Cognizable Object in Tshad ma rigs gter According to Go rams pa

The article presents Go rams pa’s interpretation and classiﬁcation of cognizable object as explained by Sa skya Pan˙d˙ita in his famous Tshad ma rigs gter. The text consists of introduction to the translation of the original, translation of Go ram pa’s commentary to the ﬁrst chapter of Tshad ma rigs gter , edition of the original, and outline of the Tibetan text.

of Seven Treatises and the Sutra Elucidating the Meaning of [Sa skya Paṅḋita's] Treasury of Epistemology).
In the first chapter on the cognizable object Sa skya Paṅḋita gives no definition of the technical terms that he uses throughout the text. From the very beginning the reader finds himself in the very center of an intense hot philosophical debate, which presupposes not only the knowledge of basic terminology but also the whole philosophical background out of which the problems discussed are picked up. Thus the tasks of the commentarial tradition of the Tshad ma rigs gter include clarifying terminology within the conceptual system used in this treatise and contextualizing the discussed problems, with possible solutions offered by different traditions of Tibetan epistemology. This clear division of commentarial work is probably the reason why Go rams pa (Go rams pa bsod nams seng ge, 1429-1489) wrote two commentaries to the Tshad ma rigs gter: sDe bdun mdo dang bcas pa'i dgongs pa phin ci ma log par 'grel ba tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa and Tshad ma rigs gter gyi dka' gnas rnam par bshad pa sde bdun rab gsal (The Complete Explanation of Difficult Points in Treasury of Epistemology that Perfectly Elucidates Seven Treatises). The first one is very encyclopedic and can be treated as an introduction to the second, 1 since the first one-as the title announces-is just an explanation of general intention of the treatise and mainly aims at clarifying terminology used in the Tshad ma rigs gter. The second one, much more extensive, concentrates on particular epistemological problems and, as the title says, "difficult points" debated in Tibetan epistemology. It is much more elaborate and goes much deeper into the issues discussed in the text of Sa skya Paṅḋita, which now can be clearly restated in the light of the first commentary and then solved. The first commentary can also be treated as a kind of shortcut to Sa skya Paṅḋita's philosophy, providing an especially clear map of the system-following Go rams pa's famous, unique ability to present complicated matters in a very accessible way.
What is presented below is the translation of the first chapter of sDe bdun mdo dang bcas pa'i dgongs pa phin ci ma log par 'grel ba tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa by Go rams pa. Meant as the introductory commentary to the first chapter of the Tshad ma rigs gter, it explains the notion of the cognizable object, provides basic definitions and discusses the divisions of the cognizable object. The fact that the main concern of this chapter is only the clarification of the terminological system set up by Sa skya Paṅḋita-and not the philosophical problems that arise within it-does not mean that there is no discussion and debate with other views of Tibetan epistemology. Thus before presenting the translation I will discuss a few crucial issues addressed by Go rams pa, who formulated them in a very concise manner, perhaps even too concise for the Western reader.
Sa skya Paṅḋita starts his treatise with the definition of the cognizable object as follows: "Definition of the object: that which is knowable by mind." 2 This very short definition is explained by Go rams pa as follows: Definition of the object is the following: that which is to be known by mind. Definition of the cognizable [shes bya] having equal scope is that which can be made into an object of mind. Definition of the perceptual [gzhal bya] is that which is to be realized by valid cognition. Definition of the established basis [gzhi grub] is that which is observed by valid cognition. Definition of really existent [yod nges] is that which can be seen by valid cognition. 3 After rewording Sa skya Paṅḋita's formula in the first sentence, Go rams pa provides a useful list of synonyms, which all describe the cognizable object in terms of perception, thus cutting off all possible doubts concerning the scope of the listed terms. The object is always something that is cognized, realized, observed, seen, known by the mind or valid cognition and seems to be defined solely in terms the cognitive process operating on it. Even though Go rams pa does not talk about the object apart from cognizing it, it does not mean that the philosophical position behind is idealism. Sa skya Paṅḋita's view-following closely Dharmakīrti-is based to a large extent on the Sautrāntika realistic system, which did not claim that the perceived object is in any way constructed in the act of perception itself. 4 Simply, for Buddhist philosophers there is no sense in talking about the object apart from the perception that confirms its existence.
After introducing the subject of the chapter, Go rams pa divides his commentary into three parts: (1) refutation of non-Sa skya systems, (2) presentation of Sa skya system and (3) rebuttal of objections to the Sa skya position. 5 Out of these three I will address mainly the first and third ones, since they are polemical while the middle part is just the terminological map with particular definitions (the sa bcad following the edition serves not only as the outline of the whole text but also as the presentation of systematic divisions of the cognizable object).
Four main points on the above mentioned map are four types of cognizable object introduced by Tibetan philosophers in the process of inventive assimilation of Dharmakīrti's system. As Śākya mchog ldan says: If to analyze the object, what comes from the scriptures is apprehended object and object of engagement. Concerning the conventions introduced by early Tibetans, there are appearing object and conceived object. 6 Generally there are three [types] of cognizable object, namely apprehended object, conceived object, object of engagement. 8 However his student Sa skya Paṅḋita accepts a fourfold division of the cognizable object and Go rams pa in the text translated below lists them in the same order, adding at the beginning the fourth one: the appearing object [snang yul]. Thus we have the context for the issue raised at the beginning of "Refutation of others' systems" in Go rams pa's commentary as well: Some Tibetans say that since the appearing object and the apprehended object have the same meaning, the universal is the apprehended object of the conceptual [cognition] and nonexistent clearly [appearing] is the apprehended object of the reverse nonconceptual cognition. 9 Go rams pa follows closely Sa skya Paṅḋita in his attack on the followers of Phya pa chos kyi seng ge, who are often referred to as "some Tibetans". What is at stake here is the status of the appearing object and the so-called object universal [don spyi], 10 as will be shown in the analysis to follow. Before that however, the notion of reverse nonconceptual cognition [rtog med log shes] has to be clarified.
Reverse nonconceptual cognition is the type of erroneous cognition defined as follows in the Tshad ma rigs gter: definition of reverse cognition: apprehension of something invalidated by something that is not [that what was to be apprehended]. 11 The so called reverse cognition in the Tshad ma rigs gter is classified as noncognizing state of mind, so actually it is not cognition in the proper sense. It does not apprehend the object that it seems to apprehend, it grasps something else, and that is why it is reverse cognition or even the opposite of cognition. Actually, in the case of reverse cognition there is no proper cognition being harmed in this way or another but rather proper valid cognition is just replaced with invalid perception. As 'Jam dbyangs blo gter dbang po says in his commentary to the Tshad ma rigs gter: 8 Hugon (2004, p. 4) [spyir shes pa'i yul la gsum ste/ gzung yul dang/ zhen yul dang/ 'jug yul lo//]. 9 The original cf. the edition at the end of this text. 10 The two Tibetan terms don spyi and sgra spyi come from Dignāga's distinction between śabdasāmānya and arthasāmānya. Concerning the role of don spyi in Tibetan philosophy, compare Dreyfus (1997, pp. 251-260). Also cf. Pind (1991). Concerning the term don spyi, Tillemans says: "The unacceptable, or completely nonexistent, type of universal which Dharmakīrti is supposedly refuting, is one which is substantially existent (rdzas yod) and is a different object from its particulars (spyi don gzhan). Tibetan commentators stress, however, that there are universals that are simple mental constructs and have at least conventional existence. In other words, it is argued that Dharmakīrti recognized the mental apoha (blo'i gzhan sel), or more exactly speaking, the don spyi, object-universal, which figures so prominently in dGe lugs and Sa skya exegeses. This notion of a don spyi is used to great advantage in explaining Dharmakīrti's thought, although it is not clear that the term don spyi (=*arthasāmānya) itself ever explicitly figured in this exact use in Dharmakirti's or even in other Indian logicians' works" (Tillemans 1999, pp. 163-164); compare also Tillemans' remarks on Go rams pa and Sa skya Paṅḋita in this context- Tillemans (1999, pp. 220-222, 229 n.6, 234 n.15). For an extensive analysis of don spyi (translated as "concept") cf. Stoltz (2006). 11 TR 84 [log rtog gi mtshan nyid ni/ de 'dzin pa de min gyis/ gnod pa].
Definition of reverse cognition: it is the apprehension of the object in such a way that it is the state of mind which is invalidated by other valid cognition [cognizing] that it is not that [object but] it is something else. 12 Thus reverse cognition is not just wrong apprehension of the object that is given in valid cognition as well. It is wrong perception because it misses the object completely and grasps something else.
Generally there are two types of that cognition-conceptual and non-conceptual. Go rams pa gives the following classification of them: There are three conceptual reverse cognitions: the erroneous one concerning shape, like apprehending a multicolored rope as a snake; the erroneous one concerning time, like apprehending a present blue color as the blue color from the past; the erroneous one concerning the object, like apprehending aloe tree and juniper tree as one type. There are two non-conceptual reverse cognitions: the error of sense consciousness, like a sense consciousness seeing two moons; and the error of mental consciousness, like the consciousness of seeing clearly the dream. 13 In case of both types of reverse cognition, what is perceived does not exist at all, even though it does somehow arise within the field perception. 14 Hence the name "nonexistent clearly appearing" in case of non-conceptual perception.
Go rams pa aims at showing that in the case of non-conceptual reverse cognition the so called nonexistent clearly appearing cannot be considered an apprehended object, since an apprehended object is an outer entity that is given to the subject either directly or indirectly by way of its aspects. The illusion of two moons, seen after pressing the eyeballs or dreamt, does not exist on the outside. Thus they are not apprehended by the subject in the way that the real tree is apprehended. But still there is something that is given in cognition, something within the field of perception that is taken to be two moons, that looks like two moons. This is called the appearing object.
In the case of conceptual reverse cognition, there is something to play the role of apprehended object-a rope mistakenly taken to be a snake which is the appearing object. The error here is just wrong conceptualization by which the concept-or the so called object universal 15 -of the snake is taken to be an outer object. Nonconceptual reverse cognition cannot be explained in that way, since there is no concept involved that could be blamed for erroneous experience. There is only what appears while there is nothing that could be apprehended correctly. Determining the status of this kind of perceptual illusions was not an easy task for Buddhist philosophers, and the text of Sa skya Paṅḋita under discussion here remains ambiguous. As we can see in the commentary translated below, Go rams pa himself admits that he is not certain what the original view of the Tshad ma rigs gter is-on the one hand he claims that non-conceptual erroneous cognition does not have an appearing object and on the other hand that the nonexistent clearly appearing, which is the object of non-conceptual erroneous cognition, is an appearing object. The reason for this hesitation is a very general statement of Sa skya Paṅḋita himself, who, in discussing the status of nonexistent clearly appearing and object universal, used the general term "the object" without specifying which of the four he actually meant. In any case what both have in common is the fact that what appears within the field of cognition does not represent the outer object (the concept of the snake does not represent any real snake or the rope and dreamt object does not represent any really existing outer object).
That is why Go rams pa shortly says-and this is what the whole critique comes down to 16 -that the nonexistent clearly appearing and the object universal, which are the objects of erroneous cognition, cannot be apprehended objects. The reason is that, whenever cognition has apprehended object, it cannot be erroneous. Thus they are given as appearing objects. This approach was probably one of the reasons for introducing differentiation between appearing object and apprehended object, upheld by Sa skya Paṅḋita in the Tshad ma rigs gter.
After polemics with the view of the followers of Phya pa chos kyi seng ge, Go rams pa presents four divisions of cognizable objects: And finally he comes to the conclusion that the ultimate and the only perceptual is the particular. This part of the text is a kind of encyclopedic dictionary to the first chapter of the Tshad ma rigs gter. However in the third and the last part of Go rams pa's text the reader can clearly see that different divisions, done from different points of view, become useful tools for dealing with the opponents who attacked one crucial statement of Sa skya Paṅḋita.
Sa skya Paṅḋita claimed that ultimately the only object of valid cognition is the particular. This statement became one of the hottest points in the debates over his system of epistemology. And the reason was that at first sight this very statement seems to contradict one of the main axioms of Buddhist epistemology formulated by Dignāga in his main treatise (PS I 2), namely that there are only two types of perceptuals, namely the particular in the case of direct perception and the universal in the case of inference. Thus a severe debate over the status of the universal began. 17 Confronting this serious accusation, Go rams pa refers to his clear divisions of the cognizable objects that he just introduced: "there are the two posited-particular and universal-since there are two ways of comprehending: from the point of view of own nature only the particular is comprehended, whereas the other is comprehended from the point of view of the object universal." One can look at this explanation as Go rams pa's interpretation of Dignāga. Dignāga indeed introduces two types of cognizable objects by way of referring to two types of cognition. Since there are two ways of cognizing, there are accordingly two cognizable objects. But this does not mean that from the point of view of the object in itself there are two different types. This approach in not without support in Dignāga himself, who in a very concise way says "mtshan nyid gnyis gzhal bya" 18 which can be understood as two characteristics [mtshan nyid], namely particular [svalakṣaṇa, rang mtshan] and universal [sāmānyalakṣaṇa, spyi mtshan], being referred to the one and only object: the perceptual [gzhal bya]. The perceptual itself cannot be given apart from either of the two-and only two-ways of perception. Since there is no third type of perception-perceiving some general perceptual in itself, which is neither universal nor particular-the very perceptual must be in the end either the universal or the particular. It cannot be universal, since direct perception reveals the particular existing independently outside, and this fact is taken for granted together with Sautrāntika realism mentioned above. Additionally Go rams pa refers to the very definition of valid cognition in Dharmakīrti, to claim that in the philosophy of the forefather of Buddhist epistemology "it is shown that it is cognition that becomes the cause for adopting and rejecting the objects that can bring benefit and harm. In this way the object that can bring benefit and is to be adopted by valid cognition and the object that can bring harm and is to be abandoned are exclusively the particular, since what is exclusively particular can bring benefit and harm while the universal can not do this." Thus there are strong premises for admitting that ultimately the particular is the only cognizable object, but still it is not clear why the perception referring to the universal can be called valid cognition. Go rams pa does not explain it in detail but claims only that the universal "is comprehended from the point of view of the object universal". Now out of two types of appearing object-nonexistent clearly appearing and object universal-the second one turns out to be a crucial point in the debates on the object 17 As Dreyfus points out, the controversy was actually stimulated by the ambiguous position of the forefathers of Tibetan epistemology and Sa skya Paṅḋita's position is "not without support" in Dharmakīrti's writings. In discussing valid cognition, Dharmakīrti asserts that nondeceptiveness (avisamvādanam, mi slu ba), the defining characteristic of valid cognition, consists of the capacity to perform a function in accordance with the way it is cognized by that cognition. Only causally effective phenomena (vastu, dngos po) have such a capacity. So, valid cognitions are nondeceptive inasmuch as they relate appropriately to real things (svalakṣaṇa, rang mtshan) Therefore, the conclusion that only real, that is, specifically characterized phenomena are objects of valid cognitions is hard to resist" (Dreyfus 1997, p. 78 Unfortunately the definition of the object universal is hardly found in Go rams pa. From Go rams pa's commentary we know that the object universal is the subcategory of appearing object and, in particular, is an object that appears directly to conceptualization. The modern Tibetan dictionary of epistemology defines it as follows: "Category of general manifestation. An imputation establishing exclusively the conceptual manifestation or it is a manifestation in the mind similar to object. For example it is like a vase appearing in conceptualization." 19 The object universal is thus mental representation of the object and, according to the definition of the universal [spyi mtshan], 20 it is the basis of the universal itself and necessary point of reference for it. The object universal is thus related to the singular object that is represented by it and also related to the universal. As a manifestation in the mind or, to put it more precisely, as the act of cognizing mind, object universal has its particular moment, since it is just a singular act or mental event. At the same time it has its general moment, since it is referred to as universal, which seems to be its conceptual content. Thus the object universal is triggered in the mind by a particular, but what it does is to establish or grasp a universal. These two aspects make the object universal different from the nonexistent clearly appearing. This is clearly stated by Go rams pa: concerning the first one [the object universal], even though it is not a particular, on the basis of it the object of engagement, which is the particular, is obtained, and concerning the second one [nonexistent clearly appearing] its own nature is not the particular and [therefore] on the basis of it object of engagement, which is the particular, is not obtained at all. 21 It is worth noticing that Go rams pa insists on the fact that in its nature a nonexistent clearly appearing is not any particular while, talking about the object universal, he does not refer to its nature-probably because he felt that it is not so clear or at least ambiguous, as I pointed out above. 22 Nevertheless the difference-and it is a crucial difference-between the two is the quality of providing the possibility of obtaining the particular. In this way the object universal-despite its mental nature-turns out to perform the function as every self-sufficiently existing particular and this function 19 bod rgya tshad ma rig pa'i tshig mdzod 1988, p. 166 [spyi'i nang gses/ rtog pa'i snang ngo tsam du grub pa'i sgro brtags kyi cha'am don gyi cha 'dra blo la snang ba/ dper na/ rtog pa la snang ba'i bum pa lta bu'o/]. 20 The definition is as follows: "Phenomenon which is solely imputed by conceptualization as an object that is not established on its own. These are non-compounded phenomena like space etc. that are there by way of excluding what is to be negated and must depend on arising of object universal [yul rang ngos nas grub pa ma yin par rtog pas btags pa tsam gyi chos/ nam mkha' la sogs pa dgag bya bcad pa dang don spyi 'char ba la ltos dgos pa'i 'dus ma byas kyi chos rnams so/];" bod rgya tshad ma rig pa'i tshig mdzod 1988, p. 200. 21 The original cf. the edition at the end of this text. is making possible the obtainment of the particular. 23 It is not particular, as is clearly stated by Go rams pa, but one can say that to some extent it performs the function of particular. This twofold nature of the object universal is in fact the key to understanding the issue at stake in the polemics presented by Go rams pa in the most important sections of the last part of his commentary.
The remaining fragment of that last part of the commentary is the review of Indian philosophical views that Buddhist epistemology had to confront. They were not debated in Tibetan philosophy 24 , since in the Land of Snow there were no other traditions challenging Buddhist epistemology. Thus Buddhist thinkers put their effort in refining Buddhist epistemology itself by way of debating on its internal problems in more and more detail.
The commentary part of which is translated below is one attempt to provide a clear conceptual frame for discussing the Tshad ma rigs gter and also for solving intensely debated problems. Go rams pa calls it "elucidation of the meaning [don gsal bar byed pa]," and this, indeed, is what he tries to do by giving a neat map of the terminology that can serve as a general framework for reading Sa skya Paṅḋita's work. Written in an accessible style, supplying basic definitions and sketching the main ideas and contexts, it is particularly helpful as both a prolegomenon and companion to the Tshad ma rigs gter. On top of that, Go rams pa is considered the most faithful and orthodox commentator of Sa skya Paṅḋita 25 because he does not depart from the original meaning and intention of the Tshad ma rigs gter. 26 That is why, out of so many commentaries to Tshad ma rigs gter, both within Sa skya tradition and others, probably sDe bdun mdo dang bcas pa'i dgongs pa phin ci ma log par 'grel ba tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa by Go rams pa seems one of the most natural starting points for our reception of this fundamental treatise of Tibetan epistemology. Acknowledged conformity of Go rams pa's interpretation with the Tshad ma rigs gter also makes his text a very good starting point for investigating interpretational differences within Sa skya lineage itself and gives a clear point of reference for comparative studies of sGe lugs and rNying ma interpretations of the Tshad ma rigs gter 27 as well. 23 Cf. the analysis of similar situation in Dharmakīrti in Dreyfus (1997, p. 74). It is thus clear that some difficult points discussed in Tibetan epistemology are in fact of Indian origin. 24 That is why the reason Go rams pa included them is more his respect for the tradition and completeness of the presentation. This concise historical overview is too general to be discussed here and getting into details would amount to writing a history of the development of Buddhist epistemology in India, which is not the aim of this paper. Cf. Eltschinger (2014). 25 The lineage of transmission from Sa skya Paṅḋita to Go rams pa cf. van der Kuijp (1983, p. 118). His contemporary Ś ākya mchog ldan (gser mdog pan chen śākya mchog ldan 1428-1509) was no less a perceptive commentator of Tshad ma rigs gter but definitely a less orthodox thinker adhering also to the view of other-emptiness [gzhan stong] fought against by Go rams pa [more about his refusal of this view cf. Cabezón and Dargyay (2006, pp. 97-144)]. 26 Cf. Dreyfus (1997, p. 27). 27 There is no commentary to the Tshad ma rigs gter written in the bka' brgyud tradition, but very interesting polemics with Sa skya Paṅḋita can be found in the Tshad ma rigs gzhung rgya mtsho (The Ocean of Epistemological Treatises) by 7th Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho (1454-1506).

Translation Cognizable Object [shes bya'i yul]
There are the two in the first [chapter on cognizable object]: (1) definition [and] (2) division.
1. Definition of the object is the following: that which is to be known by mind. 28 Definition of the cognizable [shes bya] having equal scope is that which can be made into an object of mind. Definition of the perceptual [gzhal bya] is that which is to be realized by valid cognition. Definition of the established basis [gzhi grub] is that which is observed by valid cognition. Definition of really existent [yod nges] is that which can be seen by valid cognition.

[Division]
There are three [subparagraphs] in the second [paragraph on division of cognizable object]: 2.1 Refutation of others' systems, 2.2 Presentation of our own system, 2.3 Rebuttal of objections.
2.1. Some Tibetans say that since the appearing object and the apprehended object have the same meaning, the universal is the apprehended object of the conceptual [cognition] and the nonexistent clearly [appearing] is the apprehended object of the reverse nonconceptual cognition [rtog med log shes]. 29 There are two lines of reasoning in the refutation of this [view]. First, the subject matter [chos can] is both conceptual and nonconceptual reverse cognition; it entails [thal] that they are not erroneous cognitions, because they are the cognition having apprehended the object. 30 Secondly, the subject matter is both the universal and the nonexistent clearly [appearing]; it entails that as for the object that can be seen they are seen by cognition of other person nearby, because they are apprehended objects substantially different from the cognition to which they themselves appear. 31 2. Alternatively, among four objects, the appearing object for valid cognition does not exist as a substance that is different from the cognition possessing the object. And when referring to that which appears in its own time, we refer only to three: -that which is experienced by direct perception as being self-knowledge; -the nonexistent clearly appearing directly to reverse [log] nonconceptual cognition; -the object universal directly appearing to conceptualization.
Concerning the second one, even though it is the appearing object of that cognition, generally it is not appearing object, which, I think, is the intention of the Division. If it is divided from the point of view of the subject, out of three mentioned above, in case of the first one, which is the object of engagement of valid cognition, there are two: the object of engagement of direct perception and the object of engagement of inference. In the case of the former one the object of engagement of direct perception as knowledge of a thing is the outer thing as the particular; and the object of engagement of direct perception as self-knowledge is cognition as the particular; and the object of engagement of direct yogic perception according to Sautrāntika is the particular which is skandhas specified by 37 Subsequent cognition [bcad shes] is briefly characterized by Sa skya Paṅḋita as follows: "Subsequent cognition is recollection of what is past [bcad shes 'das pa dran pa yin]" TR, p. 78. Go rams pa gives the following definition: "Definition of subsequent cognition: "knowledge engaging in the object that has been realized before and is kept intact [in memory] which is knowledge contradicting projections that are opposite to it [object] [bcad shes kyi mtshan nyid/ sngar rtogs zin gyi byed pa ma nyams pa'i don la/ log phyogs kyi sgro 'dogs dang 'gal bar 'jug pa'i rig pa]." G, p. 51. Dreyfus summarizes Sa-paṅ's critique of this concept introduced by Phya pa chos kyi seng ge: "Sa-paṅ grants that subsequent cognition exists, but does not accept it as a division of nonvalid cognition. For Sa-paṅ, subsequent cognitions are nonrealizing cognitions. He rejects the idea that subsequent cognitions have any cognitive role. They merely repeat a previous cognition without contributing to the identification of an object. Hence, it is not even a realization of a previously realized object, as Ge-luk thinkers would have it. Sa-paṅ compares the identification of an already cognized object to cutting a tree already cut. Just as something that is already established and not forgotten does not need to be reestablished, something previously understood cannot be understood unless one forgets it in the meanwhile.
Sa-paṅ is particularly critical of the idea of the second moment of a perception as a subsequent cognition. Since perception merely holds its object and since this object is in constant transformation, the subsequent moments of perception are as valid as the first moment. Therefore, no perception can ever be a subsequent cognition. Only the conceptions that are recollections (dran shes) of something previously realized can be subsequent cognitions." (Dreyfus 1997, p. 391 40 [In case of the latter] the object of engagement of inference is referred to as that which is to be proven through authentic premise [rtags yang dag gi bsgrub bya].
The object of engagement of the sound is like the ox being the particular that is the object of engagement of compatibility between the sound "ox" and the thing.

[Division into two truths from the point of view of the nature]
In the case of the two truths from the point of view of the nature, according to Vaibhāṡika when something is destroyed or inquired into by the mind, then that nonengagement of the mind apprehending it is the definition of the truth of complete projection. For example, it is like the vase that the mind apprehending it is not engaged into when it is destroyed, and it is like the water known to the world the mind apprehending it is not engaged into when it is analyzed by the mind in terms of particular eight atomic substances. 41 When something is destroyed or inquired into by the mind, that engagement of the mind apprehending it is the definition of absolute truth. For example, it is like the āyatana of form as it is accepted, for it is said in Abhidharmakośa:

If something is destroyed or excluded intellectually [blo yis gzhan bsal]
Mind does not engage into it. It exists as complete projection as vase or water. The absolute exists the other way. 42 39 More on this topic cf. John D. Dunne saying: "In practice, the Buddhist adept is meant to realize all four aspects of that truth, and one such aspect is impermanence, especially as applied to the psychophysical aggregates (skandha). Certainly, on Dharmakīrti's system the constituents that make up the aggregates can be considered causally efficient, ultimately real particulars. Nevertheless, the impermanence of those particulars is not ultimately real. Instead, as with any quality applied to that which possesses it, impermanence is formed through a process of abstraction and exclusion. That is, a quality such as impermanence is conceptually abstracted from the particulars it qualifies, but in ontological terms, that quality is reducible to the particulars themselves" (Dunne 2006, p. 509). 40 The conception of three natures [mtshan nyid gsum] is meant here. Among these three natures there are two that are considered as phenomenality or absolute truth, namely yongs su grub pa and one type of gzhan gyi dbang, which is pure [dag pa'i gzhnan dbang]. The other two: ma dag pa'i gzhan dbang and kun brtags are considered to be the truth of complete projection [kun rdzob].
I decided to translate chos nyid as "phenomenality" to preserve in English the affinity from Sanskrit and  , p.18 [6.5]. Concerning the relation of Vasubandhu and Buddhist epistemology after Dignaga, Arnold says that the latter "retains the basic intuition underlying Vasubandhu's approach: the idea that there are two fundamentally different kinds of things (the reducible and the ontologically basic) and that the "two truths" (or, emphasizing sat rather than satya, two kinds of existents) should be understood as consisting of two sets of enumerable entities. Now, however, it is not dharmas that are said to constitute the set of "ultimately existent" (paramārthasat) phenomena, but svalakṣaṇas. And where Vasubandhu had (in keeping with the conventional sense of the Sanskrit word) understood svalakṣaṇas as definitions individuating dharmas as categories, svalakṣaṇas are now viewed as the unique, discrete phenomena that Sautrāntika holds that the definitions of the two are two phenomena: the one that is effective [don byed nus pa] on the absolute [level] and the one that is not, 43 since it is said that "the absolute is whatever is effective," 44 etc.
Cittamātra maintains that the definition of the truth of complete projection is whatever thoroughly increases afflictions while being really perceived [dngos su dmigs], and the definition of absolute truth is whatever necessarily increases complete purity while being really perceived. Since in Abhidharmasamuccaya it is said: The perceived [object] that thoroughly expands afflictions while being perceived, exists as complete projection. The perceived [object] that expands complete purity while being perceived, exists as absolute. 45 Madhyamaka mantains that the definition of absolute truth is that which is apprehended by the apprehension seeing really. For example, it is like that which is apprehended by the apprehension of the ārya's mind-stream in equipoise. The definition of the truth of complete projection is that which is apprehended by the apprehension seeing falsely. 46 For example the real object of the mind of the ordinary being. As it is said in Madhyamakāvatāra: Since all things are seen really and falsely, There is the apprehension of two natures: real and false. Any object seen really is suchness; And what is seen falsely is complete projection, as [Buddha] said. 47 Footnote 42 continued are the direct objects of perceptual cognition-such that svalakṣaṇas here would correspond to what had been, for Vasubandhu, the potentially innumerable tokens of the type dharma. These ontological primitives are, moreover, here defined particularly by their being causally efficacious-which means (in terms of the epistemological concerns of this program) by their capacity in particular to cause perceptual cognitions" (Arnold 2005, p. 28). 43 Cf. summary of Sautrāntika theory: "Given the theory of causality, the idea of spatiotemporal restriction then serves to positively establish the entire Sautrāntika system: (1) Whatever exists, occupying space and time, is produced (kṛtaka) or conditioned (saṃskṛta) by a cause, because spatiotemporal restriction is impossible without a cause.
(2) A conditioned, individual and impermanent thing is able to produce an effect through restricting the effect to a particular place and time (deśakālaniyama) in accordance with its own spatiotemporal location.
[¼ x', y' and z'] (3) A pervasive and permanent thing, if it existed, could not produce an effect because it would be unable to restrict the effect to a particular place and time; this is because it would have no spatiotemporal location of its own.
From this theory of causality, one can derive the ontological distinction between the individual and the universal, and thus the theory of momentariness, in the following way: (1) Only the individual (svalakṣaṇa) is causally efficacious (arthakriyāsamartha) and therefore ultimately real (paramārthasat). A pervasive and permanent thing such as the universal (sāmānya) is causally inefficacious and therefore not existent in reality (asat).
(2) Because a pervasive and permanent or non-momentary thing does not exist in reality due to its lack of causal efficacy, all existents are exclusively impermanent (anitya) or momentary (kṣaṇika)" (Yoshimizu 2007(Yoshimizu , pp. 1073(Yoshimizu -1074 48 Compare the discussion on Sa skya Paṅḋita's and Go rams pa's understanding of this term in Dreyfus (1997, pp. 416-427). 49 Cf. discussion of this example in the introduction.

2.2.3.2.2.1.
Here are the three above mentioned [and they can be described] thus. The first one is the vase that is the indirect for the conceptualization apprehending the vase. Concerning cognition it is the cognition of one's own mindstream that is the indirect for the person who does not have direct cognition of other mind's cognition. Phenomenality is the indirect for ordinary beings. Therefore if there is something that is the direct for reverse non-conceptual cognition, it would not necessarily be the direct; and if there is something that is the indirect in case of reverse conceptual cognition, it would not necessarily be the indirect. This is because if there is something that is an appearing object of the reverse nonconceptual cognition, it is not necessarily an existent [yod pa], and because if there is something that is a conceived object of reverse conceptual cognition, it is not necessarily an existent. In the case of that which is the indirect of the doubt, some parts of the thing are indirect and the others are not indirect.  52 According to Sa skya Paṅḋita, claiming to follow Dharmakīrti of course, these crucial notions are understood as follows: "Apprehending of a particular is nonconceptual. Apprehending of the universal is conceptual. Here particular is the thing and universal is that which does not exist as object established. The so called particular itself, individuals, thing, substance, the isolated, the absolute, etc. are established as the ones that are effective, substance, as unmixed with other, as cause and result. They are what is to be accepted and what is to be abandoned into which normal beings engage or withdraw from. So since they are the object of engagement, they have the same meaning as the thing. […] The universal, apoha, the reverse, devoid of aspects, non-autonomous, related-the so called relative etc.-do not stay within absolute. They are not established as any object. Not being the object of sense, they are projections of the mind. [rang mtshan 'dzin pa rtog med de/ spyi 'dzin pa ni rtog pa yin/ de la rang mtshan dngos po ste/ spyi ni dngos por grub pa med/ rang gi mtshan nyid gsal ba dngos po rdzas log pa don dam pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa ni don byed nus pa rdzas phan tshun rna 'dres pa rgyu dang 'bras bur grub pa skye bu thams cad kyi blang dor bya ba'i 'jug yul yin pas dngos po don du don gcig pa yin te/ […] spyi dang/ gzhan sel dang/ ldog pa dang/ rnam gcos dang/ 'drel pa dang/ 'brel pa dang/ kun rdzob ces bya ba la sogs pa ni/ don la mi gnas pa/ dngos por ma gdub pa/ dbang po'i yul ma yin pa blos sgro brtags pa/]" TR 85n. 53 Cf. discussion of Go rams pa's understanding of rang mtshan in: Yoshimizu (2007Yoshimizu ( , pp. 1067Yoshimizu ( -1069. Also cf. Yoshimizu (2004, pp. 117-133); Dreyfus (1997, pp. 67-82, 90-94, 111-118). 54 In other words, the division is made into the so called main mind [gtso sems], including all the above mentioned six consciousnesses [mig gi rnam par shes pa, rna ba'i rnam par shes pa, sna'i rnam par shes pa, lce'i rnam par shes pa, lus kyi rnam par shes pa, yid kyi rnam par shes pa] and mental acts [sems byung] which are called 'khor-the ones related [to the main mind]. 55 Go rams pa refers here to the dge lugs system in which ldog pa, as Tillemans explains, functions it the context of realism: "although objects of thought, such as universal, sādhya etc, are themselves no more than mind-created appearances/representations (snang ba = pratibhāsa) or exclusions (ldog pa¼vyāvṛtti), non-implicative negation [med dgag] 56 and the universal of intellectual apoha [blo'i gzhan sel] 57 . However the explanation in the texts says that there are three universals based on thing, no-thing and both; the universals and also the three aspects are there because they are based on thing, no-thing and both. 58 Or else there can be division into four: -universal of the one [category] divided into different ones, -universal of different ones reduced to one, -universal of the one appearing as one, -universal of the different ones appearing as different.
This is because similar divisions are made in case of apoha, since universality [spyi], universal and apoha have the same meaning. 59 Footnote 55 continued it does not follow that if x is such an object of thought, x is mind-created-real particulars can be said to be the ascertained objects (nges yul), or equally, to use the words of dGe 'dun grub pa and lCang skya rol pa'i rdo rje, they are the explicit objects (dngos yul) of thought; elsewhere in Tsong kha pa and virtually all other dGe lugs pa writers on the matter, it is routinely mentioned that they actually appear (snang ba) to thought" (Tillemans 1999, p. 216). Compare also Tillemans (1999, pp. 222-224).
The term ldog pa in Sa skya tradition is understood in the following way (note that Dreyfus translates ldog pa as distinguisher): "Only individuals (gsal ba, vyakti) are real. Thus universals, being universally characterized phenomena and not specific individuals, can be only unreal. They are conceptual characteristics (known as distinguishers, ldog pa, vyāvṛtti) through which we categorize things. The reason universally characterized phenomena are unreal is they do not meet the three sets of identity conditions delineated by Dharmakīrti. Ś ākya Chok-den, for example, defines a universal as that unique distinguisher which is the mere preclusion of [things of] discordant kinds.' A universal is a distinguisher; that is, it is not a real property but a negatively constructed one. For example, the universal cowness is not some essential property that all cows would share but merely the exclusion of all cows from a class (noncow) to which they do not belong" (Dreyfus 1997, p. 154. 56 Concerning non-implicative negation [prasajyapratiṣedha, med dgag] Avalokitavrata says: "This [prasajyapratiṣedha] has the following characteristics: (1) it does not show the sign of arthāpatti; (2) is devoted to negation, aims only at negation, i.e. simply negates what is asserted by the other party; (3) does not affirm the existence of an entity or non-entity; (4) having [the characteristic of] negation and without having [those of] implication and the affirmation of an entity, expresses [the object of negation] by its own word, as when one, meaning 'not a Brahman' says 'not a Brahman' by which he simply makes negation." Quotation translated in: Kajiyama 1973, p. 170. 57 According to Go rams pa one of the possible divisions of apoha is into [yod pa gzhan sel] and [med pa gzhan sel]. The first one is further divided into sound apoha [sgra'i gzhan sel] and intellectual apoha [blo'i gzhan sel]; Cf. his sde bdun mdo dang bcas pa'i dgongs pa phin ci ma log par 'grel ba tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa in: dpal sa skya pa'i tshad ma rig pa'i gzhung gces bsdus, G 71. Cf. also Tillemans' remark quoted in footnote 10. 58 PV III 51 c. As Dreyfus says, "Sa-gya thinkers seem to be on stronger grounds when they argue that realism is unsound as an interpretation of Dharmakīrti's ideas. Go-ram-ba denounces one of the main Geluk interpretive moves: that which differentiates universal (spyi, sāmānya) and universally characterized phenomena (spyi mtshan, sāmānyalakṣana). No such distinction is ever made by Dharmakīrti, argues Goram-ba. On the contrary, Dharmakīrti repeatedly identifies these two. For example, Dharmakīrti specifies three types of universally characterized phenomena: 'Since they rely on either thing, nonthing, [or] both, these universals are also threefold.' This division serves as a typology of both universals and universally characterized phenomena. Itsuggests no difference between the two. Therefore, their separation is without solid basis in Dharmakīrti's system. Universals can be no more real than universally characterized phenomena" (Dreyfus 1997, p. 157). 59 As Dreyfus says, "Sa-paṅ provides a parallel list for the conceptual domain of universally characterized phenomena: universal (spyi, sāmānya), elimination of others (gzhan sel, anyāpoha), Cognizable Object in Tshad ma rigs gter According... 975 2.2.5. Reducing to one: the particular that is the ultimate perceptual. Concerning reducing to one-the particular which is the ultimate perceptual-if you think what it means to say that the perceptual is particular only as in [quotation] "Particular only [is] the perceptual" 60 , then generally according to the tradition of texts on reasoning [rtog ge] it means that first after identifying what is known as valid cognition for the ones that have philosophical system and the ones who do not have, there comes the moment for proving that the teacher similar to that is the embodiment of valid cognition; because after identifying that [valid cognition as] non-deceptive [mi bslu] clarifying of the object not known before, later it is said that "Bhagavan that has it is valid cognition itself." 61 Concerning the meaning of what is known as valid cognition for everyone who is engaged in a philosophical system and who is not, Pramāṇaviniścaya says: "Concerning achieving what is beneficial and abandoning what is not beneficial, one starts with reliable and true [nges par yang dag pa] cognition." 62 And it is shown that it is cognition that becomes the cause for adopting and rejecting the objects that can bring benefit and harm. In this way the object that can bring benefit and is to be adopted by valid cognition and the object that can bring harm and is to be abandoned are exclusively the particular since what is exclusively particular can bring benefit and harm while the universal can not do this. As it is said, "Since what is to be accepted and abandoned have consequences, all beings engage into them" 63 and "Why to pursue and investigate the object that is not effective?" 64 It is only the particular which, when comprehended by direct perception that is the knowledge of the thing, is the apprehended object. When it is comprehended by direct inference, it is the conceived object. Based on these two valid cognitions at the time when the being engages into it, there is object of engagement because of nondeceptiveness. Concerning the intention here auto-commentary to the Tshad ma rigs gter says: "If one thoroughly comprehends ['jal] this very particular, it is the object of engagement. If one comprehends the indirect, it is the conceived object. If somebody is engaged in both as well, then they are objects of engagement because of non-deceptivness." 65 The meaning of the phrasing "directly comprehends" and also what is the meaning of phrasing "thoroughly comprehending" is known through the modifier. 66 Footnote 59 continued distinguisher (ldog pa, vyāvṛtti), preclusion (rnam gcod, vyavaccheda), indeterminate (literally mixed, 'dres pa), relation ('brel ba, sambandha), relative (kun rdzob, saṃvṛti). These phenomena do not exist in reality (don la mi gnas pa) for they are superimposed (sgro btags pa) by thought" (Dreyfus 1997, p. 77). 60 PV III 53 d. 61 PV II 7 a. Concerning interpretation of this verse and Buddha as embodiment of valid cognition in Dharmakīrti, cf. Van Bijlert (1989, pp. 115-120 and 158-168). Also cf. Ruegg (1994); Silk (2002); Steinkellner (1983 66 tshig grogs-literally "accompanying word". technical term of Tibetan grammar referring to words modifying or enriching the meaning of the words they accompany. Adjectives, adverbs etc. are included into this category. Here the terms "directly" and "thoroughly" are meant.
In short, when valid cognition engages only in comprehending the particular by way of direct perception and inference, then even though the perceptual is twofold from the point of view of the way of engaging, namely, particular and universal, only the particular as an object of engagement is the perceptual. This is nonerroneous intention of the phrase "particular only [is] the perceptual" 67 . As it is said in the commentary of Devendrabuddhi, Since it is only the particulars which can be comprehended [rtogs] from the point of view of their own nature and of the other, how can they be defined? [They are presented]  2.3.1.1. If someone says: "If at the time of engaging by way of comprehending exclusively the particular by the two: direct perception and inference, the apprehended object is only a particular, then there is contradiction, with acarya Dignāga claiming that there are two perceptuals", there is no fault [in our system]. This is because there are the two posited-particular and universal, since there are two ways of comprehending: from the point of view of own nature only a particular is comprehended and the other is comprehended from the point of view of the object universal. 69 2.3.1.2. If someone says: "If object universal-despite its nonexistence in reality [don]-is a perceptual, then also nonexistent clearly [appearing] is similar to it", there is no fault [in our system]. This is because concerning the first one [object universal], even though it is not a particular, on the basis of it the object of engagement, which is the particular, is obtained, 70 and concerning the second one [nonexistent clearly appearing] its own nature is not the particular and [therefore] on the basis of it object of engagement, which is the particular, is not obtained at all. 67 PV III 53 d. 68 D 144. 69 Cf. discussion in the introduction and also Dreyfus (1997, p. 78). 70 Sa skya Paṅḋita and Go rams pa in this case follow Dharmakīrti. Cf. Dreyfus (1997, p. 74).
2.3.1.3. If someone says: "If the appearing object is not the particular, it contradicts the fact that it appears clearly to the cognition", there is no fault [in our system]. This is because there are two parts: the part of the aspect appearing clearly to conceptualization and the part of projection referring to it as external. Out of these two the first one is cognition and the second is the universal.
2.3.1.4. If someone says: "It entails nonexistence of valid cognition comprehending a nonexistent thing, since the object of engagement of the valid cognition is the object that becomes the cause for performing accepting and rejecting, so it must be a particular", there is no fault [in our system]. This is because of the [aforementioned] analysis whether there is or is not valid cognition comprehending nonexistent thing.
The meaning of that it is explained non-erroneously by the four and a half stanzas of the  71 The fragment mentioned is as follows: "They say, if [Dignaga] accepts two objects, it invalidates [Sa skya Paṅḋita's position that there is only one]. From the point of view of the way of engagement there are two: particular and universal. If they say that even nonexistent is similar to the perceptual, then concerning this, there can't be any purpose for that object. Appearance such as a strand of hair etc. is mind itself. Appearance as a strand of hair is not established as an object. So if to analyze whether it exists as an object or does not exist, it is universal. If they say: both nonexistent things object universal and nonexistent clearly appearing are established together with self-knowing and that is why they are clear, then both mistaken cognitions have no object but because they are experienced by self-knowing, they are cognitions themselves. Moreover because of apprehending non-being, they are mistaken cognitions. If they say, if there is no object that is a particular, the nonexistence of the object contradicts the perceptual, then since you prove whether what is to be rejected is the existing or nonexisting object, there is no contradiction [yul gnyis bzhed pas gnod ce na/ /'jug tshul sgo nas rang spyi gnyis/ /med pa'ang gzhal byar mtshungs she na/ /de la yul gyi dgos nus med/ /skra soTa snang ba blo nyid yin/ /skrar snang don la grub pa med/ /de ni dngos por yod med ces/ /rtog pas dpyod na spyi mtshan yin/ /dngos med gnyis po rang rig gi/ /shugs la grub pas gsal zhe na/ /'khrul shes gnyis la yul med cing/ /rang rig gis ni myong ba'i phyir/ / shes pa nyid yin de yang ni/ /med pa 'dzin phyir 'khrul shes yin/ /rang mtshan min pa'i yul med na/ /dngos med gzhal byar 'gal zhe na/ /dgag bya dngos por yod med ces/ /bsgrub pa'i phyir na 'gal ba med/]." TR 11d-15. At the time of proclaiming of knowledge of the aspect, he rejected the claim of true aspectarians that gross appearances [rags pa snang ba] are truly established within sense consciousness and proclaimed lack of aspects, since it is said "Thus object and consciousness do not exist as gross appearances." 80 So then there are two [traditions] here: Sautrāntika and Cittamātra. If the above formulated objection is treated by way of Sautrāntika, the first argument 81 does not hold because in this tradition the outer object referred to through the aspect is referred to as an apprehended object.
If it is treated by way of Cittamātra, [the same] is claimed, since in this tradition the subject and object got on the basis of apprehended object is not established. That is why in the Tshad ma rigs gter it is said: As long as the outer is accepted, for that long the cause is said to be an apprehended object. If what is to be cognized is posited as inside one, object and subject are not established. 82 The explanation of the first chapter being the analysis of the object is completed. 79 Tibetan Classics edition does not identify the source of quotation but only indicates that this sentence is similar to Sa skya Paṅḋita's formulation from his autocommentary. However in dbu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad 'jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa'i zhal lung by 'jam mgon 'ju mi pham rnam rgyal rgya mtsho (The Complete Explanation of Madhyamakālaṁ kāra Called Oral Transmission Rejoicing the Guru Manjuśri) which is his the commentary to Śāntarakṡita's Madhyamakālaṃkāra, this sentence is quoted again and attributed explicitly to Dharmakīrti. Both editions of Go rams pa's commentary I used render this sentence as follows: gal te phy rol dpyod la 'jug pa ni/ kho bos mdo sde'i skabs la rnam par brten/ while Jamgön Mipham version reads: gal te phy rol dpyod la 'jug pa ni/ kho bo mdo sde'i skas la rnam par brten/. Apart from small difference in case of agentive particle, there is also skas instead of skabs in the version from 'Jam mgon mi pham. In translation I follow his version, since skabs does not make good sense in the sentence.
The question of Sautrāntika view in Dharmakīrti's philosophy was quite extensively discussed in Western literature. Cf. Arnold (2008, D 85-87, 99-105, 380-385), Dunne (2004, pp. 58n., 70-74), Kellner (2011). 80  In square brackets are the titles of the sections inserted by the editor of Institute of Tibetan Classics included into the translation as well. Numbers within the text indicate the page of the Sakya College edition. The edition is followed by the outline of the chapter showing the structure of the text.