Editorial

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
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John Skorupski was one of the keynote speakers at the conference 'Ethical Theory and Moral Practice: How Do They Relate', in Amsterdam, March 2008. For reasons of space, the revised version of his paper was not included in the conference's special issue (vol. 12:5). It serves now as the opening article of this issue. In his paper, Skorupski draws an outline of his version of sentimentalism. Sentimentalism is for him the view that some or all of value concepts, moral concepts, practical reasons can be analysed in terms of feeling, sentiment or emotion. He argues that there are reasons to feel ('evaluative reasons') that are not reducible to practical or epistemic reasons, and that value is analysable in terms of evaluative reasons. He rejects that *all* practical reasons are in one way of the other grounded in evaluative reasons.

The next three papers stem from the Annual Conference of the British Society for Ethical Theory, Edinburgh 2008. Guest-editor for this part of the issue was Mike Ridge.

Jonathan Dancy holds that being wrong is not a further reason in addition to those that it passes verdict on. He states that if it were, it would be a further consideration that has to be taken into account in order to reach a verdict. In her paper, Ulrike Heuer criticizes Dancy. If being wrong is a reason, she says, it is not a reason that affects the balance of reasons on the account of 'affecting the balance'. That is, Heuer argues, true of many other reasons. More importantly, being wrong necessarily does not affect the balance of reasons. However, this is true of specifiable properties as well. Yet specifiable properties are reasons. It follows, according to Heuer, that verdictive judgments may well be about reason-giving properties. Whether or not they are is independent of whether those reasons can affect the balance of reasons.

In the second BSET-paper, Martin Peterson seeks to show that all moral theories can be consequentialised. To consequentialise a moral theory means to account for moral phenomena usually described in nonconsequentialist terms, such as rights, duties, and virtues, in a consequentialist framework. Peterson distinguishes between different interpretations of the consequentialiser's thesis, and emphasises the need for a cardinal ranking of acts. He also offers a new answer as to why consequentialising moral theories is



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important: This yields crucial methodological insights about how to pursue ethical inquiries.

Is there a morally relevant distinction between lying and misleading? In the last BSET-paper, Alan Strudler argues, as Bernard Williams does, that lying and misleading are both commonly wrong because they involve an aim to breach trust. In lying one invites trust that one aims to breach, which makes lying ordinarily wrong. In making misleading statements, someone conveys propositions implied not by what he says, but by his choice to engage in the particular speech act of saying it. Thus, in misleading one invites trust by implicature. If someone would invite your trust either by assertion or by implicature, he would not invite the same trust. Strudler's argument concerning different levels of trust relies on ideas about control: you cede more control to a person in trusting his assertion than in trusting his implicature, at least when the assertion and the implicature express the very same proposition, because you can handle doubt about an implicated proposition more readily than doubt about an asserted proposition.

The issue continues with a paper on artificially intelligent (AI) assistive technologies in health care practices. Mark Coeckelbergh discusses four objections to introducing AI assistive technologies in health care practices as replacements of human care. He analyses them as demands for felt care, good care, private care, and real care. He argues that, although these objections cannot stand as good reasons for a general and a priori rejection of AI assistive technologies as such or as replacements of human care, they necessitate us to clarify what is at stake, to develop more comprehensive criteria for good care, and to rethink existing practices of care. In response to these challenges, Coeckelbergh proposes a (modified) capabilities approach to care and emphasize the inherent social dimension of care. He concludes that if we set the standards of care too high when evaluating the introduction of AI assistive technologies in health care, we have to reject many of our existing, low-tech health care practices.

The subject of Christopher Freiman's paper is immorality. We take it for granted, he says, that immorality is animated by an eagerness to defy social norms that restrict our ability to achieve our ends. This picture of the immoralist, however common, is crucially incomplete. As suggested by Kant and Rousseau, immorality can also be animated by an eagerness to conform to social norms that actually sabotage our ability to achieve our ends. What Kant calls 'servility' is an underappreciated but pervasive motive for immorality. Recognizing servility as a basic cause of immorality obliges us to reconsider questions about the rationality of morality. If we are to offer compelling reasons to refrain from immorality, Freiman argues, we must also offer compelling reasons to refrain from servility.

Enzo Di Nucci, in his paper, aims to refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurttype counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. The objection says that if in
the counterfactual scenario the agent does not act, then the agent could have avoided acting
in the actual scenario. And because what happens in the counterfactual scenario cannot
count as the relevant agent's actions given the sort of external control *that* agent is under,
then we can ground responsibility on *that* agent having been able to avoid acting. Di Nucci
illustrates how this objection to Frankfurt's famous counterexample is motivated by
Frankfurt's own 'guidance' view of agency. His argument consists in showing that even if
we concede that the agent does not act in the counterfactual scenario, that does not show
that the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. This depends, Di Nucci
says, on the crucial distinction between 'not ϕ -ing' and 'avoiding ϕ -ing'.

In the last paper of this issue, James Sherman seeks to advance a long-standing debate about the nature of moral rights. The debate focuses on the questions: In virtue of what do persons possess moral rights? What could explain the fact that they possess moral rights?



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The predominant sides in this debate are the status theory and the instrumental theory. A status theory claims that an individual possesses moral rights in virtue of some of his essential properties, often her rationality, autonomy and dignity. An instrumental theory claims that an individual possesses a moral right in virtue of something valuable that is likely to be promoted by her possessing and exercising that right. Sherman's aim in his paper is to offer a new instrumental theory in which duties are grounded on individuals' interests, and individuals' rights exist in virtue of the duties owed to them.

