



Expressivism and Explaining Irrationality: Reply to Baker

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Abstract

In a recent paper in this journal, Derek Baker (Erkenntnis 83(4):829–852, 2018) raises an objection to expressivism as it has been developed by Mark Schroeder (Being for, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Baker argues that Schroeder’s expressivist (1) is committed to certain sentences expressing rationally incoherent states of mind, and he objects (2) that the expressivist cannot explain why these states would be rationally incoherent. The aim of this paper is to show that Baker’s argument for (1) is unsound, and that (1) is unlikely to be true. This obviates the need to explain the alleged rational incoherence, and so Baker’s objection to Schroeder’s expressivism is undermined.

1 Introduction

In his paper ‘Expression and Guidance in Schroeder’s Expressivist Semantics’ (2018) Derek Baker raises an objection to expressivism as it has been developed by Mark Schroeder in his book ‘Being For’ (2008). The objection is based on a particular argument. Baker argues that if the view Schroeder developed on behalf of expressivism is true, then the following sentence “must be expressing inconsistent psychological commitments” or an “inconsistent state of mind” (2018, p. 838):

(S) ‘Murder is wrong, but not blaming for murder makes sense’.

So Baker’s argument is supposed to establish the claim (henceforth: Baker’s claim) that the mental state expressed by (S) is, as I prefer to say, *rationally incoherent*,¹ and his objection is based on that claim.

¹ For the purpose of this paper, I shall stipulate that a mental state or set of mental states is rationally incoherent iff by simultaneously holding these states an agent violates some requirement of rationality.

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Baker's objection to Schroeder's expressivism is *not* that the above sentence (S) intuitively does not express a rationally incoherent mental state.² Rather Baker accepts the incoherence and objects that Schroeder's expressivism is unable to explain the rational incoherence of the state expressed by (S), at least without raising serious problems elsewhere in the expressivist theory.

The aim of this paper is to show that Baker's argument is unsound, and so does not establish Baker's claim about the incoherence of the state expressed by (S). Moreover, I shall argue that even more promising arguments for that claim also fail and so it is unlikely that the state expressed by (S) is rationally incoherent. But if Baker's claim is false, this undermines his objection to expressivism: one cannot object to expressivism that it is unable to explain why a state is rationally incoherent, when in fact it is not rationally incoherent.

2 Baker's Objection and Schroeder's Expressivism

Let us start by taking a closer look at Baker's objection and Schroeder's expressivism. On Baker's understanding, (S) is a conjunction of two atomic first-order language sentences. The first conjunct, 'murder is wrong', contains the normative predicate 'wrong' applied to 'murder'. The second conjunct, 'not blaming for murder makes sense', contains the normative predicate 'makes sense' applied to 'not blaming for murder'.³ Baker primarily, though not exclusively, uses 'makes sense' in his paper as the normative predicate in the second conjunct, but he suggests that it could be replaced by 'is the thing to do', 'is rational', 'is reasonable', 'is fitting', 'is appropriate', or 'one ought to'.⁴

The heart of Schroeder's metaethical expressivism is a formal semantics for a first-order language containing moral or normative predicates like 'wrong'. This expressivist semantics provides a recursive mapping from every sentence of the

² This is surprising, because Baker, I think correctly, says that "the claim is not that the utterance 'Murder is wrong, but one ought not to blame for murder' sounds infelicitous; I am happy to acknowledge it does not" (Baker 2018, p. 838). Baker suggested to me (in personal communication) that despite its felicity (S) may nevertheless express an incoherent state, but that the incoherence need not be obvious. However, if the expressed incoherence is non-obvious, this clearly shifts the burden on Baker to provide a convincing argument for the incoherence which, if my arguments in this paper are correct, he has not done.

³ I think we should not treat 'not blaming for murder' (or 'notblamingformurder') as a singular term in a formal first-order language. At least, we must be aware that if we treat it as a singular term, then the alleged rational failure of believing that notblamingformurder makes sense while also believing that blamingformurder makes sense cannot be explained by the logical meaning of 'not', since 'not' does not contribute to the meaning of the term 'notblamingformurder' in the usual way. But if 'not blaming for murder' is not a singular term, this is a problem for Baker's objection, because his whole discussion assumes that 'makes sense' functions like a predicate in order to be able to use Schroeder's semantic clause for atomic formulas (see below). I will ignore this problem, because I am primarily concerned with Baker's argument, not with his objection, and the argument does not require that 'makes sense' is a predicate.

⁴ Standard semantic theorizing treats 'ought' as a deontic modal understood as a sentential operator. Baker cannot treat either 'makes sense' or 'ought' as a modal however, because Schroeder's semantics does not contain a semantic clause for deontic modals, and so Baker cannot use such a clause to construct (U) below.

language to the mental state it expresses. Schroeder stipulates that in his particular form of expressivist semantics, all sentences express noncognitive states of *being for*, even non-normative sentences, since he believes that otherwise expressivists will not be able to provide a constructive solution to the Frege–Geach problem.⁵ Being for is supposed to be a noncognitive, desire-like, motivational state that takes complex mental properties as its content. For atomic sentences, Schroeder offers the following semantic clause:

Atom For every predicate F and singular term t , sentences of the form $F(t)$ express $\text{FOR}(\psi(t))$, where $\psi(t)$ is a complex property one is for having, namely the property of standing in the ψ -relation to t .⁶

Schroeder suggests that ‘ t is wrong’ expresses being for blaming t , or slightly more formally: $\text{FOR}(\text{blaming}(t))$. The sentence ‘murdering is wrong’ then expresses the state of being for blaming murdering. Since, as a quasi-realist, Schroeder’s expressivist will hold that to believe what a sentence says is to be in the state expressed by it, it follows that to believe that murder is wrong is to be for blaming murder, and likewise for all other beliefs.

Another important stipulation of Schroeder’s theory is that being for is capable of what he calls *A-type inconsistency*: A set of mental states is A-type inconsistent iff the states are all of the same genus (e. g. belief, intention, or being for...) and the set of states is rationally incoherent if their contents are (logically) inconsistent. It follows, that a set of states of being for is rationally incoherent if their contents are (logically) inconsistent. This implies that $\text{FOR}(\alpha)$ is rationally incoherent with $\text{FOR}(\neg\alpha)$, where α is a schematic letter standing for an arbitrary metalanguage formula describing a property one is for having. It is natural to reformulate A-type inconsistency as a requirement of rationality: rationality requires that one is not being for (logically) inconsistent contents (cf. No Contradictory Being Fors below). It follows from my definition of rational incoherence as violation of a rationality requirement that being for inconsistent contents is *one* way of being rationally incoherent, but it need not be the only way.⁷

⁵ For more on Schroeder’s notion of constructiveness see footnote 7.

⁶ Cf. Schroeder (2008, p. 78). I follow Schroeder in using small caps to denote mental states, but I also write ‘belief’ and ‘being for’ to preserve better readability. For simplicity I ignore that only closed sentences express states, and I also ignore Schroeder’s use of λ -abstractions in the metalanguage.

⁷ An anonymous reviewer objects that I do not make clear what should count as rational incoherence. This is incorrect, I do so in footnote 1, where I say that any violation of a rational requirement gives rise to rational incoherence. Since I think Schroeder’s A-type inconsistency, as well as what he calls B-type inconsistency [for these notions see Schroeder (2008, p. 43/48)], are classifications of types of requirements of rationality, it follows from my definition of rational incoherence that any way of being A- or B-type inconsistent is a way of being rationally incoherent. For instance, if it is a requirement of rationality that one is not being for something while also being against it (which would be a form of B-type inconsistency), then violating this requirement makes one rationally incoherent. The same holds for all other requirements of rationality, such as Enkrasia, No Contradictory Intentions, or Means-End-Coherence etc.

The same reviewer criticizes that I do not mention that Schroeder and Baker [in joint work with Woods

According to Baker, Schroeder's semantic clause for atomic sentences (together with his clause for conjunction) determines that (S) expresses the following state:

(U) FOR(blaming(murder) and ψ (¬blaming(murder))).

Baker here uses ψ as a placeholder, because Schroeder's semantics does not include a lexical entry for the predicate 'makes sense'.

Now, if Baker's claim is correct, which says that the state that is expressed by (S) must be an incoherent or inconsistent state of mind, and Schroeder's theory says that (U) is the state expressed by (S), then (U) must be an inconsistent state of mind. This raises the question: "does Schroeder's theory predict an inconsistent state of mind?" (Baker 2018, p. 838).

The answer to this will obviously depend on what ψ is, and the largest part of Baker's paper is concerned with the question of whether ' ψ ' can be replaced with something that allows Schroeder to predict the rational incoherence of (U). In fact, Baker thinks there *are* ways to predict the incoherence (for instance, if ' ψ ' is replaced with 'being for'). But he argues that every replacement that allows Schroeder to predict the incoherence creates problems elsewhere in the expressivist theory (e. g. having to do with the inexpressibility of some states). So his objection is that, *ultimately*, expressivists are unable to explain the incoherence.

I think that expressivists could say some things in reply to Baker's various replacements of ' ψ '. But it is unnecessary that I go into the downstream details of Baker's objection here, since I want to suggest that Baker's claim about incoherence is false anyway. I do so by showing that Baker's argument for the claim is *unsound*

Footnote 7 (continued)

(Baker and Woods 2015)] disagree about how expressivists can and should explain logical relations such as logical inconsistency between sentences in terms of the rational relations between the states they express. In my view, all sides agree that expressivists want to be able to say that a set of sentences is logically inconsistent iff the rational incoherence between the states expressed by them survives substitutions. But Schroeder believes, whereas Baker and Woods do not, that expressivists can guarantee that rational incoherence survives substitutions in a *constructive* and non-*ad hoc* way, only if they appeal to forms of rational incoherence which are due to relations between the contents of states (A-type inconsistency), and not due to relations between types of states (B-type), because he thinks B-type accounts can not be generalized. [Schroeder (2015b) seems to think expressivists can have a constructive higher-order account without requiring A-type inconsistency. For Schroeder's notion of constructiveness see for instance his Schroeder (2010, p. 133) or the précis to a PEA-soup discussion (Paakkunainen 2015)]. It is not totally clear whether Baker and Woods disagree with Schroeder's idea that all such explanations need to be constructive, or if they disagree with the idea that constructiveness can be achieved only by appeal to A-type inconsistency. But whatever their disagreement ultimately consists of, I must admit that I do not see why this debate should have any bearing on the issue being explored in Baker's paper to which my paper is a response. Whether or not expressivists can or should explain logical inconsistency by appeal to specific forms of rational incoherence, such as A-type inconsistency, does not tell us which further requirements of rationality expressivists should accept, which is the topic of this and Baker's paper. In particular it does not imply that they should accept the principles which Baker needs in order to make his argument against Schroeder (e. g. Forcia or Direct Enkrasia below). The debate about how expressivists can account for logic, even though they do so by appealing to rational incoherence, is orthogonal to the issue discussed here.

(Sect. 3), and that better arguments for it can and should be resisted by Schroeder's expressivist (Sect. 4). This undermines Baker's objection to expressivism, because if there is no incoherence to be explained in the first place, then it cannot be objected that expressivism is unable to explain said incoherence.⁸

3 Baker's Argument for Incoherence

Why does Baker think that the sentence 'murder is wrong, but not blaming for murder makes sense' must express a rationally incoherent mental state? He offers the following argument:

the agent who utters the above sentence [(S)] is expressing a *commitment* [...] to blame for murder, while simultaneously the same agent judges it makes sense not to blame for murder—and since 'makes sense' is normative, she must also be expressing a commitment *not* to blame for murder. So it seems like we should want to say that 'Murder is wrong but not blaming for murder makes sense' is semantically incompetent or she is irrational—she's committing to doing something and simultaneously committing to not doing it. (Baker 2018, p. 837, italics original)

Here is another version of the argument:

We can put the point this way: either the agent does not blame for murder, in which case she fails to have an attitude she is committed to having; or she blames, in which case her emotions don't conform with her own better judgment, her judgment about which reaction would make the most sense. So she is guilty of inconsistency in her psychological commitments. (Baker 2018, p. 838)

This argument relies on two principles. The first is:

it seems like an implicit commitment about the nature of the being-for attitude is that failing to have the target attitudes that one is for having is a failing of rational coherence. Presumably it was always part of the story that an agent who is for blaming for murder but does not in fact blame for murder is guilty of irrationality (all else being equal). (Baker 2018, p. 843)

I shall reformulate this as a requirement of rationality, and call it:

Forcia: Rationality requires: if one is FOR(α), then one is α .

⁸ In other words, Baker argues that expressivists who walk the path proposed by Schroeder are committed to the claim that (S) expresses a rationally incoherent mental state, but are unable to explain why this would be so. The main goal of this paper is to show that Baker's argument for the incoherence of the state expressed by (S) is unsound, and that it is unlikely that the state expressed by (S) is incoherent. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for urging me to be clearer on the dialectic.

The argument also relies on a second principle which is:

[There] is the widespread intuition that an agent who sincerely judges that something is the thing to do will be motivated to do it, barring weakness of will or other forms of defective agency. Someone who judges that some feeling is the one that makes sense suffers from a case of irrationality (of recalcitrant emotion) if they do not in fact feel it. (Baker 2018, p. 837)

Applied to his second conjunct he says:

If I judge ‘Not blaming for murder makes sense,’ what this judgment should intuitively regulate is my attitude of blame (or my lack of such an attitude). If I continue to blame for murder, I am acting, by my lights, irrationally. ... [that judgment] does rule out the rational coherence of continuing to blame for murder. (Baker 2018, p. 839)

We can also reformulate this as a requirement of rationality, and call it, following Broome (2013):

Direct Enkrasia: Rationality requires that if one believes one ought to $\neg\alpha$, then one is $\neg\alpha$.

Two points on my reformulation of Baker. First, Direct Enkrasia is formulated in terms of ‘ought’, instead of ‘makes sense’ or ‘is the thing to do’, because this is the way Enkrasia (see below) is standardly formulated. This should be fine for Baker, since he explicitly “‘treat[s] ‘One ought to x ’ as equivalent to ‘ x -ing makes sense’ or ‘ x -ing is reasonable.’” (Baker 2018, p. 831). Second, in the quote above Baker says that someone who judges that something is the thing to do will be *motivated* to do it. My reformulation does not mention motivation because, if instead of Direct Enkrasia we interpret Baker as saying that it is rationally required that if one believes one ought to $\neg\alpha$, then one is *motivated* to $\neg\alpha$, then Baker’s argument will become invalid.

So here is Baker’s argument in a more explicit form:

Forcia: Rationality requires that if one is being for α , then one is α .

Direct Enkrasia: Rationality requires that if one believes one ought to $\neg\alpha$, then one is $\neg\alpha$.

Corollary: one necessarily violates a requirement of rationality (i. e. one is rationally incoherent) if one is for α and believes one ought to $\neg\alpha$.

Belief as Being For: believing that t is wrong is being for blaming for t .

Baker’s Claim: Hence, one necessarily violates some requirement of rationality if one believes that t is wrong and believes that one ought not blame for t . (From Corollary, Belief as Being For, and substitution of α with ‘blaming for t ’)

This argument is valid. It is impossible to satisfy both Forcia and Direct Enkrasia, if one believes one ought to $\neg\alpha$ while also being for α , which means that one cannot be in both states and be fully rationally coherent. By replacing α with ‘blaming for

t' , we get that it is rationally incoherent to believe one ought not to blame for t while also being for blaming for t . Since, according to Schroeder's noncognitivist 'analysis of belief' (Belief as Being For), being for blaming for t is believing that t is wrong, it follows that the belief that t is wrong is rationally incoherent with the belief that one ought not blame for t . Hence, Baker's argument entails his claim about incoherence.

Even though Baker's argument is valid, it is not sound. Contrary to what Baker assumes, Schroeder's expressivist *does* not, *need* not, and *must* not accept either Forcia or Direct Enkrasia. I shall argue for each of these claims in turn.

Schroeder's expressivist does not assume Forcia, at least not explicitly. Schroeder nowhere in his book or his papers⁹ assumes "that an agent who is for blaming for murder but does not in fact blame for murder is guilty of irrationality (all else being equal)" (Baker 2018, p. 843). What Schroeder does assume instead is "that being for has the motivational property that someone who is FOR(α) will tend to do α , all else being equal" (Schroeder 2008, p. 93). This is neither formulated as nor intended to be a requirement of rationality.¹⁰ Since Schroeder's expressivist does not assume Forcia, she is not committed to accepting Baker's argument.¹¹

Schroeder's expressivist does not assume Direct Enkrasia either, at least not explicitly. This again shows that Schroeder's expressivist, as he currently formulated the view, need not accept Baker's argument.

Schroeder also does not *implicitly* assume Forcia or Direct Enkrasia, because his theory does not *need* these principles. Neither of them plays a theoretical role in his theory. The only principle Schroeder actually needs in order to establish his results especially about logic is A-type inconsistency.

Perhaps Schroeder would have to assume additional requirements besides A-type inconsistency, if he wanted to explain not only logic, but also how it is possible that certain requirements of rationality (e. g. Enkrasia) hold, if normative beliefs really are noncognitive states of being for. But whatever additional requirements expressivists need in order to explain some widely accepted requirements, they *must not* accept either Forcia or Direct Enkrasia, since they are false, or so I shall argue now.

Direct Enkrasia is false. Rationality does not require that rational agents *succeed* in doing what they believe they ought to do. Rational agents may be omniscient, but they need not be omnipotent. That one sometimes fails to do what one believes one ought to do, does not make one irrational, because it is sometimes, in fact often, beyond our control to secure that we succeed in doing what we believe we ought to do. This line of argument is rooted in the widely accepted principle that rationality supervenes on the mind.¹²

Direct Enkrasia will be compatible with the supervenience principle, and may in fact sound more plausible, if it is restricted to α 's that are not actions or states

⁹ A collection of some of Schroeder's papers on expressivism can be found in his volume (Schroeder 2015a).

¹⁰ Even if it were formulated as a requirement, it would require only that one *tends* to do α , not that one does α , which is what Baker's argument needs.

¹¹ As a reviewer correctly points out, Schroeder's expressivist might be committed to Baker's claim even if he does not assume Forcia, and even if Baker's argument is unsound. It is for precisely this reason that I discuss and reject other possible arguments for the incoherence below.

¹² See for instance Broome (2013, p. 89), Kieseewetter (2017) and Wedgwood (2017).

of the world, but mental states. It has, however, been convincingly argued by John Broome that “we have to reject the Direct Enkratic Condition, even restricted to mental states. Its apparent attraction is spurious, and the counterexamples show it is false” (Broome 2013, p. 96).¹³

Similar points can be made about Forcia. If Forcia is not restricted to mental states, then it violates the supervenience constraint for rational requirements. One cannot be accused of irrationality just because one fails to succeed to do what one is for doing. Bad luck is not the same as bad reason. But even if Forcia is restricted to mental states, it seems false.¹⁴ Toppinen, to whose paper Baker refers in a footnote, argues against ‘Schroeder-style views’ that there is “*no appropriate rational connection*, at all, between desiring to desire φ and the desire to φ ”, and likewise that “it is possible for me to be fully rational, to be for desiring φ , and yet not to desire to φ ” (Toppinen 2015, p. 160f.; italics original). Moreover, Baker himself should be sceptical about Forcia, given that he says about desire that “it is an open question whether there is any breakdown in rational coherence in failing to have an attitude one desires to have” (Baker 2018, p. 840). I do not see why this should be any different in the case of being for. Hence, Forcia is not plausibly a requirement of rationality.

To summarize: Schroeder’s expressivism does not assume Forcia or Direct Enkrasia. Moreover, Schroeder does not need to assume these principles in order to establish the results of his expressivist semantics and logic. And more importantly, these principles must not play a role in his theory, since they do not appear to be requirements of rationality at all. So I conclude that, since either of the crucial premises of Baker’s argument is false, the argument does not establish the truth of his claim about incoherence.

4 Better Arguments for Incoherence?

In the previous section I showed that Baker’s argument for incoherence is unsound. But showing that an argument is unsound, does not show that its conclusion is false. So might Baker’s claim nevertheless be true? In this section I offer some better arguments for Baker’s claim of incoherence, but show that even these better arguments can and should be resisted by expressivists. Here is another argument:

No Contradictory Intentions: Rationality requires that if one intends α , then one does not intend $\neg\alpha$.

Enkrasia: Rationality requires that if one believes one ought $\neg\alpha$, then one intends $\neg\alpha$.

¹³ For discussion of (Restricted) Direct Enkrasia and the counterexamples see Broome (2013, Ch. 6) who concludes that “Versions of Direct Enkrasia have an initial appeal, but they are no real alternative to Enkrasia itself” (Broome 2013, p. 173).

¹⁴ Baker’s talk of ‘emotions’, ‘feelings’ and ‘attitudes’ in the above quotes clearly suggests that he implicitly restricts Forcia to mental states. But it is not clear that in the case of being for blaming for murder, blaming is a mental state, or that it could not be replaced by actions like sanctioning, punishing, or outlawing.

Corollary: One necessarily violates a requirement, if one intends α while believing one ought $\neg\alpha$.

Belief as Intention: Believing that t is wrong is *intending* to blame for t .¹⁵

Baker's Claim: it is necessarily rationally incoherent to believe that t is wrong while believing that one ought not blame for t .

This is valid. No Contradictory Intentions and Enkrasia cannot jointly be satisfied, if their antecedents are true, because their consequents are inconsistent (Corollary). What we need in order to derive Baker's claim from this is the additional noncognitivist premise which says that to hold a moral belief is to intend something (Belief as Intention). This premise is Schroeder's Belief as Being For, simply with 'being for' being replaced by 'intention'. Baker's claim then follows straightforwardly from Corollary, Belief as Intention, and by substituting 'blame for t ' into ' α '.

This argument is better than Baker's original one, because it relies on the widely accepted requirements No Contradictory Intentions and Enkrasia.¹⁶ I will not debate their truth here, and simply assume that expressivists accept them for the sake of argument. But even when Schroeder's expressivist accepts these as requirements, the argument has an obvious flaw: Schroeder does not accept Belief as Intention, but Belief as Being For. So, this argument does not apply to Schroeder's expressivism as it is currently formulated.

So is Schroeder's expressivism safe from this new argument? One might think that there are two problems, both deriving from the fact that being for and intention share some of their main features.

Here is the first problem. What is important about the being for attitude is that it is a noncognitive, desire-like motivational pro-attitude that is rationally incoherent to hold towards inconsistent contents. But these characteristics seem to be true of intention as well. This suggests that Schroeder could perhaps have formulated his theory in terms of intention, instead of being for. If he did, he would accept Belief as Intention. But then the better argument would apply to his theory and commit him to Baker's claim about incoherence.

Are there any reasons that speak against replacing being for with intention? I think the fact that identifying moral belief with intention allows one (via the better argument) to derive Baker's claim (which is intuitively false) is itself a reason not to identify moral belief with intention.

Another reason against the identification with intention is that if the belief that t is wrong were the *intention* to blame for t , then the belief that one ought to blame for t would require (via Enkrasia) to believe that t is wrong. This does not sound correct to me in general. It seems rationally fine to believe that blaming for t is the thing one

¹⁵ A reviewer rightly emphasizes that just like the attitude of being for is only part of Schroeder's toy expressivist theory, the relation of blaming for is also just a toy example, and not essential to his theory. Luckily, nothing in the better argument hinges on the blaming for-relation.

¹⁶ This does not mean they are uncontested. Famously, Kolodny (2005) denies that there are *any* requirements of rationality. It is an open question which, if any, requirements of rationality expressivists accept or are committed to accepting.

ought to do even though one does not believe that t is wrong, for instance, because one thinks t is not wrong.¹⁷

Another consideration that speaks against replacing being for with intention is the following. Many think that moral belief provides motivation that is *pro tanto*. This means it can be overridden or outweighed by stronger motivation, perhaps provided by some other moral belief, or a belief about what one prudentially ought or ought all things considered to do. Desire, and plausibly being for, also provide *pro tanto* motivation. In contrast, to desire the motivation that is provided by intentions seems rather *pro toto*. The motivational force of an intention seems to be the result of weighing the motivational forces of competing desires or other *pro-tanto*-motivation-providing attitudes. This is also supported by the observation that if one intention is stronger than some other incompatible one, then we will normally drop the weaker one completely, which is less frequently the case with desires: we often stick to our desires even if they are incompatible and of very different strengths. This suggests that moral belief is more desire-like, and hence rather like being for, than like intention.

These considerations suggest that the Schroederian expressivist should not accept *Belief as Intention*.¹⁸ In any case, Schroeder can escape the better argument by simply sticking to his choice of letting being for be the central attitude in his theory.

This brings us to the second problem mentioned above. If being for and intention are similar in important respects, then perhaps being for is also governed by requirements that are structurally similar to those governing intention. Suppose, for instance, that the following variation of Enkrasia governs the being for attitude:

Forkrasia: Rationality requires that if one believes one ought $\neg\alpha$, then one is being for $\neg\alpha$.

This principle combined with Schroeder's Belief as Being For and with the following principle (implied by A-type inconsistency)

No Contradictory Being Fors: Rationality requires that if one is being for α , then one is not being for $\neg\alpha$.

again entails Baker's claim.

This version of the better argument has two premises that are actually accepted by Schroeder, namely Belief as Being For and No Contradictory Being Fors. However, Forkrasia is not part of Schroeder's theory, at least not an explicit part, and I do not think anyone has defended this particular principle.

¹⁷ Maybe Allan Gibbard would disagree with me here. He famously proposes to analyse what is morally good in terms of which feelings one rationally ought to have. So perhaps he would accept that believing one ought to blame for t rationally requires believing that t is wrong.

¹⁸ Another reason against identifying believing that something is wrong with intending to blame for it is that it is not clear whether it is even possible to intend to blame, if we think of blaming as a certain sort of attitude or mental state. The impression that our attitudes, like our beliefs, are not under our control in the same way as our actions are, is shared by a number of philosophers such as, for instance, Broome (2013, p. 220f.), Hieronymi (2006) and Wedgwood (2017). I thank an anonymous reviewer of this journal for raising this point.

But is Forkrasia implicitly accepted by Schroeder? Perhaps this is so. In a short paragraph of his book Schroeder investigates the idea of explaining the motivational character and inconsistency-transmittingness of intentions on the basis of the motivational character and inconsistency-transmittingness of the attitude of being for. In this context he assumes, though quite hypothetically, that “intending to do A ... involves or commits to being for doing A” (Schroeder 2008, p. 101). Call this assumption: *Intention-For*. This bridge-principle, however, together with Enkrasia entails Forkrasia. This means that Intention-For, Enkrasia, Belief as Being For, and A-type inconsistency jointly entail Baker’s claim. Should we accept this argument?

Since Schroeder accepts Belief as Being For, and A-type inconsistency, this argument crucially rests on Enkrasia and Intention-For. I have already noted that it is unclear if Schroeder’s expressivist accepts Enkrasia or not, but that I assume it for the sake of argument.

So what about Intention-For, the view that intention involves or commits to being for? Interestingly, there is a very similar thesis accepted by many philosophers of mind, namely the thesis that intention involves *desire*. Kieran Setiya says that it

is a matter of consensus in the philosophy of intention that intending to do A entails wanting to do A, in the motivational sense for which the ‘primitive sign of wanting is trying to get’ (Anscombe 1963, p. 68). Doubts about this entailment are attributed to ambiguities in ‘desire.’ When I intend to do A reluctantly, from the motive of duty, I may deny that I want to do it, but what I lack is ‘appetite’ not ‘volition’ (Setiya 2018).

Most authors understand the notions of ‘wanting’ or ‘desire’ here rather narrowly, as they figure, for instance, in discussions of the so-called Humean theory of motivation.¹⁹ The entailment thesis is mostly taken to be intuitively true or defended indirectly by showing that apparent counterexamples to it fail. The only direct argument for the entailment I know of is this. If a person has or expresses an intention that she is going to do something, it is always appropriate or legitimate to ask that person “Why do you *want* to do that?”²⁰ It seems that the question would not always be appropriate, if what it presupposes, namely that one wants something, would not be made true by that person’s having an intention. This suggests that it is impossible to intend something without wanting or desiring it. This is supposed to justify the view that intention entails desire.

In the present context the question is: Does intention also entail being for? Answering this is difficult, because we would have to know more about the being for

¹⁹ For an overview on desire see Schroeder (2017). For a list of properties of desires see Audi (1973), or more recently, Sinhababu (2017).

However, some authors in the debate have a very broad conception of the wants or desires that are entailed by intentions so that various kinds of non-cognitive or motivational states count as desires (see Hyman 2014, p. 84; Tuomela 1977, p. 128). These authors seem to take the true core of the principle that intention involves desire to be the following: “someone intends to do something only if he is *motivated* to do it” (Davis 1984, p. 46). But this principle is much weaker than the claim that intention entails the particular mental state of desire in the narrow sense. In fact it is so weak as to become philosophically uninteresting, because almost everyone agrees that intention involves or is a sort of motivation.

²⁰ See Davis (1984) and Thompson (2008, p. 104).

attitude in order to answer it. For instance, is it a decidedly moral attitude or not? If we think of it as being some *sui generis* attitude of moral approval, then the entailment does not seem to hold: intending to go swimming does not require that one morally approves of swimming.²¹ If, on the other hand, being for is not a decidedly moral attitude, then it could just be the attitude that goes along with our ordinary notion of being for something. After all, ‘to be for something’ or ‘to be in favor of something’ are familiar English expressions (that contrast with ‘being against’, see OED), and it is natural to think of voting as a way of indicating what we are for.

But this ordinary notion of being for something also does not support Intention-For. Consider the following case. Former Prime Minister Theresa May intended to implement Brexit.²² But even if, in some sense of ‘want’, she wanted or was motivated to implement Brexit (because doing so was her political duty or mandate), it appears incorrect to describe her as *being for* Brexit. Famously, she voted Remain, and so she was for Britain’s remaining in the EU, not for leaving it. Moreover, if May had on some occasion declared that she intends to implement Brexit (perhaps by saying ‘I shall implement Brexit’), it may have been appropriate to ask why she wants it (she wanted it, because she promised to deliver on the ‘will’ of the British people), but it would have been inappropriate to ask her why she is for Brexit, since everyone knows she was not for it, and perhaps she would even have voted Remain again, if there had been a second referendum.²³

Cases like this one cast doubt on the thesis that intention entails being for. For this reason, Schroeder’s expressivist should not accept it. I conclude that even the better arguments for Baker’s incoherence claim fail. Thereby, Baker’s objection to Schroeder’s expressivism is undermined.

5 Conclusion

The main aim of this paper has been to argue against Baker’s claim that it is rationally incoherent to believe that murdering is wrong while believing that one ought not blame for murdering. I have done so by arguing that Baker’s original argument

²¹ I fully agree with a reviewer that the attitude of being for, as Schroeder thinks of it, cannot be a *sui generis* attitude of moral approval. If it were, then the belief that grass is green (which on Schroeder’s proposed analysis is the state of being for proceeding as if grass is green) would also have to count as a moral belief, which is absurd. It might be replied that what turns being for blaming for murder into a *moral* belief is not the being for attitude, but the relation of (morally) blaming for something, or it is the combination of being for with blaming. I cannot pursue this idea further here.

²² I am of course bracketing conspiratorial doubts about whether the real-world May really intended or only pretended to intend to implement Brexit.

²³ A reviewer who agrees with me that being for is most certainly not a *sui generis* moral attitude of approval, also thinks that Schroeder’s attitude of being for is not the attitude that goes along with our ordinary notion of being for something. As a reason for this the reviewer cites that Schroeder stipulated that his being for attitude can only take (mental) properties as objects, whereas we can ordinarily be for taking certain ways of acting. If that is true, then perhaps the Brexit example, and with it all appeals to the ordinary meaning of ‘being for something’, will not be able to show that intention does *not* involve being for. But be that as is may, it also does not show that intention *involves* being for, which is the claim a defender of the better argument would have to make plausible.

for the incoherence rests on false premises, and is thus unsound. I showed that there is a better argument available for the incoherence of these beliefs which, however, does not apply to Schroeder's expressivism as the view is currently formulated, and there are reasons for Schroeder not to reformulate his view in terms of intention or to assume that intention entails being for. I take my arguments to provide inductive evidence for the falsity of Baker's claim. But if Baker's claim about incoherence is false, he cannot object that expressivism is unable to explain the incoherence.

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