

## Editorial

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In the first article Donald Beggs argues that postliberal theory—a political theory that is neither liberal nor anti-liberal—consists in acknowledging that in political contexts some voluntary but persisting groups can as such be moral, not merely political, agents. He discusses and rejects four versions of postliberalism. A key common element among the four rejected positions is their emphasis on the normative authority of some practices as over against principles or theory. Beggs argues that recognition of a voluntary group's (episodic) moral authority over their members' moral autonomy is sufficient to be non-liberal but not anti-liberal.

In the second contribution, Eric Cave discusses unsavory seduction which he regards as the conversion of a target's initial sexual unwillingness to sexual willingness accomplished by managing her motives in a way that bypasses her concerns. Unsavory seduction violates an important and widely-accepted moral principle prohibiting agents from undermining others' capacity to reflectively manage their own motives. This account of the nature and unsavoriness of unsavory seduction implies that agents ought not to cross the line between sexual seduction and unsavory sexual seduction without a morally significant reason. If it is correct, then the frequency and casualness with which many sexual agents seem to cross this line is, according to Cave, cause for concern.

Jens Johansson analyses Chris Heathwood's recent argument against the view that intrinsic value is analysable in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare—intrinsic value *for a person*—can be analysed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to the rationality of our bias towards the future. In his paper, Johansson argues that so long as we keep the tenses and the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction right, the fitting-attitudes analysis of welfare can be shown to survive Heathwood's criticism.

Chad Kleist's paper redirects the reader's attention from ethical theory to moral psychology. Huck Finn believes that he is wrong in helping Jim, and yet continues to do so. He is, according to Kleist, an inverse akratic: someone who believes X, all things considered, is the correct act, and yet performs  $\sim X$ , where  $\sim X$  is the correct act. Kleist

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investigates Huck's nature to see why he performs such acts contrary to his beliefs. In doing so, he explores the nature of empathy and shows how powerful Huck's empathic feelings are. Drawing from Martin L. Hoffman, he shows the relationship between empathy and a principle of justice. This relationship leads to Huck acting virtuously, as Rosalind Hursthouse maintains.

Epistemic reductionists are critics who think that all supposed cases of moral luck are illusory. In his contribution, Anders Schinkel argues that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. They implausibly separate judgements of character from judgements concerning acts, and they assume a conception of character that is untenable both from a common sense perspective and from that of social psychology. Schinkel uses especially the example of Scobie, the protagonist of Graham Greene's novel *The Heart of the Matter*, to show that moral luck is real—that there are cases of moral luck that cannot be reduced to epistemic luck. The reality of moral luck, in this example at least, lies in its impact on character and personal and moral identity.

Weighted lotteries are of one the three most common responses to Taurek's 'numbers problem', the other two being saving the greater number and equal chance lotteries. In his article, Ben Saunders considers the objections against weighted lotteries, and argues that they do not succeed in refuting their fairness. Therefore, a weighted lottery remains a potential solution to cases of conflict. Moreover, he shows how these responses actually lead to a new argument for weighted lotteries, appealing to fairness and Pareto-optimality.

It is commonly believed that in emergencies extraordinary measures, such as state emergency powers, curfews, and deployment of troops, are justified referring to the danger of a 'moral black hole' (looting, panic flight, price gouging and general selfishness). In their article, Per Sandin and Mise Wester state that empirical evidence on crises following natural disasters does not seem to warrant that belief. The existence of a 'moral black hole' for such situations can therefore be called into question. Thus, extraordinary measures cannot be justified with reference to a moral black hole. The possibility version of the moral black hole argument is, according to Sandin and Wester, also deeply problematic. It runs into difficulties similar to those facing Pascal's Wager or some versions of the Precautionary Principle.

The last contribution is a review article by Simon Derpmann of recent literature, both in German and in English, on solidarity and cosmopolitanism. In some contexts, solidarity and cosmopolitanism are closely related, in other contexts they are considered to be incompatible. The article starts with a general account of solidarity, the communal obligations that follow from it, and of its opposition to the moral arguments grounding cosmopolitan obligations. The second part deals with the actual development and realisation of solidarity and cosmopolitanism, as well as with the tension between both within the European Union. In the last part, Derpmann discusses whether solidarity can ground cosmopolitan affiliations, obligations and institutions.

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