

## Editorial Note

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This issue consists of an interesting mix of articles on theoretical and practical ethical issues. *Katerina Hadjimatheou* opens the issue with an article that discusses the moral acceptability of surveillance that targets broad categories of people. She argues that in a wide range of cases untargeted surveillance treats people less like suspects than more targeted alternatives and that it often deters unwanted behaviour more effectively than targeted alternatives, including profiling.

Drawing on fairly technical recent work by Seamus Miller, Christopher Kutz, and Tracy Isaacs in the field of collective responsibility, *Michael Skerker* examines individuals' moral responsibility for collective action within organisations. Building on and refining Isaacs' theory, he argues that organisation members can be held responsible for their unique interpretations of the organisation mission and unique contributions to their role duties.

In *Humanity's End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement*, Nicholas Agar presents a novel argument against the prospect of radical life-extension. Agar's argument hinges on the claim that extended life spans will result in people's lives being dominated by the fear of death. In their article, *Aveek Bhattacharya* and *Robert Mark Simpson* examine this claim and the surrounding issues in Agar's discussion.

*Georg Brun's* subject is the method of reflective equilibrium. This is, says Brun, often characterised in terms of intuitions or understood as a method for justifying intuitions. An analysis of reflective equilibrium and current theories of moral intuitions reveals that this picture is problematic. The method of reflective equilibrium presupposes that we have initially credible commitments, it does not presuppose that they are intuitions as conceived by philosophical intuitionism. Nonetheless, Brun, argues, intuitions can enter the process of developing a reflective equilibrium and, if the process is successful, they can be justified.

According to expressivism, moral judgements are desire-like states of mind. It is often argued that this view is made implausible because it isn't consistent with the conceivability of amorality, i.e., agents who make moral judgments yet lack motivation. In response, expressivists can invoke the distinction between dispositional and occurrent desires. In his article, *John Eriksson* criticises Caj Strandberg who has recently argued that this distinction does not save expressivism. Eriksson argues that expressivism is a much more complex thesis than Strandberg assumes. Once these complexities are acknowledged, Strandberg's arguments are rendered ineffective and expressivism rendered more plausible.

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*William MacAskill's* subject in his article is career choice. It is remarkable, he says, that very little philosophical work has been done on the ethics of career, considering that one's choice of career can be the determining factor in whether one's life is fruitful or worthless; happy or miserable; admirable or contemptible. The small literature which does exist has focused primarily on whether it is permissible to pursue a non-altruistic rather than an altruistic career. MacAskill focuses on a different question: within the domain of altruistic career paths, which careers are ethically preferable to which others?

Moral contextualism is the view that claims like 'A ought to X' are implicitly relative to some (contextually variable) standard. If this claim is relative to a utilitarian standard, then its truth conditions are trivial: 'Relative to utilitarianism, you ought to maximize happiness'. *Daan Evers* states that it certainly doesn't seem trivial that you ought to maximize happiness (utilitarianism is a highly controversial position). Evers shows that the problem of triviality is not unique for contextualism and is therefore no reason to favour noncontextualist views.

*Gabriel S. Mendlow* says that people often act contrary to their better judgment, not because they suffer a volitional infirmity like weakness of will or compulsion but because they care too little about what they judge best (they are unconcerned) or they care too much about something else (they are compromised). Unconcerned and compromised action are phenomena worth examining not only in their own right but also for what they reveal about the better known varieties of akratic action for which they might easily be mistaken, such as weak-willed action and action (or inaction) that stems from accidie.

*Toby Svoboda* develops a view on our indirect duties to non-humans that is an alternative to the much criticised view of Kant. He argues that this indirect duty view strictly proscribes knowingly causing unnecessary harm to organisms, and shows that it is not subject to the damaging objections directed against the indirect duty view attributed to Kant by the orthodox interpretation.

*Thomas Douglas* analyses Kelly Sorensen's model of the relationship between effort and moral worth in which the effort exerted in performing a morally desirable action contributes positively to the action's moral worth, but the effort required to perform the action detracts from its moral worth. According to Douglas, Sorensen's model, though on the right track, is mistaken. He suggests amendments that correct this model's defects.

In their article, *Andreas Albertsen and Sören Flinch Midtgaard* enter the still ongoing debate on luck egalitarianism. Two competing versions of luck egalitarianism are asymmetrical and symmetrical luck egalitarianism. According to the former, while inequalities due to luck are unjust, equalities due to luck are not necessarily so. The latter view, by contrast, affirms the undesirability of equalities as well as inequalities insofar as they are due to luck. Albertsen and Midtgaard argue that the symmetrical view is by far the more compelling, both by internal luck egalitarian standards and in light of the external rightist emphasis on choice and responsibility to which luck egalitarianism may partly be seen as a response.

*Martha Nussbaum* grounds her version of the capabilities approach in political liberalism. In their article, *Luara Ferracioli & Rosa Terlazzo* argue that the capabilities approach, insofar as it genuinely values the things that persons can actually do and be, must be grounded in a hybrid account of liberalism: in order to show respect for adults, its justification must be political; in order to show respect for children, however, its implementation must include a commitment to comprehensive autonomy, one that ensures that children develop the skills necessary to make meaningful choices about whether or not to exercise their basic capabilities.

The last article discusses a central question of environmental ethics: how best to account for the intuitions generated by the Last Man scenarios. Seeking an alternative to extrinsic views, according to which nonhuman entities possess normative features that obligate us, *Roman Altshuler* turns to constitutive views, which make value or whatever other limits nonhuman

nature places on action dependent on features intrinsic to human beings and constitutive of them or their obligations. After examining two kinds of constitutive views—environmental virtue ethics and Korsgaard’s Kantianism—Altshuler suggests an alternative that takes up the strengths of both while avoiding their shortcomings. On this view, we have an indirect obligation to experience nature as obligating us, although we have direct obligations only to human beings.