

Editorial note

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This issue offers a rich variety of articles on a wide range of subjects. In their contribution, *Travis Rodgers* and *Brandon Warmke* go into the unrecognized tension between two theses in John Doris' situationism: the descriptive thesis that our folk usage of global personality and character traits in describing and predicting human behaviour is empirically unsupported and the prescriptive thesis that we can more successfully act in line with our moral values if, in our deliberation about what to do, we focus on our situation instead of on our moral character. *Ambrose Lee* argues that legal coercion is morally problematic because (1) it fails to respect individuals as reason-responsive agents; and (2) individuals ought to be respected as such in virtue of the fact that they are human beings. Thus it is in this sense that legal coercion fails to treat individuals with the kind of respect 'due to them as men'. Contrastivists, such as Walter Sinnott Armstrong and Justin Snedegar, state that all reasons claims should be understood as a relation with an additional place for a contrast class: rather than X being a reason for A to P simpliciter, X is a reason for A to P out of {P,Q,R...}. In his article, *Andrew Jordan* argues that the contrastivist account of reasons will be ill-fitted for accommodating certain features of moral reasons. In brief, the reason why the contrastivist analysis fails is that it cannot adequately allow for cases where consideration of any alternate course of action would be misguided.

Georg Spielthener's subject is analogical reasoning in ethics, which, according to him, can be a powerful tool in ethical reasoning. In his article, he first explains the basic structure of arguments from analogy in ethics, and then discusses the diversity of analogical arguments that can be found in ethics. His conclusion is that analogical reasoning can be a logically valid type of ethical reasoning that can provide reasons for action that are not worse than the reasons provided by any other kind of practical reasoning. *Paul Formosa* and *Catriona Mackenzie* critically examine the role that dignity plays in Martha Nussbaum's recent work. On the basis of a comparison between Nussbaum and Kant, they highlight tensions between Nussbaum's Aristotelianism and her commitment to political liberalism. They conclude that Nussbaum's claim that her conception of dignity is only a partial political conception is implausible and that her conception of dignity seems to commit her to a satisficing form of perfectionist liberalism.

Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen's influential account of 'cultures of honor' speculates that honour norms are a socially-adaptive deterrence strategy. After criticising this account, *Dan*

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Demetriou offers, in his article, another theory of honour which sees honour as an agonistic normative system regulating prestige competitions. The persistent appeal of honour's principles, and their moral plausibility in certain contexts, suggests not antirealism, as is suggested by John Doris and Alexandra Plakias, but pluralism. *Rob van Someren Greve* examines a particular way in which the principle ought 'implies 'can' has been defended, namely, by appeal to considerations of fairness. The idea (due to David Copp) is that moral requirements we cannot comply with would be unfair, and there cannot be unfair moral requirements. Van Someren Greve discusses several ways of spelling out the argument, and argues that all are unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons.

Archaeology is a research area rarely discussed within ethics. Given the central place of context for archaeological excavation, archaeologists have done everything in their power to combat the black market. Hoping to stem the tide, they have leveled attacks on those who excavate these materials, those who traffic in them, and those who purchase them. Unfortunately, according to *William Krieger*, despite decades of argument and legal wrangling, archaeologists have been unable to stop the black market. In his article, he analyses this failure from the supply side (what archaeologists call looting) and suggests better ways to engage other stakeholders to the benefit of most, if not all.

On an agent-centered way of understanding, what lies at the bottom of judgments of wrongness is a bad attitude; when someone does something wrong, she does something that expresses a bad, or inappropriate, attitude (where inappropriateness is understood, tentatively, as a failure to recognize the separateness of others). In order to motivate this account, *Elizabeth Foreman* discusses a general Kantian agent-centred ethics, as well as Michael Slote's agent-based ethics, in light of analysis of the grounding role of attitudes in the evaluation of two core cases. In light of these discussions, she argues that there are advantages to preserving the grounding of the appropriateness of attitudes in facts about their objects (as opposed to Slote's sentimentalism), while cutting such an agent-centred ethics away from a Kantian grounding. *Garvan Walshe* outlines a 'green libertarianism' in which our property rights are grounded in fundamental ecological facts. He argues that it is immune from two objections levelled at right- and left- libertarian theories of acquisition: that Robert Nozick, without justification, divided people into those who were able to acquire unowned resources, and those who could not; and, that left-libertarian attempts, such as Hillel Steiner's, to separate choice from circumstance cannot account for the fact that not only people's decisions to have children, but even their decisions to continue living, affect people's entitlements to use the natural world.

Juan Espindola makes the case for the permissibility of post-conflict amnesties. He argues that amnesties of a certain scope, targeted to certain categories of perpetrators, and offered in certain contexts are morally permissible because they are an acknowledgment of the difficulty of attributing criminal responsibility in mass violence contexts. Based on this idea, he develops the further claim that deciding which amnesties are permissible and which ones are not, should be done on a case-by-case basis

Love is, according to *Alexander Jech*, practical, having to do with how we live our lives, and a central aspect of its practical orientation is the wish for union. Union is often considered in two forms—as a union of affections and as union in relationship. In his article, Jech considers both sorts of union and argues for their connection. He first discusses the union of interests in terms of the idea of attentive awareness that is focused upon the beloved individual and his or her concerns, life, and history. He then discusses union in relationship and shows how this emerges from the attentive awareness in a desire to specify a determinate way of responding to the concerns that attentive awareness opens us to.

In the last contribution, *Ezio Di Nucci* responds to Greg Janzen's criticism of his defence of Frankfurt's counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities by arguing that Jones avoids killing Smith in the counterfactual scenario. Janzen's argument consists in introducing a new thought-experiment which is supposed to be analogous to Frankfurt's and where the agent is supposed to avoid A-ing. Here he argues that Janzen's argument fails on two counts, because his new scenario is not analogous to Frankfurt's and because the agent in his new scenario does not avoid A-ing.