

Editorial

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Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen was Associate Editor of our journal since 2005. Unfortunately, he decided to give up his job because he could no longer find the time to do his editorial work as he thought it should be done. The reason why he leaves characterises Toni as we have come to know him: a serious and dedicated worker. We are very grateful to him. His place will be taken by someone not unfamiliar to Toni: Björn Petersson, Toni's direct colleague at Lund University. Logi Gunnarson served our journal as a Book Review Editor since 2008. He also had to leave our team because of an accumulation of work. Many thanks also to Logi. His successor is Andreas Vieth of Munster University.

The first contribution of this issue deals with autonomy. Autonomy, its nature, and its conditions, is undoubtedly one of the most discussed subjects in ethics. According to Claudia Blöser, Aron Schöpf and Marcus Willaschek, an important condition for autonomy has been neglected in the literature: the capacity to critically reflect on one's desires, preferences and values in the light of new experiences. Experience is not just information, it is information acquired by direct, first-personal cognitive contact with the world. Experiences are a more powerful challenge to habits and values than information.

The next two contributions are on virtue ethics. Many virtue ethicists defend the following account of right action (VR): An action *A* is right for *S* in circumstances *C* if and only if a fully virtuous agent would characteristically do *A* in *C*. According to Frans Svensson, there are serious objections to VR. These take the form of counter-examples in which we are confronted with cases where less than fully virtuous persons would be acting rightly in doing something that no fully virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. He presents four such counter-examples to VR, and proceeds to consider various proposals for how to revise VR in order to avoid these counter-examples. He argues that in so far as the revised accounts really manage to steer clear of all the counter-examples to VR, they instead fall prey to other damaging objections.

Does Aristotle's ethics encourage a dismissive attitude toward moral disagreement, as several eminent critics have argued? After exploring the features of the Aristotelian account that explain these criticism, Bridget Clarke points to other features overlooked by those

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critics. McDowell says that stress on the appreciation of the particular is a way to register the enormous difficulty of seeing ethical reality clearly; at the same time it is a way of encouraging humility. Hursthouse endorses that view. Adherents of the Aristotelian account of the primacy of the particular are well aware of the difficulty and fallibility of our moral judgements, which is often responsible for moral disagreement.

Many philosophers have found it obvious that pleasure and pain come in measurable quantities, and that these quantities are of central importance to morality. Several philosophers have presented or felt compelled to respond to arguments for the conclusion that it is false. One important class of these arguments concerns the use of numbers to represent aggregates of pleasure and pain. If pleasure and pain were measurable quantities, then, by definition, it would be possible to perform various mathematical and statistical operations on numbers representing amounts of them. In his contribution, Justin Klocksiem presents, explains, and rebuts several of the most interesting and significant instances of this type of argument in an effort to show that, in general, it is specious. Along the way, he explains his reasons for thinking that pleasure and pain are amenable to interval measurement.

The issue continues with two contributions on themes within political philosophy. The first is by W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz. There is, he says, a grave poverty problem all around the globe. There is massive cross-border crime. There are environmental challenges, such as pollution and shortage of water and global warming. These states of affair necessitate a new positive world transformation. Korab-Karpowicz argues that the new positive world transformation needs a Global Solidarity movement and that this movement can take lessons from Poland's Solidarity of the 1980s. It should not be grounded in any ideology, but in inclusive values that do not divide but can potentially unite all human beings, and these are derived from basic human needs. In short, Global Solidarity should be based on what he calls the 'righteousness of life.' It can be achieved if there is a growing recognition of what is right for life and a growing interest in protecting and enhancing life.

The second contribution in the area of political philosophy, by Patti Tamara Lenard, deals with the moral legitimacy of protests by immigrants within western democratic countries who are dissatisfied with their status in the host community and who object to the ways in which various laws and practices have proved to be obstacles to their full integration. Because immigrants, upon entering, have consented to abide by the rules and regulations of the host country, it might be thought that they are under a special duty to abide by the laws of their host country. Lenard evaluates whether immigrants are indeed under such a special duty. She argues that there are limits to what can be demanded of and by immigrants as well as of and by host communities. In the final part she suggests principles that help to evaluate the motivations of immigrant protestors, as well as that help guide their actions, when they believe that the community they have joined is treating them unjustly.

The issue closes with a contribution by Aaron Smuts on ethical criticism of humor. Smuts distinguishes three to the ethical criticism of humor: 1) attitude-based theories, 2) merited-response theories, and 3) emotional responsibility theories. First, he sets himself to showing the limitations of the attitudinal endorsement theory by presenting new criticisms of Ronald de Sousa's position. Then, he turns to assess the strengths of the other two approaches, showing that that their major formulations implicitly require the problematic attitudinal endorsement theory. He argues for an effects-mediated responsibility theory, holding that the strongest ethical criticism that can be made of our sense of humor is that it might indicate some omission on our part. This omission could only be culpable in so far as a particular joke could do harm to oneself or others.