno*..."), apparently from a Jaina Āgama (which has not been identified yet). He does not use Pūjyapāda's other quotation "*pragrhya pramāṇataḥ*..." (apparently also from an unidentified Āgama). It is noteworthy that in the TASV Vidyānandin also omits the one quotation, but refers to the other when commenting on the same TAS 1, 6, in his *vārtikas* to 1, 6, 21 and 1, 6, 45 (pp. 123, line 23 and 136, line 7).⁹ Could it perhaps be that he too could not identify the one putative Āgama quotation? One would assume that he would otherwise capitalised on it for his own purposes in vindicating the Jaina position, even without mentioning the original source. The 5th section is one of the longest sections of Akalaṅka's *vārtika* to TAS 1, 6; it is in 2 pages of the edition used here where he introduces the well-known Jaina *sapta-bhaṅgī*:

praśna-vaśād ekasmin vastuny avirodhena vidhi-pratiśedha-vikalpanā sapta-bhaṅgī (TASRV p. 33, l. 25).

⁹ In these *vārtikas* Vidyānandin vindicates what TAS 1, 6 says, supported by Pūjyapāda's and Akalaṅka's commentary on it, that the *pramāṇas* and the *nayas* have different roles associated with cognitions of the universal and of the particular. Since the quotation continues to play a significant part in the 'authoritative' understanding of the *sūtra*, it is noteworthy to mention how Vidyānandin retains the traditional idea, even though the one apparent Āgama quotation in Pūjyapāda does not seem to be kept alive. The two places in the commentary to TAS 1, 6 where Vidyānandin directly uses Pūjyapāda's quotation are (note his *iti vacanāt* in the first quotation; see fn. 8 above on Trikha's DCVW):

1. TASVA to 1, 6, 21, p. 123, lines 22–26: *tathaiva sakalādeśitva-pramāṇatvenābhīdhānāt sakalādeśaḥ pramāṇādhīna itī | na ca sakalādeśitvam eva satyatvaṃ vikalādeśīno nayasyaśatyatva-prasaṅgāt | na ca nayo 'pi sakalādeśī, vikalādeśo nayādhīna itī vacanāt | nāpy asatyāḥ suniścītāsambhavad bādhatvāt pramāṇavat | tataḥ sūktam sakalādeśī pramāṇam vikalādeśīno nayād abhyarhitam itī sarvathā virodhābhāvāt |*

2. TASVA to 1, 6, 54, p. 136, lines 6–8: *sakalādeśo hi yaugapadyenāśeṣa-dharmātmikam vastu kālādhībhīr abhedavṛttiyā pratipādāyaty abhedopacāreṇa vā tasya pramāṇādhīnatvāt | vikalādeśas tu krameṇa bhedopacāreṇa bheda-prādhānyena vā tasya nayāyattvāt |*

According to the question with reference to an object [an answer] has seven parts which, without inconsistency, allow an option/alternative (*vikalpanā*) in warding off a rule [regarding any contradiction]’ (this section goes on to p. 35 line 16).¹⁰

Sections 6–13 in Akalaṅka’s commentary continue to deal with this aspect of Jaina thought, e.g. section 9 says that there is no question of expressing any doubt (*saṁśaya*) through the Jaina *syādvāda*, because it yields a knowledge specific to a particular aspect of an object of inquiry (*saṁśaya-hetur iti cet; na; viśeṣa-lakṣaṇopalabdheḥ*, TASRV 1, 6, 9, p. 36 line 8).¹¹ The last section, 14, deals with other views like Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist.¹² Let us look at the part of this section which the editor says refers to the Buddhist view.

apara āhuḥ — ‘varṇādi-paramāṇu-samudāyo rūpa-paramāṇuḥ’ iti | teṣāṁ kakkhadtvādi-bhinna-lakṣaṇānāṁ rūpātmanā mithaś ca na virodhaḥ | atha matam ‘na paramāṇur nāmaiko ’sti bāhyaḥ, kintu vijñānam eva tad-ākara-parīnataṁ paramāṇu-vyapadeśārham’ ity ucyate; atrāpi grāhaka-viṣayābhasa-saṁvitti-śakti-trayākārādhikaraṇasyaikasyābhyupagamān na virodhaḥ |

‘Some have said that a collection of minute atoms like colours, etc. is a minute atom with a colour’. There is no contradiction from the [standpoint of] the colour of those who say that the (atoms) have different natures. Moreover, if it is said that ‘indeed there is no minute atom out there, but only that consciousness (*vijñāna*) is transformed in the form of that (colour), appropriately enabling a representation (*vyapadeśa*) of the minute atom’, then even in this case there is no contradiction because it is the same (*abhyupagama*) as the single substrate (*adhikaraṇa*) with the threefold form of: the grasper, the appearance of the object, and the ability (*śakti*) of *saṁvitti*.

Akalaṅka is here briefly touching on a crucial issue in Buddhist epistemology, the concept of *grāhya*, *grāhaka* and the role of consciousness, with the intricate discussion of the status of the object in relation to the manner in which it is known, namely the distinction between the object out there (*artha*) and the *object as it is known* (*jñeya*). It seems that Akalaṅka’s reference to *trayākāra* is concerned with the Yogācāra doctrine of *trisvabhāva* dealing with the triple nature of existence and the problem of reality and appearance.¹³ Akalaṅka is clearly presenting the Buddhist view that consciousness (*vijñāna*) bears or carries in itself only the *form* (*ākāra*) of the object, and not the object itself which is out there. The word *saṁvitti* which he

¹⁰ Vidyānandin deals with *sapta-bhaṅgī* in greater detail: TAŚV 1, 6, 49–52 on *syād-vāda* in sequence with a very long *vārtika* to all four *sūtras*, (over 4 pages in the 1918 ed.) enumerating all 7 perspectives; 53 is on a sentence (*vākya*); 54–55 on the use of the word *syāt*; and 56 on the use of the particle *eva*.

¹¹ See also Soni 1996, pp. 20–45: “*Syādvāda* is not *Samśayavāda*”.

¹² The editor indicates them in the footnotes to words like *kecit* and *apare*.

¹³ For the basic theory and the problems associated with it see the articles by Sponberg (1982) and D’Amato (2005). The *trisvabhāva* theory is related to the Buddhist theory of *citta-mātra* (mind-only) and *vijñapti-mātra* (representation-only). The three forms of reality (which is assumed to be without duality) in the *trisvabhāva* theory are: the imagined nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*), the dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*) and the perfected nature (*pariṇiṣpanna-svabhāva*).

uses is a synonym for awareness (*saṃvedana*) in the process of which self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) is also involved in the mechanism of the way in which we cognise things, namely that the cognition does not need another cognition for its validation. Vidyānandin takes up these points in his commentary in more detail.

The general trend of Akalaṅka's commentary seems to be that the Jainas do not have any irrational view and that their ideas are compatible with those of Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Buddhists. Akalaṅka implies that neither the Buddhists nor the others can have any objections because, as the keywords of the section 14 states: *sarva-pravādy-avipratipatteś ca*, 'because there is no incompatibility in all the utterances'. It seems that here in his commentary to TAS 1, 6, Akalaṅka's position is unusually conciliatory, saying that the Jaina views can be reconciled with what the others say.¹⁴ This conciliatory tone applies probably only in the context of the mechanism of the process of knowing what we know, not in the ontological context of there being a permanent conscious principle which the Jainas call *jīva*, which in the final analysis, enables cognition and the Jaina *syād-vāda*.

Vidyānandin is much more forthright in his commentary to the same *sūtra* and although one can see his debt to his immediate predecessors Akalaṅka and Pūjyapāda, it is clear that here he adds other insightful dimensions to the ideas related to epistemology and ontology.

The key term *svasaṃvedana* (also called *svasaṃvitti*) as self-awareness which Vidyānandin takes up in this section of his commentary to TAS 1, 6, is regarded as unmediated, direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), and is said to be introduced into debates on logic and epistemology by Dignāga in the 5th–6th c.¹⁵ It was further elaborated by Dharmakīrti in the 7th c. Since then it continued to occupy the debate on epistemological matters not only specifically for Buddhism but also for Indian thought generally. Vasubandhu's works also feature prominently in Buddhist epistemology since the time of Dharmakīrti and Dignāga (there are references to Vasubandhu's lost *Vādaśāstra*, his *Abhidharma-kośa* with his *bhāṣya*, *Vijñapti-mātratā*, *Viṃśatikā Trīṣika*, *Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa*, etc.). In the tenth century Vidyānandin also takes up *svasaṃvedana* and Buddhist epistemology in his commentary to TAS 1, 6. The term *svasaṃvedana* is indeed a complex one, the dictionary meaning of which is 'knowledge derived from one's self'. In its technical use it is variously translated as "self-apprehension" (Franco 1986, p. 91), "self-cognition" (Katsura 1991, p. 144) or "self-awareness" (Steinkellner 2005, p. 24). It also seems to be generally accepted that "the concept of self-awareness is by no means uniform in the Buddhist tradition".¹⁶ The main thrust in its interpretation is that self-awareness entails a cognition of itself, that cognition is aware of itself as

¹⁴ It is unusual because Akalaṅka is quite critical of the Buddhists generally and of Dharmakīrti specifically: "In his writings Akalaṅka is very satirical and sarcastic about Buddhists, particularly about Dharmakīrti keeping in view the euphemistic criticism of Syādvāda resorted [to] by Dharmakīrti. ... denunciatory expressions such as *jādyahetavaḥ*, *paśulakṣaṇam*, *alaukikam*, *tamasam* which were used by Dharmakīrti himself." Shah (1967, p. 39). See also Soni (1996, p. 20) where Dharmakīrti refers to the Jainas as the "shameless ones" (*ahrikāḥ*).

¹⁵ In Vidyānandin the word *svasaṃvedana*, a synonym of *svasaṃvitti*, occurs in three *śloka*s of his commentary to TAS 1, 6, namely TAŚV 1, 6, 11–12, 15, with hints of it perhaps also in 42–43.

¹⁶ Kellner in JIP 38/3: 205; see also the other thought provoking contributions in this special issue.

cognising an object and that this cognition itself is the result (*phala*) of cognition (e. g. Arnold in JIP 30/8: 349; see also p. 347¹⁷).

Without going into the details of differences with regard to Dignāga (as indicated in Soni 1999, pp. 141–144), Dharmakīrti's four kinds of the direct cognition with each being called a type of *pratyakṣa* (perception) are noteworthy here: *indriya-pratyakṣa* (sense perception), *mānasa-pratyakṣa* (mental perception), *svasaṃvedana* (self-awareness, e.g. of desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure and pain, and of every cognition) and finally *yogi-pratyakṣa* (the perception of a yogin, like that of the Buddha's).¹⁸

Let us delve into perception a bit. *Pratyakṣa* is by and large the cognition derived through the sense organs and their respective objects, seen generally as direct cognition, without anything intermediary between the object and the perception of it. The senses (*indriyas*) are the instruments (*pramāṇas*) through which perception takes place, enabling us to cognise and identify the object as such and such a thing. However, the instruments themselves cannot be said to account for the 'cognition' itself, namely for the knowledge (*pramā* or *pramiti*) of the object as *some thing*. For this, consciousness needs to be acknowledged, a conscious principle that is inalienably associated with the cognition process. The crux of the matter is that Vidyānandin is using the generally accepted view that this entire *pratyakṣa* process is a direct one and regarded by all schools as the only direct means of cognition and that it is the basis for all the other means, like *anumāna* and the other *pramāṇas*.¹⁹ In the debate it is assumed in the background, but not thematised here, that for the Jainas cognition finally takes place because of the inalienable role of the *jīva*.²⁰

Further in his commentary on TAS 1, 6 Vidyānandin picks out the Buddhist view of the *pratyakṣa* that is called *svasaṃvedana* which has the same directness as the other kinds of *pratyakṣa*. He leaves out the intricacies of *mānasa-pratyakṣa* (mental perception) which has been referred to as a "conundrum in the Buddhist *pramāṇa* system" (see Nagatomi 1979) and about which there is an ongoing concern.²¹ He sees *svasaṃvedana* as the most important kind of *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*, highlighting it not only because it is the basis of every cognition, but also to bring out the element of

¹⁷ Arnold's article seems to have an anachronistic starting point and is like the proverbial cart being put before the horse. He says earlier on p. 329: "We can, then, usefully equip ourselves with some conceptual tools for reading Dignāga and his Indian followers and critics by briefly considering Franz Brentano and David Hume to exemplify certain aspects of a "perceptual" understanding of self-awareness; and by then considering the sense it makes to say that one of Kant's main transcendental arguments against Hume is in the service of an essentially "constitutive" understanding thereof." Should one rather say that Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's "conceptual tools" help in better understanding Brentano and the others?

¹⁸ See the article by Yao (2004) dealing with the four types of *pratyakṣa* and whether they are also traceable back to Dignāga, and not only to Dharmakīrti. Moreover, Yao also seems to see *svasaṃvedana* as a separate kind of *pratyakṣa*, as distinct from, and not an aspect of, *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, and deals with what is called the confusion between it and *mano-vijñāna*, ibid, p. 63. Vidyānandin also seems to take *svasaṃvedana* as a separate *pratyakṣa*. See as well Franco (1993) who questions whether Dignāga accepted four kinds of perception.

¹⁹ The debate over epistemological issues also include the intricacies of the status of *pramā* and *pramāṇa*. See the interesting introduction to it in Bandyopadhyay (1979) dealing, among other things, with whether they are seen as synonymous or not (reference from Kellner 2010a, p. 216).

²⁰ See, for example, TAŚV 1, 6, 40–41 on the eyes, etc. and the role of *cit*.

²¹ This is evident in the special issue of JIP 38/3 in 2010 on *svasaṃvedana*.

consciousness intrinsically associated with it in cognising something. In this sense, he is taking the compound *svasaṃvedana* as a genitive *tatpuruṣa* to mean an awareness of one's self, the conscious principle which is responsible for the awareness, namely for the cognition that occurs through the means of perception.²²

The status of the external object is crucial for epistemological matters for both the Jains and the Buddhists. The Jains are realists and so they accept the existence of the external object, allied to their acceptance of universals and particulars which are revealed in cognition. As for the Buddhists, the matter is quite complex and complicated. Kapstein 2014, pp. 132–133 gives a succinct account of the issues involved in the inquiry into our knowledge of the external world. He says:

While Dignāga held that the objects of our perceptions are particulars bearing unique characteristics, his concept of the particular becomes the point of departure for a number of difficult questions: Is the object that we perceive actually something that exists 'out there' in the world, just as we perceive it? Or is the object something that arises within our sensory field, perhaps corresponding to an external object that served as a stimulus, but not in fact identical to it? Or is the object exclusively an object of *consciousness*, on the basis of which we construct the *idea* of an external world that does not exist in reality?

The word *svasaṃvedana*, a synonym of *svasaṃvitti*, occurs in 3 *śloka*s of Vidyānandin's commentary to TAS 1, 6 (11–12, 15) which we should now look at in concluding this ongoing investigation of the text.

svasaṃvedanam evaikam pratyakṣam yadi tattvataḥ |
siddhir aṃśāṃśi-rūpasya cetanasya tato na kim || TAŚV 1, 6, 11 || p. 120/342.

If the *pratyakṣa* that is *svasaṃvedana* is the only real (*pratyakṣa*), then why is there no proof for a sentient principle (*cetana*) which has the form of *aṃśa-aṃśi*?²³

In the short *vārttika* to this stanza Vidyānandin briefly mentions *mānasa-pratyakṣa* and *yogi-pratyakṣa*. There is no mention of *indriya-pratyakṣa* in this particular context because, it seems, that only its unproblematic directness is assumed, that applies also to the other forms of *pratyakṣa*. Vidyānandin says (apparently presenting the Buddhist view): just as (the object of) external perception produced by the senses is in fact non-existent so too (there is the non-existence) of the knowledge through *mānasa-pratyakṣa* and *yogi-pratyakṣa*, because this would result (*paryavasita*) in the form of the self(-awareness) only; thus, if you say that it is established (*siddha*) that *svasaṃvedana* is the only *pratyakṣa*, then [it is] because the category of *cetanā* has its own form [entailing a cognition] of a whole with parts, on account of *svasaṃvedana*, since this is admitted (*pratīyamāna*) [even by you]; nor can the parts such as (inner) happiness and (exterior objects that are) blue, etc.

²² See Kapstein (2014), p. 132 for *pramāṇa* as the measure or 'criterion' of knowledge.

²³ In Jainism the sentient principle is *jīva-dravya*. When Vidyānandin refers to its possessing *aṃśa-aṃśi*, he is probably referring to it in the context of *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya* (which also applies to the *ajīva-dravya*) and the *upayoga* functions (which do not occur in any *ajīva-dravya*, because it is insentient).

be admitted (*pratīyante*) because there is an experience of consciousness (*mahatas*), (i.e.) an awareness (*saṃvedana*) of happiness, etc., an awareness that pervades one's entire body, and because the appearance of blue, etc. on account of the blue, etc., (perceived) by the senses appears as the nature of a collection [involving a cognition both of the object as a whole and of its part].²⁴

Vidyānandin then deals with the status of the exterior object and the validity of cognition. The Buddhist is interpreted as one who does not evidently regard the object as really existing out there, and hence he questions the perception of it as such.

vijñāna-pracayo 'py eṣa bhrāntaś cet kim avibhramam |
svasaṃvedanam adhyakṣaṃ jñānāṇor apravedanāt || TAŚV 1, 6, 12 || p. 121/343.

If even the accumulated knowledge is such an error, then what is without error?, because [otherwise] the evident self-awareness would not make known the cognition (*jñāna*) and the atoms [out of which the object is made up].

In the *vārttika* to this, Vidyānandin says at the beginning that if in a self-knowledge of the accumulated consciousness (*vijñāna-pracayasya*), which is regarded (*mānasya*) as an appearance, has the nature of erroneousness, then indeed (*nāma*) perception which is self-awareness and not mistaken/not erroneous, would not be established by anyone; if you say that this awareness (*saṃvedana*) of both the cognition (*vijñāna*) and the subtle atom is this [awareness], then this is not so, because even this at all times would not make it [the object out there] known (*apravedanāt*); [your view is rejected] because it is established that everyone's self-awareness has the nature of what grasps and the [object] grasped.²⁵

nātra saṃvedanam kiṃcid anamśaṃ bahir-arthavat |
pratyakṣaṃ bahir-antaś ca sāmśasyaikasya vedanāt || TAŚV 1, 6, 15 ||

Like the external objects, here [in our cognition of the objects in the world] self-awareness is never what is bereft of the part(s) [which make up the whole], because perception makes known the one [thing] with its parts, both the external and internal [objects].

The *vārttika* to this *śloka* entails only a sentence in which Vidyānandin says: just as the external object which is momentary or not, manifold or single, because its momentary and following nature (in the subsequent moments) which is manifold or single appears (*pratibhāsana*, in our cognition) directly, so too is it with the internal

²⁴ *yathendriyajasya bahiḥ-pratyakṣasya tattvato 'sadbhāvas tathā mānasya yogi-jñānasya ca svarūpa-mātra-paryavasitavāt | tataḥ svasaṃvedanam ekaṃ pratyakṣam iti cet siddhaṃ tarhi cetanā-tattvam aṃśāni-svarūpaṃ svasaṃvedanāt tasyaiva pratīyamānatvāt | na hi sukha-nīlādy ābhāsaśāśā eva pratīyante svaśarīra-vyāpinaḥ sukhādi-saṃvedanasya mahato 'nubhavāt | nīlādy-ābhāsasya cendra-nīlādeḥ pracayātmaḥ pratibhāsanāt |*

²⁵ *na hi svasaṃvidi pratibhāsamānasya vijñāna-pracayasya bhrāntatāyām kiñcit-svasaṃvedanam abbhrāntaṃ nāma yatas tad-eva pratyakṣaṃ siddhyet, vijñāna-paramāṇoḥ saṃvedanam tad iti cet, na, tasya sarvadāpy apravedanāt | sarvasya grāhya-grāhakātmanāḥ saṃvedanasya siddheḥ | (yatas...tat from anyone so ever).*

awareness because this is not different [i.e. it is momentary or not, manifold or single].²⁶

In this *śloka* and *vārttika* Vidyānandin again pleads for the fact that we automatically cognise not only an object as a whole, but the whole object with its parts. Both exist out there really. Further, the awareness of this cognition must entail what perception yields, namely the object as a whole, with the parts out of which it is comprised, as realities, without an ensuing conceptual superimposition or mental construction (*kalpanā*). The object exists out there and our cognition of it through perception is as it is really.

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- TASVA: Vidyānandin's prose commentary (*alaṅkāra*) to the metrical commentary (*śloka*).
- TAS: *Tattvārtha-sūtra* by Umāsvāti.
- TASRV: see Akalaṅka

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²⁶ *yathaiva kṣaṇikam akṣaṇikam vā nānaikam vā bahir-vastu nānaṣṣaṃ tasya kṣaṇiketarātmano nānaikātmanaś ca sāṅgāt pratibhāsanāt tathāntaḥ-saṃvedanam api tad-aviṣeṣāt |*

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