

## *Ālayavijñāna* from a Practical Point of View

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**Abstract** In 1987, Lambert Schmithausen published an important extensive monograph on the origin of *ālayavijñāna* (*Ālayavijñāna: On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy*). In his opinion, the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* was closely linked to *nirodhasamāpatti*, but it was not meditative experience itself that directly lead to the introduction of this new concept. Rather, according to Schmithausen, it was dogmatic speculation on a sūtra passage about *nirodhasamāpatti*. My own hypothesis is that the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* was more directly based on meditative experiences. Focusing on the “Proof Portion” of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the present paper examines this hypothesis. My examination reveals that *ālayavijñāna* is the physiological basis of the body, and as such it is correlated to the state of the body and mind. When one’s body and mind are transformed from an inert to a well-functioning state through meditative practice, the transformation seems to hinge on the transformation of *ālayavijñāna* itself. It appears that Yogācāra meditators intuitively realized this mechanism at the stage of *darśanamārga*. This paper also responds to some points raised by Schmithausen on my hypothesis in his recent monograph on early Yogācāra (*The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda: Responses*

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A Japanese version of the first portion (Introduction, §§1–2.6, Conclusion) of this paper has been published in *Tōyō no shisō to shūkyō* 東洋の思想と宗教 (*Thought and Religion of Asia*), no. 33 (2016), under the title “Āraya shiki setsu no jissenteki haikai ni tsuite” アーヤ識説の實踐的背景について (On the Practical Background of *Ālayavijñāna*), and a Japanese version of the second portion (§3) has appeared in *Indo ronrigaku kenkyū* インド論理学研究 (*Indian Logic*), no. 8 (2015), under the title “Yugashijiron Shōketsujakubun ni okeru āraya shiki no daiichi ronshō no kaishaku ni tsuite” 『瑜伽師地論』「撰決撰分」におけるアーヤ識の第一論証の解釈について (On the Interpretation of the First Proof of *Ālayavijñāna* in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*).

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and Reflections, 2014). Through these discussions, this paper sheds light on the importance of the correlation between body and mind in meditative contexts and proposes that this was the key issue in the introduction of the *ālayavijñāna* theory.

**Keywords** *ālayavijñāna* · *Yogācārabhūmi* · *dauṣṭhulya* · *praśrabdhī* · *ekayogakṣema* · mind-body correlation

## Introduction

In 1987, Lambert Schmithausen published an important extensive monograph on the origin of *ālayavijñāna*, entitled *Ālayavijñā: On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy* (Schmithausen [1987] 2007, hereafter, *Ālayavijñāna*). In his opinion, the voluminous *Yogācārabhūmi* is a compilation of heterogeneous materials and can be roughly analyzed into three layers:

- 1) Parts of the “Basic Section,” in particular, the *Śrāvabhūmi*, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, and the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, which do not refer to *ālayavijñāna*.
- 2) The rest of the “Basic Section,” which sporadically refers to *ālayavijñāna* but not to the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*.
- 3) *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, which discusses *ālayavijñāna* in detail and presupposes the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*. (*Ālayavijñāna*, §1.6.6, my paraphrase)

In this model, the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* falls between layers two and three, so the oldest source that discusses *ālayavijñāna* is layer two, namely (portions of) the “Basic Section.” Thus, according to Schmithausen, the original context of the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* must be sought in layer two.

Schmithausen believes that a passage that shows the original context of *ālayavijñāna* must satisfy the following two criteria:

- (1) It must show that the introduction of a new type of *vijñāna* became inevitable, or there must be clear evidence that such a new type of *vijñāna* was directly experienced.
- (2) It must explain why the new *vijñāna* is called *ālayavijñāna*. (*Ālayavijñāna*, §1.7, my paraphrase)

In his opinion, such a passage, which he calls “the Initial Passage,” is found in the *Samāhitā bhūmiḥ* of the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

nirodhaṃ samāpannasya cittacaitasikā niruddhā bhavanti / kathaṃ vijñānaṃ kāyād anapakrāntaṃ bhavati / tasya hi rūpiṣv indriye <ṣv avi >pariṇateṣu<sup>1</sup>  
pravr̥ttivijñānabhījaparigṛhītaṃ ālayavijñānaṃ anuparatamṃ bhavati āyatyaṃ

<sup>1</sup> Corrected according to *Genesis*, §72. In what follows, I refer to Schmithausen (2014) as *Genesis*.

tadutpattidharmatāyai </> (Quoted from *Ālayavijñāna*, en. 146, emphasis added [similarly below])

When [a person] has entered [Absorption into] Cessation (*nirodha[samāpatti]*), his mind and mental [factors] have ceased; how, then, is it that [his] mind (*vijñāna*) has not withdrawn from [his] body?—[Answer: No problem;] for [in] his [case] *ālayavijñāna* has not ceased [to be present] in the material sense-faculties, which are unimpaired: [*ālayavijñāna*] which comprises (/possesses/ has received) the Seeds of the forthcoming [forms of] mind (*pravṛttivijñāna*), so that they are bound to re-arise in future (i.e., after emerging from absorption). (*Ālayavijñāna*, §2.1)

Schmithausen points out that this passage presupposes the Mūlasarvāstivāda version of the *Dharmadinnāsūtra*, which states that in *nirodhasamāpatti*, “*vijñāna* has not withdrawn from the body” (*vijñānaṃ cāsya kāyād anapakrāntaṃ bhavati*).<sup>2</sup> Since, however, *nirodhasamāpatti* is by definition an unconscious state, the *vijñāna* that remains in the body in *nirodhasamāpatti* cannot be one of the conventional six *vijñānas* or their associates. This problem necessitated the introduction of a new, subliminal type of *vijñāna*, namely, *ālayavijñāna* (*Ālayavijñāna*, §2.3). The “Initial Passage” also accounts well for what Schmithausen believes to be the original meaning of *ālayavijñāna*, “the mind sticking [in the material sense-faculties]” (ibid., §2.7, my paraphrase; note that the material sense-faculties as a whole constitute our sentient body).

According to Schmithausen, the original *ālayavijñāna* was merely a hypostatization of *bījas* of the *pravṛttivijñānas* and was not a veritable *vijñāna* endowed with cognitive functions (ibid., §2.13.1). It kept the body alive and retained *bījas* of the *pravṛttivijñānas* during *nirodhasamāpatti* so that the *pravṛttivijñānas* could re-arise later (ibid., §2.5). In other words, it functioned as a kind of “gap-bridger” (ibid., §2.13.6).

Thus, in Schmithausen’s understanding, the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* was closely linked to *nirodhasamāpatti*, but it was not meditative experience itself that directly triggered the introduction of this new concept. Rather, according to him, it was dogmatic speculation on the exegetical problem regarding the canonical sūtra, the *Dharmadinnāsūtra*, that made the introduction of this new concept inevitable (§7.4).

I cannot properly summarize the entirety of this very rich monograph here, but Schmithausen’s arguments in this book are definitely well documented and very solid.<sup>3</sup> Not surprisingly, this work has prompted further investigations into the origin of *ālayavijñāna* by other scholars, most notably Matsumoto Shirō (2004) and Hartmut Buescher (2008). I myself have published a brief synoptic article on this matter in Japanese (Yamabe 2012).

Recently, Schmithausen published a voluminous and very detailed response to these arguments (2014, hereafter “*Genesis*”). Partly referring to this work, at the 17th Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies held at the

<sup>2</sup> *Ālayavijñāna*, §§2.3–4, en. 149. See Honjō (1983), p. 97, 2014, p. 1:67. This sūtra is also quoted in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §1.50 (Nagao 1982, pp. 231–232).

<sup>3</sup> See Yamabe (2012), pp. 192–197 for a Japanese summary of his arguments.

University of Vienna (August 18–23, 2014), I presented my own hypothetical view on the origin of *ālayavijñāna*, mainly based on Yamabe (2012) (which is just a preliminary presentation of my working hypothesis in Japanese) with more supporting materials. Due to time constraints, however, in that presentation I had to keep to a minimum my responses to *Genesis*. Since I was given more time at the international workshop held at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, entitled “Yogācāra Buddhism in Context: Approaches to Yogācāra Philosophy throughout Ages and Cultures” (June 19–20, 2015), I could present my view with more detailed responses to Schmithausen’s comments on Yamabe (2012).<sup>4</sup> The present article is a revised and expanded version of the paper I gave at the Munich workshop.

Before entering into a substantial discussion, I have to admit that I have been heavily influenced by Schmithausen’s meticulous work for many years. Thus, my own view is not too radically different from his. I also think that meditation was behind the introduction of *ālayavijñāna*, and I further believe that the relationship between *ālayavijñāna* and the body was very important, as pointed out by him.<sup>5</sup> Our main difference lies in my suspicion that the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* was more directly based on meditative experiences.

Another point made in Yamabe (2012) is that the *Basic Section* may not be the only portion of the *Yogācārabhūmi* in which the original context of *ālayavijñāna* could be located.<sup>6</sup> “The Initial Passage” is rather “isolated” (in the sense that the surrounding portions do not discuss *ālayavijñāna*)<sup>7</sup> and does not seem to me to reveal the full background of the introduction of this new concept. The oldest systematic discussion of this concept in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* (which Schmithausen calls the “*Vin[iścaya-]S[am]g[rahaṇī] ālay[avijñāna]*. *Treatise*” [§1.5]) should be given more attention, even if it is later than the *Basic Section*. This is because the people who introduced this innovative concept might not have revealed everything they had in mind from the outset (see Yamabe 2012, p. 202). In *Genesis* (§8.2), Schmithausen agrees with my suggestion on this point.

<sup>4</sup> I also gave a shorter version, entitled “*Ārayashiki setsu dōnyū to zenjō no taiken tonokan kei ni tsuite*” アーヤ識説導入と禪定の体験との関係について (On the Relationship between the Introduction of *Ālayavijñāna* and Meditative Experience), at the 32nd annual meeting of Waseda Daigaku Tōyō Tetsugaku Kai 早稲田大學東洋哲学會 (Association for Asian Philosophy, Waseda University) held at Waseda University on June 13, 2015.

<sup>5</sup> See Yamabe (2012), pp. 194–195.

<sup>6</sup> In *Ālayavijñāna*, Schmithausen says, “it is therefore the pertinent passages in this text [=Basic Section] that should be investigated first,” though he does not deny the possibility that later layers may also include some old materials (§1.6.7).

<sup>7</sup> The “Initial Passage” (*Samāhitā bhūmiḥ*, Delhey ed., §4.1.3.4.3.3) is found in a series of questions and answers concerning *nirodhasamāpatti*. These questions and answers do not necessarily presuppose each other, and the “Initial Passage” could be removed without causing incoherence. However, as Schmithausen points out, this alone is not a sufficient reason to regard the “Initial Passage” as an interpolation. See *Genesis*, §§31.1–4. In the “Initial Passage,” the word *pravṛttivijñāna* is used without definition, but according to Schmithausen, the verb *pra-vṛt-* is used together with *vijñāna* already in pre-*ālayavijñāna* portions of the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Therefore, according to him, the occurrence of *pravṛttivijñāna* in the “Initial Passage” does not necessarily mean that the passage presupposes the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, §V.4–5. See *Genesis*, §37.2 + fn. 159.

## 1 The Proof Portion

In the “*VinSg ālay. Treatise*,” in particular in its first section, “the Proof Portion,”<sup>8</sup> physiological maintenance of the body (*upādāna*, in Schmithausen’s translation, “biological appropriation”) is clearly the predominant function of *ālayavijñāna*.<sup>9</sup> As Schmithausen has already shown, four out of the eight proofs (i, vi, vii, viii) concern this aspect of *ālayavijñāna*.<sup>10</sup> Here, I discuss the first and the eighth proofs. The first proof is as follows:

(i) kena kāraṇenāśrayopādānaṃ na yujyate / āha—pañcabhiḥ kāraṇaiḥ / tathāhi  
 (a) ālayavijñānaṃ pūrvasaṃskārahetukam<sup>11</sup> / cakṣurādipravṛttivijñānaṃ punar  
 vartamānapratyayahetukam / yathoktam — indriyaviśayamanaskāraśāśā  
 vijñānānāṃ pravṛttir bhavātīti vistareṇa / idaṃ prathamam kāraṇam / (b) api  
 ca kuśalākuśalāḥ ṣaḍ vijñānakāyā upalabhyante / idaṃ dvitīyam kāraṇam /  
 (c) api ca saṃnāṃ vijñānakāyānāṃ sā jātir nopalabhyate yāvyaḥkṛtā vipāka-  
 saṃgrhītā<sup>12</sup> syāt / idaṃ tṛtīyam kāraṇam / (d) api ca pratiniyatāśrayāḥ ṣaḍ  
 vijñānakāyāḥ pravartate, tatra yena yenāśrayeṇa yad vijñānaṃ pravartate tad eva

<sup>8</sup> Schmithausen points out that the “*VinSg ālay. Treatise*” consists of the “Proof Portion” (i.e., the eightfold proof of *ālayavijñāna*), “Pravṛtti Portion,” and “Nivṛtti Portion” (*Ālayavijñāna*, en. 226).

<sup>9</sup> According to the website of *Organismal Biology Journal*, “Human physiology seeks to understand the mechanisms that work to keep the human body alive and functioning” (<http://www.omicsonline.org/organismal-biology-journal.php>, accessed October 16, 2016). If human physiology is defined this way, it is very close to the mechanism of *upādāna* performed by *ālayavijñāna*. I have benefitted from private discussions with Professor Daniel Stuart on this matter.

<sup>10</sup> In *Ālayavijñāna*, §9.2, Schmithausen classifies the eight proofs into the following four groups (my paraphrase).

A1: Proofs i (*upātta*), vi (*kāyiko ’nubhavaḥ*), vii (*acitte samāpatī*), viii (*cyuti*)

These proofs are concerned with the “somatic” aspect of *ālayavijñāna*, namely appropriation of the body. All these functions are either already expressed in the *Basic Section*, or they are “organic developments.” These proofs do not presuppose the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*.

A2: Proof iv (*bīja*)

This proof is not concerned with the “somatic” aspect of *ālayavijñāna* but with its function as the Seed of ordinary forms of mind. It does not substantially go beyond what is already found in the *Basic Section*.

B1: Proofs ii (*ādi*), iii (*spaṣṭatva*)

These two proofs do not directly prove the existence of *ālayavijñāna* but rather the fact that several *vijñānas* can arise simultaneously, and this would presuppose the system of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* V.

B2: Proof v (*karman*)

This proof also proves the simultaneity of several *vijñānas*, but in addition, it seems to directly refer to the cognitive function of *ālayavijñāna* itself. It presupposes the new *manas* and is close to the Pravṛtti Portion.

These eight proofs should be compared with the four proofs of *ālayavijñāna* in the *Pañcaskandhaka* (16.11–17.4) and the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* (Kramer ed., 51b1–57b5) and the six proofs in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §§1.29–55. A helpful overview of these proofs is found in Kramer 2016, pp. 148–158.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *jīvitendriyam punaḥ kimpratyayam / sa pūrvasaṃskārapratyayam jīvitendriyam ity avatarati / (Śrāvākabhūmi, Shōmonji Kenkyūkai ed., 92.10–11).*

What conditions the life-force (*jīvitendriya*)? The [practitioner] realizes that the life-force is conditioned by prior karmic acts.

I owe this reference to Mr. Harada Wasō.

<sup>12</sup> Hakamaya ed., *yā ’yāvyaḥkṛtavipākasamgrhītā*, but here I follow Yūgagyō Shisō Kenkyūkai ed., 89.16.

tenopāttam syād avāśiṣṭasyānupāttateti na yujyate, upāttatāpi na yujyate vijñānavirahitayā / idaṃ caturthaṃ kāraṇam / (e) api ca punaḥ punar āśrayasyopādānaḍoṣaḥ prasajyate / tathāhi cakṣurvijñānam ekadā pravartate ekadā na pravartate evam avāśiṣṭāni / idaṃ pañcamaṃ kāraṇam / ... (Hakamaya [1978] 2001, p. 328; here and below I omit the hyphenation.)

(Question:) For what reason is the appropriation of the body (*āśrayopādāna*) not reasonable [without *ālayavijñāna*]? Answer: For five reasons, namely: (a) *Ālayavijñāna* is caused by prior karmic acts (*saṃskāra*) whereas the visual and other [types of] functional consciousness (*pravṛttivijñāna*) are caused by present conditions (*pratyaya*). As has been said: “Consciousness operates based on a sense faculty (*indriya*), cognitive objects (*viṣaya*), and attention (*manaskāra*),” and so on.<sup>13</sup> This is the first reason. (b) Further, the six groups of consciousness are observed to be wholesome or unwholesome. This is the second reason. (c) Also, among the six groups of consciousness, the kind that would be comprised in morally neutral maturation is not observed. This is the third reason. (d) In addition, the six groups of consciousness operate [based on] distinct bases. With regard to this, it is not reasonable that only the specific [basis]<sup>14</sup> by which it operates is appropriated by that [consciousness] and that the remainder is not appropriated. Even if [the remainder] is appropriated, this is not reasonable, because [it is] separate from [that type of] consciousness [in question]. This is the fourth reason. (e) Further, the fallacy of repeated appropriation of the body will result [without *ālayavijñāna*], for the visual and other [types of sense-]consciousness sometimes operate and sometimes do not. This is the fifth reason. ...

Regarding this proof, my interpretation is slightly different from Schmithausen’s. I shall discuss this point in detail later (§3). For now, suffice it to say that the main point of this proof is *upādāna*, which in this context, I believe, means physiological maintenance of the body. Particularly noteworthy in this proof is point (d), which clearly implies that *ālayavijñāna* maintains not only any particular sense faculty but also the whole body. On this last point, Schmithausen and I agree.

The eighth proof reads as follows:

(viii) kena kāraṇenāsaty ālayavijñāne cyutir api na yujyate / tathāhi cyavamānasya vijñānam ūrdhvadehaṃ vā śtīkurvad<sup>15</sup> vijahāti, adhodehaṃ

<sup>13</sup> For the source, see Hakamaya ([1978] 2001), pp. 360–361.

<sup>14</sup> Strictly speaking, this supplement is problematic from the point of view of grammatical gender. This point will be discussed later in this paper (§3.1).

<sup>15</sup> Hakamaya’s edition reads *śtīkurvan*, which is based on Tatia ed., §9B(xiii) [13.17]. However, in Tatia’s edition this compound is printed as *śotikurvan*. Here, *śoti-* is clearly a misprint and should be read *śtī-*. On the other hand, *-kurvan* is a masculine form, but its grammatical gender should agree with the preceding *vijñānam* (neuter). Thus, Sakuma (1996), p. 8 suggests emending it to the neuter form, *śtīkurvad*. Gramatically speaking, however, the correct form is *śtīkurvad* (see Whitney 1889, §§1091–94 [pp. 401–403]). I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing my attention to this point. One might also take into consideration the fact that the manuscript of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* used by Tatia appears to be a little inattentive to grammatical genders. See the discussion in §3.1 of this paper below.

vā / na ca manovijñānaṃ kadācin na pravartate / ato 'py ālayavijñānasyaiva dehopādānakasya vigamād dehaśītātā upa[la]bhyate dehāpratisaṃvedanā ca / na tu manovijñānasya / ato 'pi na yujyate // (Hakamaya [1978]2001, p. 337)

For what reason is death not reasonable without *ālayavijñāna*? This is because the consciousness of a dying person leaves the top or bottom of the body cooling down the respective portions, but it is not the case that *manovijñāna* ever fails to operate. For this reason also, because this very *ālayavijñāna* that appropriates the body leaves [it], the cooling and senselessness of the body is observed, not because *manovijñāna* [leaves the body]. Therefore, [death] is not reasonable [without *ālayavijñāna*].

The interpretation of the line *na ca manovijñānaṃ kadācin na pravartate* is difficult. Tibetan translations of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*<sup>16</sup> and the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*<sup>17</sup> and Chinese translations of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* 攝決擇分,<sup>18</sup> the *Xiānyáng shèngjiào lùn* 顯揚聖教論,<sup>19</sup> and the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* 阿毘達磨雜集論<sup>20</sup> support the double negation. Thus, it is difficult to doubt the Sanskrit text here.

In Yamabe (2012), p. 216: en. 52 I tried to read this double negation in the sense of partial negation (“It is not the case that *manovijñāna* never operates”). On the other hand, logically the point of this proof must be that “*ālayavijñāna* can leave the body little by little, while this is not possible for *manovijñāna* (in other words, partial negation is possible only with *ālayavijñāna* and not with *manovijñāna*)” (Yamabe 2015a, p. 159).

On this matter, I referred to Speijer ([1886]1973) in Yamabe (2016) (pp. [8]–[9]). Regarding repeated negations, Speijer makes the following observations: *na tatra kaścin na bahūva tarpitaḥ* (Rāmāyana 2.32.46) means “there was no one there but was made content” ([1886]1973, §406), but in fn. 4 to the same section, he states, “*nādyā bhokṣye na ca svapsye na pāsye na kadācana* [Rāmāyana 3.47.8] is an instance of emphatic denial by means of repeating the negation, unless the reading be false and we must read *na pāsye ca kadācana*.” Based on these observations, two opposite interpretations of the line in question seem possible, namely, strong affirmation, “it is, however, not the case that *manovijñāna* ever fails to operate,” or emphatic denial, “*manovijñāna*, however, never operates.”

In Yamabe (2016) (pp. [8]–[9]) I also referred to the following passage from the *Chéng wéishí lùn* 成唯識論:

又契經說。諸有情類受生命終必住散心非無心定。若無此識生死時心不應有故。謂生死時身心昏昧，如睡無夢極悶絕時，明了轉識必不現起。又此位中六種轉識行相所緣不可知故，如無心位必不現行。六種轉識行相所緣有必可知，如餘時故。(T31:16c23-28 [No. 1585])

<sup>16</sup> *yid kyi rnam par shes pa ni nam yang mi 'byung ba ma yin pas* / (Hakamaya [1978] 2001, p. 338).

<sup>17</sup> *yid kyi rnam par shes pa ni nam yang mi 'byung ba ma yin te* / (Hakamaya [1978] 2001, p. 338).

<sup>18</sup> 非彼意識有時不轉 (T30:579c19 [No. 1579]).

<sup>19</sup> 非彼意識有時不轉 (T31:565c19-20 [No. 1602]).

<sup>20</sup> 非彼意識有時不轉 (T31:702a1-2 [No. 1606]).

Scriptures also say: “When various types of sentient beings are born or die, they definitely stay distracted but conscious, not unconscious or concentrated.” If this [*ālaya-*]*vijñāna* did not exist, the mind at the moments of birth and death [mentioned in these scriptural passages] could not exist. Therefore[, *ālaya-vijñāna* must exist]. Namely, upon birth and death, the body and mind are unclear and, as in a dreamless sleep or in a complete faint, *clear functional consciousness definitely does not operate*. Also, in these moments, the modes of cognition (*ākāra*) and the cognitive objects (*ālambana*) of *the six types of functional consciousness* are unperceivable. Therefore, *as in unconscious states, they definitely do not operate*. The modes of cognition and the cognitive objects of the six types of functional consciousness must always be perceivable as in other states.

I believe the meaning is as follows: When one is about to be born or die, one’s cognitions are unclear. Thus, the six types of clear functional consciousness (including *manovijñāna*), whose cognitive functions are always perceivable, cannot arise. Therefore, what makes sentient beings “conscious” as stated in these scriptural passages must be *ālayavijñāna*. Since just after the quoted portion the *Chéng wéishí lùn* mentions gradual cooling down of the body either from the top or bottom at the moment of death (T31:17a13–14), the context is the same as that of the eighth proof of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*. Thus, based on Speijer’s observation and the *Chéng wéishí lùn* passage, I tentatively interpreted the line in question, *na ca manovijñānam kadācin na pravartate*, as “but *manovijñāna* never operates” in Yamabe (2016) (pp. [8]–[9]) and in the original draft for the present article.<sup>21</sup>

This interpretation, however, met with critiques of several scholars.<sup>22</sup> Ogawa Hideyo<sup>23</sup> pointed out that the *Rāmāyana* 3.47.8ab quoted by Speijer, *nādyā bhokṣye na ca svapsye na pāsye na kadācana*, reads in Tokunaga Muneo’s electronic text (available at [http://grettil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/grettil/1\\_sanskrit/2\\_epic/ramayana/ram\\_03\\_u.htm](http://grettil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/grettil/1_sanskrit/2_epic/ramayana/ram_03_u.htm), accessed March 8, 2018) as *nādyā bhokṣye na ca svapsye na pāsye ’ham kadācana* (3.45.8ab in this version). Thus, Speijer’s reservation applies, and this line cannot be quoted as an example of emphatic denial by means of repeated negations.

On the other hand, Lambert Schmithausen<sup>24</sup> and Daniel Stuart<sup>25</sup> suggested the possibility of the following interpretation: “it is not the case that *manovijñāna* is sometimes inoperative” (i.e., it is always operative; this would agree with the first interpretation of Speijer). Schmithausen further pointed out that the Chinese

<sup>21</sup> In Yamabe (2015a), pp. 157–158, I argued that the issue of cognitive objects is irrelevant in the eighth proof of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, but considering the passage from the *Chéng wéishí lùn* quoted above, this might not necessarily be the case. This point requires further investigation. (In addition, in the same article, *spāṣṭavyam* [p. 149, line 24] should be read *spāṣṭatvam*, and *spāṣṭavya* [p. 161, line 17] should be read *spāṣṭatva*.)

<sup>22</sup> Matsumoto Shirō in a response (dated April 29, 2016) to Yamabe (2016); Daniel Stuart in his comments (dated July 5, 2016) on an earlier draft of the present paper; Ogawa Hideyo in a response (dated September 9, 2016) to Yamabe (2016); and one of the anonymous reviewers of the original draft of this article.

<sup>23</sup> See the previous footnote.

<sup>24</sup> Personal communication (September 13, 2016).

<sup>25</sup> Personal communication (July 5, 2016).



translations of the relevant line of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* by Paramārtha (意識常在身, “*manovijñāna* is always in the body,” T 31:1019a22 [No. 1584]) and by Xuanzang (非彼意識有時不轉, “it is not the case that this *manovijñāna* sometimes fails to operate,” see nn. 18–20 of this paper) both support this interpretation.

According to the detailed description of the process of death and rebirth in the *Manobhūmi*, *manovijñāna* seems operative just before death and throughout the process of reincarnation because the being sees various visions and also has emotional reactions (Yamabe 2013, pp. 612–654).<sup>26</sup>

The *Chéng wéishí lùn* also says (just after the passage quoted above):

第六意識不住身故, 境不定故, 遍寄身中恒相續故, 不應冷觸由彼漸生. (T31:17a17-18)

Because the sixth mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) does not stay in the body, because its cognitive object is unfixed, and because *it always continues [to operate]* universally relying on the body, coldness should not be gradually experienced based on the [mental consciousness].

The statement that *manovijñāna* always continues to operate seems to contradict the above quotation from the same text (T31:16c23-28 [No. 1585]). Perhaps a clear *manovijñāna* does not operate but an unclear one keeps operating,<sup>27</sup> or the *Chéng wéishí lùn* has some internal inconsistency.

Not everything is clear, but many of the relevant passages strongly suggest that *manovijñāna* is always operative even in one’s dying process. Thus, in this article I would like to adopt tentatively the translation given above (“it is not the case that *manovijñāna* ever fails to operate”).

In any case, when one reads this eighth proof in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* in conjunction with the relevant passages from the *Manobhūmi* (see Yamabe 2013), the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §1.42, and the *Chéng wéishí lùn* (T31:16a23-17a22),<sup>28</sup> the point of this proof must be that when one is about to die, *ālayavijñāna*, not *manovijñāna*, leaves the body little by little, and the body becomes cold in the places that *ālayavijñāna* has already left. This again clearly indicates that in ordinary states *ālayavijñāna* physiologically maintains the whole body and keeps the body warm.

Thus, both the first and the eighth proofs seem to presuppose that *ālayavijñāna* pervades the whole body.<sup>29</sup> This point is expressly stated in Yogācāra texts, including Sthiramati’s *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*:

<sup>26</sup> See also discussions in §3.4 of this article.

<sup>27</sup> This was the possibility that I raised in Yamabe (2016), p. 10, fn. 15 and that Stuart also suggested (see fn. 21 above). The problem with this interpretation is that the first passage from the *Chéng wéishí lùn* (T31:16c23-28 [No. 1585]) unconditionally states that the modes of cognition and the cognitive objects of the six types of functional consciousness must always be perceivable. Thus, this passage does not seem to presuppose the existence of an unclear *manovijñāna*.

<sup>28</sup> See Yamabe (2015a), pp. 158–160.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *Ālayavijñāna*, §3.7.1; *Genesis*, §121.2.2. + fn. 662; §234 + fn. 1282. Yokoyama (1979), p. 131 also discusses this passage from the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* (Tibetan version).

kāyo 'tra sendriyaṃ śārīraṃ / samantaṃ hi śārīraṃ vyāpyālayavijñānaṃ  
vartate / (*Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, Kramer ed., 106.11-12)

Here, “body” means the body endowed with sensory faculties, for *ālayavijñāna* operates pervading the whole body.

## 2 The Sixth Proof and the Meaning of “Bodily Sensations”

Another noteworthy statement is found in the sixth proof:

(vi) kena kāraṇenāsaty ālayavijñāne kāyiko 'nubhavo na yujyate / tathāhy  
ekatyasya yoniśo vā 'yoniśo vā cintayato vā 'nuvitarkayato vā *samāhitacetaso*  
vā 'samāhitacetaso vā ye kāye *kāyānubhavā* utpadyante 'nekavidhā bahunā-  
nāprakārās te na bhaveyur upalabhyante ca / tasmād apy asty ālayavijñānaṃ //  
(Hakamaya [1978]2001, pp. 335–336)

For what reason is bodily sensation not reasonable without *ālayavijñāna*? This is because various and multifarious *bodily sensations* arise in the body of a person who is thinking or pondering properly or improperly, whose mind is *concentrated* or not. These [sensations] would not exist or be observed [without *ālayavijñāna*]. For this reason also, *ālayavijñāna* exists.

This proof states that since there is *ālayavijñāna*, manifold bodily sensations are experienced regardless of the state of the conscious mind, which, in light of such expressions as “thinking” (*cintayataḥ*) and “pondering” (*anuvitarkayataḥ*), must primarily refer to *manovijñāna*.

### 2.1 *Praśrabdhi*

Here, what is particularly problematic is the compound *samāhitacetasaḥ* (“for someone whose mind is concentrated”). According to the Abhidharma/Yogācāra system, *kāyavijñāna* does not operate from the second *dhyāna* upward,<sup>30</sup> so the explanation of bodily sensations presents a difficulty.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> na hi tat tayoh kāyikaṃ yujyate / samāpannasya vijñānakāyābhāvāt (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Samāpattinirdeśa. Pradhan ed., 438.19-20).

“For it is unreasonable that the [pleasant sensation] in these two (i.e., the first and the second *dhyānas*) is bodily [sensation] because for a being who is in meditative absorption, the group of [five sense] *vijñānas* do not exist.” (I have referred to Sakurabe, et al. 2004, p. 244)

Cf. 眼耳身識二界二地，鼻舌兩識一界一地，自類互作等無間緣。(*Chéng wéishí lùn*, T31:40c7-8). “Visual, auditory, and tactile consciousness [operate] in two realms (*kāma*- and *rūpa-dhātus*) and two *bhūmis* (the first and the second *dhyānas*), and olfactory and gustatory consciousness in one realm (*kāma-dhātu*) and one *bhūmi* (*kāma*). Each [type of consciousness] functions as the *samanantarapratyaya* of [the subsequent moment of] the same [type of consciousness].”

<sup>31</sup> The same problem is taken up in the *Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya*, §II.12 as well:

gang gyi phyir mnyam par bzhag pa rnam par shes pa lnga ni nye ba ma yin la / nang gyi nyams su myong ba ni 'byung bar 'gyur te / (Pek. Sems tsam, Li 173b6)

Because the five [types of sense] consciousness are not present [for] a concentrated one but because internal sensation will arise, ...

謂有色處於定位中無五識時，在色身中內領受起。(T31:340a14-15 [No. 1597])

On this point, one might refer to the following line from the commentary on the sixth proof in the *Yúqīeshīdīlùn lüèzuān* 瑜伽師地論略纂 by Cīēn 慈恩:<sup>32</sup>

法師云，身受即輕安觸身起受。(T43:172b1-10 [No. 1829])

The Dharma Master says that the *bodily sensation* [here] means the sensation caused by *meditative ease* (*praśrabdhi*) in contact with the body.

This statement attributed to the “Dharma Master” (in this context, Xuanzang 玄奘) is noteworthy. Namely, if we follow this interpretation, *ālayavijñāna* is somehow linked to the feeling of ease (*praśrabdhi*) experienced in meditation.<sup>33</sup>

Using a Chinese commentary for interpreting an Indian text might be somewhat problematic, but Xuanzang’s view may well have been based on the information he had obtained in India and should not be treated lightly. We should further note that, as Schmithausen has already pointed out,<sup>34</sup> a somewhat comparable statement is found in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* as well, which actually is a quotation from the *Xiānyáng shèngjiào lùn* (T31:487a3-6; concerning the *prīti-sukha* in the first and second *dhyānas*):<sup>35</sup>

prītiḥ katamā / yā parivṛttāśrayasya pravṛttivijñānāśritā cittatuṣṭiḥ cittaud-bilyam cittaharṣaḥ cittakalyatā sātamaḥ veditaḥ vedanāgatam / sukhaḥ katamat / yaḥ<sup>36</sup> parivṛttāśrayasyālayavijñānāśrita āśrayānugraha āśrayahlādaḥ sātamaḥ veditaḥ vedanāgatam iti / (Tatia ed., §61H(iii) [61.1-5], corresponding to Yugagyō Shisō Kenkyūkai ed., 409.11-15).

What is gratification? The satisfaction, delight, rapture, and soundness of *mind* based on the *pravṛttivijñānas* of [a practitioner] whose personal basis has been transformed. It is pleasant feeling subsumed under *vedanā*. What is bliss? The benefit and pleasure of the *body* based on the *ālayavijñāna* of [a practitioner] whose personal basis has been transformed. It is pleasant feeling subsumed under *vedanā*.

Here the expression *parivṛttāśrayasya*, “of [a practitioner] whose personal basis has been transformed,” indicates that this is a discussion of the state achieved through the practice of meditation. In the early model of *āśrayaparivṛtti* found in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, *dauṣṭhulya* is replaced by *praśrabdhi* in this way:

Footnote 31 continued

When *none of the five [types of sense] consciousness is present in concentration* in a material realm, *internal sensation arises* in the physical body.

<sup>32</sup> A similar statement is found in the *Yúqīelùn jì* 瑜伽論記 (T42:595b16 [No. 1828]) by Doryun 道倫.

<sup>33</sup> A similar view is found in *Ālayavijñāna*, §3.7.2 + 2:683–685. In this work, however, Schmithausen does not refer to the *Yúqīeshīdīlùn lüèzuān* or the *Yúqīelùn jì*. He bases his argument on the *Xiānyáng shèngjiào lùn* quoted below. In his discussion of my argument in *Genesis*, Schmithausen takes these Chinese commentaries into consideration (see fn. 34).

<sup>34</sup> *Ālayavijñāna*, en. 297.

<sup>35</sup> 喜者謂已轉依者依於轉識心悅心勇心適心調安適受所攝。樂者謂已轉依者依阿賴耶識能攝所依令身怡悅安適受所攝。See also *Ālayavijñāna*, §§5.4.2-3, where it is suggested that the *kāyiko 'nubhavaḥ* in the Proof Portion may have something to do with *dauṣṭhulya* and *praśrabdhi*.

<sup>36</sup> Tatia’s edition has *yad*. Corrected following the suggestion in *Ālayavijñāna*, en. 297.

tatrāśrayanirodhaḥ prayogamanasikārabhāvanānuyuktasya yo dauṣṭhulyasahagata āśrayaḥ, so <’> nupūrveṇa nirudhyate, praśrabdhisahagataś cāśrayaḥ parivartate / (Quoted from Sakuma 1990a, p. 434, fn. 3, corresponding to Shukla ed. 283.6-8; Sakuma 1990b, 17.7-9; T30:439a19-21).

In the [preceding passage], **the extinction of the personal basis** [means that] for a person engaged in the practice of preliminary meditation, the personal basis accompanied by inertness gradually disappears, and the personal basis accompanied by ease evolves.

In the *Xiǎnyáng shèngjiào lùn* quotation in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, the word *praśrabdhi* does not appear. Nevertheless, *prīti* and *sukha* there clearly refer to the meditative comfort one feels in mind and body respectively,<sup>37</sup> and *sukha* is based on *ālayavijñāna*. If so, it is certain that in the Yogācāra School people somehow linked meditative comfort to *ālayavijñāna*.

In the Abhidharma and Yogācāra literature, *āśraya* without contextual specification often means “body.”<sup>38</sup> In the *Xiǎnyáng shèngjiào lùn* passage also, the *āśraya* juxtaposed with *citta* is most likely used in that sense. This also suggests that *āśrayaparivṛtti* is not only spiritual but also physical transformation.

However, as early as the Pravṛtti Portion, *ālayavijñāna* is said to be associated only with neutral (*aduḥkhāsukha*) sensation (Hakamaya [1979]2001: §1.2.(b)B.4.). If so, the link between “various and multifarious bodily sensations” (in the sixth proof) or *sukha* (in the *Xiǎnyáng shèngjiào lùn* passage) and *ālayavijñāna* is problematic. Further, the mental functions associated with *ālayavijñāna* are considered very subtle, and thus any sensation associated with it might not be something a practitioner could be easily aware of, as Schmithausen points out (*Genesis*, §8.3).

## 2.2 Upādāna

Regarding the expression *ālayavijñānāśrita*, “based on *ālayavijñāna*,” in the *Xiǎnyáng shèngjiào lùn* passage, the explanation of the Chinese commentary, the *Yúqiélùn jì* 瑜伽論記 (T42:595c2-8 [No. 1828]), might give us some clue:

若在散心有思慮位，由有賴耶執持五根及五識相應身受種子，若遇外緣身受得生。言或處定心者，處有心定五識不行。若有外緣觸身，賴耶捨受於中領納，名為身受。又由賴耶執持在定五根及五識相應身受種子，若有外緣觸身，五識身受依根而起。

If one is at a stage of distracted mind and [discursive] thought, since there is *ālayavijñāna* that appropriates (*zhíchí* 執持) the five sense faculties and the

<sup>37</sup> Note also that in the commentary on this quotation of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, we find the expression *praśrabdhisukha* (Tatia ed., §61(H)(iii) [61.7]; Yugagyō Shisō Kenkyūkai, ed., 409.17).

<sup>38</sup> Note the expression *āśrayopādāna* seen in the first proof in the Proof Portion. Mental elements are usually not appropriated in the Abhidharma/Yogācāra system. An exception is found in the *Triśīkāvijñaptibhāṣya*, Buescher ed., 52.4-5: *tatrādhyātman upādānam parikalpitavasabhāvābhīniveśavāsanā sādhiṣṭhānam indriyārūpaṃ nāma ca*. Here *nāma* refers to mental *skandhas*. See *Genesis*, §240.3.1-4. See also *ibid.*, fn. 1529. For the meaning of *āśraya*, see also nn. 66–67 of this paper.

seeds of the bodily sensations associated with the five [sense] *vijñānas*, bodily sensations can arise if one encounters external objects. If one's mind is concentrated, the five [sense] *vijñānas* do not operate in a conscious concentration (*samādhi*). If an external object is in contact with the body, the neutral sensation of *ālayavijñāna* perceives it there, and it is called bodily sensation. Also, since *ālayavijñāna appropriates the five sense faculties in concentration* and the seeds of bodily sensations associated with the five [sense] *vijñānas*, if an external object is in contact with the body, bodily sensations associated with the five [sense] *vijñānas* arise based on the sense faculties.

This is a fairly doctrinal argument and may not directly reflect actual practice. Nevertheless, the idea that *ālayavijñāna* “appropriates” (or, maintains [*zhīchí* 執持, \**ā-dā*]<sup>39</sup>) the five sense faculties, and that based on these sense faculties bodily sensations arise is noteworthy. Unlike *samprayukta*, which is a technical term meaning the association between a *vijñāna* and its mental functions (*caitta*, *caitasā dharmāḥ*),<sup>40</sup> *āsrita* may have a broader meaning. Therefore, if *ālayavijñāna* maintains the body, and if the maintained body makes the perception of meditative comfort possible, presumably that kind of indirect dependence could also be *āsrita*. At least that kind of understanding is suggested by this Chinese commentary. If we follow this interpretation, even if the meditative comfort is not directly associated with *ālayavijñāna*, it could still be “based on” *ālayavijñāna* in an indirect way.

Regarding the significance of (*upa*-)*ā-dā*-, we should further refer to the Abhidharmic definition of *upātta*, “appropriated.”<sup>41</sup>

upāttam iti ko 'rthaḥ / yac cittacaittair adhiṣṭhānabhāvenopagṛhītam *anugrahopaghātābhyām* anyonyānuvidhānāt / yal loke *sacetanam* ity ucyate / (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Pradhan ed., 23.16-17)

What does “appropriated” mean? [It means] something that is taken hold of as the [physical] basis [of a being] by [his/her] mind and its functions because [the physical basis and the mind and its functions] are consonant with each other in terms of benefit and harm. [This is] what is called “*sentient*” in the world.

See also a more directly relevant passage from the \**Pañcavi-jñānakāyasamprayukta-manobhūmi-viniścaya*.

<sup>39</sup> The *Yúqiélùn jì* is a Chinese commentary but is obviously based on the Indian text, the *Yogācārabhūmi*, in which *zhīchí* 執持 in general corresponds with *ā-dā*- (Yokoyama and Hirokawa 1996, p. 444, s.v. *shūju* 執受). Needless to say, *ā-dā*- and *upa-ā-dā*- are closely connected.

<sup>40</sup> According to the *Pañcavi-jñānakāyasamprayuktā bhūmiḥ*, for *citta* and *caitasā dharmāḥ* to be *samprayukta*, they must satisfy the following four conditions: *sahāyaḥ katamaḥ / tatsahabhūsamprayuktās caitasā dharmāḥ / ... te punar* (1) *ekāmbanā* (2) *anekākārāḥ* (3) *sahabhuvāḥ* (4) *caikaikavṛttayaḥ ca / (Pañcavi-jñānakāyasamprayuktā bhūmiḥ [Yogācārabhūmi, Bhattacharya ed., 5.12–15])*

What are the accompaniments? Mental elements that are coexisting and associated with the [visual consciousness]. ... Also, they share (1) the same cognitive object but not (2) the cognitive mode. They are (3) coexisting and (4) operating one by one.

<sup>41</sup> See Yokoyama (1979), pp. 128–129.

de la rnam par shes pa gnas pa dang mi gnas pa ni zin pa'i gzugs gang yin pa de ni rnam par shes pa gnas pa zhes bya ste / de yang rnam par shes pa dang 'dres pa grub pa dang bde ba gcig pa'i don gyis<sup>42</sup> 'jug pa gang yin pa dang / tshor ba rnams skye ba'i rten<sup>43</sup> du gyur pa gang yin pa'o // de las bzlog pa ni ma zin pa yin par rig par bya'o<sup>44</sup> / (Pek. Sems-tsam, Zi 41b1-2; D. Sems-tsam, Zhi 39a4-5)<sup>45</sup>

Within that [*rūpa-skandha*], [there are *rūpas*] inhabited by *vijñāna* and not inhabited by *vijñāna*. Regarding this [distinction,] *appropriated rūpas* are called [*rūpas*] inhabited by *vijñāna*. These [*rūpas*] are those that are mingled with *vijñāna* and arise in the manner of *sharing the same destiny* [with *vijñāna*] (*ekayogaḥśema*) and those that become the basis for generating *sensations* (*vedanā*). Contrary to those should be understood to be the *unappropriated [rūpas]*.

It is likely that the sixth proof in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* presupposes this kind of system. Since the mind “appropriates” (*upa-ā-dā-*) the body, the body remains sentient and becomes the basis for generating sensations.<sup>46</sup> If so, the interpretation of the *Yúqiélùn jì* is in agreement with Indian sources. The sixth proof does not necessarily mean that *ālayavijñāna* itself directly experiences (or is associated with) various sensations. Rather, it may merely mean that since *ālayavijñāna* physiologically maintains the body and keeps it sentient, various bodily sensations become indirectly possible.

### 2.3 *Ekayogaḥśema*

Another noteworthy point of these quotations is that they consider the states of the body and mind to be correlated. This mind-body correlation in terms of benefit and harm (*anugrahopaghāta*) is referred to as *ekayogaḥśema* or *anyonyayogaḥśema* in Yogācāra texts.<sup>47</sup> In the following example, *anugrahopaghāta* and *anyonyayogaḥśema* are clearly connected:<sup>48</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Pek. *gyi*.

<sup>43</sup> D. *don*.

<sup>44</sup> Pek. om. 'o.

<sup>45</sup> The corresponding Chinese version is as follows: 識執不執者，若識依執名執受色。此復云何。謂識所託安危事同和合生長。又此為依能生諸受。與此相違非執受色。(T30:593c28-594a2).

<sup>46</sup> Cf. 有說。於彼斫刺破裂時，生苦痛捨擔名有執受。與此相違名無執受。(\**Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā* 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論, T27:712c9-11 [No. 1545]).

Somebody maintains: [A body that] generates pain and makes one throw away a shoulder pole [inadvertently] when cut, stabbed, or burst is called an “appropriated [body].” Otherwise, it is called an “unappropriated [body].”

<sup>47</sup> See Yokoyama 1979, pp. 131–136; *Genesis*, §§126-129.2.5.

<sup>48</sup> See also the well-known early occurrence of *ekayogaḥśema* in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, §V.3: \*ālayavijñānam ity apy ucyate, yaduta tasyāsmiṁ kāya ālayanapralayanatām upādāya ekayogaḥśemārthena (Reconstruction by Schmithausen, *Genesis*, §122.1). The *Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya*, §II.12 (Pek. Sems-tsam, Li 173b7-8; T31:340a16-18) is also relevant.

cittavaśena (citta=ālayavijñāna) ca tan (=kalala-rūpaṃ) na pariklidyate, tasya ca *anugrahopaghātāc* cittacaittānām *anugrahopaghātaḥ* / tasmāt tad *anyonyayogakṣema* ity ucyate / (Quoted from *Ālayavijñāna*, en. 184, corresponding to *Manobhūmi* [*Yogācārabhūmi*, Bhattacharya ed., 24.16-17])

By the power of the mind (*ālayavijñāna*), that [body of the *kalala*] does not decay, and due to the *benefit and harm* of that [*kalala*], the benefit and harm of mind and its functions [are brought about]. Therefore, they are said to *share the same destiny*.

In this passage, the context is a description of an embryo just after conception. Thus, it has no direct relevance to meditation. However, in some contexts, *anugraha* is expressly linked to *praśrabdhi*.

*anugrahikaḥ praśrabdhīḥ*, tayā kāyacittānugrahakaraṇāt / (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, Tatia ed., §92(iv)(b), p.87; Yugagyō Shisō Kenkyūkai ed., 565.6; T31:740a22-23)<sup>49</sup>

“*What benefits*” means *meditative ease*, because [meditative ease] benefits the body and mind.

Also, regarding *upaghāta* (or a similar word), we can find this statement (though this one is less clear than the previous line):

麤重差別者，謂欲界中麤重麤而損害。(*Xiānyáng shèngjiào lùn*, T31:484c28)

In regard to the classification of *dauṣṭhulya*, in *kāmadhātu*, *dauṣṭhulya* is gross and *harmful*.

Both *praśrabdhi* and *dauṣṭhulya* have explicitly practical connotations. Recall also that in the *Xiānyáng shèngjiào lùn* (cited in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*) passage on *prīti* and *sukha* quoted above, meditative *sukha* was defined as *āśrayānugraha*, “benefit to the body.” Thus, it is likely that *anugraha* and *upaghāta* shared by the body and *ālayavijñāna* can refer to meditative ease and non-meditative inertness.<sup>50</sup> I suspect that this mind-body correlation is relevant to the mind-body transformation in the process of *āśrayaparivṛtti*.

## 2.4 *Dauṣṭhulya* and *Praśrabdhi*

Accordingly, my understanding is that *ālayavijñāna* physiologically maintains the body and keeps it sentient and thus indirectly makes various bodily sensations possible. I think if we understand the relevant passages this way, it also solves Schmithausen’s question. As I have briefly mentioned (§2.1), he argues that

<sup>49</sup> This passage appears in the context of *bhāvanā*.

<sup>50</sup> I am not arguing that *anugraha* and *upaghāta* always correspond to *praśrabdhi* and *dauṣṭhulya*. *Ekayogakṣema* is a term signifying the body-mind interrelationship in general, but I understand that the body-mind interrelationship in meditative context is also included in this concept. I gave a separate paper on the body-mind interrelationship in *Yogācāra* at an international symposium, entitled “*Mārga: Paths to Liberation in South Asian Buddhist Traditions*” held at Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, on December 17–18, 2015 and now this paper is being reviewed for publication.

according to the *Śrāvakahūmi*, *praśrabdhi* becomes intensive and easily perceivable as meditation progresses, as seen in this passage:

tasyaivam ātāpino viharato yāvad vinīya loke <'>bhidhyādurmanasyaṃ pūrvam eva samyakprayoga<sa>mārambhakāle<sup>51</sup> sūkṣmā <cittaikāgratā kāya>cittapraśrabdhir [ca]<sup>52</sup> durupalakṣyā pravartate / yā tatra śamatham<sup>53</sup> vā bhāvayato vipaśyanām<sup>54</sup> vā prasvasthacittatā prasvasthakāyatā *cittakāyakarmaṇyatā*, iyam atra *kāyacittapraśrabdhiḥ* / tasya saiva sūkṣmā cittaikāgratā cittaikāyapraśrabdhiś cābhivardhamānā *audārikāṃ sūpalakṣyāṃ cittaikāgratāṃ* <citta>kāyapraśrabdhim āvahati, yaduta hetu-pāraṃparyādānayogena,<sup>55</sup> tasya nacirasyedānīm *audārikī* cittaikāyapraśrabdhiś cittaikāgratā ca *sūpalakṣyotpatsyatīti* ... (*Śrāvakahūmi*, Sakuma 1990b, Part 2, 26.3-27.1 [§G.2], referred to by Schmithausen [*Genesis*, §8.3, fn. 30])

For the [practitioner who is] thus eagerly practicing, when he first undertakes the correct preliminary practice as soon as he has removed desire and dejection with regard to the world, *subtle* mental concentration [and] *not easily perceivable* meditative ease of the body and mind arise.<sup>56</sup> There, the soundness of the body and mind, namely the *well-functioning state*<sup>57</sup> of the mind and body of [the practitioner] who is practicing calming or contemplation, is the *meditative ease of the body and mind* here. The same subtle mental concentration and the meditative ease of the mind and body of the [practitioner], while increasing, bring<sup>58</sup> about *intensive* and *easily perceivable* mental concentration and the meditative ease of the mind and body. Namely, in the manner of successive causality, *intensive* and *easily perceivable* meditative ease of the mind and body and mental concentration will now arise for him shortly.

According to Schmithausen, this description does not fit well with *ālayavijñāna*, “which is essentially subtle and hard to perceive, inaccessible to a person who has not yet seen the Truth(s)” (*Genesis*, §8.3).<sup>59</sup>

As we have discussed above, however, this does not create a problem, since, in my understanding, *ālayavijñāna* by itself does not necessarily perceive various sensations.<sup>60</sup> As Schmithausen points out, the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* states that

<sup>51</sup> Sakuma ed., *-arambha-*.

<sup>52</sup> See Sakuma (1990b, Part 2, p. 26, fn. 161).

<sup>53</sup> Sic. Sandhi not observed.

<sup>54</sup> Sic. Sandhi not observed.

<sup>55</sup> Perhaps *-ādāna-* should be emended to *-adāna-*. See Sakuma (1990b), Part 2, p. 26, fn. 169.

<sup>56</sup> Note that the original *pravartate* has a singular form.

<sup>57</sup> This is how I understand *karmaṇyatā*. For this word, see also Abe (2008).

<sup>58</sup> The original *āvahati* has a singular form.

<sup>59</sup> See the Pravṛtti Portion (Hakamaya [1979]2001, §I.1.B.1.) and the Nivṛtti Portion (ibid., §I.5.(b)B.2.).

<sup>60</sup> One might notice here a discrepancy between practitioners' actual experience and the doctrinal requirements that the five sense *vijñānas* should not operate in meditative states and that *ālayavijñāna* should be associated only with neutral sensations.



ālayavijñāna is not accessible for those who have not seen the Truth(s). My suspicion is that what practitioners realize at *darśanamārga* is not merely the comfortable sensations in their body and mind, but also the existence of a hidden physiological basis that makes the bodily and mental sensations possible. I shall come back to this point later.

This passage from the *Mahāyānasamgraha* is also relevant here:

yang gnas ngan len gyi mtshan nyid dang / shin tu spyangs pa'i mtshan nyid do // *gnas ngan len gyi mtshan nyid ni nyon mongs pa dang nye ba'i nyon mongs pa'i sa bon gang yin pa'o / shin tu spyangs pa'i mtshan nyid ni zag pa dang bcas pa'i dge ba'i chos kyi sa bon gang yin pa ste / de med du zin na rnam par smin pas*<sup>61</sup> *gnas kyi las su mi rung ba dang / las su rung ba'i bye brag mi rung bar 'gyur ro / (Mahāyānasamgraha, §I.61A [Nagao 1982, pp. 54–55])*

\*punar dauṣṭhūyalakṣaṇaṃ praśrabdhilakṣaṇaṃ ca / *dauṣṭhūyalakṣaṇaṃ yat kleśopakleśabījam / praśrabdhilakṣaṇaṃ yat sāsraṅvakuśaladharmabījam*<sup>62</sup> / tasminn avidyamāne vipākāśrayasya *karmaṇyākarmaṇyaviśeṣo na yujyate / (Reconstruction by Aramaki Noritoshi [Nagao 1982, p. 55]; partly emended by the present author)*

Also, [there is *ālayavijñāna*] characterized by inertness and ease. [*Ālayavijñāna*] characterized by *non-meditative inertness (dauṣṭhūlya)* is that which holds the *seeds of primary and secondary defilements*. [*Ālayavijñāna*] characterized by *meditative ease (praśrabdhi)* is that which holds the *seeds of defiled wholesome dharmas*. If this [distinction] does not exist, the distinction between the *well-functioning (karmaṇya)* and *not well-functioning (akarmaṇya)* [states of the] maturation-body is not reasonable.

Thus, the *akarmaṇya* and *karmaṇya* states of the body are based respectively on the *dauṣṭhūlya* and *praśrabdhi* phases of *ālayavijñāna*. Since *akarmaṇya* and *karmaṇya* must be very concrete states of the body that are commonly experienced, this seems to be a concrete statement based on practitioners' actual experience.

However, since *dauṣṭhūyalakṣaṇa* and *praśrabdhilakṣaṇa* are tied here to *kleśopakleśabīja* and *sāsraṅvakuśaladharmabīja* respectively, this may seem to be a doctrinal statement rather than a practical description.<sup>63</sup>

Here, it is important to note that *bīja* as a technical term does not refer to some sort of material grain found in our body. It refers to the overall state of our personal (especially physical) existence. When our body is regulated by meditation and is

<sup>61</sup> Sic, but should be read *pa'i*?

<sup>62</sup> Original reconstruction: *sāsraṅvakuśaladharmabījam*.

<sup>63</sup> Sometimes the *bījas* of *kleśas* are also called *dauṣṭhūlya*:

de (=nyon mongs pa) nyid kyi sa bon ma spangs shing yang dag par ma bcom pa ni bag la nyal\* (anuśaya) zhes bya ste / gnas ngan len (dauṣṭhūlya) kyang de yin no // (\**Savitarkasavicārādi-bhūmi-viniścaya*, Pek. Sems-tsam, Zi 118b2; T30:623a22-23; D. Sems-tsam, Zhi 113a6-7).

\*D. adds *ba*.

The seed of the [*kleśa*] that is not abandoned or severed is called *anuśaya*, and it is also *dauṣṭhūlya*. This passage is quoted in *Ālayavijñāna*, en. 482. See also *ibid.*, en. 495.

well functioning (*karmaṇya*), it does not give rise to *kleśas*, but when it is still uncontrolled and not well-functioning (*akarmaṇya*), it does produce *kleśas*, as stated in this passage:

... etac caiva katham bhaviṣyaty eṣāṃ prahīṇaḥ kleśa eṣāṃ aprahīṇa iti /  
prāptau satyāṃ etat sidhyati tadvigamāvīgamāt /  
*āśrayaviśeṣād* etat sidhyati / āśrayo hi sa āryāṇāṃ darśana-  
bhāvanāmārgasāmarthyāt tathā *parāvṛtto* bhavati yathā na punas tat-  
praheyāṇāṃ kleśānāṃ prarohasamartho bhavati / ato 'gnidagdHAVRīhivad<sup>64</sup>  
*abījībhūte*<sup>65</sup> āśraye kleśānāṃ prahīṇakleśa ity ucyate / (*Abhidhar-*  
*makośabhāṣya*, Pradhan ed., 63.17-20; see also Yamabe (1997), pp. 197–  
198; 444, en. 26)

[Question: If there is no *prāpti* (acquisition) as one of the *cittaviprayukta-*  
*samskāra*,] how [do you explain] the distinction between those who have  
abandoned defilements (*kleśa*) and those who have not? If *prāpti* exists, [the  
distinction] is made in terms of the association with or separation from the  
[*prāpti*].

[Answer:] This [distinction between noble and ordinary ones] is made in terms of  
*the distinct states of the “bases” (āśrayaviśeṣa)*. [This distinction is possible]  
because the “basis” (*āśraya*) of noble ones is *transformed (parāvṛtta)* by the  
power of the paths of seeing and practice (*darśanabhāvanāmārga*), so that [the  
“basis”] is no longer capable of generating the defilements to be abandoned by the  
[paths of seeing and practice]. Therefore, when one’s “basis” has ceased to be the  
*seed of defilements (abījībhūte āśraye kleśānāṃ)*, like a grain of rice consumed by the  
fire, [that basis] is called that which has abandoned defilements.<sup>66</sup>

As I have already mentioned, “basis” (*āśraya*) without contextual specification  
frequently refers to the body.<sup>67</sup> If so, I believe these passages show that Buddhist

<sup>64</sup> Text, *-brīhivad*.

<sup>65</sup> Text, *-avījī-*.

<sup>66</sup> As Hyōdō (1980), pp. 68–75 points out, in the system of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, *bīja* and *bījabhāva* have distinct meanings. As I shall discuss in the following footnote, *bīja* is identified with *āśraya* and *nāmarūpa*, namely the totality of a sentient being (centering on the body). On the other hand, *bīja* is defined as follows: What is this *bījabhāva*? It is the capacity of the body (*ātmabhāva*) that is engendered by *kleśas* and can give rise to *kleśas* (Pradhan ed., 278.20-21). The following chart shows this structure:

*bīja*=*āśraya*=*nāmarūpa*

*bījabhāva*=*śakti*

According to Ogawa (2005), p. 109 and Unebe (2015), p. 301, in Indian Grammatical treatises, *bhāva* refers to the existence (*bhāva*) of an attribute (*guṇa*) so that a word is applied to a certain entity (*dravya*). In the system of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, *āśraya/nāmarūpa* would be called *bīja* when it has the attribute (capacity) of giving rise to *kleśas*. I thank Professor Ogawa Hideyo for his assistance with the Indian Grammar.

<sup>67</sup> In a portion just after the passage quoted above (Pradhan ed., 63.18-20), the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* states as follows: “What is this *bīja*? It is *nāmarūpa* capable of giving rise to fruits immediately or indirectly (after the passage of some time)” (Pradhan ed., 64.4-5). In the passage quoted in the main text above (Pradhan ed., 63.17-20), *bīja* is identified with *āśraya* (capable of giving rise to *kleśas*), and in the passage quoted in this footnote (Pradhan ed., 64.4-5), *bīja* is equated to *nāmarūpa*. Thus, this seems to imply the following equation: *bīja*=*āśraya*=*nāmarūpa*. If so, it follows that mental elements (*nāma*) are

meditation is not merely a mental practice. It is to a large degree a bodily practice as well.

The above passage from the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* would not presuppose *ālayavijñāna*, but in the system of Yogācāra, in which *ālayavijñāna* is closely linked to *āśraya* and maintains it, the transformation of *āśraya* is naturally inseparable from the transformation of *ālayavijñāna*.

## 2.5 On the Problem of “Direct Perception”

In a former article (Yamabe 2012, p. 204), I referred to the following passage from the Nivṛtti Portion:

de de ltar zhugs shing nyan thos kyi yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa la zhugs sam / byang chub sems dpa'i yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa la zhugs te chos thams cad kyi chos kyi dbings rtogs par byed pa na / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa yang rtogs par byed de / der kun nas nyon mongs pa thams cad la yang dag par 'dus par blta zhing / de nang gi so so'i bdag nyid la phyi rol gyi mtshan ma'i ching ba dang / nang gi gnas ngan len gyi 'ching bas bdag nyid bcings pa rtogs par byed to // (Nivṛtti Portion, §I.5.(b)B.2. Hakamaya [1979]2001, p. 405)

\*sa evaṃ praviṣṭaḥ śrāvakasamyaktvaniyāmaṃ vāvakrāmya bodhisattvasamyaktvaniyāmaṃ vā sarvadharmadharmadhātuṃ pratividhyaty *ālayavijñānaṃ* ca pratividhyati / sa ca tatra sarvān saṃkleśān samastataḥ paśyati pratyātmam / ātmānaṃ bāhyanimittabandhanena cādhyātmadauṣṭhulyabandhanena ca baddhaṃ pratividhyati / (Reconstructed in collaboration with Aramaki<sup>68</sup>)

Thus having realized [the truths], [the practitioner] attains the certitude of the supreme good (i.e., *darśanamārga*) for *śrāvakas* or for *bodhisattvas* and intuitively sees the Dharmadhātu of all the elements and *ālayavijñāna*. There, he in person sees all the defiled elements comprehensively. He intuitively sees himself to be bound by external bonds of cognitive appearances and internal bonds of non-meditative inertness (*dauṣṭhulyabandhana*).

Footnote 67 continued

also included in *āśraya*. In addition, the *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya* has the following line: “*āśraya* means *ātmabhāva*, namely the physical sensory faculties with their bases and the mental elements (*āśraya ātmabhāvaḥ sādhiṣṭhānam indriyarūpaṃ nāma ca*)” (Buescher ed., 52.14-15). Here, *āśraya*, *ātmabhāva*, and *sādhiṣṭhānam indriyarūpaṃ nāma ca* are equated (see *Ālayavijñāna*, p. 329, en. 372). In the case of *āśraya-parivṛtti/parāvṛtti* also, as the *Xiānyáng shèngjiào lùn* passage quoted in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (cited above in the main body of this article [§2.1]) indicates, what is transformed is clearly the totality of the body and mind. “Personal basis (consisting of body and mind)” may be a more suitable translation of *āśraya*. Perhaps *āśraya* means “body” in its narrower sense and “the totality of personal existence” (i.e., body and mind) in its wider sense. In this article, depending on the context, I sometimes translate the word *āśraya* as “body” and sometimes as “personal basis,” but it should be noted that this distinction is not always clearcut. Nevertheless, as many passages quoted in this article show, it remains true that *āśraya* is often closely associated with the bodily side of human existence in the relevant texts.

<sup>68</sup> To save space I do not quote the Chinese version here, but this reconstruction is based not only on the Tibetan but also on Paramārtha’s and Xuanzang’s Chinese versions. See also *Ālayavijñāna*, §10.1.

Schmithausen notes the following points regarding this passage. In the Nivṛtti Portion, *ālayavijñāna* is defined as *duḥkhasatya* in the present life, what causes *samudayasatya* in the present life, and what causes *duḥkhasatya* in the future life. If so, since *darśanamārga* is traditionally defined as the first direct comprehension of the four *āryasatyas*, it is natural that the Nivṛtti Portion states that *ālayavijñāna* is directly perceived at *darśanamārga*. Thus, he suspects that this statement was a prescriptive one based on the doctrinal framework of the Nivṛtti Portion, rather than a description of actual experience (*Genesis*, §8.3).

Considering the usage of *praśrabdhi* and *dauṣṭhulya* in the Yogācāra literature, however, I have a contrary impression. I feel that this Nivṛtti Portion passage was a description of practitioners' actual experience. The passages I have discussed in this paper indicate rather strongly that *praśrabdhi* and *dauṣṭhulya* were something practitioners experienced directly in their practice. To be sure, *praśrabdhi* and *dauṣṭhulya* themselves were well-known from early on and nothing novel, but, in my opinion, what the Yogācāra practitioners realized anew was that the root of the *praśrabdhi* and *dauṣṭhulya* that they experienced was in a latent physiological substratum supporting their body and mind.

## 2.6 Meditative Comfort Pervading the Whole Body

The fact that some of the eight proofs presuppose that *ālayavijñāna* pervades the entire body might be connected with the old notion that *pīti* (*prīti*) and *sukha* pervade the whole body in meditation. For example, the *Kāyagatāsatisutta* states:

Puna ca paraṃ, bhikkhave, bhikkhu vivicc' eva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkam savicāram vivekajam pītisukham paṭhamajjhānam upasampajja viharati. *So imam eva kāyam vivekajena pītisukhena abhisandeti parisandeti paripūreti parippharati*, nāssa kiñci sabbāvato kāyassa vivekajena pītisukhena apphutaṃ hoti. (*Kāyagatāsatisutta*, *Majjhima-Nikāya*, No. 119, PTS ed., 3:92.23-28)

Further, monks, a monk, having been separated from lusts and unwholesome dharmas, attains and stays in the first [stage of] meditation endowed with gross and subtle thought, arising from the separation, and accompanied by gratification and bliss. *He makes the gratification and bliss arising from the separation flow round, permeate, fill, and pervade his body*. No part of his whole body is not pervaded with gratification and bliss arising from the separation.

As Anālayo (2014) has pointed out, the physical aspect is very important in the four stages of *dhyāna*. In this context, the body clearly plays a positive role. We should also note that the *Xiānyáng shèngjiào lùn* passage (quoted in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*) that ties *sukha* to *ālayavijñāna* is a discussion of the *prīti-sukha* in the first and second *dhyānas*. I think the experience of *prīti-sukha* filling the body in meditation may well have been behind the idea that *ālayavijñāna* fills the whole body.

### 3 The First Proof Reexamined

Finally, let us return to the interpretation of the first proof. Schmithausen analyzes the first proof into these three portions (*Ālayavijñāna*, §9.2, my paraphrase):

- i.a-c: Appropriating the body at the moment of conception.
- i.d: Keeping it appropriated as a whole.
- i.e: Keeping it appropriated throughout life.

Namely, Schmithausen understands the first three arguments of this proof in the context of reincarnation.

On the other hand, in earlier articles (Yamabe 2012, pp. 186–187; Yamabe 2015a, pp. 139–145), I have expressed a view that the first proof does not concern conception. In my opinion, *pūrvasaṃskārahetuka*, “caused by prior karmic acts,” does not refer to the process of reincarnation from the former life to the present life. It merely shows that the basic nature of *ālayavijñāna* is predetermined by one’s previous karma, and thus it does not change much throughout this life.

Schmithausen disagrees with my view (*Genesis*, fn. 1277[1.]). In his opinion, since the eighth (last) proof concerns death, it is natural that the first proof concerns conception.<sup>69</sup> Also, since one of the present conditions for “the traditional set of *vijñānas*” (*pravṛttivijñānas*), namely *indriya*, is missing at the moment of *pratisandhi*, the argument (i.a) fits perfectly well with the moment of conception.

#### 3.1 Material Supporting Schmithausen’s View

Schmithausen quotes the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* (Kramer ed., 107.3–6) and points out that this proof was understood in the context of *pratisandhi* by Sthiramati (*Genesis*, fn. 1277[2.]).<sup>70</sup> Table 1 juxtaposes the relevant passages from *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* and *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*.

Undoubtedly, the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* here presupposes the entirety of the first proof in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*. It is also clear that portion (a) of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* links argument (a) of the first proof to the moment of conception. This passage from the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* would indeed support Schmithausen’s argument.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Table 1 (f) of this article.

<sup>70</sup> On the discussion of *ālayavijñāna* in the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, see Matsuda (2010).

<sup>71</sup> Schmithausen further refers to Tsong-kha-pa’s *Yid dang kun gzhi’i dka’ ’grel* (and its commentary by Ke’u tshang) to support his argument (*Genesis*, fn. 1277[3.]). Tsong-kha-pa’s view seems to be in line with the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* passage quoted above and is probably based on Indian Yogācāra literature such as the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* itself. In this paper I limit the scope of my argument to Indian texts.

**Table 1** Discussions of *pūrvasaṃskārahetuka* in the *Viniścayaśaṃgrahaṇī* and the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*

The first proof ( <i>Viniścayaśaṃgrahaṇī</i> , loc. cit.)	<i>Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā</i>
(a) ālayavijñānaṃ pūrvasaṃskārahetukam / cakṣurādīpravrṭtīvijñānaṃ punar vartamānapratyayaḥhetukam / yathoktam – indriyaviśayamanaskāravaśād vijñānānāṃ pravṛttir bhavatīti vistareṇa / idaṃ prathamam kāraṇam /	(a) tac ca yat pūrvasaṃskārahetukam śukraśoṇitasammūrchitāvasthāyām bhavam upādatte / tad eva maraṇāt kāyopādātṛtveneṣyate / na cakṣurādīvijñānāni tatpṛṣṭhalabdham vā manovijñānam, teṣāṃ tata ūrdhvaṃ vartamānacakṣurādīpratyayanimitatvāt / (107.3-6)
<i>Ālayavijñāna</i> is caused by prior karmic acts whereas the visual and other [types of] functional consciousness are caused by present conditions. As has been said: “Consciousness operates based on a sense faculty, cognitive object, and attention,” and so on. This is the first reason.	What has been caused by prior karmic acts ( <i>vipāka</i> = <i>ālayavijñāna</i> ) appropriates existence at the stage of merging of the semen and blood. The same [ <i>ālayavijñāna</i> ] is recognized as what appropriates the body until death. It is not the visual and other [types of sense] consciousness or the subsequent mental consciousness, because they depend on present conditions such as the visual sense faculty after that [moment of conception].
(b) api ca kuśalākuśalāḥ ṣaḍ vijñānakāyā upalabhyante / idaṃ dvitīyam kāraṇam /	(b) na ca tatrānyan manovijñānaṃ saṃskārahetukam, tasya kuśalākuśalatvāt / saṃskārahetukam hy ekāntenāvvyākṛtam, vipākatvāt / vipākaś ca na vicchinnaḥ sandhīyate, cakṣurādivat / (107.6-9)
Further, the six groups of consciousness are observed to be wholesome or unwholesome. This is the second reason.	In that situation, mental consciousness other [than <i>ālayavijñāna</i> ] cannot be what has been caused by prior karmic acts, because it is either wholesome or unwholesome. What has been caused by karmic acts is always neutral, because it is karmic maturation. And karmic maturation is understood to be uninterrupted unlike the visual and other [types of consciousness].
(c) api ca ṣaṇṇam vijñānakāyānām sā jātir nopalabhyate yā 'vyākṛtavipākaśaṃgrhītā syāt / idaṃ tṛtīyam kāraṇam /	(c) na cālayavijñānād anyad ekāntenāvvyākṛtajātīyam upalabhyate yad vipākavijñānatvena parikalpyate // (107.9-10)
Also, among the six groups of consciousness, the kind that would be comprised in morally neutral karmic maturation is not observed. This is the third reason.	And no exclusively morally neutral type, which is considered to be the consciousness of karmic maturation, can be observed other than <i>ālayavijñāna</i> .
(d) api ca pratiniyatāśrayāḥ ṣaḍ vijñānakāyāḥ pravartante, tatra yena yenāśrayeṇa yad vijñānaṃ pravartate tad eva tenopāttaṃ syād avāśiṣṭasyānupāttateti na yujyate, upāttatāpi na yujyate vijñānavirahitatayā / idaṃ caturtham kāraṇam /	(d) api ca pratiniyatāśrayapravṛttatvāt ṣaṇṇam vijñānakāyānām vicchedapravṛttatvāc ca na sarvasyāśrayasyopādānaṃ prasajyate / tathāhi yena yenāśrayeṇa yad vijñānaṃ pravartate, sa eva tenopāttaḥ syāt, avāśiṣṭasyānupāttatvaṃ vijñānavirahitatvāt / (107.11-14)
In addition, the six groups of consciousness operate [based on] distinct bases. With regard to this, when a certain [type of] consciousness operates [based on its] individual basis, it is not reasonable that only that [type of consciousness] is appropriated by that [basis] and that the remainder is not appropriated. Even if [the remainder] is appropriated, this is not reasonable, because [it is] separate from the consciousness. This is the fourth reason.	In addition, because the six groups of consciousness operate [based on] distinct bases, and because their operation can be interrupted, it follows that the whole personal basis cannot be appropriated. Namely, when a certain [type of] consciousness operates [based on its] individual basis, only that [particular basis] would be appropriated by that [type of consciousness] but the remainder would be unappropriated because [it is] separate from [that type of] consciousness.

**Table 1** continued

The first proof ( <i>Viniścayasamgrahaṇī</i> , loc. cit.)	<i>Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā</i>
(e) <i>api ca punaḥ punar āśrayasyopādānadoṣaḥ prasajyate / tathāhi caḥsurvijñānam ekadā pravartate ekadā na pravartate evam avaśiṣṭāni / idaṃ pañcamaṃ kāraṇam /</i>	(e) <i>tathā caḥsurādivijñānaṃ vicchedena punaḥ punaḥ pravartata iti tadāśrayasya punaḥ punar upādānadoṣaprasaṅgaḥ / (107.14-15)</i>
Further, <i>the fallacy of repeated appropriation of the body</i> will result [without <i>ālayavijñāna</i> ], for the visual and other [types of sense-]consciousness sometimes operates and sometimes do not. This is the fifth reason.	Likewise, because the visual consciousness and so forth re-arise again and again after interruptions, <i>the fallacy of repeated appropriation of its basis</i> will result.
—	(f) <i>tasmād ālayavijñānam eva pratisandhau kāyam upādatte<sup>a</sup> ā maraṇāc ca samastakāyāśrayeṇa pravartata iti tad eva pratisandhibandhāt prabhṛty ā maraṇāt kāyam upādatta (text, upādatta) ity ādānavijñānam ity ucyate //</i> ( <i>Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā</i> , Kramer ed., 107.16-108.2, quoted in <i>Genesis</i> , fn. 1281)
—	Therefore, since only <i>ālayavijñāna</i> appropriates the body at [the moment of] conception and operates as the basis of the whole body until death, and since the same [ <i>vijñāna</i> ] appropriates the body starting [the moment of] conception until death, it is called <i>ādānavijñāna</i> .

<sup>a</sup>Sic. Sandhi not observed

We should further note that there is a problematic line in argument (d) of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* noted by Hakamaya ([1978]2001, pp. 355–356, en. 49; 359): *tad eva tenopāttaṃ syād*, which literally would mean that *vijñāna* (neuter) is appropriated by *āśraya* (masculine).<sup>72</sup> However, it is a standard tenet that *vijñāna* appropriates *āśraya*, and it is difficult to reverse this relationship (Yamabe 2002, p. 366; 2015a, p. 169, nn. 9-10). Moreover, if we interpret the line as “*vijñāna* is appropriated by the *āśraya*,” the word “remainder” (*avaśiṣṭa*) in the following line (*avaśiṣṭasyānupāttateti na yujyate, upāttatāpi na yujyate vijñānavirahitayā*) must logically refer to “the other *vijñānas*.” This amounts to saying, “The other *vijñānas* are separate from *vijñāna*,” which does not seem reasonable.<sup>73</sup> In the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, on the other hand, this line reads: *sa eva tenopāttaḥ syāt*, which should mean that *āśraya* (masculine) is appropriated by *vijñāna* (neuter). Obviously the latter reading makes better sense.<sup>74</sup> Either the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* retains the original reading, or Sthiramati rectified the inattention to gender in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*. In either case, Sthiramati’s statement is definitely significant.

<sup>72</sup> See also Yamabe (2002), p. 366; Yamabe (2015a), p. 169, nn. 9-10.

<sup>73</sup> It might be possible to interpret it as, “the other *vijñānas* are separate from the *vijñāna* in question,” however.

<sup>74</sup> This was already pointed out by Matsumoto (2015), p. 390, fn. 29. In Yamabe (2015b), pp. 128–129, I overlooked Matsumoto (2015) (which appeared a little before I submitted the final draft) and noted the same point without referring to Matsumoto’s article. I apologize to Professor Matsumoto for my oversight.

### 3.2 Material Supporting Yamabe's View

My own interpretation (Yamabe 2012, p. 214, en. 27; see also Yamabe 2015a, pp. 142–143) was based on the passage from the *Chéng wéishí lùn* 成唯識論 shown in the middle column of Table 2).

This *Chéng wéishí lùn* passage also shares a few key expressions with the first proof and thus is definitely relevant. What is characterized as *vipāka* in this passage is the neutral sensation associated with *ālayavijñāna*, but since *ālayavijñāna* and the associated mental functions share the basic characteristics,<sup>75</sup> the same characterization also applies to *ālayavijñāna* itself. *Vipāka* is of course determined by one's former karma, but I believe the main point of this passage is not the karmic continuity between the former and present lives, but the unchanging, stable nature of the sensation associated with *ālayavijñāna* (and of *ālayavijñāna* itself). Once a determinative karma (*ākṣepaka-karma*) has brought about its maturation (*vipāka*), its nature does not change throughout a person's lifetime. On the other hand, *pravṛttivijñānas* depend on present conditions and thus are constantly changing and unstable. It seems to me that the point of the first proof of the "Proof Portion," is that such unstable *vijñānas* cannot maintain the body throughout a lifetime. Only the stable *ālayavijñāna* is capable of that function.

We should further note that the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* itself also includes a similar statement, as shown in the right column of Table 2. Here, Sthiramati states that since *ālayavijñāna* is caused by former karmic acts, it is always *vipāka* only and is morally neutral. This is close to my view that the expression *pūrva(karma) saṃskārahetuka* refers to the stability of its fruition rather than the karmic continuity between the previous and present lives.<sup>76</sup>

Thus, I believe that these later testimonies are equivalent. There is, indeed, a passage that supports Schmithausen's interpretation, but my interpretation is also supported by the tradition. Therefore, we cannot decide conclusively based on these later interpretations. We need to return to the original text, the *Viniścayasamgrahanī*, itself.

### 3.3 Two Types of *Upādāna*

Before discussing the first proof itself, I shall review some key concepts. As shown in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §I.5, there are two types of *upādāna* in the Yogācāra system:

ci'i phyir len pa'i mnam par shes pa zhes bya zhe na / (a) dbang po gzugs can thams cad kyi rgyu yin pa dang / (b) lus thams cad nye bar len pa'i gnas su gyur pa'i phyir te / 'di ltar (a) tshe ji srid par rjes su 'jug gi bar du des dbang po gzugs can lnga po dag ma zhig par nye bar gzung ba dang / (b) nying mtshams sbyor ba sbrel ba na yang de mngon par 'grub pa nye bar 'dzin pa'i phyir lus

<sup>75</sup> See *Chéng wéishí lùn*, T31:12b1-5.

<sup>76</sup> It should also be noted that in the subsequent portion of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, conception is mentioned. This point will be discussed later (Table 3).



**Table 2** The first proof in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* compared with the *Chéng wéishí lùn* and the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*

The First Proof (loc. cit.)	<i>Chéng wéishí lùn</i> (T31:11c29-12a8 [No. 1585])	<i>Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā</i> (Kramer ed., 93.1-6)
<p>(a) ālayavijñānaṃ pūrvasaṃskārahetukam / cakṣurādipravṛttivijñānaṃ pūnar vartamānapratyaya-hetukam / yathoktam – indriyaṣayamanaskāraśāśad vijñānānāṃ pravṛttir bhavattī vistareṇa / idaṃ prathamam kāraṇam / (b) api ca kuśalākuśalāḥ śad vijñānakāyā upalabhyante / idaṃ dvitīyam kāraṇam / (c) api ca śaṅṅam vijñānakāyānāṃ sā jātir nopalabhyate yāvyaṅkrta vipākasaṃgrhītā syāt / idaṃ tṛtīyam kāraṇam /</p>	<p>此識行相極不明了。不能分別違順境相，微細一類相續而轉，是故唯與捨受相應。又此相應受唯是異熟。隨先引業轉不待現緣。任<sup>a</sup>善惡業勢力轉故，唯是捨受。苦樂二受是異熟生，非真異熟。待現緣故，非此相應。又由此識常無轉變，有情恒執為自內我。若與苦樂二受相應，便有轉變。寧執為我。故此但與捨受相應</p>	<p>pravṛttivijñānaṃ kuśalakliṣṭāvvyākṛt-jātyam, ālayavijñānaṃ tv ekajātyam / tatra na tāvat kuśalākuśalajātyam kuśalākuśalair asamprayogāt / tad dhi pañcabhir eva sarvatragaiś caitasaiḥ samprayujyate, manaskārasparśavedanāsañjñācetanābhiḥ / ālayavijñānaṃ sasamprayogaṃ pūrvakarmasaṃskārahetukatvād ekāntena vipāka evety avyākṛtajātyam eva //</p>
<p>(a) <i>Ālayavijñāna</i> is caused by prior karmic acts whereas the visual and other [types of] functional consciousness are caused by present conditions. As has been said: “Consciousness operates based on a sense faculty, cognitive objects, and attention,” and so on. This is the first reason. (b) Further, the six groups of consciousness are observed to be wholesome or unwholesome. This is the second reason. (c) Also, among the six groups of consciousness, the kind that would be comprised in morally neutral maturation is not observed. This is the third reason.</p>	<p>The mode of cognition (<i>ākāra</i>) of this [<i>ālaya</i>]-<i>vijñāna</i> is extremely unclear. It cannot discriminate the modes of favorable and unfavorable objects and subtly and coherently continues to operate. For this reason, [<i>ālayavijñāna</i>] is only associated with neutral sensation (<i>upekṣā vedanā</i>). This associated sensation is also karmic maturation (<i>vipāka</i>) only. It operates following the determinative karma (<i>ākṣepa-karma</i>) in a former life and does not depend on present conditions. Because it operates following the power of [former] wholesome and unwholesome karma, it is only neutral sensation.<sup>b</sup> Unpleasant and pleasant sensations are derivatives of karmic maturation (<i>vipākaja</i>) and are not genuine karmic maturation. Because they depend on present conditions, they are not associated with this [<i>ālayavijñāna</i>]. Also, because this [<i>ālaya</i>]-<i>vijñāna</i> is always free from transformation, sentient beings always take it to be their inner self. If it is associated with unpleasant and pleasant sensations, it has transformation. Why can [sentient beings] take it to be [their] self? Therefore, it is only associated with neutral sensation.</p>	<p>Functional consciousness [belongs to] the wholesome, defiled, or neutral class, but <i>ālayavijñāna</i> [belongs to] one class. There, in the first place, [<i>ālayavijñāna</i> does] not [belong to] the class of wholesome or unwholesome, for it is not associated with wholesome or unwholesome [elements]. This is because it (<i>ālayavijñāna</i>) is associated only with the five omnipresent (<i>sarvatraga</i>) mental functions, namely attention (<i>manaskāra</i>), contact (<i>sparsā</i>), sensation (<i>vedanā</i>), ideation (<i>sañjñā</i>), and volition (<i>cetanā</i>). Since <i>ālayavijñāna</i>, together with its associates, is caused by karmic acts in a previous [life], it is invariably karmic maturation only and [belongs] only [to] the neutral class.</p>

<sup>a</sup>The text has zhù 住 here, but based on the variant reading shown in fn. 1 on T31:12 and the Shindō 新導 edition of *Chéng wéishí lùn* 3:4.7, I emend it to rèn 任.

<sup>b</sup>As shown in the subsequent explanation, the purport of this argument should be as follows: Pleasant and unpleasant sensations depend on present conditions and thus are not predetermined solely by the karma in a previous life. Therefore, they cannot be pure karmic maturations.

gzung ba yin te / de lta bas na de len pa'i rnam par shes pa zhes bya'o / (*Mahāyānasamgraha*, §I.5 [Nagao 1982, p. 11]<sup>77</sup>)

\*kiṃ kāraṇam ādānavijñānam ity ucyate / — (a) sarvarūpīndriyopādānavena (b) sarvātmabhāvopādānāśrayatvena ca / tathāhi (a) tena pañca rūpīndriyāny<sup>78</sup> upādīyante `vināśāya yāvad āyur anuvartate / (b) pratisamdhibandhe ca tadabhinirvṛtṭyupādānavatnētmabhāva upādīyate / evaṃ tad ādānavijñānam ity ucyate / (Reconstruction by Aramaki found in Nagao 1982, pp. 11–12, slightly modified by the present author)

[Question:] For what reason is [*ālayavijñāna* also] called *ādānavijñāna*?

[Answer:] (a) [*Ālayavijñāna* is called *ādānavijñāna*] because it appropriates all the material sense faculties, and (b) because it is the basis for appropriating all [types of] bodies. Namely, (a) the five sense faculties are appropriated by it so that they do not perish throughout the duration of life, and (b) at [the moment of] conception, the body is appropriated by means of appropriating its actualization. Thus, it is called *ādānavijñāna*.

Namely, (a) the appropriation of the body throughout life, and (b) the appropriation of a [new] form of existence at the moment of conception. Here, the second type of appropriation refers to the crucial moment of *pratisandhi* at which a new form of existence is assumed.<sup>79</sup> In that sense it is different from the first type of *upādāna*, which refers to the maintenance of the body one has attained at the moment of conception.

### 3.4 Paul Griffiths' Interpretation

Regarding the first proof of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, Paul Griffiths (1986, p. 98) says (emphasis added):

Yet if this is true, and if a complete account of conscious experience (the 'functioning consciousnesses') can be given without reference to past events, then no place is allowed for *the causal efficacy of karma, of actions performed in the past*. And this in turn would mean that no account could be given of why a particular individual '*appropriates' or takes on a particular body, rather than some other, when reborn*, since the event of being reborn *cannot involve any of the six functioning consciousnesses* and thus has to be explained by the causal efficacy of past actions. And it is here that the store-consciousness

<sup>77</sup> Here and below, I have converted the text into the Wylie transliteration system.

<sup>78</sup> The original reconstruction: *pañcarūpīndriyāny*.

<sup>79</sup> See Nagao (1982), p. 85; Sasaki (1982), pp. 186, 192; *Genesis*, §273. Sasaki links this second type of appropriation to *sopādānavijñāna*, which, according to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, etc., takes hold of existence in the next life. On the other hand, in the *pratītyasamutpāda* passages, largely identical in the *Savitarkasavicārādi-bhūmi* and the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*, we find the expression *hetuvijñānapratyayaṃ pratisandhiphalavijñānam* (Harada 2004, p. 144; I thank Mr. Harada for drawing my attention to this passage). *Sopādānavijñāna* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, etc., probably corresponds to the *hetuvijñāna* in the *pratītyasamutpāda* passages of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. It appears that at the moment of conception, the consciousness is already *phalavijñāna*.

comes in as an explanatory category, for it is the store-consciousness, caused as our text says by ‘prior karmic formations,’ which can provide a locus for karmic effect<sup>80</sup> and thus an explanation of how the *rebirth process* occurs.

Thus, in his opinion the point of this proof is the causal link between the past life to the present one. In his understanding, the explanation of the causal link between the past karma (cause) and the new existence (effect) is impossible without *ālayavijñāna*. Once a being has entered the womb, no alteration of the type of existence is possible. So, clearly he understands that this proof discusses the moment when a new type of existence is taken hold of. In other words, in his understanding, this proof refers to the second type of *upādāna* of the *Mahāvānasamgraha*, §I.5.

As Schmithausen points out while discussing Matsumoto’s argument, in the first proof of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, at least points (d) “appropriation of all the sense faculties” and (e) “continuous appropriation” of the first proof clearly refer to the first type of appropriation in the *Mahāvānasamgraha*, §I.5 (the appropriation of the body throughout life [*Genesis*, §233<sup>81</sup>]). It is strange that Griffiths does not consider this possibility at all.<sup>82</sup> As I have pointed out, it is noteworthy that the word *pratisandhi*, or any similar expression, does not appear at all in the first proof (see Yamabe 2012, p. 187).

Also, Griffiths argues that “the event of being reborn cannot involve any of the six functioning consciousnesses,” but according to the detailed description of the process of rebirth in the *Manobhūmi* of the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, at least *manovijñāna* and *caḥsurvijñāna* are operative during the period of *antarābhava*. See the following quotations:

tasya ca *divyacaḥsur* iva *caḥsur* na vyāhanyate yāvad upapattyāyatanāt / (*Manobhūmi* [*Yogācārabhūmi*, Bhattacharya, ed.], 19.9; Yamabe (2013), p. 619)

His *eyes*, which are like *divine eyes*, reach as far as the place of his [future] rebirth without being obstructed.

sacet strī bhavitukāmo bhavati puruṣe *saṃrāgaḥ* saṃvāsecchotpadyate / sacet puruṣo bhavitukāmo bhavati tasya striyāṃ *saṃrāgaḥ* saṃvāsecchotpadyate / tatas tatsamīpaṃ ca gacchati / striyāś ca stryapagamanecchotpadyate puruṣasya ca puruṣāpagamanecchā / (*Manobhūmi* [*Yogācārabhūmi*, Bhattacharya, ed.], 23.6-9; Yamabe (2013), p. 641)

<sup>80</sup> I understand that “karmic effect” is equivalent to “causal efficacy of past actions” mentioned just above.

<sup>81</sup> “... what is at stake here is hence not the taking hold of a new existence or basis-of-existence (*ātabhāva*) in the sense of the whole psycho-physical personality but the ‘biological’ appropriation ....”

<sup>82</sup> Griffiths interprets even point (d) as “appropriation of a new physical body at the moment of a new birth.” However, here “the moment of a new birth” must be meant to be the moment of conception. If so, it does not make sense to appropriate the *indriyas* that have not been formed yet at the stage of conception.

If [the being to be reborn] desires to become female, *passion* driving to intercourse arises toward the man. If [it] desires to become male, *passion* driving to intercourse arises in it for the woman. Thereupon, it approaches them, and for [a being who would become] female, the wish to be away from the woman arises, whereas for [a being who would become] male, the wish to be away from the man [arises].

Here, the first passage clearly shows that a being sees things during the period of *antarābhava*, while the second one states that the being develops passion (*samrāga*) just before entering the womb, which means that its *manovijñāna* is operative then. Thus, we cannot simply assert that *pravṛttivijñānas* are not involved in the process of rebirth. The role of *pravṛttivijñānas* in the process of rebirth is not entirely clear, but in any case Griffiths' attempt to understand the entirety of the first proof in the context of causal link in the process of rebirth would be difficult for the reasons stated above.

### 3.5 Lambert Schmithausen's Interpretation

Meanwhile, Schmithausen's argument needs to be treated separately from Griffiths', but he also understands that the first half of the first proof (arguments a-c) refers to the situation just after conception. As we have seen, such an interpretation did exist in later Yogācāra tradition in India, but a different interpretation also existed. Therefore, we cannot determine the interpretation of the first proof based on these later interpretations and need to come back to the first proof itself. When I reread the first proof keeping Schmithausen's comments in mind, I still do not think that it refers primarily to the process of reincarnation or the moment of conception.

First, as I have already stated, *pratisandhi* is not mentioned at all in this proof. This point should not be treated lightly.

Then, regarding argument (a) of the first proof, it would be a matter of course that the surface layers of mind (i.e., *pravṛttivijñānas*) are not (at least, fully) operative in early stages of pregnancy because the sense faculties are still not formed.<sup>83</sup> If so, obviously *pravṛttivijñānas* cannot physiologically maintain the body. To my mind, it does not make much sense to discuss something self-evident. On the other hand, in the context of daily cognition after birth, it is meaningful to compare *pravṛttivijñānas*, which depend on present conditions and are changeable, and *ālayavijñāna*, which is predetermined by past karma and is unchangeable. If we interpret argument (a) this way, we can easily understand that such *pravṛttivijñānas* change their moral nature depending on present conditions (argument [b]) and are often interrupted (argument [e]), again depending on present conditions. Thus, we can understand the entirety of the first proof coherently.

In addition, Schmithausen understands arguments (b) and (c) also as referring to the situation just after conception. Here also, since (at least most of) the *pravṛttivijñānas* are not operative yet, it does not seem reasonable to discuss the moral nature of something nonexistent, or to discuss whether or not it is karmic maturation. It makes much better sense in the daily context after birth, in which *pravṛttivijñānas* routinely arise.

<sup>83</sup> Perhaps *kāyavijñāna* and *manovijñāna* may be exceptions. See Yamabe (2013), pp. 650, 654.

Considering these points, I believe the most natural interpretation of the first proof is that it compares the functions and characteristics of the *pravṛttivijñānas* and *ālayavijñāna* during one's lifetime after birth. In this way, we can understand the entirety of the first proof in one context, namely physiological maintenance of the body throughout life (primarily after birth), and the arguments of this proof can be understood coherently. The fact that this proof is the first of the eight proofs does not necessarily mean that it is connected to the first moment of life. It does not seem to me that the eight proofs are arranged in such a systematic way.

I should add, however, that my statement in Yamabe (2012) was primarily directed at Paul Griffiths. I cannot agree with his interpretation for the reasons stated above. However, we cannot treat Schmithausen's argument in the same way. Schmithausen translates the second type of appropriation in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §I.5 as "taking hold of a new existence/body," "appropriating a new body" (*Genesis*, §130.2.3; §202; §233) and so forth, but in *Genesis*, fn. 1277 under discussion, he uses the expression, "'biological' appropriation of the body." Thus, it is certain that he understands all parts of the first proof as discussions of the first type of appropriation in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §I.5. (This point is expressly stated not only in §233, quoted above, but also in §235<sup>84</sup> of *Genesis*).<sup>85</sup>

If I can understand Schmithausen's argument this way, it may not fundamentally contradict my own view. Once a *vijñāna* has merged with the (still undeveloped) body (i.e., the embryo), the same basic mechanism of physiological maintenance would operate, and this mechanism lasts until the moment of death. I have no theoretical reason to rule out this interpretation. Thus, though I understand the first proof primarily to refer to the mechanism of *upādāna* after birth, theoretically it should be possible to extend the same mechanism to the embryonic stage as well. In that sense, my understanding might not be so radically different from Schmithausen's.

<sup>84</sup> "Thus, this argument of the 'Proof Portion' is concerned with 'biological' appropriation only, ..."

<sup>85</sup> However, there is one point of Schmithausen's argument that is unclear to me. On the one hand, he states:

According to the first reason, this cannot be achieved by the six *pravṛttivijñānas*—visual awareness, etc.—because they originate from present conditions, viz., from a sense faculty, an object, and an act of attention (*manaskāra*). This would seem to mean that they presuppose the 'linking up' (*pratisandhi*) of the new life and hence the 'appropriation' of its basis as having already taken place. (*Genesis*, §231, emphasis added [similarly below])

On the other hand, he states:

I would find it quite unnatural if this important aspect were not also taken into account, and the place where it would naturally be expected is surely at the very beginning, just as the death argument is placed at the very end. Actually, the very first reason of the first proof (i(a)) is perfectly appropriate for this purpose: the traditional set of *vijñānas* results from present conditions, among which *at least one, the sense faculty, is lacking* at the moment of 'linking up', because it exists only in a living, sentient organism and hence presupposes that 'biological appropriation' has already taken place. (*Genesis*, fn. 1277 [1.])

In the first statement, he seems to be thinking that the first reason of the first proof presupposes that the body has already been appropriated (i.e., conception has already taken place). In the second statement, he says that the sense faculty is missing at the stage of conception and that it exists only in an organism that has already been appropriated. This seems to imply that the first reason of the first proof concerns the stage at which "biological appropriation" has not taken place yet (i.e., before conception). Thus, these two statements seem contradictory to me, but this may simply be a matter of my insufficient comprehension. Therefore, I refrain from further argument on this point here.

I believe the same interpretation is also supported by the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §I.35, which clearly discusses a situation after reincarnation.

nyin mtshams sbyor ba sbrel zin pa rnam kyī dbang po gzugs can 'dzin par byed pa yang de las gzhan rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes par mi 'thad de / de ma yin pa'i rnam par shes pa gzhan rnam ni (i) gnas so sor nges pa dang (ii) mi brtan pa'i phyr ro // rnam par shes pa med pa'i dbang po gzugs can ni mi rung ngo // (Nagao 1982, p. 38 [numbering added, also to the following two paragraphs])

\*baddhapratīsamdhīnām ca rūpīndriyasamparigrāhakaṃ vipākavijñānād anyan nopapadyate / (i) *pratīnyatāśrayatvād* (ii) *adhruvatvāc* ca tadanyavijñānām / na ca rūpīndriyāny avijñānāni yujyante / (Aramaki's reconstruction in *ibid.*)

For those who have already been reincarnated, [a *vijñāna*] other than the *vipākavijñāna* that takes hold of the material sense faculties is not possible, (i) *because the other vijñānas have distinct bases* and (ii) *are unstable*. Material sense faculties without *vijñāna* are not reasonable.

Here, the two italicized reasons seem to presuppose respectively arguments (d) and (e) of the first proof, and thus this passage also likely presupposes the first proof.<sup>86</sup> In the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, the process of transition from *antarābhava* to conception is discussed in the preceding §I.34, and the interdependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* in the subsequent §I.36. Thus, both the context and the content of §I.35 itself clearly show that this section concerns conception. However, since this is a discussion “for those who have already been incarnated,”<sup>87</sup> conception has already taken place. This cannot be a discussion of the moment of taking hold of a new existence. Because the process from *antarābhava* to *pratisandhi* is already explained in detail in §I.34, the context does not require a discussion of the same issue in §I.35. Therefore, we cannot interpret §I.35 in the sense of the second appropriation of §I.5 (acquisition of a new existence).

Vasubandhu's commentary on this portion is concise but clear:

**nying mtshams sbyor ba sbrel zin pa** zhes bya ba ni bdag gi lus rab tu thob pa'o / **de las**<sup>88</sup> **gzhan** zhes bya ba ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ma yin pa ni gzhan pa ste / gzhan rnam par shes pa drug po rnam ni gnas so sor nges pa dang g.yo ba'i phyr ro / ji ltar mig gi rnam par shes pa gnas so sor nges pa yin pa<sup>89</sup> bzhin du rna ba'i rnam par shes pa la sogs pa lhag ma rnam kyī yang rna ba la sogs pa dbang po gzugs can rnam ni rten yin no / des na gal te rnam par

<sup>86</sup> Perhaps based on this passage Schmithausen does not take these items of the first proof as referring to the situation just after conception. Cf. *Genesis*, §234.

<sup>87</sup> 以取後身(Buddhaśānta, T31:99b27 [No. 1592]); 復次若衆生已託生 (Paramārtha, T31:116b19-20 [No. 1593]); 復次結生相續已 (Xuanzang, T31:136a13 [No. 1592]). The Chinese versions other than Buddhaśānta's indicate that the conception has already taken place. So does *zin* in the Tibetan version. See Yamabe (2015a), p. 170, en. 28.

<sup>88</sup> D. *nas*.

<sup>89</sup> Pek. *ba*.

shes pa de dag gi rang rang gi gnas blangs par gyur la / rnam par shes pa de rnam 'gags par gyur pa na thob pa'i mig la sogs pa rnam rul par 'gyur ro // (Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya, §I.35, Pek. Sems-tsam, Li 159b7-160a2; D. Sems-tsam, Ri 135b2-4)

釋曰。結生相續已者，謂已得自體。若離異熟識者，謂離阿賴耶識，其餘諸識各別依故。不堅住故者，謂餘六識各別處故，易動轉故。且如眼識眼為別依，如是其餘耳等諸識，耳等色根為各別依。由此道理，如是諸識但應執受自所依根。又此諸識易動轉故，或時無有。若離阿賴耶識，爾時眼等諸根無能執受，便應爛壞。(T31:332a18-25 [No. 1597])

“One who has already been reincarnated” means one who has acquired an *ātmabhāva*.<sup>90</sup> As for the phrase “other than,” [*vijñānas*] other than *ālayavijñāna* are “others,” because the other six *vijñānas* have distinct bases and are changeable. As visual consciousness has its distinct basis, for the remaining auditory and other types of consciousness, material sense faculties like ear are the bases. Therefore, if these types of consciousness appropriate their own respective bases, when these types of consciousness cease, the sense faculties appropriated [by them] will perish.<sup>91</sup> (Translated from the Tibetan version)

Thus, “distinct bases” refer to the *cakṣus* corresponding to *cakṣurvijñāna*, *śrotra* corresponding to *śrotravijñāna*, and so forth (as the *Upanibandhana* points out, *manas* is not physical,<sup>92</sup> so what is at issue here must substantially be the relationship between the five *vijñānas* and the five *indriyas*). “Unstable” means that these five *vijñānas* can be interrupted.<sup>93</sup> Here, since the five *indriyas* are not formed in the early stages of pregnancy, the five sense *vijñānas* naturally do not arise.<sup>94</sup> Since what has not arisen in the first place cannot be interrupted, if we follow these commentaries, the discussion in §I.35 must mainly refer to the stage in which the five *indriyas* have already been formed (primarily after birth), even if the starting point is just after conception.

About this, Nagao states: “After an embryo is conceived, whether it is in the womb or is already born, there is a physical body, which is represented by the five sense faculties (five *indriyas*)” (1982, p. 199). This understanding is basically

<sup>90</sup> The corresponding portion of Asvabhāva’s *Mahāyānasamgrahopanibandhana* (Pek. Sems-tsam, Li 259a2; D. Sems-tsam, Ri 211a5) has simply *lus*, but Xuanzang has *ziti* 自体 for both the *Bhāṣya* (T31:332a18) and the *Upanibandhana* (T31:393a14). The original Sanskrit must have been *ātmabhāva* for both commentaries. “Acquisition of an *ātmabhāva*” is an expression used in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §I.5 as a definition of conception. But Xuanzang’s version of the *Bhāṣya* (T31:332a18) and the *Upanibandhana* (T31:393a14) both have *yide ziti* 已得自体 in §I.35. From the context also, conception must have already taken place.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, Tatia ed., §47(1)(iv); Sasaki (1982), p. 183.

<sup>92</sup> **dbang po gzugs can** zhes bya ba ni yid ma gtogs pa’o / (*Mahāyānasamgrahopanibandhana*, Pek. Sems-tsam, Li 259a3; D. Sems-tsam, Ri 211a6)

“Material sense faculties” means [faculties] except for *manas*.

<sup>93</sup> The *Upanibandhana* expressly says that they can be interrupted.

<sup>94</sup> As seen above (fn. 83), *kāyavijñāna* might be an exception.

**Table 3** The fourth proof in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* compared with the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*

The fourth proof of the <i>Viniścayasamgrahaṇī</i> (Hakamaya [1978]2001, p. 333)	<i>Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā</i> (Kramer, ed.)
kena kārāṇena bījatvaṃ na saṃbhavati saṃṇām <sup>a</sup> vijñānakāyānām anyonyam /	santānānuvṛttis <sup>b</sup> ca / atra hy ālayavijñānaṃ nikāyasabhāgāntareṣu pratisandhim upādāya <sup>c</sup> yāvac cyutiṃ tāvat kṣaṇaprabandhapravāhena vartate, na tv antarāntarā vicchidyate, pravṛttivijñānavat / (93.7-9)
For what reason can the six groups of <i>vijñānas</i> not be the seeds of one another?	“[ <i>Ālayavijñāna</i> ] operates continually.” Because, having been conceived in another [new] category of beings ( <i>nikāyasabhāga</i> ), <i>ālayavijñāna</i> operates continually as a series of moments until death. It is not interrupted occasionally unlike functional consciousness.
—	tathāhi cakṣurvijñānānantaram śrotrādivijñānāny utpadyante, śrotravijñānānantaram cakṣurādivijñānāni / evaṃ ghrāṇādivijñānānantaram iti vistareṇa vācyam / (93.9-12)
—	For example, auditory and other types of consciousness arise just after visual consciousness, visual and other types of consciousness just after auditory consciousness. Likewise, it should be said that just after olfactory and other types of consciousness, and so forth.
tathāhi kuśalānantaram akuśalam utpadyate, akuśalānantaram kuśalam, tadubhayānantaram avyākṛtam, hīnadhātukānantaram madhyadhātukam, madhyadhātukānantaram praṇītadhātukam, evaṃ praṇītadhātukānantaram yāvad dhīnadhātukam, sāsravānantaram anāsravam, anāsravānantaram sāsravam, laukikānantaram lokottaram, lokottarānantaram laukikam / na ca teṣāṃ tathā bījatvaṃ yujyate / dīrghakālasamucchināpī ca saṃtatiṣ cireṇa kālena pravartate, tasmād api na yujyate /	tathā kuśalānantaram akuśalam utpadyate, akuśalānantaram kuśalam, tadubhayānantaram avyākṛtam hīnadhātukānantaram madhyadhātukam, madhyadhātukānantaram praṇītadhātukam, praṇītadhātukānantaram apraṇītadhātukam, apraṇītadhātukānantaram madhyadhātukam iti vistareṇa vācyam / nāpy ekaṃ dravyam ā maraṇād anuvartata iti // (93.12-16)
This is because an unwholesome [element] arises just after a wholesome [element], a wholesome [element] just after an unwholesome [element], a neutral [element] just after both [wholesome and unwholesome elements], what belongs to the middle realm just after what belongs to the inferior realm, what belong to the superior realm just after what belongs to the middle realm. Similarly up to what belongs to the inferior realm just after what belongs to the superior realm. A pure [element] just after a defiled [element], a defiled [element] just after a pure [element], a supramundane [element] just after a mundane [element], a mundane [element] just after a supramundane [element]. These [elements] in this manner cannot be the seeds of one another. Even if interrupted for a long time, a stream resumes even after a long interval. For this reason also, this is not reasonable.	Likewise, it should be said that an unwholesome [element] arises just after a wholesome [element], a wholesome [element] just after an unwholesome [element], a neutral [element] just after both [wholesome and unwholesome elements], what belongs to the middle realm just after what belongs to the inferior realm, what belong to the superior realm just after what belongs to the middle realm, what belongs to an inferior realm just after what belongs to a superior realm, what belongs to a middle realm just after what belongs to an inferior realm, and so forth. It is not the case that one substance continues until death.

<sup>a</sup>Text, *saṃṇām*, but Tatia ed. §9B(iv) has *saṃṇām*.<sup>b</sup>Kramer ed., *santānānuvṛtti*.<sup>c</sup>Cf. *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya*, Buescher ed., 48.17-19.



accurate,<sup>95</sup> and Schmithausen expresses a similar view (*Genesis*, §234<sup>96</sup>). On this point, I have no objection.

I would like to reiterate, however, that the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §I.35 does not discuss the process of rebirth from *antarābhava* to *pratisandhi*. If, as I understand, this portion is closely tied to the first proof in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, Griffiths' understanding is not tenable for this reason also.

Finally, I juxtapose the portion of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* that immediately follows the portion quoted above (in Table 2) with the fourth proof in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* in Table 3.

The purport of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* here is that *ālayavijñāna* keeps operating without interruption from conception till death. According to argument (e) of the first proof in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, this is a prerequisite for the physiological maintenance of the body. Therefore, this passage from the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* is in line with what we have already seen.

What is noteworthy here is the last portion. Here the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* very likely refers to the fourth proof of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*. The purport of the fourth proof, however, is that the *pravṛttivijñānas* cannot be the seeds of one another, but the main point of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* here is the continuous operation of *ālayavijñāna*. Clearly the contexts are different. This example suggests that Sthiramati does not always faithfully convey the original meaning of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. If so, his statement may not always be an authoritative standard for interpreting the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

### 3.6 My Interpretation of the First Proof

Based on the foregoing discussions, my interpretation of the first proof is as follows. I understand that the first proof of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* compares the functions and characteristics of the *pravṛttivijñānas* and *ālayavijñāna* primarily in a daily context after birth and argues that only *ālayavijñāna* can physiologically maintain the body. What is at issue here is not the causal link between the previous life and the present one. Neither the content of the first proof itself nor the interpretations of later Yogācāra literature supports Griffiths' interpretation.

Nevertheless, once *ālayavijñāna* is merged with the body, basically the same mechanism of physiological maintenance of life should operate for both an undeveloped embryo and a developed body after birth. Therefore, it is possible that the situation just after conception is also implied by the first proof, and it is presumably for this reason that the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §I.35 reflects such an understanding. Since the *Mahāyānasamgraha* was truly an influential text in Indian Yogācāra, similar interpretations seem to have been inherited by the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* and later by Tsong-kha-pa. If so, Schmithausen's and my views on this matter may not be as radically different as they seem.

<sup>95</sup> However, as mentioned above, one should note that the five *indriyas* have not been formed in early stages of pregnancy.

<sup>96</sup> “[A]ppropriation of the physical sense faculties (*dbang po gzug can*, \**rūpindriya*) after conception (i.e., throughout life).”

## Tentative Conclusions

In the foregoing discussions, I have made the following observations:

- (1) *Ālayavijñāna* physiologically maintains the whole body and keeps it sentient. *Ālayavijñāna* pervades the whole body.
- (2) *Ālayavijñāna* is somehow linked to meditative ease (*praśrabdhi*) and non-meditative inertness (*dauṣṭhulya*) in the body and mind.
- (3) *Ālayavijñāna* and the body are correlated in terms of benefit (*anugraha*) and harm (*upaghāta*).
- (4) This correlation is observable in meditative context as well.
- (5) When the *āśraya* (body) is transformed, it no longer gives rise to *kleśas*.
- (6) The transformation of the body from the *akarmaṇya* phase to the *karmaṇya* phase seems to be based on the transformation of *ālayavijñāna* from the *dauṣṭhulya* mode to the *praśrabdhi* mode.
- (7) *Ālayavijñāna* is unperceivable unless one enters *darśanamārga*.
- (8) *Ālayavijñāna* is directly perceived at *darśanamārga* in conjunction with *dauṣṭhulyabandhana*.

Taking all these points together, I strongly suspect that *ālayavijñāna* is not only a subconscious layer supporting the surface mind but also a latent physiological basis supporting the body. When the body and mind are transformed, this transformation is based on and linked to the transformation of that physiological basis. The transformation of body and mind from a state of *dauṣṭhulya* to a state of *praśrabdhi* was well known from early on. What Yogācāra practitioners discovered anew was that behind this transformation, there is a subconscious and physiological root that makes the transformation possible.

The passages collected in this paper seem to me to point to that direction. Needless to say, this is just a preliminary hypothesis, and much more research will be required to examine its validity.

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