Classical Sāṁkhya on the Relationship between a Word and Its Meaning

The aim of this article is to reconstruct the classical Sāṁkhya view on the relationship between a word and its meaning. The study embraces all the extant texts of classical Sāṁkhya, but it is based mainly on the Yuktidīpikā, since this commentary contains most of the fragments which are directly related to the topic of our research. The textual analysis has led me to the following conclusion. It is possible to reconstruct two different and conflicting views on the relationship between a word and its meaning from the classical Sāṁkhya texts. The first view, the source of which is the Yuktidīpikā, is that all words are conventional in their origin. It resembles the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of the primary linguistic convention and the conventional origin of all words. The second view, which is the implication of the Sāṁkhya idea of the authorless Vedas we can reconstruct on the basis of the majority of the classical Sāṁkhya commentaries (including the Yuktidīpikā), is that the relationship between a word and its meaning is natural. This view is probably influenced by Mīmāṁsā. Both of these views are hardly compatible with the Sāṁkhya teaching. It seems like classical Sāṁkhya, not having created its own detailed theory, oscillated between different conceptions.

quality (guṇa) of the gross element of ether (ākāśa) (it is a view of the P, the SVṙ, the SSVṙ, the GB, and the MV) or each of the five gross elements, that is, of ether, air, fire, water, and earth (it is a view of the YD, the JM, and the TK) (see classical Sāṁ khya commentaries to kārikās 22, 26, and 38). 6 It is worth noting that Sāṁ khya, like Nyāya-Vaiśeṡika and unlike Mīmāṁ sā, does not draw a distinction between word sounds and non-linguistic sounds. In Mīmāṁ sā language sounds are distinguished from non-linguistic sounds, that is, acoustic tones (nāda; dhvani) through which language sounds and words are manifested; word sounds and words are permanent (eternal), while acoustic tones arise and cease to exist immediately after their emergence. In YD 34 the author uses the word 'dhvani' as a synonym of 'śabda'. 7 Also in a polemic with a Buddhist opponent in which the author of the YD (see YD 10) disagrees with him that sounds and words are momentary (kṣaṇika) in their nature, the author does not make any distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic sounds. 8

The Meaning of 'Meaning' (artha) in Classical Sāṁkhya
What did classical Sāṁ khya authors understand by 'meaning'? Their texts do not provide enough material for the reconstruction of the classical Sāṁ khya theory of meaning. They do not explicate Sāṁ khya comprehension of meaning. In the YD we find some examples of the meanings of words. These examples embrace the main structural principles of Sāṁ khya ontology (tattva) 9 and other things that really exist, perceptible as well as imperceptible (a cook, a cutter, 10 a tree, 11 heaven, 12 etc.). Besides the passages containing these examples, there are also some other contexts in the YD which indicate indirectly that by word meaning the author understands a thing that really exists. 13 Can we conclude on the basis of these passages that by 'meaning' Sāṁ khyas understood the individual? In my opinion, rather not. The texts of other schools of 9 Introduction to the YD (Yuktidīpikā1998, p. 7, vv. 23-26). The YD gives more extensive explanations of most of the kārikās than other classical Sāṁ khya commentaries, therefore in my references to the YD I indicate, besides the number of the kārikā, the page and the verse number of the edition of the YD. 10 Introduction to the YD (Yuktidīpikā1998, p. 7, vv. 19-20). 11 YD 6 (Yuktidīpikā1998, p. 101, v. 6). 12 YD 6 (Yuktidīpikā1998, p. 101, vv. 6-7). 13 See polemics in which the author argues that authoritative verbal testimony cannot be reduced to inference (YD 6;Yuktidīpikā1998, p. 101, v. 16-p. 105, v. 9), as well as polemics where the author defends the view that comparison (upamāna) is not a separate source of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) (YD 4;Yuktidīpikā1998, p. 70, v. 25-p. 72, v. 21).
Word-Meaning Relationship in Sāṁ khya 305 Indian philosophy, for example, the texts of Nyāya, contain fragments in which the authors give as examples of meanings concrete individual things, e.g., gayal (the forest cow) (gavaya), mudgaparṇī and māṣaparṇī (these are plants) (Vātsyāyana's Nyāyabhāṣya and Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārttika I, 1, 6), food, fire, sword (Nyāyabhāṣya II, 1, 53), but from this it does not follow that the authors of these Nyāya texts understand by 'meaning' a concrete individual thing. According to these Nyāya authors, the word means (i.e., denotes, stands for, refers to, designates), first, the concrete individual thing (vyakti), 14 second, the 'form' (ākṛti), and third, the universal (jāti) (see Nyāyasūtras,Nyāyabhāṣya,and Nyāyavārttika II,2,[59][60][61][62][63][64][65][66][67][68][69]. What else can we say about the Sāṁ khya understanding of meaning? It is almost certain that we can exclude the possibility that the authors of classical Sāṁ khya believed the universal to be the meaning of the word. In YD 28 the author rejects the view that the universal (sāmānya) can exist and be perceived as something distinct from the individual thing. 15 The author rejects here the view of Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṡikas, which hold that the universal (sāmānya, jāti) is a separate entity, existing even when the concrete individual which is its seat does not exist. From YD 15 16 it follows that Sāṁ khyas understand the universal as 'a similarity of form'/'a similarity of nature'/'likeness ' (sārūpya). 17 It is difficult not to agree with the scholars that Sāṁ khya metaphysics has no place for universals understood as realities that can exist separately from concrete individual things (Frauwallner 1973, p. 314;Maas 2010, p. 385), that at best Sāṁ khya could accept universals as general notions (Kumar 1983, pp. 136-137, 300), 18 and that Sāṁ khyas "do not appear to have given considerable thought to the problem of universal" (Kumar 1983, p. 300). 19 As for the word 'sāmānya', being a common Indian term denoting the universal, in Sāṁ khya it is an important term applied to prakṛti. In Sāṁ khya in most cases it can be translated with one of the following words: 'common', 'general', 'universal', 'commonness', 'universality', 'generality'. This term is used when prakṛti is characterized, first, as something 'common' to all unliberated puruṣas (that is, as the common object of experience of all unliberated puruṣas, as well as the common cause of all the subtle and gross bodies with which the puruṣas not liberated from saṁsāra are connected), second, as the 'common', or universal cause of everything (of all the things of the visible and invisible world) except puruṣa, third, as 17 The Nyāya and Mīmāṁ sā opponents of Sāṁ khya ascribe the view that the universal is sārūpya to Sāṁ khya philosopher Vindhyavāsin (ca. 300-400 CE). See Chakravarti (1951, p. 143), Kumar (1983, pp. 136, 300), Larson and Bhattacharya (1987, pp. 144-145), Takenaka (1977, pp. 505, 502-501). 18 "At best … Sāṁ khya would sanction it a 'notional existence'" (Kumar 1983, p. 137). 19 See also Harzer Clear: "The theory of universals and particulars was not one that developed within the Sāṅkhya school. At the time of Vindhyavāsin, the Sāṁ khya school incorporated notions which belonged to other schools. … Among these were the notions of universals and particulars" (Harzer Clear 1990, pp. 334-335, note 9). something having 'common' nature with her products (namely, the nature of three guṇas), fourth, as something 'general', or undifferentiated. This term is also applied to some products of primordial creative matter when Sāṁ khya authors want to emphasize their undifferentiated nature (first of all it concerns tanmātras) or the fact of their being the 'common' cause of or having the 'common' nature with other products of prakṛti. In some fragments the term "sāmānya" is used in several of these senses. For the above usages of the word sāmānya see, for example, SK 11 together with the commentaries to this kārikā, as well as YD 15,20 YD 16,21 YD 38. 22,23 All of this indicates that classical Sāṁ khya does not accept the universal as a separate ontological category. 24 Can we suppose that Sāṁ khyas by meaning understood a notion, or the universal possessing only a 'notional existence'? I think it is not very probable, because the so-called 'orthodox' (āstika) darśanas, to which Sāṁ khya belongs, defined the meaning as the universal (sāmānya, jāti, ākṛti), the individual (the particular) (vyakti, dravya), or all of these three things: the universal (jāti, sāmānya), the individual (vyakti), and the 'form' (ākṛti). None of these three things was considered to possess a 'notional existence' only. Mīmāṁ sakas claimed that the meaning of a word is the universal (ākṛti) (see Jaimini's Mīmāṁsāsūtras I, 3, 30-35 together with the Ś abara's commentary Mīmāṁsāsūtrabhāṣya). Ś aṁ kara and most Advaita Vedantins after Ś aṁ kara held, like Mīmāṁ sakas, that the meaning of a word is the universal (ākṛti) (so far as empirical word usage-vyavahāra-is concerned) (see Potter 1981 On the meaning of the term 'sāmānya' when this term is applied to prakṛti and its products see: Malinar (1999, pp. 619-643). 24 I would like to note that my observations on the classical Sāṁ khya view of the universal have a preliminary character, and that this matter requires a separate research. The following fragments of classical and post-classical Sāṁ khya confirm that we should be careful in our conclusions. In TK 27 Vācaspati Miśra, trying to incorporate the Mīmāṁ sā and Nyāya-Vaiśeṡika version of the theory of two stages of perception, that is, indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka) perception, into Sāṁ khya epistemology, uses the word sāmānya in the same sense in which the Sāṁ khya opponents used it. Vācaspati Miśra says that at the first stage the qualifiers (viśeṣaṇa), namely, the universal (sāmānya), etc., and their bearer, qualificand (viśeṣya), are perceived separately, and on the second stage manas establishes the relation between the qualifiers and the qualificand (viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva). It follows from this that the universal is understood as the real that has its own existence and can be perceived as something distinct from the individual. Such an interpretation of the universal is alien to Sāṁ khya; it looks like a mechanical borrowing from other schools, since it is hardly possible to fit it in the Sāṁ khya doctrine. The conception of two stages of perception-nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka-is taken up also by Aniruddha in his Sāṁkhyasūtravṛtti (ca. 1400-1500 CE), the earliest and the most important commentary to the Sāṁkhyasūtras (ca. 1400-1500 CE), the main text of post-classical Sāṁ khya (see Sāṁkhyasūtravṛtti I, 89). (For a detailed analysis of the fragments of the TK and the Sāṁkhyasūtravṛtti in which the authors speak about the two stage perception see my article in the Ukrainian language: Lutsyshyna 2011.) It is worth noting that the post-classical Sāṁ khya texts Sāṁkhyasūtras and Sāṁkhyasūtravṛtti contain a passage where the authors present their view on the universals (V, 91-92). The passage is difficult to interpret. It seems that for the Sūtrakāra and Aniruddha the universals (sāmānya) are something more than general notions: they make an intriguing statement that the universals, though they are not eternal, possess 'stability' (sthiratā).
How did philosophers of the sister Yoga darśana explain the meaning of 'meaning' (artha)? In the Yoga texts I dealt with (the Yogasūtras, the Yogasūtrabhāṣya, Vācaspati Miśra's Tattvavaiśāradī, and the Rājamārtaṇḍa by Bhoja Rāja) I have found only one small fragment where the author says what he means by 'meaning': commenting upon Yogasūtras III, 17, in the Rājamārtaṇḍa (ca. 1150 CE) Bhoja Rāja explains artha as jāti-guṇa-kriyā-ādi ('the universal, the quality, action, etc.'). It follows from this that according to Bhoja Rāja the word means both the universal and the particular. This small fragment is not enough for making any definite conclusions about the Yoga theory of meaning.
The Yogasūtras speak about the erroneous identification of śabda ('word'), artha ('meaning'), and pratyaya ('notion', 'idea'), which should be distinguished from one another (III, 17). As an example of 'meaning' (artha) the commentators give a real empirical cow, possessing a dewlap and other necessary attributes of a cow (see the Yogasūtrabhāṣya, the Tattvavaiśāradī and the Rājamārtaṇḍa on Yogasūtras III,17). In all the four Yoga texts mentioned a meaning of a word is clearly distinguished from a notion produced by a word in our mind. Bhoja Rāja explains pratyaya as "knowledge, that is, the modification of the intellect in the form of the object" (jñānaṁ viṣaya-ākārā buddhi-vṛttiḥ) (Rājamārtaṇḍa III, 17). The above distinction between the word meaning and the mental idea evoked by the word implies that the Yoga philosophers did not identify a meaning as a notion.
Thus we can say, generally, that according to philosophers representing Brahmanical darśanas, including philosophers of Yoga, a sister darśana of Sāṁ khya, the meaning of a word, be it the universal, the 'form', or the particular, is a thing of the external world, 26 but not a notion or something that exists only in our thought. I think we can sum up that the theories of meaning of Brahmanical philosophies of language are referential. 27 I do not claim that the philosophers in all 25 The sūtras of Vaiśeṡikas seem to be silent about the meanings of words (see Vaiśeṣikasūtras VII, 2, 14-20). 26 For Advaita it is the world which is real from the lower, relative standpoint. 27 I do not agree with the following generalization made by Raja (1969, p. 25) concerning the Indian philosophy of language: "The Indian conception of the relation between śabda and artha (word and sense) is quite analogous to de Saussure's definition of a linguistic sign as a relation between the signifiant and the signifié. … Here it must be noted that both the signifiant and the signifié are psychical entities … . the contexts by 'meaning' (artha) understand a referent, that is, the thing to which the word refers in the existent world; I claim that in the cases when the philosophers express their view on the word meaning directly they identify the meaning with the referent. I assume that in some contexts, speaking about 'meaning' (artha), they speak about sense. There is no doubt that the philosophers distinguished between an existent thing to which the word refers and the notion produced in our mind by this word. This mental image evoked by a word was very often called jñāna, which is usually translated as 'knowledge', though jñāna embraced not only valid knowledge, but also erroneous knowledge, doubtful knowledge, and some other mental states. I think that here, in this distinction between the knowledge or notion produced by the word and the thing for which the word stands in the existing world, lies the root of the sense-reference distinction in Indian philosophy, rightly pointed out by some scholars inquiring into the philosophy of language of Indian philosophers: see, for example, the publications of Siderits (1986Siderits ( , 1991, Taber (1989Taber ( , 2002, Ganeri (1996), Houben (1995. However, we should remember that, unlike certain Western philosophers, Indian philosophers never claimed that the word meaning had two distinct elements; the sense-reference distinction did not have the status of theory-it was only implicitly present in the Indian philosophy of language.
Taking into account all the above, we can suppose that for Sāṁ khya the meaning is a thing that really exists. It is barely possible that Sāṁ khya understood the meaning as a notion or something that exists only in our thought, though we cannot entirely exclude this possibility. We can also suppose that Sāṁ khya understood the meaning as the particular, not as the universal. 28 The classical Sāṁ khya texts on which this research is based do not contain material sufficient for drawing any definite conclusions about the Sāṁ khya understanding of meaning.
Footnote 27 continued … A fundamental identity of opinion is often concealed by divergent and overlapping terminologies. Thus the artha or sense appears as signifié in de Saussure, thought or reference in Ogden-Richards, mental content in Stern, sense in Gombocz, idea in Roudet, concept in Weisberger and meaning in Gardiner." I agree with the careful observation of Siderits (1991, p. 65): "It is generally accepted that Indian philosophers of language do not posit sense as a component of the meaning of an expression in addition to its reference. … We find instead a more or less pure reference theory of meaning: the meaning of an expression is that entity which the expression designates. … I shall nonetheless argue that, predominant though the reference theory might be in their tradition, certain Indian philosophers of language were still forced to recognize something akin to sense as a distinct element in meaning. That the sense-reference distinction was never extensively made use of by Indian philosophers of language is clear; I shall not be concerned to dispute this … ." 28 The following evidence concerning the Sāṁ khya view before Īśvarakṙṡṅa's SK can support our hypothesis: "According to Kumārila in his Ślokavārttika and his commentator, Umbeka (ākṛtivāda, 76 and 65), Vindhyavāsin accepted Vārṡagaṅya's interpretation of vyaktivāda, or the notion of particularity (in contrast to ākṛti or 'genus' or 'class') with respect to the meaning of words …" (Larson and Bhattacharya 1987, pp. 144-145). However, views of classical Sāṁ khya can differ from views of these Sāṁ khya philosophers.

Word-Meaning Relationship in Sāṁ khya 309
Classical Sāṁkhya Texts about the Relationship between a Word and Its Meaning

Evidence for Sāṁ khya's Accepting the Conventional Origin of the Relationship between a Word and Its Meaning
Evidence 1 This view can be reconstructed on the basis of two fragments of the YD (which contain evidence 1 and evidence 2).
In the Introduction to the YD we find the following fragment: A name (saṁjñā) is a word used for revealing (pratyāyana)  As it follows from the YD (see YD 4), the seer's cognition of Kapila is a supernatural cognition which has the nature of direct insight. This cognition is beyond the pramāṇas, that is, it is not obtained through the sources of valid knowledge (it is called apramāṇa-pūrva, which literally means 'not preceded by a pramāṇa'). The seer's cognition of Kapila is inborn and does not require any means (sādhana) for its arising (Yuktidīpikā1998, p. 67, v. 20-p. 68, v. 2;p. 68, vv. 10-13;p. 75, vv. 19-24). 30 saṁjñipratyāyanārthaḥ śabdaḥ samjñā / sā ca dvividhā / arthanibandhanā svarūpanibandhanā ca / tatrārthanibandhanārthavaśenārthakriyāpekṣā / jātyādyarthasvarūpāntarbhāvī yathārthas tathābhūtam This fragment is a part of the larger passage in which the author presents characteristics of a genuine tantra, arguing that the SK composed by Īśvarakṙṡṅa possesses all of them. The author says that one of the components of a tantra is 'name' (saṁjñā). 31 The author describes two types of names, arguing that Īśvarakṙṡṅa's treatise SK, which is a genuine tantra, is based on the proper (that is, meaningful) names/special terms (saṁjñā). It follows from this fragment that the Sāṁ khya doctrine presented in the works of different Sāṁ khya teachers, to which Īśvarakṙṡṅa, the author of the SK, belongs, is based only on those special terms which were given originally by Kapila (who is according to Sāṁ khya tradition the founder of Sāṁ khya), for the author says that the later teachers being the followers of Kapila's doctrine do not produce any new special terms of the Sāṁ khya system. The author says that there are two categories of names (saṁjñā): 'based on the [etymological] meaning' (or 'based on the meanings [of the meaningful parts of which the word consists]') (artha-nibandhana) and 'based [merely] on the own form [of the word]' (svarūpa-nibandhana). The first category includes names with such an etymological meaning that reveals the specific features of the thing named. The author of the YD gives the following examples: 'pācaka' ('a cook'), 'lāvaka' ('a cutter'); pradhāna is called so because "[all her] products are primarily placed in her" (pradhīyante 'tra vikārāḥ); puruṣa is called so because he "rests in the body" (puri śete). 32,33 The second category embraces names with such an etymological meaning which says nothing about the nature of the thing. The examples given by the author are 'gaja-karṇa', literally meaning 'an elephant ear', and 'aśva-karṇa', literally meaning 'a horse ear', being the botanical names of the plants or the proper names.
The author says that Kapila's original teaching is based on artha-nibandhana names only, and that the supreme seer (ṛṣi) Kapila "bestowed" (vidadhat) them "with great care" (prayatnataḥ), after "having grasped the own nature (svarūpa) of all the principles (tattva) through the seer's cognition (ārṣeṇa jñānena)". It is clear that all names given by Kapila (these are the names of the tattvas and probably also other terms of the Sāṁ khya system) are based on his direct insight into the essence of things denoted by them. Kapila's cognition of the nature of all the Sāṁ khya tattvas (the main structural principles of Sāṁ khya ontology) should be interpreted as Footnote 30 continued eva saṁjñinaṁ pratyāyayati / tad yathā pācako lāvakaḥ iti / svarūpanibandhanā punaḥ saṁjñipratyāyanopāyamātraṁ svarūpamātropakāriṇī vināvayavārthaṁ samayavaśād atathābhūtam api saṁjñinaṁ pratyāyayati / tad yathā gajakarṇo 'śvakarṇa iti / prayatnato bhagavataḥ paramarṣer ārṣeṇa jñānena sarvatattvānāṁ svarūpam upalabhya saṁjñāṁ vidadhato nāsti svarūpanibandhanaḥ śabdaḥ / tad yathā pradhīyante 'tra vikāra iti pradhānam / puri śete iti puruṣa ity ādi / tanmatānusāriṇām apy ācāryāṇāṁ tābhir eva saṁvyavahārān nāsty apūrvasaṁjñāvidhānaṁ praty ādaraḥ / (Yuktidīpikā1998, p. 7, vv. 16-27.) 31 About these components, one of which is the terminological name/the special term, see entries Tantraguṇaḥ, Tantrayuktiḥ (Oberhammer et al. 1996, pp. 109-112), and Saṁjñā (Oberhammer et al. 2006, pp. 219-223). 32 Literally: 'rests (√śī) in the fortress (pur)'. 33 The author gives the popular traditional etymologies of 'pradhāna' and 'puruṣa'. These etymologies are not correct from the point of view of scientific linguistics. They express certain religious or philosophic beliefs. What can we say about the relationship between a word and its meaning on the basis of this fragment? I think we can conclude that all words are conventional in their origin, because Kapila's creating the Sāṁ khya terms should be understood as establishing the primary linguistic convention. First I shall try to prove that Kapila's act in regard to the special terms of the Sāṁ khya system is an act of creation of these terms, that is, an act of establishing the linguistic convention. Next I shall attempt to prove that the convention established by Kapila is a primary linguistic convention.
What are the arguments confirming that Kapila does not manifest already existing names but creates them? The action of Kapila in regard to the names is denoted by the word 'vidadhat' (literally: 'distributing'; 'granting', 'bestowing'; 'producing', 'creating'), being a derivative (a present active participle) of the verb 'vi-√dhā'. The verb 'vi-√dhā' has a wide range of meanings. To this range the following meanings belong: 'to distribute'; 'to grant', 'to bestow'; 'to produce', 'to create'. Does Kapila disclose already existing names or create them? Answering this question is of great importance for clarifying the author's view on the relationship between a word and its meaning. If we accept that Kapila creates the names, we can say that Kapila is the author of the linguistic convention. If we assume that Kapila only discloses already existing names to the future users of language, we can say that the connection between these names and their meanings is natural, namely, exists independently of the will of Kapila or any other person. Below I present the arguments for interpreting Kapila's act as an act of creation of names. I shall attempt to prove that the artha-nibandhana names bestowed by Kapila are conventional in their origin; the relationship between these words and their meanings, though not random, is nevertheless not inborn, not eternal, and not inseparable.
First, in the same fragment, in a similar and close context, there is another derivative of the verb 'vi-√dhā', that is, 'vidhāna', which means in this context 'creation'. It denotes the action of the 'teachers' (ācārya) in regard to Sāṁ khya terms, and it is clear from the context that the author of the YD speaks here about the possibility of creation of new terms by Sāṁ khya teachers. This appearance of 'vidhāna' in the same context in the meaning of 'creation' can be considered an argument for interpreting the action of Kapila as creation of names.
Second, there is no meaning which conveys the idea of manifesting, disclosing, or revealing among the main dictionary meanings of the verb vi-√dhā. If the author intended to convey the idea of manifesting by Kapila already existing names, he would probably use some other expression. If we take the first dictionary meaning 'to distribute' as the meaning intended by the author of the YD, we cannot make a conclusion that the relation between the words bestowed by Kapila and their meanings is natural. The idea of 'distribution' of names seems to be incompatible with the idea of the natural relationship between these names and their meanings, for names which are naturally and inseparably connected to their meanings need no 'distribution'.
Third, the author says that Kapila creates (vi-√dhā) the names 'with great care' ('with special effort', 'carefully') (prayatnataḥ). Special effort, care, or carefulness is more needed in the case of creation of names than in the case of merely making them manifest.
Fourth, the author does not say a word about Kapila's knowledge of already existing names. It does not follow from Kapila's cognition of all things that he also cognizes names existing independently of his will, for in Indian philosophy a person (or persons) possessing knowledge of things can play the role of the creator (or the creators) of words naming these things. For example, in Nyāya-Vaiśeṡika cognition of things is the basis of creation of their names. As it follows from Vaiśeṣikasūtras II, 1, 17-19, names (saṁjñā) of things imperceptible by ordinary people are created by persons "distinguished from ourselves" (asmad-viśiṣṭānām) on the basis of their perception of these things. In the later texts of Nyāya-Vaiśeṡika all-knowing Īśvara creates names, being the author of the primary linguistic convention (see, for example: Candrānanda's Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti II, 1, 18-19; Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhat˙ṫa (Potter et al. 1977, pp. 371, 377-378; Vācaspati Miśra's Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā II, 1, 52-56; Ś aṅkara Miśra's Upaskāra VII, 2, 20 and II, 1, 18-19). It does not follow from Īśvara's omniscience that he manifests names which exist independently of his will.
Fifth, this fragment brings to mind some parallels between the role of allknowing Kapila, who is characterized in the YD (see YD 1 and 69) as "born at the beginning of the world" (viśva-agra-ja), 34 and the role of omniscient Īśvara in Nyāya-Vaiśeṡika, who creates names at the beginning of a new cycle of existence of the world. Kapila is the knower of all things; he creates the names on the basis of direct insight into the own nature (svarūpa) of the things he names. This knowledge is necessary for giving correct, that is, meaningful names-the names which convey information about the specific features of the things named. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṡika omniscient Īśvara is the author of the primary linguistic convention which is established (re-created) by him according to his will at the beginning of a new cycle of existence of the world. In fact, the Vedas and the language convention established by Īśvara are the same in all the creations. The following fragment from Nyāyamañjarī of Nyāya philosopher Jayanta Bhaṫṫa, cited by Pollock (1985, p. 516), illustrates the Nyāya idea of the persistence of the Vedas: "All sciences have existed, precisely like the vedas, from the first creation. People, however, ascribe them to one or another human author who has sought to abbreviate or expand them." Though the Vedas and the primary language convention are the same in all the creations (in this sense we can say that they are persistent), they are dependent on the will of Īśvara, who is identified by the adherers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṡika as their author, and for this reason the relationship between a word and its meaning established by Īśvara is considered as conventional.
Taking into account these arguments, I am inclined to think that the author of the YD implies that the Sāṁ khya terms bestowed by Kapila are conventional in their origin. The interpretation of Kapila's action (denoted by the derivative of the verb vi-√dhā) in regard to these terms as creation of them seems to be more natural and substantiated than any other interpretation. Though the names bestowed by Kapila are not accidental (for they convey information about the specific features of the things named), they are created by him (in accordance with his knowledge of these things) and therefore conventional in their origin. 35 It is clear from this fragment that Kapila creates core terms of the Sāṁ khya system: Kapila creates names for the tattvas and probably also other special terms of the Sāṁ khya doctrine. For the Sāṁ khyas their own system is the highest science: one can attain the highest goal-mokṣa-only through this science (see SK 2, 69, and 70 together with the commentaries to these kārikās). They ascribe to their own system the status of the Veda or even higher (see P 69 and SVṙ, SSVṙ, JM, and MV 70). In YD 2 the author says that the highest goal prescribed in Sāṁ khya is the same as the highest goal prescribed in śruti, and that the Sāṁ khya path of liberation through knowledge (jñāna) is considered in śruti the sole path which leads to the permanent and complete elimination of all kinds of suffering (duḥkha). The author claims that Sāṁ khya is the Vedic doctrine, for the highest goal prescribed in Sāṁ khya, as well as the Sāṁ khya path of realization of this goal, are the same as the highest goal and the path of its realization prescribed in the Upaniṡads, which are the quintessence of the Vedas. 36 From all this we can conclude that according to the Sāṁ khyas the special terms of the Sāṁ khya system are the same as the special terms of the Vedas, that is, of the Vedic science of liberation through knowledge which is considered by the Sāṁ khyas the highest science of the Vedas. Thus Kapila appears at the beginning of the world cycle (as it is mentioned above, he is characterized in the YD as "born at the beginning of the world") and creates the basic Sāṁkhya-Vedic terms. The Vedas are often believed to appear at the very beginning of each creation. If the basic Sāṁ khya-Vedic terms are conventional in their origin, this convention cannot be other convention than the primary linguistic convention. As it has been mentioned above, the role of Kapila is similar to the role of omniscient Īśvara in Nyāya-Vaiśeṡika, which creates names (establishes the primary linguistic convention) and the Vedas at the beginning of a new cycle of existence of the world. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṡika the words of the Vedas are the words created by Īśvara, that is, the words of the primary linguistic convention.
To sum it up, the convention of Kapila, who creates the special terms of the Sāṁ khya system, is the primary linguistic convention. If the primary linguistic convention takes place, then all words are conventional in their origin. 35 Artha-nibandhana words, though conventional in their origin, are not random. It may turn out to be fruitful to compare this idea of convention which is based on the nature of a thing and is therefore not random with Plato's idea of the relationship between a word and its meaning. Perelmuter (1980) in his profound and careful research devoted to Plato's linguistic views writes that in the dialogue Cratylus Plato holds the view that the relationship between a word and its meaning (that is, the thing denoted by it), though established by convention, is not merely conventional (random), for it is based on the nature of the thing. 36 Yuktidīpikā1998, p. 50, v. 12-p. 54, v. 16.

Evidence 2
The second evidence for Sāṁ khya's acceptance of the conventional origin of the relationship between a word and its meaning we find in YD 6. It is in the passage devoted to polemics in which the author argues that authoritative verbal testimony (āpta-vacana; śabda; āgama) is irreducible to inference (anumāna). 37 Refuting an opponent's view that authoritative verbal testimony is a kind of inference, the author tries to show that the relation between a word and its meaning, unlike the relation between a logical sign (liṅga) and the thing to be proved by it (sādhya; liṅgin) in an inference, is not inseparable and natural. The author says that the same word can be connected with different meanings, that is, denote different things, and the same thing can be denoted by different words. He holds that the same word in different places (regions) and different times can have different meanings, and the same meaning can be conveyed by different words. Moreover, the author adds, the word's use in one or another meaning depends on the intention (iṣṭa; abhiprāya; apekṣā) of the speaker. The author gives concrete examples to support his point of view. The author contrasts the relationship between a word and its meaning with the inseparable relationship between a logical sign and the thing to be proved by it in an inference. He notices that smoke cannot be separated from fire, which essentially distinguishes the relationship between smoke and fire from the relationship between a word and its meaning. Contrasting the logical sign with the word, the author says that "the logical sign is natural" (svābhāvikaṁ liṅgam), 38 that is, it is by its nature and inseparably connected to the thing to be proved by it (sādhya); by saying this, the author implies that the relationship between a word and its meaning, unlike the relationship between a logical sign and the thing to be proved by it, is not natural and inseparable. The author notices that a word is capable of denoting every thing, and this universal denotative power of a word is limited by man (puruṣa). He ends the fragment which interests us with the following words: It is not so that just as one word (śabda) uttered in the world, depending on [its] usage by man (puruṣa-viniyoga-apekṣa), is capable of denoting every thing, in the same manner one logical sign (liṅga) is capable of making known every thing through some reasoning. Therefore [authoritative] word (śabda) is not a logical sign. 39 Evidence Which Does not Agree with the Theory of the Conventional Relationship between a Word and Its Meaning and Imply That This Relationship Is Natural Classical Sāṁ khya texts provide the evidence which seems to contradict the theory of the conventional origin of the relationship between a word and its meaning, implying that this relationship is natural. This evidence is the idea of the authorless 37 Yuktidīpikā1998, p. 101, v. 12-p. 103, v. 7. 38 Yuktidīpikā1998, p. 102, v. 7. 39 yathā caikaḥ śabdo jagaty evam uditaḥ puruṣaviniyogāpekṣaḥ sarvam artham abhidhātuṁ samartho ˂na˃ tathaikaṁ liṅgaṁ kayācid yuktyā sarvārthapratyayanasamartham / tasmān na śabdo liṅgam / (Yuktidīpikā1998, p. 103, vv. 4-7.) Vedas we find in most of the classical Sāṁ khya texts. The author of the YD and Vācaspati Miśra in the TK state directly that the Vedas have no author (YD 5 40 ; TK 2 and 5). Four other classical Sāṁ khya commentators, though they do not formulate their view explicitly, suggest that the Vedas are authorless (see SVṙ 5, SSVṙ 5, GB 5, MV 5). A detailed analysis of these classical Sāṁ khya fragments, containing the idea of the authorless Vedas, is presented in my article "Classical Sāṁ khya on the Authorship of the Vedas", published in the "Journal of Indian Philosophy" (Lutsyshyna 2012).
If the Vedas are authorless, that is, not created by some author, human or divine, the following question arises: how do they come into existence? There were philosophers, for example, Ś aṅkara and adherers of his Advaita, Bhartṙhari the Grammarian and his followers, who accepted the concept of a periodic remanifestation of the authorless Vedas. This concept was probably shared also by Sāṁ khyas: they held that the Vedas arise from prakṛti spontaneously at the beginning of a new cycle of existence of the world. It is worth noticing that according to the Sāṁkhyasūtras and Aniruddha's commentary to it called the Sāṁkhyasūtravṛtti, which are important post-classical Sāṁ khya texts, the authorless, but uneternal Vedas evolve from prakṛti spontaneously (see Sāṁkhyasūtras and Sāṁkhyasūtravṛtti V,[46][47][48][49][50]. The idea of the authorless Vedas, reemerging from prakṛti at the beginning of a new creation, seems to be incompatible with the theory of a primary linguistic convention as a source of language. This idea implies that the relationship between a word and its meaning is natural and stable: language sounds and words from which the Vedas consist are the products of a natural development of prakṛti (ungoverned by any consciousness); they reappear from prakṛti at the beginning of each new creation and preserve stability till the next periodic dissolution (pralaya) of the world.
If Sāṁ khya in some passages of its texts tended to accept this view, it was probably influenced by Mīmāṁ sā which held that word sounds, words, and the Vedas are eternal, that is, have neither beginning nor an end. In the context of Sāṁ khya, which accepts, unlike Mīmāṁ sā, the concept of periodic dissolutions of the world, this stability of language sound, word, and the Vedas can be understood not as eternal actual existence but as duration from the beginning of creation to the pralaya and reappearance from prakṛti (where they subsists in a potential state during the pralaya) at the beginning of a new cycle of existence of the world.
Is such a view compatible with the Sāṁ khya teaching? This view, influenced by the Mīmāṁ sā conception of language sound and word, seems to be incompatible with the Sāṁ khya doctrine. In Mīmāṁ sā each language sound and word, though it is not always manifested (a speaker is needed to manifest it, namely, to make it perceptible), is always existent as a separate entity and never loses its identity; words preserve their identity and connection with their meanings also before and after their manifestation by the speaker. According to Sāṁ khya, an unmanifested state of every thing originated from prakṛti, including sounds and words, is a state of its dissolution into its material cause, that is, a state of its essential unity with its material cause and non-distinction from it. 41 What is the immediate material cause of language sounds and words? It is hardly possible to give a clear, unambiguous answer to this question on the basis of the classical Sāṁ khya texts. On one side, according to the YD, the phoneme (varṇa) and the word (pada) are modifications (vikāra) 42 or manifestations (abhivyakti) 43 of sound (śabda) which is a quality of the gross element(s), and it follows from this that the unmanifested state of different language sounds and words is a state of their non-distinction from the gross element.
On the other side, there are reasons for interpreting the unmanifested state of sounds and words as a state of their latent (potential) existence in the tanmātra of sound (śabda-tanmātra) or each of the five tanmātras 44 (and not in the gross element). As it follows from the passage of YD 38 in which the author comments on the third line of SK 38 where the bhūtas are characterized as viśeṣa ('differentiated'), the qualities of the bhūtas are 'differentiated', that is, we can distinguish many different sounds, touches, colours, tastes, and smells within the bhūtas. 45 If different sounds exist in the gross elements in the manifest state, then the unmanifest state of these sounds should be interpreted as a state of their potential existence in the tanmātra(s), for the tanmātras are immediate material causes of the bhūtas. Moreover, in YD 38 the author suggests that those products of prakṛti which are modifications of the gross elements (like cow, etc.) arise due to the joining together of several different gross elements. 46 But language sounds and words are not combinations of several gross elements (like a cow, a pot, or a tree), for sound is only a quality of the gross element(s). It can follow from this that language sounds and words are not modifications of the gross element (they are the gross element itself), but modifications of the tanmātra.
The state of potential existence of sounds or words in the tanmātra is a state of their unity with it, that is, a state of their dissolution in the tanmātra. In the state of 41 See the classical Sāṁ khya commentaries to kārikā 15 of Īśvarakṙṡṅa's SK, namely, the fragment of these commentaries in which the Sāṁ khya authors comment on the fifth (the last) SK argument for avyakta's ('the unmanifest', by which the unevolved prakṛti is meant) being the ultimate material cause. It follows from the commentaries that things originated from prakṛti in a state of their dissolution into their material cause are not distinct from this cause, that is, do not exist as separate entities. Thus all the gross material things which consist of the five gross elements (bhūta, mahābhūta) in the state of unity with their immediate material cause are not different from the gross elements, the five gross elements in this state are not different from tanmātras, etc. In most of the commentaries it is said that different entities in the state of their dissolution into their immediate material cause are indistinguishably (avibhāgaṁ) united with it (see P, SVṙ, SSVṙ, GB, and MV 15). 42 See YD 34 (Yuktidīpikā1998, p. 218, vv. 9-10). 43 See YD 29 (Yuktidīpikā1998, p. 207, vv. 29-31). 44 The author of the YD states forth quite original conception of the tanmātras, which is untypical for Sāṁ khya, for we do not find this conception in other classical Sāṁ khya commentaries. According to the YD, not only the gross elements which arise from the tanmātras but also the tanmātras themselves possess qualities (guṇa), and sound is a quality of each of the five tanmātras (not only of the śabdatanmātra) (Yuktidīpikā1998, p. 225, vv. 15-19). This untypical understanding of the tanmātras is highlighted by Bronkhorst (1999 dissolution in the tanmātra sounds and words lose their peculiarities and mutual distinctions. It is said in the YD that the śabda-tanmātra is an undifferentiated principle of sound, that is, there are no specific sounds within it (it is not an aggregate of specific, distinct sounds or words). Sāṁ khya calls the tanmātras 'undifferentiated' (aviśeṣa) principles (see SK 34 and 38 together with the commentaries to these kārikās). An important piece of evidence confirming that there are no different sounds within the śabda-tanmātra is given in the YD, in its commentary on the 38 th kārikā of the SK. Explaining the first line of the 38th kārikā where the tanmātras are characterized as aviśeṣa, the author states that "there is no differentiation (viśeṣa) within the same kind" (tulya-jātīya-viśeṣa-anupapatti) in the case of the tanmātras. As to the śabda-tanmātra, the author says that specific sounds (sounds possessing any distinctive features) do not exist within it. 47 Taking into account these aspects of the Sāṁ khya teaching, we can conclude that it is hardly possible to agree the Mīmāṁ sā conception of language sound, word, and the Vedas with the Sāṁ khya doctrine. 47 The YD commentary on the first line of SK 38, which sounds tanmātrāṇy aviśeṣāḥ ("the tanmātras are undifferentiated"), is translated and analyzed by Bronkhorst (1999, p. 25). My rendering of the first line of SK 38 and of some terms differs from the rendering of Bronkhorst, but there is no need to accentuate these differences here. I shall cite his careful translation of this important fragment together with a part of his commentary: "Sāṁ khya Kārikā 38 begins with the words tanmātrāṇy aviśeṣaḥ "The 'ones without specific features' (aviśeṣa) are the tanmātras". The Yuktidīpikā comments: Those indeed are the ones without specific features. Which are the tanmātras? They are śabdatanmātra, sparśatanmātra, rūpatanmātra, rasatanmātra, and gandhatanmātra. Why are they [called] tanmātras? Because specific features of the same kind are not possible [in them]. When there is no difference of kind, e.g. sound, no other specific features-such as the accents called udātta, anudātta, svarita, or the being nasal-are found in it, and that is why it is [called] śabdatanmātra (approx. 'sound and nothing but that'). In the same way [there are no specific features] such as 'soft', 'hard' etc. in the tanmātra of touch; [no specific features] such as 'white', 'black' etc. in the tanmātra of colour; [no specific features] such as 'sweet', 'sour' etc. in the tanmātra of taste; [and no specific features] such as 'fragrant' etc. in the tanmātra of smell. For this reason only the general feature of each quality is present in the [tanmātras], no specific feature; and this is why those 'ones without specific features' are the tanmātras.
We are primarily interested in the śabdatanmātra. It is here presented as sound without the specific features that may accompany sound. It is, moreover, different from the quality sound. The quality sound, we may assume, possesses all the specific features which the śabdatanmātra is here stated not to possess" (Bronkhorst 1999, p. 25

Conclusion and Perspectives for Future Research
It is possible to reconstruct two different and conflicting views on the relationship between a word and its meaning on the basis of the classical Sāṁ khya texts. The first view, which we can find in the YD, is that all words are conventional in their origin. According to the YD, Kapila, who is identified by the Sāṁ khya tradition as its founder, is the author of the primary linguistic convention. The second view is that the relationship between a word and its meaning is natural. It is the implication of the Sāṁ khya idea of the authorless Vedas which can be reconstructed on the basis of the majority of the classical Sāṁ khya texts (the YD and five other commentaries: the SVṙ, the SSVṙ, the GB, the MV, and the TK). This idea of the authorless Vedas, evolving from prakṛti at the beginning of a new creation, implies that the relationship between a word and its meaning is natural and stable: it follows from this idea that language sounds and words from which the Vedas consist are the products of a natural development of prakṛti (ungoverned by any consciousness), reappearing from prakṛti at the beginning of each new creation and preserving stability till the next periodic dissolution (pralaya) of the world. Which of these views is really Sāṁ khya's, and which of these views is more compatible with the Sāṁ khya doctrine? It is difficult or maybe even impossible to answer these questions. The first of these views resembles the Nyāya-Vaiśeṡika theory of the primary linguistic convention and the conventional origin of all words. It seems not to agree with the Sāṁ khya idea that all things which evolve from prakṛti (including words) are the products of its spontaneous development, not governed by any consciousness (see SK 57 and the commentaries to this kārikā). 48 The second Sāṁ khya view on word and the relationship between a word and its meaning is probably influenced by Mīmāṁ sā. 49 This view is incompatible with the Sāṁ khya doctrine, for in this doctrine there is hardly any place for word or sound preserving its identity (its nature of being this very word or sound, distinct from other words and sounds) in the unmanifested state. It seems like classical Sāṁ khya, not having developed its own detailed theories of sound, word, and the relationship between a word and its meaning, oscillated between different views. 50 Answering 48 Our ordinary observations, indicating that such things as books, pots, etc., come into existence due to the conscious efforts of some author, contradict this Sāṁ khya idea. 49 About the Mīmāṁ sā influence on the fragments of the YD and the TK in which the authors of these commentaries state that the Vedas have no author see my article (Lutsyshyna 2012, pp. 461-463, 465). 50 I shall venture to say that the sister Yoga darśana also did not develop a consistent and detailed view on the relationship between a word and its meaning, oscillating between different theories. According to the Yogasūtrabhāṣya (see I, 27), the relationship between a word and its meaning (śabda-arthasaṁbandha) is permanent (sthita), and convention (saṁketa) is understood in this text not as an act of agreement being an act of creation of the relation between a word and its meaning unrelated before this act, but as an established usage of words (established custom of usage of words). It is said that the relation between a word and its meaning is not created by convention but only made known through it. This understanding of a language convention is similar to its understanding by Bhartṙhari the Grammarian and his followers (about Bhartṙhari's and Helārāja's notion of language convention see the article of Houben 1992). In the Yogasūtrabhāṣya the relation between a word and its meaning is compared to the relation between a father and his son; the author implies that this relationship is natural. It is said that the language convention is the same in all the creations (sarga). In the context of Yoga teaching, like in the context of Sāṁ khya, this permanent relationship should be understood as existing from pralaya to pralaya and the questions formulated above could be an area for future research. This research should include a careful examination of pre-Īśvarakṙṡṅa Sāṁ khya material, postclassical Sāṁ khya texts, texts of the sister Yoga darśana, as well as evidence presented in the texts which do not belong to the Sāṁ khya or Yoga darśana.