

Editorial

Albert W. Musschenga · Robert Heeger

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For the first time in the journal's history, we publish a list of reviewers. To be precise, the list contains the names of all persons who completed one or more reviews in 2010. Since reviewers usually remain anonymous, their work doesn't get the recognition it deserves. Publishing a list of reviewers makes their work at least more visible.

This issue opens with an article by Peter Brian Barry. Barry discusses Peter Strawson's view that being evil exempts persons from moral responsibility. Many philosophers endorse the pre-theoretic intuition that evil people deserve our strongest moral condemnation, an intuition that does not make much sense unless we also have the intuition that evil people are morally responsible agents. Due to the force of these intuitions, philosophers sympathetic to Strawson's views have difficulty in incorporating evil persons in their accounts of moral responsibility. Barry argues that Strawson is not committed to supposing that being evil is an exempting condition—at least, he can allow that evil persons are morally responsible agents.

In many countries, wedding vows are part of a marriage ceremony. Such vows are a kind of promises. Breaking promises is generally considered to be—at least *prima facie*—wrong. Although (unilateral) divorce implies breaking marriage vows, it is in a large part of the world not morally condemned. In her contribution, Elisabeth Brake discusses how this inconsistency can be resolved. She argues that emotions cannot be subject of promises because emotions cannot be controlled. Spouses cannot promise each other 'enduring love'. But acts and behaviour can be subjects of promise. The more the spousal role is socially understood in behavioural, as opposed to emotional, terms, the more fit it is to be a subject of promise. Brake finds that, if marriage vows are taken seriously as promises, spouses should only promise what they think they can perform.

Voyeurism is generally seen as morally troubling, even in the absence of harm and deceit. In his contribution, John Draeger investigates whether these feelings are well-founded. He contends that voyeurism is morally wrong because it is disrespectful. Respect for others requires being sensitive to the way things are done in a particular community. The appropriateness of various forms of looking depends on a variety of both complex and

A. W. Musschenga (✉) · R. Heeger
Department of Philosophy, VU University, De Boelelaan 1105, Amsterdam 1081 HV, The Netherlands
e-mail: a.w.musschenga@vu.nl

fluid social conditions. When the context is gendered, respect for others will also require attending to prevailing gender norms.

In her paper 'Virtue Theory and Abortion' Rosalind Hursthouse states that a virtue ethical approach to abortion makes the issue of fetal ontology and status irrelevant. In her contribution, R. Jo Kornegay argues that Hursthouse understates the importance fetal ontology and status in fact play in her analyses. For Hursthouse, a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of a woman's morally right decision to abort is that the woman apportion due respect for the potential or actual human being and wisely factor the correct fetal value into her deliberations. Hursthouse succeeds only in making fetal status one among several decisive factors in the acceptability, not mere permissibility, of many abortions.

Hursthouse's virtue ethics figures also prominently in Matt Stichter's article. According to her virtue based account of right action, says Stichter, an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. Robert Johnson has criticized the account on the grounds that the actions a non-virtuous person should take are often uncharacteristic of the virtuous person. The non-virtuous need to take steps to improve themselves morally, but the fully virtuous person need not take such steps. So Johnson argues that any virtue based account of right action will have to find a way to ground a moral obligation to improve oneself. Stichter argues that, while Johnson is correct in his criticisms of Hursthouse's account of right action, the model of virtues as practical skills developed by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus can offer a partial solution to Johnson's challenge.

Many contemporary philosophers are attracted to Isaiah Berlin's value pluralism. Neo-Berlinians even contend that value pluralism is, in the words of William Galston, the best account of the moral universe we inhabit; they also contend that value pluralism provides a powerful case for liberalism. Robert B. Talisse challenges both claims. According to him, the arguments offered in support of value pluralism are lacking. He offers some reasons for thinking that value pluralism is not an especially promising view of our moral universe. Talisse also makes a case for thinking that value pluralism frustrates or weakens liberal politics.

A well-known objection to the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires holds that, since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the last contribution of this issue Atilla Tanyi investigates an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of this argument by David Sobel. Sobel invokes a counterexample: hedonic desires, i.e. the likings and dislikings of our present conscious states. Tanyi aims to defend the premise by bringing the alleged counterexample under its scope. He first points out that reference to hedonic desires as a counterexample presupposes a particular understanding of pleasure, which we might call desire-based. In response, following Sobel, he draws up two alternative accounts, the phenomenological and the tracking views of pleasure. Although Sobel raises several objections to these accounts, Tanyi argues that both are defensible.

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