On the Relative Chronology of Dharmakīrti and Samantabhadra

In the discussions concerning the date of Dharmakīrti, Jaina sources have never been seriously taken into account. They may, however, provide a valuable insight because Dharmakīrti both criticised and was criticised by Jaina thinkers. Two Jaina authors, Samantabhadra and Pūjyapāda Devanandin, may prove crucial in determining the actual dates of Dharmakīrti. The paper argues that Dharmakīrti directly influenced Samantabhadra in a number of ways, which sets the terminus ante quem for Dharmakīrti, and his traditional chronology has to be reconsidered in the light of new findings. The paper suggests new dates for all the three authors.


1.
The paper analyses certain doctrinal points in the oeuvre of a Jaina Digambara ascetic thinker Samantabhadra who seems to respond to, criticise and be directly influenced by Dharmakīrti. The thesis of Samantabhadra's historical posteriority to Dharmakīrti may have implications for the dating of both Samantabhadra and Dharmakīrti, but also for Pūjyapāda Devanandin, a Jaina grammarian and thinker.
The issues involve the idea of identity, inexpressibility, the use of the delimiting particle eva in the sense of exclusion or delimitation (vyavaccheda), and certain other issues found in a few passages of Samantabhadra's works which reveal his knowledge of the Pramāṇa-vārttika.
Samantabhadra-to whom such works as Āpta-mīmāṃsā (Ā Mī), 1 Yukty-anuśāsana (YA), Svayambhū-stotra (SvSt), Stuti-vidyā (StVi) and Ratna-karaṇḍaśrāvakâcāra (RKŚ Ā ) are ascribed-is traditionally considered to live around 500-550, perhaps even earlier. Sometimes he is also thought to be contemporaneous with Mallavādin Kṡamāśramaṅa, alias Vādimukhya (before 600 CE), the author of the Dvādaśāra-naya-cakra, the source of plethora of quotations from Dignāga's Pramāṇa-samuccaya, who had apparently had no knowledge of Dharmakīrti. Whether such dating can still be maintained will also be addressed in the paper. Of note is that Samantabhadra never produced a typical philosophical work which would lay down the rudiments of his philosophical system or described a portion of it in a systematic way, and instead he phrased his philosophical reflections as eulogies (stuti, stotra), philosophically quite ambiguous, in praise of religious founders, which has some important implications, such as that he never quotes his opponents, and external influences in his work are rather difficult to determine with certainty.
The working hypothesis is that Samantabhadra was acquainted with some of Dharmakīrti's ideas, primarily with his critique directed against Jainism. Additional working methodological assumption is that x's criticism directed against y's views is, as it was usually the case in India, framed and phrased with wording and manner indicative of the original inspiration. Another methodological strategy accepted below is that if we have reasons to think that x seems to respond to the ideas expressed by both y and z, out of whom y temporarily precedes z, there is no justifiable reason to assume that x was influenced by z, rather we should be ready to admit that we have only evidence to the effect that x was influenced by y, unless some additional evidence is found in favour of z's impact on x's thought.

2.
In his criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekānta-vāda) found in the Svârthânumāna Chapter of the Pramāṇa-vārttika/-svavr ̥ tti (PV/ PVSV 3.181-184), 2 Dharmakīrti 3 expresses an idea that 'acts of cognitive awareness do not concern an indescribable thing,' 4 viz. inexpressible entities are necessarily not objects of the language, but also they cannot become objects of thought. The context is a discussion that entities, which is Dharmakīrti's thesis against the Jaina's, in their natures are absolutely discrete, different from each other: 1 Alias Devâgama-stotra, from the opening hemistich devâgama-nabho-yāna-cāmarâdi-vibhūtayaḥ. 2 The chapter numbering of PV/PVSV primarily follows Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana's edition(PV 4 ), and the sub-section numbering of PV/PVSV 3.181-184 found in Balcerowicz (2011). A larger portion of PV/PVSV 3.182-184 is quoted in AJP I: 23.1-27.4 and refuted in AJP I: 295.10-317.10 and AJP II: 124 ff. 3 See Balcerowicz (2011). a certain sense, P and non-Q'). As I have shown elsewhere, 9 both figures of the sapta-bhaṅgī have quite a similar structure, roughly: σ (x is (P & Q)), the difference being in emphasis (ε) of the properties P and Q, which are either expressed (ε 1 ) or suppressed (ε 0 ) with respect to a given parameter (π), such as substance, place, time and condition, etc. 10 What is important in the context of Dharmakīrti's criticism is precisely the fact that in both these figures of the sapta-bhaṅgī (as well as in the remaining three ones), two properties, for Dharmakīrti apparently contrary ones, are related to one and the same substratrum. In one case (apparently Fig. 4), one of the related properties (Q), or rather the absence of it, cannot be meaningfully expressed because it is simply not related to the substratum (184.22: tathâpi kathaṃ niṣiddho yāvad asya sambandho dharmo vā nâstîti matir na bhavati.-'Nevertheless, how can [this relation] be negated as long as its relation or property does not exist?'), and in the other case (apparently Fig. 3 of the sapta-bhaṅgī), the substratum with unexpressed properties is inexpressible (as the Jainas say, it is avaktavya), for inexpressible thing cannot possibly become an object of our cognition, and can neither be conceptualised in thought nor expressed in language (184.22: na hy avācyam arthaṃ buddhayaḥ samīhante.-'For acts of cognitive awareness do not concern an indescribable thing.') In Jaina view, however, the elements of language (words, sentences) may also refer to what can be called the incommunicable (PVSV 184.8: nirupākhya), and the example which they are reported to provide and which should be acceptable to the Buddhist nominalist are ultimate particulars, which are considered by the Buddhist to have no essential nature (svabhāva), and hence are genuinely inexpressible, even though can be referred to by language.
The whole discourse in which the above discussion is embedded is opened by the following verse, often quoted by the Jainas: Since-if everything [is supposed] to have a form of both 11 -[any] distinction between these [entities (or: between the camel and yoghurt)] would be revoked, then why does a person enjoined as follows: "Eat yoghurt!", not run towards the camel?' 12 If entities were definable in terms of their own nature as well as in the nature of other entities, argues Dharmakīrti, any distinction between them would disappear and their natures would ultimately merge. Not only could they remain absolutely inexpressible (but also impossible) and would not become objects of our thought (na hy avācyam arthaṃ buddhayaḥ samīhante), but also they would share ultimately the same, self-contradictory, as it were, nature, making any distinction between them an impossibility.
Both this verse, implying the identity of entities possessed of contrary properties (P and non-P/non-Q) and therefore sharing their respective natures, as well as the conclusion that any such entity would not only be inexpressible in the absolute sense but also not amenable to thought, find their rejoinder in the following verses of Samantabhadra's Āpta-mīmāṃsā: [70] Because of the contradiction, there cannot be selfsameness of nature of both [entities that are opposed in nature, which is incriminated] by the enemies of the method of the sevenfold modal description. Also when [a charge is expressly formulated by the opponents] that if [a thing is claimed to be] indescribable 13 it is [indescribable] in the absolute sense, then even the statement that it is indescribable would not be possible. 14 [71] The substance and the mode are one, insofar as there is no mutual exclusion (disassociation) of these two (sc. they are invariably related) and insofar as [these two always] undergo [their respective] particular kind of transformation due to the relationship [that holds between these two] of the potentiality bearer (sc. substance) and the potentialities (sc. modes).
[72] On the other hand, since [these two] have their particular designations and their particular numerical character (sc. substance is one, modes are many), since they have their unique natures and since there is a distinction between them in terms of their purpose etc., [therefore] there is difference between them. However, [the difference] is not in the absolute sense.' 15 Verse 70 seems to be Samantabhadra's direct reply to Dharmakīrti's two objections. First, Dharmakīrti's supposition that 'everything [is supposed] to have a form of both' (sarvasyôbhaya-rūpatve) is met with the rejoinder, in very similar wording, that it is not the case because that would lead to a contradiction (virodhān nôbhayaîkātmyaṃ).
Second, Dharmakīrti's criticism that inexpressible entities remain ultimately inexpressible and can never become objects of thought, i.e. 'acts of cognitive awareness do not concern indescribable thing' (PVSV 184.22: na hy avācyam arthaṃ buddhayaḥ samīhante), leads to Samantabhadra's statement that if some entities were truly inexpressible it would not be possible even to predicate inexpressibility of them (Ā Mī 70 cd: avācyataîkānte 'py uktir nâvācyam iti yujyate).
The remaining two verses (71-72) serve to adduce justification for the theses expressed in Ā Mī 70, but even these two verse have in the background the discussion of the relevant relation of the universal and the particular found the Jaina section of the Pramāṇa-vārttika (PV/PVSV 3.181-184), which in Samantabhadra's exposition are simply called substances and modes. The implication is that any two entities can be considered as both identical and different in accordance with the substance-expressive (dravyārthika-naya) and the modeexpressive (paryāyārthika-naya) viewpoints, where the two viewpoints serve as parameters. 16 In the context of Dharmakīrti's possible influence, of note is the use of the term avyatirekataḥ, which seems to be a direct reaction to, or rather a criticism of, Dharmakīrti's usage of the delimitative/restrictive particle eva, which is defined in terms of exclusion (vyatirecaka) in Pramāṇa-vārttika 4.190 (see also below).
Of significance is that, while referring to an entity which is inexpressible from a certain perspective according to the Jaina sevenfold modal description (syād-vāda), Samantabhadra does not use the standard and well-established Jaina term avaktavya, 'inexpressible', but prefers to use a rather unusual term avācya ('indescribable'), which is precisely the same word used by Dharmakīrti in his account inexpressibility (avaktavyatva).
Even if one concedes, that the actual context of Dharmakīrti's and Samantabhadra's statements does not necessarily have to concern the syād-vāda as such and some of its figures, the actual contents (and the wording) of what Dharmakīrti and Samantabhadra say leads to the conclusion that the are discussing one and the same thing.
All these points of correspondence cannot be coincidental, and one has to be a rejoinder prompted by the other. It will have to be decided whether it was Dharmakīrti who is criticised by Samantabhadra or vice versa, for with the traditional Jaina dating of Samantabhadra it was him who preceded Dharmakīrti. But if it was not Dharmakīrti to whom Samantabhadra responds, who would that be?
Samantabhadra deals with a similar problem in his other work, Yukty-anuśāsana, which demonstrates that the charge of contradiction against the syād-vāda was something he took seriously and tried, over the years, to exonerate the theory of the apparent contradiction: avācyam ity atra ca vācya-bhāvād avācyam evêty ayathā-pratijñam / sva-rūpataś cet para-rūpa-vāci sva-rūpa-vācîti vaco viruddham // It is not impossible that also this verse was, albeit less directly, prompted by Dharmakīrti's criticism.
Could we however trace Āpta-mīmāṃsā 70-72 and Yukty-anuśāsana 29, which both speak of an indescribable thing, back to Dignāga? Indeed, Dignāga speaks of indescribable, inexpressible particulars which might seem to strike a familiar chord with Āpta-mīmāṃsā 70, which does speak of thing's indescribability (avācyatā), namely while explaining the grounds for two kinds of inference (anumāna) he explains in his Pramāṇa-samuccaya(-vr̥ tti): While dealing with the ultimately existent thing, Dignāga does speak of its inexpressibility, but both the context is completely different (here, he is concerned with the nature of inference and its inapplicability to the perceptibles) and the term used, anirdeśya, is not the same as avācya. Further, I do not find anything in Dignāga's work which could be taken as a kind of criticism directly or indirectly waged against Jaina anekānta-vāda, and which Samantabhadra could interpret as an a charge of contradiction implied by it. And, clearly, Samantabhadra's statement that 'because of the contradiction, there cannot be selfsameness of nature of both [entities that are opposed in nature, which is incriminated] by the enemies of the method of the sevenfold modal description' (virodhān nôbhayaîkātmyaḥ syād-vāda-nyāya-vidviṣām) is a reaction to a critique from an adversary party. We do not find anything of this sort in Dignāga's writings, whereas both the contents and wording of Dharmakīrti's critique fits the context very well. Therefore, the Pramāṇa-samuccaya has to be dismissed as potential source of inspiration for and influence on Āpta-mīmāṃsā 70 and Yukty-anuśāsana 29. And there seems to be no other such potential source in the extant Indian philosophical literature of that time.
Here I follow the reconstructed text (not yet published) by Horst Lasic (the project 'Reconstruction of Dignāga's Pramāṅasamuccaya with the Vrtti', Research: Ernst Steinkellner and Horst Lasic, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia), to whom I would like to express my thanks for making the passage available. It agrees in most details with the reconstructed text in Pind (2009: 302, n. 552): atha kasmād anumānam eva dvidhā bhidyate? yasmāt "svalakṣaṇam anirdeśyam grāhya-bhedāt". bhinnaṇ hi pratyakṣānumayoḥ svātmavad grāhyam. yadi ca\pratyakṣârtho nirdeśyaḥ syāt,[ sa tenaîva śabdenânumeyaḥ syāt. Cf. also the translation of the passage in Hayes (1988: 232).

3.
Pramāṇa-vārttika 3.182 quoted above 19 is followed by another verse: These two verses, PV 3.182-183, jointly are meant to criticise the Jaina idea that entities allegedly share certain properties which allow one to relate them in an objective manner, by virtue of a really existing, ontologically determinable link between the entities which would bind them together, and not purely via imaginative relation, based on individual subjective observation of internally perceived similarity which is projected onto the external reality. Whereas for Dharmakīrti, all entities, being momentary, are ultimately bearers of their own unique quality only which is never shared with any other entity, for the Jainas entities have both their singular, specific qualities as well as generic qualities held by them, or some of them, in common. In other words, Dharmakīrti's criticism is directed against the ontological underpinnings of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekānta-vāda), according to which the entities, while undergoing constant change, which implies also the change in the qualities they possess, preserve their identity, which entails the idea that a range of qualities is common to them. This line of criticism is independently confirmed by Abhayadeva-sūri (TBV, p. 243.27 ff.), who quotes the two verses and refutes them.
It seems that it was rather Pramāṇa-vārttika 3.182-183, being a criticism directed against the Jainas than some other passage, e.g. 22 expressing the same idea, which may have prompted the following rejoinder from Samantabhadra in his Āpta-mīmāṃsā: Samantabhadra does admit that entities share some kind of common characteristics but does not accept Dharmakīrti's conclusion that that would prevent any theoretical and practical distinction between the entities whose natures would become indistinguishable from each other. He denies-and that is a criticism of the apoha theory (which may intimate either Dignāga or Dharmakīrti as the butt)-that every entity is in a way absolutely 'self-centred', or 'it resides in itself' (svarūpa-sthiti), i.e. that it is ultimately incommensurable. If an entity shared no common qualities with other similar entities, it could never be expressed in language, ergo it could not even be conceptualised in thought, which is reciprocally connected to language. Samantabhadra seems to point out that the apoha theory is methodologically flawed because, were it true, it would necessarily prevent any description of and reference to any entity. What he does is he turns Dharmakīrti's argument around as follows. What Dharmakīrti actually asserts is the following: if any entity x possesses its own unique qualities as well as another entity's, y's, unique qualities, then these two x & y can be treated as identical, ergo they should be expected to perform the same function, which is still another quality S: What Samantabhadra does is to demonstrate that any entity has to possess also other entities' qualities because it is the way that things are nameable through the language in which one word necessarily has to potentially refer to more qualities than just one. Otherwise, the language would have to consist of as many words as there are unique entities and discrete qualities, and this would render any description and communication impossible. From the fact that more entities than one share more qualities than one follows that they share one more quality, i.e. nameability N, viz. more unique entities than one and more discrete qualities than one can be named with one and the same word, but it cannot follow that these entities and qualities are identical: While commenting on Pramāṇa-vārttika 3.40-41, which conveys the same idea as 3.182-183, the Pramāṇa-vārttika-svavr̥ tti-ṭīkā commentator Karṅakagomin does not fail to notice the exchange of criticisms between Samantabhadra and Dharmakīrti, and he quotes the above hemistich of Āpta-mīmāṃsā 11: 'Also, what a certain Digambara maintains, namely: "«This [real thing] is in a certain sense of the nature of everything, if we put aside [the Buddhist theory 24 Ā Mī 11: sarvâtmakaṃ tad ekaṃ syād anyâpoha-vyatikrame / anyatra samavāye na vyapadiśyeta sarvathā // The structure of the argument in Karṅakagomin's commentary might, in theory, suggest historical priority of Samantabhadra, for Karṅakagomin first quotes Ā Mī 11ab and then implies that 'that certain Digambara', namely Samantabhadra, who must have first criticised the originator of the apoha theory, i.e. Dignāga, was subsequently refuted by Dharmakīrti (so 'py anena nirastaḥ). However, the sequence which Karṅakagomin suggests, namely Dignāga → Samantabhadra → Dharmakīrti, does not necessarily have to reflect a historical reality. Such historical sequence does not have to be necessarily implied by Karṅakagomin, who flourished around 800, 26 i.e. c. approximately two centuries after Dharmakīrti. The time which elapsed does not have to speak against the historical (in)accuracy of Karṅakagomin's account, but it would be methodologically flawed to rely on the way the commentator dialectically structures the line of his presentation by juxtaposing the opinions of two representatives of rival schools simply for the sake of argument, and to draw from it conclusions of historical import. It could as well be argued that Samantabhadra simply features in this account as a prominent representative of Jainism, without implying any real chronology.
We should examine whether a possible inspiration for Samantabhadra's passage could indeed, as Karṅakagomin could imply, be Dignāga's Pramāṇa-samuccaya, and there we do find the following passage: This passage does speak of a real thing which cannot be really designated (na … vyapadiśyate). The context is however quite different. For Dignāga, it is the particular, or the ultimately real thing (svalakṣaṇa), which produces cognition but cannot be designated. For Samantabhadra, the problem of indescribability of an object, which is not a svalakṣaṇa but a vastu endowed with both particular (viśeṣa) and generic (sāmānya) features, would occur if one tried to describe it in terms of something absolutely different from the objects. Further, what Dignāga takes as 'not describable' (na vācyaṃ) is not, as in the case of Samantabhadra, the object of cognition but the cognition itself which is intensional, i.e. it requires a direct reference to its object as its actual contents. Thus the contexts and purport of Dignāga's and Samantabhadra's passages are quite different. In addition, what is of crucial importance to Dignāga's project, both in the above passage and in the texts of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya and Ālambana-parīkṣā, is the problem of an objective substratum which should provide a basis for a production of its cognition (ālamba/ālambana). Had Samantabhadra been inspired by Dignāga and provoked to criticise him directly, he would certainly have refereed to that idea and to the term ālamba/ālambana explicitly. However, these nowhere occur in Samantabhadra's works.

4.
Whether it will be eventually decided who preceded whom, there is additional evidence that Āpta-mīmāṃsā 11 and Dharmakīrti's critique of Jainism found in PV/ PVSV 3.181-184 are clearly related, which is noticeable in the verbal parallelism of the two verses, especially in their first pādas (Ā Mī 11a: sarvâtmakaṃ tad ekaṃ syād… and PV 3.184a: sarvâtmatve ca sarveṣāṃ), both of which deal with the same problem, taking different perspectives though on what makes linguistic reference possible: These two verse do read like a conversation between both authors. Samantabhadra's statements presuppose his knowledge of the apoha theory, which could be Dignāga's version. Dharmakīrti's criticism requires that he knew the Jaina claim that all entities share their natures, a thesis which, it should be admitted, was not unique to Samantabhadra.

5.
In reply to a hypothetical question, or rather a paradox pointed out by an imaginary Jaina interlocutor, how universal-bound words, which convey some meaning and, in the process of reference, map onto entities whose essential natures have to correspond to the ideic contents conveyed by the words, could refer to ultimate particulars which are devoid of such essential nature, 30 Dharmakīrti asseverates that the process of denoting particulars through words, which primarily have a universal meaning, is possible provided an object is amenable to thought and speech: 'Of course speech elements refer necessarily to these [inexpressible particulars], because assertion ('x is P') and negation ('x is not non-P') are not possible with regard to [entities] that are not determined one way or another (sc. either through cognition or speech).' 31 In other words, the precondition for both assertion (positive concomitance) of an entity, i.e. an ascription of a property to a particular substratum, and negation (negative concomitance), i.e. a denial of a contrary property to the substratum, is that the entity can be conceptually determined through (or to which our attention can be directed by means of) an act of cognition or speech. 32 To be determinable at the same time means to possess the capacity of causal efficacy, or to execute causally efficient action (artha-kriyā-kārin), and these are ultimately particulars. 29 PV 3.184: sarvâtmatve ca sarveṣāṃ bhinnau syātāṃ na dhī-dhvanī / bheda-saṃhāra-vādasya tad-abhāvād asambhavaḥ // 184 // 30 PVSV 3.184.8: bhavatu nāma bhāvānāṃ svabhāva-bheda sāmānyam. yeṡāṃ tu nirupākhyānāṃ svabhāva eva nâsti tatra kathaṁ svabhāva-bheda-viṣayāḥ śabdāḥ.-'[The Jaina opponent]: "Let the universal character of entities consist in the distinction of essential natures [of entities], if you wish. But how can speech elements have as their contents essential natures [of entities] such as inexpressible [particulars] which do not have, [as you claim,] any essential nature at all?' 31 PVSV 3.184.9: teṡv avaśyaṁ śabda-pravr ̥ ttyā bhāvyam. kathaṃcid avyavasthāpiteṣuvidhipratiṣedhâyogāt. 32 Cf. PVSVṪ ad loc., p. 343.6-8: kathaṃcij jñāna-śabda-viṣayatenâvyavasthāpiteṣu nirupākhyeṣu sarvatra vidhi-pratiṣedhe vā yogāt (recte: vidhi-pratiṣedhenâyogāt). yadi kvacid asata ākārasya niṣedhe jñānâbhidhāne syātāṃ, tadā niṣiddhâkāra-parihr ̥ te 'rthe vidhiḥ syāt.
Accordingly, Dharmakīrti's passage contains three vital elements: the notion of particulars, which are by nature inexpressible and are the sole entities which ultimately real and nothing except them can execute causally efficient action, the possibility of reference either by way of assertion (vidhi, 'x is P') or negation (pratiṣedha, 'x is not non-P'), and the precondition for any meaningful reference, and thus for verbal communication and conceptualisation, is the idea that these particulars are amenable to language and thought (vyavasthāpita).
These three elements are found in Samantabhadra's verse, which seems to be a rejoinder to the Pramāṇa-vārttika and uses quite similar wording (avyavasthāpita/ anavasthita; vidhi-pratiṣedha/vidhi-niṣedha): What Samantabhadra means is that the ultimately existent thing is an object which is characterised by both assertion and denial, which is also the underlying idea of the sapta-bhaṅgī, directly referred to by him in the preceding verse. 35 The same ideas are also found in Samantabhadra's Svayambhū-stotra 36 and Yukty-anuśāsana, 37 which do not appear to have necessarily been directly prompted by Dharmakīrti.

6.
In the portion of the Pramāṇa-vārttika section criticising the Jaina anekānta-vāda, Dharmakīrti asserts the nominalism thesis as against the multifacetedness claim that entities, preserving their separate identities, share similar natures: 33 I.e. by both auxiliary causes and material cause, or by additional factors and the main cause.
[Thereby] the distinction between primary and secondary [figure of the syād-vāda] is established. Such is the guideline of the wise (or: of the fifth Tīrthaṁ -kara Sumati). That is your most excellent creed. Let the worshipper praise you.' 37 YA 46: vidhir niṣedho 'nabhilāpyatā ca trir eka-śastri-dviśa eka eva / trayo vikalpās tava sapta-dhāmī syāc chabda-neyāḥ sakale 'rtha-bhede // In other words, the purport of the conclusion of a few-line argument is that there is intrinsically nothing in things which would objectively relate them, and which would then serve as an objective basis for forming class notions and for the objective existence of universals. What they all have in common is that they all are discrete (bheda-lakṣaṇa), i.e. numerically distinct and different from each other. This view is put forward as a criticism of the Jaina position.
This particular view seems to be directly addressed in the Āpta-mīmāṃsā in the following verse: 'All [entities] are selfsame inasmuch as they have the same universal existence (i.e. all exist); [they are] discrete due to the difference in substance etc. (i.e. qualities and modes), like a unique cause [of something which is either expressed or unexpressed] in the case of intention [to accentuate its] singular character or non-singular character.' 39 Dharmakīrti's notions of 'no association of essential natures of entities' (na bhāvānāṃ … svabhāvânvayaḥ) and 'universal character characterised by distinction' (bheda-lakṣaṇam sāmānyam) are countered by the ideas of 'selfsameness of all entities' (sarvaîkyaṃ), besides their discrete character (pr̥ thaktva) and 'universal existence' of all entities (sat-sāmānya).

7.
Samantabhadra is reckoned as the first Jaina thinker to introduce the delimitative/restrictive particle eva into the scheme of the syād-vāda, 40 which since his times became an integral part of the standard formulations of the respective seven figures within this theory. We do not find any evidence for the usage of the particle eva prior to Samantabhadra. Once it was introduced, it proved a useful semantic tool to restrict the applicability of a property (dharma) predicated of the real thing (vastu) without excluding the application of other properties to the same thing or the possession of the same property by other things.
We should remember that the syād-vāda of fifth-sixth centuries was still at a relatively early stage of its development, and the sentential functor syād was not always used. 42 Ā Mī 14: kathaṃcit te sad evêṣṭaṃ kathaṃcid asad eva tat / tathôbhayam avācyaṃ ca naya-yogān na sarvathā // 43 Cf. e.g. AṡS ad loc., 132.10, 14-15; RVār 4.42, p. 254.14 ff., TṪ 5.31,p. 409.29 ff. 44 The four basic parameters that qualify the way we predicate of a thing are meant here: substance (dravya), place (kṣetra), time (kāla), condition (bhāva), see: Balcerowicz (2014: 36) and (forthcoming 1 : 3.5). Akalaṅka in AṡŚ provides the example: sthity-utpatti-vināśâtmakaṃ sva-predeśa-niyataṃ sva-śarīravyāpinaṃ tri-kāla-gocaram ātmanām…, which correspond to bhāva, kṣetra, dravya and kāla of the soul (ātman). However, AṡSTV ad loc., p. 343, speaks of sva-para-rūpa (l. 7), saṃyoga-vibhāga (l. 11), svadravya and para-dravya (l. 14), sva-kṣetra and para-kṣetra (l. 15). 45  But in both such basic figures, the application of the predicate is delimited by the usage of the particle eva. The Āpta-mīmāṃsā is not the only work in which Samantabhadra applies the particle eva to the syād-vāda scheme. We find it also in the Svayambhū-stotra: '[A thing] is in a certain sense P (tad) indeed, and, in a certain sense, it is not P indeed. Because this is the way [the thing] is comprehended in front of you, [O Jina!], it is somehow P. Assertion and negation do not [convey] difference and non-difference in an absolute sense, because they would [suffer from] the defect of being empty.' 46 While dealing with his favourite theme in the context of the syād-vāda, namely the mutual relation between the particular and the universal which allows for the ascription of seemingly contradictory properties P and non-P (or rather non-Q, to be precise, see above) to one and the same substratum analysed through the prism of the universal-particular relation, 47 Samantabhadra explains the rule governing the language of the syād-vāda in two verses, the first of which is in itself particularly cryptic both for the modern reader and for its commentator Vidyānanda, and at the same time provides a justification for his introduction of the particle eva into the system: '[41] Such a speech element which is furnished with the particle "only/indeed" (eva) delimits its own object from foreign objects. And [such a speech element] which expresses all modes, substances and particulars, [without differentiating its primary referent from everything else] would be tantamount to the deprivation of reference (entities designated by it), and would be like [a word which expresses] something contrary. 48 [42] [Such a speech element] which does not contain the particle "only/indeed" is equivalent to [an expression of] what has not been expressed (sc. something contrary), inasmuch as there is no exclusion [of the contrary property], even though both types of contention (straightforward assertion and straightforward denial without "indeed") [are explicitly stated; and without the exclusion of the contrary property through the particle "only/indeed", both contrary properties would effectively function like synonyms]. If there were [such] a relation of synonymy [between the two contrary properties, one implied by the other, if no particle "only/indeed" is employed,] none could be effectively expressed.
[Consequently, if one property could not be expressed without a possibility of 46 SvSt 9.2 = 42: tad eva ca syān na tad eva ca syāt tathā-pratītes tava tat kathañcit / nâtyantam anyatvam ananyatā ca vidher niṣedhasya ca śūnya-doṣāt // 47 YA 40: sāmānya-niṣṭhā vividhā viśeṣāḥ padaṃ viśeṣântara-pakṣapāti / antar-viśeṣântara-vr ̥ ttito 'nyat samāna-bhāvaṃ nayate viśeṣam // 48 What is ambiguous in the verse is the second hemistich, which allows for more interpretations than one. What Vidyānanda says in not a clarification of the verse as such, not to mention a word-for-word analysis, but merely a loose gloss. The gist of this complex argument is that the particle eva serves as a delimitor of the primary meaning of a word in such a way that it merely distinguishes the primary referent of the word from everything else without denying the existence of all non-referents. In other words, for a term or phrase to be meaningful requires that it leave room for all other properties which are contrary to the primary referent without excluding their existence, i.e. without entailing that they are unrelated to the primary referent in an absolute sense. In other words, an assertion has to leave room for a negation and vice versa. In addition, whether we accept the validity of such reasoning or not, Samantabhadra emphasises that a predicate or a sentence without the delimiting particle eva would be ambiguous, to say the least; even more so, the undesired consequence which Samantabhadra points out is that the semantic difference between two contrary predicates would disappear, and when it is transposed onto the ontological plane, entities would loose their separate identities.
This clearly is a semantic background and justification which Samantabhadra succinctly provides for the idea underlying the anekānta-vāda, namely that P and non-P (non-Q) are interrelated and neither P or non-P (non-Q) can exist alone in an absolute sense. Each has to be delimited in the sense that its existence is directly expressed, without denying a possible existence of non-P (non-Q). Assertion of P in an absolute sense would, argues Samantabhadra, leave no room for a denial of non-P (non-Q), and consequently both P and non-P (non-Q) would turn out to stand in a relation of synonymy, ergo would become meaningless. What is important is that Samantabhadra in his works consistently understands the ascription of two seemingly contradictory properties to one and the same substratum primarily in terms of the universal-particular relation, when often the universal is exemplified as 'substance' (dravya), which extends over a number of particulars (guṇa, paryāya).
I would argue, that the inspiration for Samantabhadra to introduce the particle eva into the syād-vāda scheme was Dharmakīrti. No one before him had done it in such as consistent way as Dharmakīrti to use the particle's delimiting/excluding force, both as emphasis and quantifier, and the way Samantabhadra uses eva emulates Dharmakīrti's approach; the differences to be observed (see below) are dictated by different ontologies and requirements of different epistemologies.
Conspicuously, Samantabhadra does not use the verb ava√dhr ̥ , 'to restrict, determine, limit, emphasise' (avadhāraṇa), which would put him in line with the tradition of the grammarians (see above). Instead, he chooses to define the character of eva with the verb ava√cchid (avacchinatti), 'to separate, to distinguish, to determine as different, to differentiate', which does not seem coincidental. I would argue that it is a reaction to, and an adjustment of Dharmakīrti's more restrictive and exclusive verb vyava√cchid (vyavacchinatti), 'to exclude, to eliminate'. The verb ava√cchid clearly relates to and replaces Dharmakīrti's vy-ava√cchid, which excludes a possibility of any link between a property and its particular kind of negative relation with other properties or substrata. The verb and its derivatives, are clearly Dharmakīrti's own innovation. This usage of vy-50 Abhyankar (1967). The rule is mentioned, with a minor variation, in DhPr 1.14, p. 75.23-24: yata eva kāra-karaṇaṃ tato 'nyatrâvadhāraṇam. 51 There is a plenitude of literature on this issue, but I would draw the reader's attention to two papers: Ganeri (1999) and Gillon (1999 ava√cchid was well justified in Dharmakīrti's nominalist programme where entities were viewed as ultimately unrelated to each other. However, for Samantabhadra and the Jainas, entities are related with each other in various ways, and Dharmakīrti's such understanding of the particle eva would go counter their ontology. A minor change in the verb, i.e. the elimination of the prefix vi°(ava√cchid to replace vy-ava√cchid) makes the verb compatible with the requirements of Jaina ontology. In this way, Samantabhadra rejects the strong claim of exclusion as the actual meaning of the particle eva, and indicates that it merely expresses the idea of distinction between properties.
An additional indication that the verses of Yukty-anuśāsana 41-42 are prompted by Dharmakīrti is the following. Dharmakīrti claims that even when the particle eva is not explicitly pronounced, all the three kinds of exclusion effected with eva are understood from the speaker's intention, inasmuch the particle eva is embedded in any sentence, for every sentence has exclusion as its result (vivakṣāto 'prayoge 'pi sarvo 'rtho 'yaṃ pratīyate). The premise is that even when the particle eva is not explicitly employed in a sentence, it is always implied, because such is the nature of the language which reflects the nominalist structure of the world.
It is precisely in this context that Samantabhadra's argument of Yukty-anuśāsana 42 should be understood: any statement of a term which does not contain the particle eva does not express what the speaker's intention is, but what it actually conveys may even be the contrary to the speaker's intention (anukta-tulyaṃ yad aneva-kāraṃ), inasmuch no exclusion (vyāvr ̥ tti = vyavaccheda) of the contrary property is ever expressed through the sentence bereft of eva. He concludes that if one property could not be expressed without an actual possibility of the denial of its opposite (anyatarâprayogaḥ), i.e. if there were no intended absence of the expression of one of two contradictory properties with the explicit usage of the particle eva, both could effectively be implied, and consequently nothing could be expressed. The implication of this argument is that he considers it imperative to use the particle eva if one intends to delimit the scope of reference, for the language as such does not convey any exclusion or emphasis on its own, i.e. eva is never embedded in the sentence. As we can see, he presents a completely different perspective on the meaning of the particle eva, the role of the language and its relation to reality. Samantabhadra's expression 'nyatarâprayogaḥ is thus apparently a reaction to Dharmakīrti's vivakṣāto 'prayoge 'pi.
The pivotal passage of  in the context of the particle eva seems to trigger another reaction from Samantabhadra's side, namely: The emphasis on both assertion and exclusion, and here in this sense the signature term of Dharmakīrti is used, seems to refute Dharmakīrti's claim that 'every sentence has exclusion as its result' . emphasises that what a sentence conveys is not merely an exclusion of one of three relations in which a property may stand, namely its non-connection, connection with other properties and absolute non-connection, but in addition the same sentence expresses something positive, viz. an assertion of a relation of a property. We can thus see from the above that the views propounded by Samantabhadra on the meaning and role of delimitative/restrictive particle eva and the actual function of a sentence would rather be quite cryptic, outlandish and ahistoric, had they had no background in the form of Dharmakīrti's ideas.
One might argue that Samantabhadra's usage of the delimiting particle eva does not go back to Dharmakīrti but rather to Dignāga, in particular to his Pramāṇasamuccaya-vr̥ tti 2.5 cd, which discusses the nature of the inference for oneself (svârthânumāna) and the idea of the three characteristics of the inferential sign (liṅga), and in which eva is introduced as a delimitor: ' [PS] [The inferential sign has to fulfil three conditions:] It has to be present in the inferable object and in objects similar to it, it has to be absent when these are absent.
[PSV] The inferable object is the property-possessor qualified by a property. After one has observed [the property which is the inferential sign] in this [inferable object] either through perception or inference, at some later point of time the presence of the property either wholly in objects belonging to the same class [as the property-possessor]  Indeed, there is no doubt that Dignāga uses the particle eva to quantify (i.e. presence in all objects similar to the inferable object, tat-tulya eva sadbhāvaḥ) and to limit the scope of objects to which a property applies. However, he himself thinks he is introducing the particle eva not as a novelty, but as something which had been well known from the tradition of the grammarians, and this is implied by the term avadhāraṇāt, i.e. the term and concept well known from grammarians' interpretations of the particle eva. What Dignāga actually does is an innovation, but he does not see it as such. 54 Hayes (1988: 239-240). On the passage and the particle eva, see also Katsura (1985) and (1986), and Hayes (1988: 148 ff.).
A case is quite different with Dharmakīrti who introduces his own vocabulary and typology of the meanings of eva. He no longer follows the traditional terminology, replacing the notion of avadhāraṇa, 'restriction, limitation, emphasis', with a new concept of vyavaccheda, 'exclusion, delimitation', even though that idea had already been implied (but not expressly articulated) in Dignāga's exposition of the three characteristics of the inferential sign.
What we see in Samantabhadra's exposition of the syād-vāda and the role of the particle eva is clearly not the more traditional approach which Dignāga represented but rather new ideas of Dharmakīrti. That is self-evident even in the usage of the verb ava√cchid, the only known forerunner of which in the whole tradition is Dharmakīrti's vyava√cchid.
In addition, of importance is that Dharmakīrti's exposition of the syād-vāda in PV/PVSV 3.181-184 entirely lacks the particle eva. The examples he provides are the following: syād dadhi nâpi sa evôṣṭraḥ yenânyo 'pi syād uṣṭraḥ (181.2), and syād uṣṭro dadhi syān na (184.3). Had he been acquainted with the Jaina tradition initiated by Samantabhadra, we would expect him to verbalise the idea as follows: *syād dadhy eva nâpi sa evôṣṭraḥ yenânyo 'pi syād uṣṭraḥ, and syād uṣṭro dadhy eva, syān na eva, respectively. This further strengthens my thesis that Dharmakīrti predates Samantabhadra. Conspicuously, all references to Dharmakīrti which I have managed to spot in Samantabhadra's writings are primarily to the Svārthânumāna and Parârthânumāna chapters of the Pramāṇa-vārttika.

8.
The date of Samantabhadra has been discussed occasionally, with most authors pointing towards around the period between fifth or sixth century, with some notable exceptions though: Rice (1889: 42): 'he might … be placed in the 1st or 2nd century A.D. As a matter of fact Jaina tradition assigns him apparently to about Ś aka 60 or A.D. 138', following him Mukhtār (1925Mukhtār ( : 115/1926 (1995,1996), but none contains a paper on Samantabhadra. What Nagin Shah refereed to was most probably a draft of a paper Fujinaga (2006: 107), who apparently relies on antiquated views of Pathak (1930b): sixth century; Dhaky (2002: 46): 550-625; Vidyābhūṡaṅa (1909: 22, 24) and (1920: 182 ff.) '600 A.D.'; following him Faddegon (1935: xiv, n. 1): '600 A.D. ';Winternitz (1987: 459) and Upadhye (1971: *50 f.): seventh-eighth centuries 56 ; Pathak (1930a: 153) 'the first half of the eighth century'. In most cases no reasons for the dating were given. In fact, the actual discussion on the dating of Samantabhadra with justifications provided is limited to two-three authors, primarily K.B. Pathak, who initiated the debate, Jugalkishore Mukhtār, who has monopolised the whole discussion about the date of Samantabhadra (actually the majority, if not all, of modern authors dealing with the chronology of Samantabhadra are directly or indirectly influenced by his arguments, with hardly any new evidence), and M.A. Dhaky.
The actual serious discussion on the dating started with a paper by Pathak (1930a), opening with a brilliantly ingenious remark: 'It is easy to fix the date of Samantabhadra if we carefully study his Yuktyanuśāsana and his Ā ptamīmāṁ sā' (which I attempt to duly follow in the present paper). Despite the correctness of this metarule-like statement ('careful study leads to better understanding'…), all the arguments he adduced in the sequel 57 were subsequently invalidated by Jugalkishore (Jugalkiśor) Mukhtār (1934). As a sample of methodological mistakes which Pathak commits (with which I will not deal because the inaccuracy of all of them were demonstrated by Mukhtār) I merely provide his first argument for post-Dharmakīrtian date of Samantabhadra. Pathak (1930a: 149) notes that 'In the former work (YA-P.B.) he (= Samantabhadra-P.B.) attacks the well-known definition of perception given by Dharmakīrti in the Nyāyabindu 58 ', and draws the reader's attention to the following verse: 'Also something amenable to (lit. endowed with) indication through perception [would] not be established, because it would not be possible to make known something non-conceptual. 59 And without establishing it, there is no Footnote 55 continued which was subsequently published as Dhaky (2002) under precisely the same title, and was not coauthored by anyone. 56 But compare Upadhye (1971: *30-31), who is very inconsistent: 'In view of the fact that Pūjyapāda refers in his grammar to Samantabhadra, the latter cannot be put later than Pūjyapāda. Inscriptions from Ś . Belgol put Pūjyapāda later than Samantabhadra. … Siddhasena, the author of the Sanmati, is later than Pūjyapāda and consequently later than Samantabhadra whose Svayambhūstotra and Āptamīmāṃsā have influenced the Sanmati of Siddhasena.' 57 Some of which rather unconventional, such as 'In my paper entitled the position of Kumārila in Digambara Jaina literature I have proved that the Ā ptamīmāṁ sā of Samanabhadra and its first commentary called Aṡṫaśatī by Akalankadeva are severely criticised by Kumārila…' (Pathak1930a: 1530). 58 What Pathak (1930a: 149) means is the definition: 'Perception is free from conceptual construction and non-erroneous' (NB 1.4: tatra pratyakṣaṃ kalpanâpoḍham abhrāntam). 59 Cf. YAṪ 33, p. 66.9-17: pratyakṣeṇa nirdeśaḥ pratyakṣa-nirdeśaḥ, pratyakṣato dr ̥ ṣṭvā nīlâdikam iti vacanam antareṇâṅgulyā pradarśanam ity arthaḥ. sa pratyakṣa-nirdeśo 'syâstîti pratyakṣa-nirdeśavat. tad apy asiddham. kuta etat, yasmād akalpakaṃ jñāpayituṃ kutaścit apy aśakyaṃ, hy yasyāt. … tad dhi pratyakṣam akalpakaṃ na tāvat pratyakṣato jñāpayitum śakyaṃ tasya parâsaṃvedyatvāt. …

[good] sense of the definition [of perception as formulated by the Buddhists]. O Mahāvīra, there is no truth in the one who is opposed to you!' 60
This is a criticism of Dharmakīrti's (?)-according to Pathak (1930a: 149)-or rather of Dignāga's definition of perception as non-conceptual by nature. It is most unlikely that Samantabhadra criticises this definition in YA 33 for at least two reasons. First, an important element of Dharmakīrti's definition, namely nonerroneousness, is entirely missing in Samantabhadra's criticism, and, secondly, it seems that what is being criticised is Dignāga's definition instead: 'Perception is free from conceptual construction, [which in turn] is disconnected from name, class, etc.,' 61 which also features the idea of non-conceptual character. What Samantabhadra deals with in the section YA 29-33 is the object of cognition, primarily the object of perception (dr̥ ṣṭa). It is in this context that Samantabhadra criticises the idea expressed by Dignāga in PS 1.5: 'No cognition whatsoever through a sense organ is possible of a propertypossessor (i.e. a thing) endowed with many facets. What is, however, the actual domain of the sense organ is a [particular] form which is amenable to self-illuminating cognition (i.e. one becomes aware of it) and cannot be indicated (specified).' 62 Apparently, Samantabhadra, in his turn, takes Dignāga's passage of PS 1.5-'no cognition whatsoever … is possible of a thing endowed with many facets'-as a criticism of anekānta-vāda, 63 and demonstrates that an object which is purely nonconceptual could not be made known to anybody, even to oneself, i.e. it would not be amenable to self-illuminating cognition. 64 What this example makes us sensitive to is that while demonstrating that Samantabhadra lived after Dharmakīrti we should always test our hypothesis against a possibility that Samantabhadra may rather have been responding to Dignāga, and we should first eliminate such a likelihood. For indeed, Samantabhadra was acquainted with Dignāga as well, as other passages of his works indicate. 65 60 YA 33: pratyakṣa-nirdeśavad apy asiddham akalpakaṃ jñāpayituṃ hy aśakyam / vinā ca siddher na ca lakṣaṇârtho na tāvaka-dveṣiṇi vīra satyam // 61 PS 3,4 1.3 cd: pratyakṣaṃ kalpanâpoḍhaṃ nāma-jāty-ādy-ayojanā.
Sometimes it is voiced that Dharmakīrti refers directly to Samantabhadra. As I demonstrated in Balcerowicz (2011), there is nothing in Dharmakīrti's writings which would justify such a claim. The syād-vāda doctrine which Dharmakīrti is much more robust and undeveloped than what is presupposed in Samantabhadra's writings. Similarly, no reference in Kumārila's writings will justify a similar claim, albeit he does happen to briefly refer to Jaina ideas, but the contents of the reference is too vague and unspecific to enable us to pinpoint whom he actually had had in mind.
When we analyse all arguments in favour of the sixth century or earlier as the date of Samantabhadra, there are two strong cases against my hypothesis which we should examine if we want to corroborate the thesis of Samantabhadra's later date.

8.1
Since an opinion has been expressed that also Kumārila Bhaṫt˙a criticised Samantabhadra's views, 66 and since Dharmakīrti and Kumārila are often regarded as contemporaries, that would exclude a post-Dharmakīrtian (ergo post-Kumārilan) date for Samantabhadra. Therefore, we should briefly consider such arguments here.
In his two papers Pathak (1930b) and (1931) argues, roughly, that since, in the Tattva-saṅgraha, Ś āntarakṡita (TSa 1 3235-3237) quotes three verses from the Mīmāṃsā-śloka-vārttika, which Kamalaśīla introduces as a criticism of the idea of omniscience and apparently, with the compound dadhi-rūpa-rasâdikaṃ, indicates the Jainas' theory of omniscience, hence one of the verses 'contains a direct attack on Samantabhadra and Akalaṅkadeva' (p. 161), and since, while quoting five verses from the Mīmāṃsā-śloka-vārttika, 'Ś antaraksita says that he knows the arguments of the Digambara Jaina authors [Samantabhadra and Akalaṅkadeva] alluded to by Kumārila …', and these verses are also quoted by another Jaina Pātrakesari[n], hence Kumārila must refer to Samantabhadra's concept of omniscience. Both the logic and historical background (Kumārila of seventh century criticising Akalaṅka of eighth century) of this arugment are rather fuzzy, they should be easily dismissed. Indeed, Kumārila criticises the idea of omniscience in his Śloka-vārttika, however there is no indication in the text itself whether this criticism is of Jaina of Buddhist concept. Granted that it were a Jaina concept, there is no slightest evidence that he had Samantabhadra in mind.
Moreover, there is no single passage in the Mīmāṃsā-śloka-vārttika, esp. in the section dealing with the idea of omniscience (MŚ V 2.110 ff.), which could be taken as a quotation, distorted quotation of paraphrase of any verse from Samantabhadra's oeuvre. The concept of omniscience criticised by Kumārila is extremely unspecific and may relate to both Jaina and Buddhist views as well as to Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṡikas', but no slightest hint to personal views of Samantabhadra can be found in Kumārila's work.
Further, Fujinaga (2001) and Shiga (2013: 33 ff.) put forward the following argument, with different conclusions though. In his Digambara-mata-parīkṣā, Jitāri (940-1000) quotes three verses 67 which go back to the Āpta-mīmāṃsā (Ā Mī 59, 57) and the Mīmāṃsā-śloka-vārttika (MŚ V 5.14.22). The same verses are quoted by Karṅakagomin (770-830) who 'additionally quotes Ā Mī 60'. 68 On this basis alone, Fujinaga (2001: 171) concludes that 'it is appropriate to assume that Kumārila criticized Samatabhadra's view' of omniscience, and therefore 'Kumārila should be considered as belonging to a period later than that of Samantabhadra or as a younger contemporary of Samantabhadra. ' Shiga (2013: 35) points out to another possible alternative, namely that 'it is probable that Buddhists considered Samantabhadra and Kumārila as holding the same views regarding existence… In this case, Samantabhadra and Kumārila did not criticize one another's views; they shared them.' A comparison of the original readings of the source texts (Ā Mī 57, 59, 60, MŚV 5.14.22) with the variants of Karṅakagomin and Jitāri leads to a conclusion that these four verses were first muddled up together by Karṅakagomin, who attributed them to the Jainas (tena yo 'pi digambaro manyate) in the context of the threefold nature of reality (origin, continuation, cessation), and he was the source for Jitāri. remains unknown, however this is no ground to believe that Kumārila could know Samantabhadra. All these and similar 69 arguments in favour of the thesis that Samantabhadra predates Kumārila rest on faulty methodology: from historical relations between different commentators of Samantabhadra, Kumārila and Dharmakīrti no conclusions can be drawn as regards a relative chronology of these three authors. Accordingly, the Mīmāṃsā-śloka-vārttika does not seem to provide an evidence which could be useful to determine a historical relation of its author to Samantabhadra.

8.2
Suzuko Ohira (1982: 143) points out two problems which could potentially undermine my conclusion about Samantabhadra posteriority to Dharmakīrti: 'Samantabhadra quotes maṅgalācaraṅa of Pūjyapāda in his Āptamīmāṃsā, and Pūjyapāda refers to Samantabhadra in the Jainendravyāyaraṇa while enunciating a rule, 'catuṡtayaṁ samantabhadrasya' (5.4.140) which refers to "jhayo haḣ" (5.4.136) and which does not exist in the Aṣṭādhyāyi. Therefore both authors are speculated to have been the contemporaries.' In support, she refers to Premī (1956: 44-45) in note 105. The first problem she mentions is Pūjyapāda's reference to Samantabhadra, which I will discuss further below. The second problem concerns the maṅgalâcaraṇa of Pūjyapāda Devanandin, alias Jinendrabuddhi, quoted by Samantabhadra. In any case, if Samantabhadra-being a post-Dharmakīrtian author, and therefore also post-Devanandin, had quoted the maṅgalâcaraṇa of Pūjyapāda Devanandin in his Āpta-mīmāṃsā, that would not contradict my contention about Samantabhadra being posterior to both Devanandin and Dharmakīrti. The problem would arise if it were Devanandin who quoted a maṅgala of a work of Samantabhadra. However, neither author, whether Premī or Ohira, specifies what maṅgalâcaraṇa is actually meant, whether that of the Jainendra-vyākaraṇa or of the Sarvârtha-siddhi. The introductory maṅgalas of Devanandin's both works read respectively: lakṣmīr ātyantikī yasya niravadyāvabhāsate / deva-nandita-pūjêśe namas tasmai svayam-bhuve // (JV) and mokṣa-mārgasya nêtaram bhettāraṃ karma-bhū-bhr̥ tām / jñātāram viśva-tattvānāṃ vande tad-guṇa-labhdaye // (SSi) Neither in found anywhere in the three stutis, nor even an indirect hint to them. Thus, at least this counter-argument against my post-Dharmakīrtian dating of Samantabhadra can safely be dismissed. 69 Such as Pathak's (1931) that there is an overlap between the criticism of Kumārila's objections against omniscience and the response contained in Akalaṅka's Aṣṭa-śatī, Vidyānanda Pātrakesarisvāmin's Aṣṭasahasrī and the Tattva-saṅgraha, and therefore Samantabhadra, commented upon by Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda, must be earlier than Kumārila criticised by them.

8.3
The second, and more serious problem concerns the final sūtra of Pūjyapāda Devanandin's grammar Jainendra-vyākaraṇa (JV 5.4.168 = JV 2 5.4.140), which reads: catuṣṭayaṃ samantabhadrasya. This is universally treated as a direct reference to Samantabhadra, and I see no compelling reason to dispute it. Pathak (1930a: 153-154) argues-in fact rather convincingly, and the arguments against his position presented by Jugalkiśor Mukhtār (1934: 86-88) are not quite convincing ('it is a mere conjecture')-that the sūtra is a later interpolation. However, Mukhtār (1934: 87) also seems quite justified in concluding that 'In the face of this sūtra one cannot put Samantabhadra later than Pūjyapāda.' Clearly, in view of this reference to Samantabhadra one should however accept that Pūjyapāda Devanandin did know a certain Samantabhadra. But here a few related problems crop up which all should be properly solved.

9.
The first of these problems is the actual dating of the Jainendra-vyākaraṇa, which entails the question whether the author of this work is the same as the author of the Sarvârtha-siddhi.
The third is the actual date of Dharmakīrti, which can help us decide on the first and second problems, but which should also be determined by the proper solution of these two questions. Clearly it is a case of methodological vicious circle under present circumstances, because none of these questions can at present be solved satisfactorily.

9.1
As far as the authorship of the Stuti-vidyā (StVi) is concerned, I would maintain, relying on intratextual criteria, that the text is not a work of Samantabhadra, i.e. it was neither composed by the author of the three epistemolgical eulogies nor by the author of the Ratna-karaṇḍa-śrāvakâcāra (in case the expert in the Jaina lay conduct is different from the epistemologist-eulogist), though we cannot absolutely exclude such possibility. If that work had been penned by someone named Samantabhadra, this has to be another Samantabhadra.
Even a cursory look at this Science of Eulogies reveals a high mastery of the author, which is not necessarily matched by the quality of the three epistemological stutis, and certainly not by the verses of the Ratna-karaṇḍa-śrāvakâcāra. This is not to say that the three epistemological stutis or the work on the lay conduct are of mediocre sub-standard. On the contrary, they are composed with considerable expertise, but they do not reflect the plethora of meters, poetic devices etc. which are found in the Stuti-vidyā. There are two conspicuous features of the Stuti-vidyā. First, it abounds in particular rhymed or semi-rhymed meters, in fact they appear to be in the majority, and it seems the author was extremely fond of them, 70 but none of these is ever found in the four other works ascribed to Samantabhadra, which would be rather surprising if we considered that the author of these works were one and the same person. In fact, I have spotted no single case of a rhymed verse in the three epistemological eulogies or in the Ratna-karaṇḍa-śrāvakâcāra. Second, the author of the Stuti-vidyā displays his exceptional skill at alliteration and similar poetic devices. 71 Were Samantabhadra, the author of the three epistemological eulogies and the Ratna-karaṇḍa-śrāvakâcāra the same person who composed the work on poetics, he would have with certainty displayed this remarkable poetic proficiency at least on one occasion.
There is little more difficulty with the terminus ante quem for him. In fact, the personage of Samantabhadra is shrouded in medieval myths, which in their turn influenced marginal glosses on manuscripts 74 which in turn provided inspiration to a range of contemporary researchers and Jainas, including Mukhtār, 75 to devise detailed biographies of Samantabhadra. All of such evidence provides no reliable basis and can rather be forthrightly rejected. Similarly unreliable are the Jaina paṭṭāvalis which present ascetic lineages. 76 With certainty, a solid terminus ante quem for Samantabhadra as the author of the stutis is the time of Akalaṅka (720-780) who wrote Aṣṭa-śatī (AṣŚ ), a commentary on the Āpta-mīmāṃsā.
But is there any additional, external evidence of Samantabhadra? The earliest epigraphic evidence for Samantabhadra comes from Karnāṫaka, in particular from Ś ravaṅabel˙agol˙a, dates back to 12th century. The inscriptions which bear the name of Samantabhadra, include Inscriptions No. 40 (dated: 1163), 47 (dated: 1115), 54 77 / 67 78 (dated: 1128), 105 79 /254 80 (dated: 1398), 108 81 /258 82 (dated: 1433) in Ś ravaṅabel˙agol˙a, 83 and from elsewhere, e.g. Inscription No. 83 (dated 1117) in Chāmarājnagar Taluq, 84 Inscriptions No. 100, (dated 1145) and 103 (dated 1120) in Nāgamaṅgala Taluq, 85 Inscription No. 76 (dated 1145) in Yallādahal˙l˙i. 86 It seems that suddenly in the 12th century, during the Hoysala reign, the references to Samantabhadra, and these are usually references to the name alone, with no reference to the kind of the literary genre which he practised, began to proliferate. Due to such late date, however, all the epigraphic evidence is of hardly any use to establish the date of Samantabhadra.
In addition, most epigraphic evidence for Samantabhadra is quite enigmatic. Interestingly, the legends found in the inscriptions associate Samantabhadra primarily with some elements of the conduct, 87 which incidentally happens to be the subject matter of the Ratna-karaṇḍa-śrāvakâcāra, much less so with his philosophical interests. These legends include the story of his planned but never accomplished sallekhanā ('terminal fast') and dietary regulations (prompted by his morbid appetite and a bhāsmaka disease, Inscription No. 54/67), a story of a proper way to carry out the pūjā and donation of food (dāna) as a criticism of the erection of thousands of liṅgas by the Kāñchi king Ś ivakoṫi, etc. In one of them, he is called 'the upholder of the community', 88 another one speaks of the 'light of the jewel (ratna) of Samantabhadra's words', 89 which may perhaps be an concealed reference to the title of the work Ratna-karaṇḍa-śrāvakâcāra, 'The Conduct for lay people in the form of a Basket of Jewels'. These stories read like justifications for assorted topics of the Ratna-karaṇḍaśrāvakâcāra and like and explanation why Samantabhadra undertook to compose the work. In addition, as Rice (1889: 42) notices, 'Samantabhadra, with Kaviparimêshṫi and Pûjyapâda, always in this order, is invoked at the beginning of all the principal Jaina works in Hal˙e Kannaḋa.' On the other hand, some inscriptions, primarily outside of Ś ravaṅabel˙agol˙a, mention only Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka together, with reference to no other Jaina teacher, e.g. Inscription No. 76 (dated 1145) in Yallādahal˙li, 90 Inscriptions No. 100 (dated 1145) 91 and No. 103 (dated 1120) 92 in Nāgamaṅgala Taluq. At the same time, two inscription of Ś ravaṅabel˙agol˙a relate Samantabhadra to the syād-vāda (No. 105/254) and call him 'the author of Jinaśāsana' (praṇetā jina-śāsanasya; No. 108/258). There is no single expression which would speak of Samantabhadra as a versatile teacher, both an expert in proper conduct for lay people and in logic or in syād-vāda.
These two-track descriptions could hypothetically be interpreted as preserving a vague memory of two personages of Samantabhadra, a distant possibility which I will discuss further on. In addition, the references to Samantabhadra as primarily connected with the proper conduct could perhaps be interpreted as a fossilised memory that one of two Samantabhadras was an author of a work of Jaina lay conduct (śravakâcāra) and lived before Pūjyapāda Devanandin.
Non-epigraphic references to Samantabhadra in early Jaina literature are very few, all of them date back to the eighth-ninth centuries, and are found: which quite importantly contains a direct reference to Samantabhadra's work Yukty-anuśāsana. 94 -perhaps also in the Anekānta-jaya-patākā (AJP) of Haribhadra-sūri (740-800), for Dhaky (2002: 31, 48, n. 29) alleges that Haribhadra refers to Samantabhadra by name, though I fail to spot that reference.
Further, as regards the date of the Jainendra-vyākaraṇa and of Pūjyapāda Devanandin, he is generally considered to be also the author of the Sarvârtha-siddhi, is normally assigned to the mid-sixth century, and there are strong reasons for this dating of at least in the case of the Sarvârtha-siddhi, including the fact that there is not slightest trace of Dharmakīrti's thought in his this text.
Concerning the two works of Devanandin, first, with respect to the date of his Jainendra-vyākaraṇa alone, there are two different opinions, which are reflected in Hartmut Scharfe's (1977: 168) comment on the date of the grammar work: 'While some scholars place Devanandin before even Candragomin (5th cent. A.D.), others put him later than the authors of the Kāśikā (early 7th cent. A.D.)' Such divergent dating is due to two factors. Those favouring the latter date, refer to the Lakṡmeśvara inscription from Dharwaḋ which was discovered and first published by Fleet (1884: 112), who is followed by other scholars, including Pathak (1883: 20) and Dikshit (1980: 158), who in turn summarizes the argument: 'another epigraph from Lakshmeśvara inscription from Dharwar records the gift of a village Kardam, south of Pulikere, to Vinayāditya's priest Udayadeva Paṅḋita (Niravadya Paṅḋita), a disciple of Pujyapada of Devaguṅa sect, for the benefit of the temple of Ś aṅkha Jinendra on the Phālguna Purṇimā of Śaka year 651 = the 8th February AD 729.' It is extremely unlikely though that the Pūjyapāda of the Lakṣmeśvara inscription refers to Pūjyapāda Devanandin, first because 'Pūjyapāda' is not a proper name but a honorific title which could also attach to other names, second that such a late dating is incompatible with a possible date of another work of Devanandin, viz. the Sarvârtha-siddhi, i.e. before c. 600 CE.
Those who assign the Jainendra-vyākaraṇa to the second half of the fifth century relate it historically to Candragomin's Cāndra-vyākaraṇa. However, there is evidence that either both works within non-Pāṅinian grammatical tradition are historically unrelated or that the Cāndra-vyākaraṇa predates the Jainendravyākaraṇa. Thus, Bronkhorst (2002), in support of his earlier publication (1983), argued that 'it has also been more satisfactorily established that the Cāndravyākaraṅa and the Kāśikā shared at least one earlier source (other than the Mahābhāṡya and the Jainendravyākara),' which also means that the dating of the Jainendra-vyākaraṇa is in a way independent of the date of the Cāndra-vyākaraṇa. Further, much earlier Pathak (1931-32) presented ample evidence for 'the priority of Candra to Pūjyapāda' and provided four proofs which were summarized by Belvalkar (1976: 53-54), who following Pathak (1931-32) and (1883) Jainendra-vyākaraṇa to the second half of the fifth century: 'Among his arguments (i.e. Pathak1931-32) are: 1. the fact that the Kāśikā seems to betray knowledge of the JV; 2. the circumstance that the Jainendra-sūtra alludes to Īśvarakrṡṅa the author of the Sāṅkhyakārikās (who is assigned by dr Takakusu to AD 450) and to twelve year cycle of Jupiter to the heliacal rising system, a system which was in vogue in the time of the Early Kadamba kings ad their contemporaries, the early Gupta kings; 3. the collateral evidence to be derived from later references to the Jainendra from the ninth century on. Thus the Ś ākaṫāyana-śabdānuśāsana (dated from 1025 AD) is largely indebted to JV. A Digambara Darśanaśāstra of 853 AD mentions a pupil of a certain Pūjyapāda as being the founder of Drāviḋa-saṅgha. Lastly, an inscription from the Ś ankhabasti temples at Lakṡmeśvara records a gift in Saka 652 (730 AD) of Ś rī-Pūjyapāda to his house pupil although this last is not quite a trustworthy evidence, being not contemporaneous, and there might have been more than one Pūjyapāda.' However, the point of fact is that there seems to be absolutely nothing which would preclude a later date for the Jainendra-vyākaraṇa than the second half of the fifth century, for the actual references to this work are quite late, from the ninth century onwards. 95 The only evidence which would speak in favour of the fifth century is an extremely vague and conjectural conviction that Devanandin must have lived when the twelve year cycle of Jupiter to the heliacal rising system was in vogue, and that was only in the time of the early Kadamba kings, but this is too weak a basis to serve as evidence for any sound historical estimate.
In addition, the date of the Sarvârtha-siddhi cannot be pushed further up towards the seventh century because of almost total absence of a discussion of the anekāntavāda, except for the term itself, which incidentally occurs for the first time in Jaina literature (although it was apparently used by the Ā jīvikas 96 ). The ideas which relate to the doctrine of multiplexity of reality are still quite robust and underdeveloped, and it is most unlikely that these would reflect the state of thought and knowledge of an educated Jaina author living in the seventh century. The total absence of any reference to Dharmakīrti's ideas in the Sarvârtha-siddhi can be explained as follows. Pūjyapāda Devanandin, while composing a commentary of the Tattvârthasūtra, wrote it primarily for the Jaina audience. The work generally avoids any longer criticism directed against other philosophical and religious schools. Accordingly, it is quite feasible to consider that Pūjyapāda Devanandin was an older contemporary of Dharmakīrti but did not refer to him for a range of reasons. Therefore, the reasonable time span within which Pūjyapāda Devanandin, alias Jinendrabuddhi, could flourish is some time between ca. 480 and ca. 600. And this fully complies with conjectural chronology and the proposed date for Pūjyapāda Devanandin as 540-600.
Consistent with this conjectural chronology, the Ratna-karaṇḍa-śrāvakâcāra of Samantabhadra has to be his first work, both socially influential and important 95 See Pathak (1931-32). The first commentary on (and redaction of) the Jainendra-vyākara is Śabdârṇava-candrikā of Somadeva dated 1025 CE or 1049 CE (Ś aka 1127), and the even later commentary is the Mahā-vr̥ tti of Abhayanandin. Somadeva mentions his predecessor's abridgement Jainendra-prakriyā of the grammar, composed some time after 962 CE (Ś aka 1040). 96 See Balcerowicz (forthcoming 2 ). enough for Devanandin to make a reference to its author in his Jainendra-vyākaraṇa. Samantabhadra could know only the earliest portions of the Pramāṇa-vārttika, i.e. the Svārthânumāna chapter, which contained the criticism against a rather robust and undeveloped version of the anekānta-vāda. And this is the portion which he criticised in the three eulogies which he composed towards the end of his life.
With this in mind and with the material presented so far, the simplest conclusion, and most innocuous one, would be the following conjectural chronology of respective works and a conjectural dating for each author: Ratna-karaṇḍaśrāvakâcāra 560 Sarvârtha-siddhi 570 Jainendra-vyākaraṇa PV, Svārthânumāna 580 Āpta-mīmāṃsā

Yukty-anuśāsana Svayambhū-stotra
The above conjecture retains the integrity of each person, i.e. does not require to presuppose that there were more Devanandins or Samantabhadras than one. I do not claim that this dating is well fixed. On the contrary, the dates of the individual works and authors in the above conjectural table which reflects relative chronology can be adjusted plus/minus 20 years, but only within certain limits, e.g. they cannot be pushed further towards the seventh century.
In the conclusion of my 2011 paper, I indicated that there were a number of 'points in Dharmakīrti's account of the anekānta-vāda … [which] significantly diverge from the genuine doctrine as it is represented by Jaina philosophers themselves.' I left a possibility open, 'that what Dharmakīrti depicts are some early developments of the theory', though at that time I considered this option less likely than an intentional distortion of Jaina syād-vāda on the part of Dharmakīrti. Now, with the adjusted dating of Dharmakīrti, this possibility seems the more accurate description of the actual state of affairs, inasmuch as he must have indeed lived in the period when the Jainas were gradually developing their doctrine of multiplexity of reality, which at his times was still in a nascent stage.

9.3
The above hypothesis takes it for granted that, first, the Jainendra-vyākaraṇa and Sarvârtha-siddhi were composed by one and the same person, Devanandin, and that, second, Samantabhadra was the author of the four works, one titled Ratna-karaṇḍaśrāvakâcāra on the Jaina lay conduct, and three epistemologically oriented eulogies. And this interpretation is what I consider most likely in view of the present state of our historical knowledge. However, there is still another possibility, which I should outline below.
Whereas I see no tangible evidence to argue for two distinct Pūjyapādas, viz. one Pūjyapāda Devanandin as the author of the Sarvârtha-siddhi and the other Pūjyapāda Jinendrabuddhi as the author of the Jainendra-vyākaraṇa, there can be some evidence, hypothetically speaking, found in support of two different Samantabhadras. In this case, the crucial point is whether the same Samantabhadra is the author of all the works ascribed to an author bearing this name. It is not entirely impossible that there could in fact be at least two Samantabhadras: the first would be the author of the Ratna-karaṇḍa-śrāvakâcāra, who lived before Pūjyapāda Devanandin, perhaps around 500 CE, and the other the author of the three eulogies: Āpta-mīmāṃsā, Yukty-anuśāsana, Svayambhū-stotra, Stuti-vidyā, who flourished after Pūjyapāda Devanandin and Dharmakīrti, i.e. perhaps around 650. That being the case, the reference in the Jainendra-vyākaraṇa of Pūjyapāda Devanandin would be to Samantabhadra I, i.e. the earlier author of the work on the conduct for lay Jainas (śravakâcāra).
While referring to Samantabhadra, Williams (1963: 19) says: 'Many legends attach to his life but little can be said of it with certainty. He would seem to have been a native of the Tamil land and to have belonged to a kṣatriya family' (quoted also in Shah1999: 33). All these legends are medieval and allow us to associate Samantabhadra both with Tamil˙nāḋu and Karnāṫaka, depending on a particular legend, which developed in different locations long after the historical events. These legends do treat all works such as Āpta-mīmāṃsā, Yukty-anuśāsana, Svayambhūstotra, Stuti-vidyā and Ratna-karaṇḍa-śrāvakâcāra as penned by one and the same author in a very same way as medieval legends ascribe a number or works to one and the same Siddhasena. In this case, the author of the Ratna-karaṇḍa-śrāvakâcāra whom Williams had in mind could not be Samantabhadra II the Epistemologist.
There are some reasons which could be interpreted as attesting to the fact that the Ratna-karaṇḍa-śrāvakâcāra (RKŚ Ā ) was composed by someone else than the epistemologically oriented eulogist of Āpta-mīmāṃsā, Yukty-anuśāsana and Svayambhū-stotra. As Shah (1999: 33) aptly noted, 'His (Samantabhadra's) authorship of Ā ptamīmaṁ sā, Svayambhūstotra and Yuktyanuśāsana is beyond any doubt. They belong to the literary form called stotra (devotional poem). But they are philosophical in substance.' All the three eulogies display, as I tried to demonstrate above, some acquaintance with the system of Dharmakīrti, and they can therefore be treated as one block, whereas the Ratna-karaṇḍa-śrāvakâcāra is the odd one out: I do not find a single idea in it which could in any way relate to Dharmakīrti.
The most conspicuous difference could be the character of the Ratna-karaṇḍaśrāvakâcāra which hardly contains epistemological issues and which has a layout or programme of which the author informs in the very beginning of the work in the first person: 'I will demonstrate the correct moral law, which destroys karman' (RKŚĀ 1 1.2ab: deśayāmi samīcīnaṃ dharmaṃ…). Neither this kind of first-person address nor clearly laid-out plan of a work are present in the three epistemological eulogies. At the same time, the outline of the Ratna-karaṇḍa-śrāvakâcāra is not a rigid and well-structured composition, and it could easily allow for an introduction of various ideas which do not directly concern the rules of the proper code of lay Jainas. Similarly, all the three stutis are rather lose in their character, and certainly are not systematic exposition of philosophical doctrines. They deal with a range of issues which the author considers relevant to the praise the Ford-makers of Jainism, and they could incorporate themes which relate to a proper conduct. In other words, the material in all the four texts ascribed to Samantabhadra is not well systematised and their structures allow for an introduction of additional ideas. A comparison of the two groups of texts-RKŚ Ā and the three stutis/stotras-and the analysis of their contents will not reveal any conspicuous contradictions between these two, which would immediately speak against their common authorship. They all are generally slightly ambiguous, vague, imprecise, informal, unsystematic. However, a juxtaposition of terminology and ideas reflected through the terms in both groups of texts, as in the table of sample terminology below, will be quite revealing. As even a cursory comparison of some technical vocabulary reveals, we can speak of four categories of expressions. (1) The first comprises terminology and ideas which are present in all four texts. These are of most general and religious nature, such as sukha, duḥkha, mokṣa, mokṣa-marga, etc., but also those which may relate to a system of inference (liṅga, liṅgin), which predates even Dignāga.
(2) Some terms occur in all the four texts with a notable change in meaning, e.g. dharma used in the sense of 'moral law' in RKŚ Ā , whereas it (and a related term dharmin) never occurs in it in the sense of 'property' (and 'property-possessor'), whereas 'dharma' is present in this ontological/epistemological sense in all three eulogies. (3) A range of other general terms, which one would expect to find in all the four religious texts, are present only RKŚĀ , such as rāga, dveṣa, darśana, 8, 9, 12, 13, 24, 28, 32, 37, 39, 41, 55, 61, 67, 70, 74, 77, 79, 82, 82, 90, 94, 97, 103, 104, 107, 108, 115 3.4 = 14, 9. samyag-darśana, samyaktva, mithyātva, samyag-jñāna, cāritra, dāna, vrata/mahāvrata, anuvrata, śraddhāna, etc., even though they could fit perfectly well the purpose of an eulogy in praise of a supreme religious teacher. Some of these (e.g. hiṃsā/ahiṃsā) are frequent in RKŚ Ā , whereas their occurrence in the eulogies is rather incidental. (4) A range of other terms and ideas are entirely absent in RKŚĀ , which for instance has no single reference to the syād-vāda (even the name itself!), a doctrine which is of pivotal importance to the author of the three stutis. We find no single occurrence in RKŚ Ā of such crucial terms as naya, syād-vāda/syād-vādin, syāt in the meaning of the sentential functor ('in a certain sense'), ekānta/anekānta in epistemological sense, etc. The word ekānta is used only once in RKŚ Ā , but in an entirely quotidian meaning of 'in a solitary place, alone, aside'. Even such important terms as vikalpa or pramāṇa are not attested in RKŚ Ā . The categories 2, 3 and 4 demonstrate that the authors of the two groups of texts-RKŚ Ā and the three stutis -were interested in a completely different range of topics and ideas, even though all such terms and ideas could easily find their equal place in all the four texts, and the open format of all these texts would allow for their introduction. That being the case, one could further argue, the authors were clearly concerned with entirely different worlds of concepts and spectra of ideas, and each of them was seriously engrossed in a separate world. The way we can terminologically, semantically, eidetically, conceptually group the three eulogies under one heading, their relation to Dharmakīrti aside, we cannot apply the same procedure to RKŚ Ā to any degree. And there is internally and structurally nothing in all the four texts which would exclude the use of some of the technical vocabulary referred to above. Since these do not occur, a possible conclusion could be that we deal here with two different authors, Samantabhadra I as the author of the Ratna-karaṇḍa-śrāvakâcāra, who must have lived before the composition of the Jainendra-vyākaraṇa, and Samantabhadra II, the author of the three stutis: Āpta-mīmāṃsā, Yukty-anuśāsana and Svayambhū-stotra, who was a contemporary of or lived after Dharmakīrti. It should be stressed, however, that such evidence is not compelling, inasmuch as one could maintain that separate topics of such divergent works as the śravakâcāra treatise and the three epistemological eulogies determine a selection of dissimilar vocabulary. As long as we can place all the three authors, i.e. Pūjyapāda Devanandin, Samantabhadra and Dharmakīrti roughly in the sixth century, there is no reason to adopt the hypothesis of two Samantabhadras. If we follow this hypothetical track, we should bear in mind that a reference to 'Samantabhadra' in a textual or epigraphic source does not necessarily have to imply the author of the three epistemological stutis. This can be a reference to one of at least two (or even three) Samantabhadras. No doubt, internal evidence based on a careful reading of the three epistemologically oriented eulogies ascribed to Samantabhadra, i.e. Āpta-mīmāṃsā, Yukty-anuśāsana and Svayambhū-stotra, shows that these were written by one and the same person who must have been acquainted with Dharmakīrti's ideas and who directly criticised some points brought up by the latter against the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekānta-vāda) in his Pramāma-vārttika/-svavr̥ tti 3.181-184. Whether this Samantabhadra is identical with the author of the Ratna-karaṇḍa-śrāvakâcāra, is a different matter. If he is, then the latter is the Samantabhadra I who is mentioned in the grammar Jainendra-vyākaraṇa by Pūjyapāda Devanandin, who also composed the Sarvârtha-siddhi, and should then be assigned to the mid-sixth century.
The author of Stuti-vidyā cannot be the same as Samantabhadra who composed the three epistemological stutis.
In this way, the traditional sequence of Jaina teachers found in Inscriptions No. 105/254 and 108/258 of Ś ravaṅabel˙agol˙a 97 -namely: Umāsvāti, Samantabhadra, Ś ivakoṫi-sūri, Pūjyapāda Devanandin, Bhaṫt˙âkalaṅka, Jinasena-sūri-could be explained as follows. In about six to seven centuries which lapsed since the times of two Samantabhadras, the memory of their distinctness faded, and Samantabhadra I and II merged into one, in the same way as it happened to two Siddhasenas, viz. Siddhasena Mahāmati (c. 710/720-770/780), author of the Nyāyâvatāra, and Siddhasena Divākara (c. 480-540), the author of the Saṃmati-tarka-prakaraṇa, 98 or to a number of Jaina teachers bearing the name Jinasena.
Jaina itinerant mendicants were particularly prone to lose their distinct identities which were predisposed to be blurred and merge into one personage due to their wandering lifestyles. This process was responsible for the merging of different persons bearing the same or similar name into one in the course of Jaina monastic history.

Conclusion
What I have laid out in the preceding Sect. 9.3, is still a distant possibility, which I consider rather unlikely at this stage of research. However, it would become quite plausible if it proves impossible to readjust Dharmakīrti's dating to the sixth century.
The dates for Dharmakīrti proposed by Erich Frauwallner (1961), i.e. between 600-660, rest primarily on the juxtaposition of the travelogues of two Chinese pilgrims who visited Nālandā university where Dharmakīrti is known to have taught. The first of them, Xuanzang (602-664), who visited Nālandā during his travel to India between 629-641, apparently 99 was completely silent on Dharmakīrti, even though he did mention the names of some renowned Buddhist thinkers teaching at Nālandā. On the other hand Yijing (635-713) travelled to Nālandā 97 See Rice (1889: [76][77]82). 98 See Balcerowicz (2009: ix-xlix). 99 This alleged silence is questioned by Kimura (1999: 209 and n. 2). during his trip to India between 673-685 and included Dharmakīrti's name among the prominent teachers of the university. This dating based on the argument of Xuanzang's silence has been questioned before. One of such attempts was made by Lindtner (1980) and(1992) who suggested 530-600 (partly on the basis of the problematic dating of the Madhyamaka-ratna-pradīpa and its attribution to Bhāviveka, etc.), a view challenged by Steinkellner (1991). Also Kimura (1999), mainly on the basis of circumstantial evidence of Chinese sources, attempted to push Dharmakīrti's date back to 550-620. These views were received with caution by e.g. Dunne (Dunne 1999: 1, n. 2), who concluded that 'the dates of Dharmakīrti are far from certain'. Similarly cautious remains Tillemans (2000" xiii-xv). The most recent attempt to reconsider Frauwallner's dating has been undertaken by Krasser (2011Krasser ( )/(2012, who reexamines the relations between Dharmakīrti, Kumārila, Bhāviveka and Sthiramati, and demonstrates that the latter two philosophers, both belonging perhaps to around 500-570, knew of Dharmakīrti. Krasser accordingly pushes Dharmakīrti's activity back to the middle of the sixth century.
Established educational institutions, particularly religious ones, and these primarily aim at preservation of religious heritage rather than at a free exercise of critical reason, are generally not interested in intellectual criticism and novel or most complex philosophical interpretations. It should therefore not be so surprising to find that direct recipients of Dharmakīrti's thought or the next generation were reluctant to promote Dharmakīrti's name to the pantheon of the most illustrious doctors of their university.
Besides, as Dharmakīrti himself expressed in the bitter conclusion of his work, he must have felt he lived in a rather inmical milieu which did not quite accept his novel views: 'My philosophy, the depth of which has not been apprehended even by those whose intellectual power is not small at all, the essence of which is the ultimate truth unfathomable even to those who persevere in their utmost effort [to grasp it], [and] which makes one understand even [things] in the world which equal something ungraspable, will perish with old age in my body just like waters in an ocean.' 100 The fact that the stanza does not occur in the editions of the Pramāṇa-vārttika preserved in the commentaries, but is instead quoted in the Dhvanyâloka (DhĀ 3.41) and clearly attributed by Ā nandavardhana to Dharmakīrti (tathā câyaṁ dharmakīrteḥ śloka iti prasiddhiḥ), may attest to a temporary suppression of Dharmakīrti's thought in the curricula of Nālandā and to the change of the attitude of the Nālandā academics, some of whom, as commentators-once they considered the Pramāṇa-vārttika a valuable work worth commenting-considered the final remark inappropriate and removed it. 100 PV 5 / PV 6 4.286: anadhyavasitâvagāhanam analpa-dhī-śaktinâpy adr ̥ ṣṭa-paramârtha-sāram adhikâbhiyogair api / mataṁ mama jagaty alabdha-sadr ̥ śa-pratigrāhakam prayāsyati payo-nidheḥ paya iva sva-dehe jarām // In addition, it is not the case that the first reaction to or critique of Dharmakīrti's thought came from the pen of Akalaṅka Bhaṫt˙a (c. 720-780). As I indicated elsewhere (Balcerowicz (2009: i-ii), a Jaina philosopher who was directly influenced by Dharmakīrti's system of logic and to whom Akalaṅka was indebted was Siddhasena Mahāmati (circa 710/720-770/780), whose dating is primarily dependent on Dharmakīrti's date, and can also be pushed slightly back. And now we also have evidence that also Samantabhadra reacted to Dharmakīrti. Thus, the argument that if Dharmakīrti had flourished in the sixth century, the absence of any reaction to his philosophy from non-Buddhistic circles for 150 years until Akalaṅka could not be accounted for can easily be dismissed.
In view of that fact that Frauwallner's dating of Dharmakīrti between 600-660 has been questioned recently more than once, in view of the present evidence the most plausible relative chronology seems to be the following one: Samantabhadra, 530-590, Pūjyapāda Devanandin, 540-600, Dharmakīrti, 550-610.
As we can see, Dharmakīrti's ideas are crucial for determining the date of Digambara Samantabhadra and his identity (one or two authors of the same name?). At the same time, any new attempt to date Dharmakīrti should take into account the time of Samantabhadra, the epistemologist-eulogist, as a terminus ante quem.