Editorial

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This issue of *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* contains a refereed selection of papers that were selected for presentation at the 2017 annual meeting of the British Society for Ethical Theory (<https://www.bset.org.uk>), hosted by the University of Bristol. The Society takes a quite ecumenical attitude to ‘ethics’, welcoming submissions from the most meta-(ethical) to the most applied-(ethical), and that diversity is reflected in the essays published here.

Eva Buddeberg and Achim Hecker, in their contribution, aim to move us past the impasse around the question of corporate responsibility, the question whether collective agents can and should be held responsible in something similar to the way that individuals are. They argue that contributors to this debate have erred in ignoring the discursive nature of individual responsibility—i.e. that holding a person responsible involves prompting her to justify her actions. As regards corporations, Buddeberg and Hecker argue that they act for reasons and can articulate those reasons and that they have a duty to give an account of their actions insofar as they affect people. The authors go on to outline what measures corporations would have to take in order to discharge this duty.

Mona Simion, in her contribution, aims to identify the norm of moral assertion. She takes it that the true norm governing any assertion is such that following it is a reliable way of producing beliefs that satisfy the norm on belief. So if the norm on belief is knowledge, then the norm on assertion is *X*, where *X* is the minimum condition an assertion would have to meet in order to produce knowledge. Simion goes on to point out that most commentators on moral testimony agree that the norm on moral belief is understanding. This raises the question: What condition would a moral assertion have to meet in order to produce understanding? Simion maintains that it would have to be accompanied by an explanation as to its truth. Hence the norm on moral assertion is the explanation-proffering norm.

Jussi Suikkanen, in his contribution, sets out a new strategy for resolving an old metaethical question: whether judgment internalism is true. Judgment internalism is the claim that for each of us there is a modal connection between our evaluative judgments and our motivational states; i.e., very roughly, if you think something is good then to some extent you will desire that that thing come to pass. Suikkanen begins with the premise that our method for determining what we desire is transparent to the desires themselves. What this means is that

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thinking about whether one desires *X* typically involves thinking about *X* itself—its merits—as opposed to thinking about one’s own mental states. For this to be a *good* method of identifying one’s own desires, as Suikkanen holds that it is, there would have to be a strong connection between making evaluative judgments about things and having desires about those things. In other words, judgment internalism would have to be true. Thus Suikkanen gives us an inference-to-the-best-explanation argument for judgment internalism.

Christian Tarnsey, in his contribution, tackles an uncertainty problem for absolutist deontologists. Specifically, the problem of pure moral uncertainty—i.e. not being certain as to the moral status about the candidate actions while treating as settled all the relevant empirical questions about those actions. While many moral theorists in such a situation would recommend maximizing expected moral value in such a case, absolutist deontologists don’t seem to be able to say this, since absolutist deontology doesn’t assign moral value to actions independent of their moral status. Tarnsey proposes that when confronted with pure moral uncertainty absolutist deontologists should employ stochastic dominance reasoning, on which the two candidate actions are compared as to their meeting a set of moral value thresholds given differing assumptions about their moral status, and one action is subjectively obligatory if it does as least as well as the other on each comparison. The result is that a morally safe option will typically dominate a morally risky option, and thus be obligatory, if the likelihood that the morally risky option is impermissible is above some threshold (.5 in simple cases).