



Regulatory Stringency and Emission Leakage Mitigation

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Abstract

We construct a two-country trade model where emissions are an input in production and generate cross-border pollution. We examine the strategic incentives of an active regulator who sets a binding level of emissions in production. We show that, in the presence of terms of trade and emission leakage strategic motives, tighter regulation can mitigate emission leakage, reduce global pollution, and improve a country's welfare. This result and the corresponding policy implications depend on the relative magnitude of emissions intensities of goods between sectors and on their relationship in production and consumption.

Keywords Environmental regulation · International trade · Emission leakage · Cross-border pollution

JEL Classification F18 · H23 · Q54

1 Introduction

Carbon leakage is a phenomenon in which reduction of emissions in one country or region leads to an increase in emissions elsewhere. It is a controversial issue, as it can undermine the effectiveness of unilateral environmental policies in reducing emissions. Tighter environmental policies in developed countries have a leakage rate of 15–25%. This implies that a reduction of 100 tons of carbon emissions domestically would be accompanied by an

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


Fig. 1 CO₂ emissions embodied in international trade by regions

increase of 15–25 tons abroad (Misch and Wingender 2021). A study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on carbon leakage due to agricultural production, concludes that if EU countries or both Australia and New Zealand were to implement a carbon tax of 100 dollars per ton of carbon emissions by 2050, approximately half of their emission reductions would be offset by carbon leakage. Furthermore, if the number of countries applying the tax were to include all OECD countries, plus Brazil, China and other non-OECD countries from East Asia, the leakage rate would decrease to 21%, resulting in a total global reduction of carbon emissions by 9.6% compared to baseline emissions (Henderson and Verma 2021).

In Fig. 1 we construct and represent CO₂ emissions embodied in international trade aggregated by region.¹ Focusing on EU countries who appear to be leading the decarbonization of their economies by introducing the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in 2005 we observe a decreasing pattern in emissions within the EU27 region. At the same time embodied emissions appear to increase, at least until 2018, across the world and in most of the regions. Interestingly, North American countries (Canada, Mexico, US) respond with a slight decrease in embodied emissions. This evidence illustrates that there can be a substitutability or complementarity in embodied emissions.

By and large, unilateral attempts by countries to address environmental degradation may fail to achieve lower levels of emissions due to the leakage effects. These concerns are amplified when terms of trade or rent shifting motives are present.² As a way to overcome these adversities, a number of studies proposes the use of trade measures, e.g., Border Carbon Adjustments (BCAs), alongside with environmental policies, in order to impede higher carbon emissions from abroad, e.g., Elliott et al. (2010), Fischer and Fox (2012), Jakob et al. (2013), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014), Böhringer et al. (2014), Böhringer et al. (2017), Balistreri et al. (2019), Cosbey et al. (2019), Al Khourdajie and Finus (2020), and Kaushal and Rosendahl (2020).³ Recently, the European Commission introduced the proposal of a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism as part of the European Green Deal (COM 2021).

¹ Source OECD: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=IO_GHG_2021.

² The literature on strategic environmental policy, e.g., Barrett (1994), Rauscher (1994), Neary (2006), Antoniou et al. (2014) show that governments have strong incentives to use environmental policies strategically to capture the terms of trade or rent shifting motives. Thus, non-cooperative policymaking can lead governments to ecological dumping.

³ Karakosta (2018) using a vertically differentiated duopoly framework with environmentally aware consumers, examines, among others, the effectiveness of border carbon adjustments when pollution is local.

The overall evidence on the impacts of tighter environmental policies on carbon leakage remains controversial. Aichele and Felbermayr (2012, 2015) find strong evidence for emission leakage. Specifically, they show that binding commitments under the Kyoto Protocol have increased ratifying countries' embodied carbon imports from non-Kyoto countries by about 8% and the emission intensity of their imports by about 3%. Larch and Wanner (2017) use a multi-sector, multi-factor structural gravity model and show that, under the Copenhagen Accord, combining national emission targets with carbon tariffs reduce carbon leakage rate from 13.4 to 4.1%. Ben-David et al. (2021) find that firms headquartered in countries with stricter environmental regulation emit less greenhouse gas at home and more abroad. Other studies conclude that the empirical evidence does not support the presence of carbon leakage. For example, Naegele and Zaklan (2019) analyze the impact of the EU ETS on the carbon emissions embodied in traded goods and conclude that the EU ETS did not cause any increase in net imports. In a similar vein, Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022) for the period 2007–2014 find little or no evidence that the EU ETS has led to a shift of carbon emissions from Europe toward the rest of the world. Branger and Quirion (2014) show that carbon leakage depends strongly upon sectoral carbon costs and trade intensity.⁴ Branger et al. (2017) find no evidence of carbon leakage in cement and steel industries under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.

Contribution of the paper: These controversial findings mandate the need for further research and improved understanding of the structure and relative emission intensities between the different sectors of the economy, those that are exposed versus those that are not exposed to trade. The present paper aims to complement these studies and bring into light new insights that contribute further on this debate. Specifically, by accounting for both tradable and non-tradable goods (or equivalently sectors), and for the use of emissions as an input in production, it is shown that the relative emissions intensities of tradable and non-tradable goods, and their relationship in production and consumption, what we call their *general equilibrium relationship*, are crucial in determining the direction of emissions leakage and of *terms of trade effects*.⁵ When the non-tradable good is relatively more *emissions-intensive* compared to the importable, and the two goods are *general equilibrium complements*, then, a stricter environmental policy reduces the world price of the importable good. The reduction in the world price of a country's importable, constitutes an improvement in its terms of trade and reduces production and its associated pollution generated abroad. A similar result emerges when the importable good is *emissions-intensive* while the non-tradable good is *non-emissions-intensive* and the two goods are *general equilibrium substitutes*. Following our theoretical analysis we provide new empirical implications in the concluding remarks.

Thus, in our framework a unilateral environmental policy by a country may be effective in reducing pollution, and at the same time temper down environmental damages in the presence of terms of trade and emission leakage motives. Interestingly enough, this result can be of relevance from a policy perspective. The reason is that it does not necessitate the use of additional policy instruments, such as BCAs or the implementation of transfers within regions as suggested by Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1996) in order to control for emissions leakage. In times where sustainable global environmental agreements are

⁴ The authors define trade intensity as the ratio in values between a sector's imports plus exports and the EU total market size.

⁵ In the international trade theory, a country's terms of trade are defined as the world relative price of its exportable to its importable goods.

difficult to reach, such features may improve the design of pollution mitigating and welfare improving non-cooperatively set environmental policies by taking into account the relative intensities of emissions in different sectors, as well as the specific relations of the different goods in production and consumption. Our findings suggest that a double dividend following tighter regulation, i.e., improving terms of trade and reducing emissions, can be present which is reminiscent of the Porter hypothesis, e.g., Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999), though the transmission channel is quite different.

Related Literature: In the absence of non-tradable goods, Rauscher (1997) show that free trade can exacerbate carbon leakage effects and lead to a race to the bottom in emission tax rates and further environmental degradation. Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003) find that carbon leakage occurs more frequently when the regulator is unable to commit on a specific level of tax on emissions. Copeland and Taylor (2005) examine whether unilateral emission reduction in one group of countries will lead to emission increases to the rest of the world. They show that in an open trading world unilateral emission reductions by one group of countries can create endogenous and self-interested emissions reductions in unconstrained countries. Böhringer et al. (2014) construct a two country perfectly competitive model, where energy is produced locally in each country and it is used as an input in the production of tradable goods. They show that uniform emissions taxation across all sectors is preferable to differentiated taxation of emissions, and it is a practical guideline for unilateral climate policy design even in the presence of terms of trade and carbon leakage motives.

In the presence of non-tradable goods, Böhringer et al. (2017) show that, in order to reduce global pollution, setting the emission tax at the Pigouvian level should be combined with output-based rebating carbon tax payments and a consumption tax for emission-intensive and tradable goods. Holladay et al. (2018) shows that emission leakage occurs when free trade is allowed to services, the clean sector. However, no leakage occurs when the service sector is non-tradable.

The above studies either with or without non-tradables goods conclude that a stricter unilateral environmental policy by a country results to a positive leakage effect, i.e., higher carbon emissions in the rest of the world as a result of such a policy. Another strand of the literature, however, without non-tradable goods, attests to a negative leakage effect, i.e., lower carbon emissions in the rest of the world as a result of such a policy. Baylis et al. (2013, 2014) in a two-country, two-good, two-factor context show that due to the substitutability of factors of production, a higher carbon tax in one of the two sectors will increase private sector's pollution abatement. This *abatement resource effect* results in negative effect on leakage. The carbon tax increase also results into a positive effect on leakage, in line with the standard literature. The overall leakage effect is determined by the magnitude of the two opposing effects. Egger et al. (2021), in a model of international trade with heterogeneous firms, show that a higher emission tax will lead to a reduction in Foreign emissions. In their model the negative leakage occurs due to a reallocation of labor towards abatement in the foreign country. Pantelaoui et al. (2020) argue that tighter environmental policy can result in export promotion and thus affect accordingly the terms of trade and the emissions from abroad, but their findings depend on the mode of regulation as well as the usage of revenues from taxation.

Our study can also contribute in the better understanding of the mixed evidence provided in the stream of the computable general equilibrium (CGE) literature. Numerical studies attest that central estimates of leakage rates for industrialized countries fall between 5% and 19%, e.g., Böhringer et al. 2012). Some studies find that only a small number of industries have high leakage rates (Morgenstern et al. 2004; Fischer and Fox

2012). However the general view e.g., Carbone and Rivers (2017), is that these studies find controversial evidence, sensitive to model assumptions. Studies based on partial equilibrium models that examine energy intensive and trade exposed industries estimate leakage rates that vary between 8% under a regime of a pure grandfathering allocation of emission allowances e.g., Demailly and Quirion 2008, to 90% under a regime with relatively low price of allowances e.g., Chen (2009), while in the EU, leakage rate predictions for these sectors are on average almost 50% for the cement sector e.g., Demailly and Quirion (2006, 2008), Ponsard and Walker (2008), and 40% for the aluminum and steel sectors e.g., Demailly and Quirion (2008).

2 The Model

We consider a two-country, Home and Foreign, and three-goods, 1, 2 and 3, world. Goods 1 and 2 are assumed to be produced by both Home and Foreign and to be traded between the two countries. Furthermore, good 1 is Home's (Foreign's) exportable (importable) good, and good 2 is Home's (Foreign's) importable (exportable) one. For purposes of our analysis, good 1 is numeraire commodity whose world price is equal to unity. Good 3, assumed to be a non-tradable good, e.g., transport, electricity production, is produced only by Home.⁶ Many primary factors (\bar{m}), assumed to be fully employed and in fixed endowments, are used as inputs in the production of all goods in the two countries. In addition, emissions (z) is an input in the production of good 2, and in Home's production of good 3.⁷ The use of emissions as an input in production generates cross-border (transboundary) pollution, which impacts negatively the welfare of residents in Home and Foreign. Home's government is active in regulating this environmental damage by setting a binding level of allowable emissions, \bar{z} . Then, it leaves it up to the producers in sectors 2 and 3 to allocate these allowable emissions. Foreign, is assumed to be inactive (passive) in controlling the generated environmental damage.

Next, we present the production, aggregate pollution and demand conditions in the two countries. For analytical convenience and simplicity, the theoretical formulation of the model is based on duality theory, e.g., Copeland (1994, 2011), Ulph (1997).⁸

2.1 Production and Pollution

Home's production functions for the three goods are denoted as $x_1(m_1)$, $y_2(m_2, z_2)$, $h_3(m_3, z_3)$, where m_j , $j = 1, 2, 3$ is the vector of primary factors used in the production of the j^{th} good, and $\sum_{j=1}^3 m_j = \bar{m}$. z_j , $j \neq 1$, is the level (quantity) of emissions used as input in the production of goods 2 and 3. Production functions of all three goods are increasing,

⁶ For analytical tractability our model considers the presence of non-tradable goods only in one country. The present model can be extended to include non-tradable goods in both countries at the cost of additional analytical complexity.

⁷ This assumption follows standard practice in the relevant literature, e.g., Oates and Schwab (1998), Ulph (1997), Ishikawa and Kiyono (2006), Golosov et al. (2014), Eichner and Pethig (2018). Although we treat pollution an input in the production process, the model can be easily modified to consider pollution as a by product of production, e.g., see Xepapadeas (1997), Copeland and Taylor (2004).

⁸ Although the primary approach, i.e., direct utility and production functions can be applied equally well, the analytics of duality are much clearer.

concave and linearly homogeneous. Then, $z = z_2 + z_3$ denotes the aggregate use of emissions input in Home's production of goods 2 and 3. We assume that aggregate use of emissions is equal to the binding level of allowable emissions set by the government, i.e., $\bar{z} = z (= z_2 + z_3)$. For Foreign $x_1^*(m_1^*)$ and $y_2^*(m_2^*, z^*)$, respectively, denote the production functions of goods 1 and 2 in the country, where m_j^* , $j = 1, 2$ is the vector of primary factors used in the production of goods 1 and 2, respectively, and $\sum_{j=1}^2 m_j^* = \bar{m}^*$. z^* is the level of emissions input in Foreign's production of good 2. All goods and factor markets are perfectly competitive.

The production side of each economy is characterized by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) function. Home's GDP function is defined by the *restricted revenue function*⁹:

$$R(p, q, \bar{z}) = \max \{x_1 + py_2 + qh_3 : (x_1, y_2, h_3) \in \Phi(\bar{m}, \bar{z}); z \leq \bar{z}\}.$$

It captures the maximum value of production at producer prices p and q , given $\Phi(\bar{m}, \bar{z})$, the country's set of production possibilities, defined over \bar{m} and \bar{z} , i.e., the country's endowment of primary factors and the government's set level of allowable emissions. q is the relative price for the non-tradable good. By the Envelope Theorem, the partial derivatives of the GDP function with respect of p , i.e., $\frac{\partial R}{\partial p} = R_p(p, q, \bar{z}) = R_p$, is the supply function of good 2, and with respect to q , i.e., $\frac{\partial R}{\partial q} = R_q$, is the supply function of the non-tradable commodity 3. The partial derivative with respect to z , i.e., $\partial R / \partial z = R_z(\cdot) = R_z > 0$, can be interpreted in either of the following ways. First, as the unit price of allowable emissions. Second, as the general equilibrium marginal abatement cost, i.e., the loss in GDP, or the loss in real income, due to lower level of overall production, when the government lowers by one unit the level of allowable emissions.¹⁰ At equilibrium, the unit price of allowable emissions equals the marginal abatement cost. The GDP function is strictly convex in prices, i.e., $\frac{\partial R_p}{\partial p} = R_{pp} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial R_q}{\partial q} = R_{qq} > 0$, and strictly concave in z , i.e., $\partial R_z / \partial z = R_{zz} < 0$. Moreover, when the cross-price derivative R_{pq} is negative, i.e., $R_{pq} (= R_{qp}) = \frac{\partial R_p}{\partial q} < 0$, the importable and the non-tradable goods are substitutes in production, else, when $R_{pq} > 0$, then, the two goods are complements. The terms $R_{pz} = \frac{\partial R_p}{\partial z}$ and $R_{qz} = \frac{\partial R_q}{\partial z}$, respectively, can be interpreted as a measure of emissions intensity in the production of good $j = 2, 3$, e.g., Copeland (1994), Kreckemeier (2005), and Neary (2006). It is worth making two points in regards to the signs of R_{pz} and R_{qz} . First, if $R_{jz} > 0$, $j = 2, 3$ we define the j^{th} good as *emissions-intensive*. That is, an increase (decrease) in the allowable level of emissions, *ceteris paribus*, increases (decreases) the output of the j^{th} good. Otherwise, i.e., if $R_{jz} < 0$, then, we define the j^{th} good as *non-emissions-intensive*. Second, in the present context with many factors of production, it is conceivable to have $R_{pz} > 0$ and $R_{qz} > 0$ at the same time, i.e., both goods 2 and 3 to be *emissions-intensive*.

⁹ Within our context, the "restricted" GDP function corresponds to the value of production in the presence of the imposed restriction of the environmental standard. In the context of trade models, the seminal contribution to the construction and properties of the restricted GDP function due to, e.g., unemployment or international capital mobility, is attributed to Neary (1985). He proves that the restricted GDP function retains the properties of the "un-restricted" revenue function, provided that the levels of employment of the restricted factors are interpreted as negative outputs sold at fixed prices. For a recent implementation, but in a different context, of the restricted GDP function, see Antoniou et al. (2019).

¹⁰ Alternatively, R_z can be interpreted as the marginal gain in GDP, when the government relaxes the level of allowable emissions by one unit, thus, the level of revenue from production increases by $\partial R / \partial z = R_z$, e.g., Ulph (1997), Copeland and Taylor (2004).

Such would be the case, if, e.g., all primary factors (\bar{m}) are *sector specific*, and z is a *general factor* inputted in the production of both goods 2 and 3.¹¹ Foreign's *GDP* function, characterized by similar properties, is given by $R^*(p, z^*(p)) = \max \{x_1^* + py_2^* : (x_1^*, y_2^*) \in \Phi^*(\bar{m}^*, \bar{z}^*)\}$, where, $y_2^*(\bar{m}^*, z^*) = \frac{\partial R^*}{\partial p} = R_p^*(\cdot)$ is the country's supply of good 2.

Pollution, in the present context, is linked to the employment of emissions as an input in the production of goods 2 and 3. Moreover, we assume that one unit of emissions employed results to one unit of pollution. Pollution is cross-border, i.e., transboundary, affecting negatively households' utility in the two countries. The overall level of pollution in Home (r), and in Foreign (r^*) are respectively defined as follows:

$$r = \bar{z} + \alpha z^*(p) \quad \text{and} \quad r^* = z^*(p) + \alpha^* \bar{z}, \tag{1}$$

where p , which is endogenously determined, is the world price of good 2, Home's (Foreign's) importable (exportable) commodity. As such, $\frac{1}{p}$ and p , respectively, denote Home and Foreign's terms of trade.¹² Reasonably, we assume that since Foreign is inactive in its environmental policy, the level of pollution generated from the use of emissions in the country's production of the tradable good 2, i.e., z^* , is positively related to changes in p , which determine the level of local production of good 2 and the required level of emissions input. Thus, $z^* = z^*(p)$, and $\frac{\partial z^*}{\partial p} = z_p^* > 0$. The two parameters α and $\alpha^* \in (0, 1]$ denote the rate of cross-border pollution between the two countries. This specification states that overall pollution in a country comprises a level of pollution generated from the use of emissions in local production plus a level of pollution generated from the use of emissions in the production of the other country. The limit case where $\alpha = \alpha^* = 0$ captures the case of local pollution. Global perfect cross-border pollution is defined when $\alpha = \alpha^* = 1$, thus $r = r^*$.¹³

2.2 Demand and Market Equilibria

A representative household resides in each country and its preferences are described by the *minimum expenditure function*. Home's minimum expenditure function is given by:

¹¹ Kreickemeier (2005) applies a similar methodology but in a quite different context of a small open economy with many goods and factors, and involuntary unemployment. In analogy to our pollution-intensity of a sector, he defines a general equilibrium measure of labor-intensity of a sector, if, and only if, an increase (decrease) in the price of the j^{th} commodity raises (reduces) the economy-wide employment. Furthermore, in his framework, it is possible for all goods to be labor-intensive at the same time, e.g., when all the fully employed factors are sector specific, and labor, in analogy to pollution emissions in our case, is a general (intersectorally used) factor.

¹² Home's terms of trade improve when the world relative price of the importable good (p) falls, and deteriorate when (p) rises.

¹³ In the relevant literature, there are various ways of modeling cross-border, thus, global pollution. For example, Conconi (2003) defines a country's, e.g., Home, total level of pollution (environmental damage) as $Z(p, p^*) = \sum_{i=1}^N [(1 - \theta_i)E_i(p_i) + \theta_i E_i^*(p_i^*)]$, where $p(p^*)$ are vectors of producer prices, E_i and E_i^* are the levels of emissions generated by sector (i) in the two countries, $(1 - \theta_i)$ and θ_i are the relative weights associated with domestic and foreign emissions in sector i . Equivalently $Z^*(p, p^*)$ defines total level of pollution in another country, e.g., Foreign. $\theta_i = \theta_i^* = 0$ represents the case of local pollution, and $\theta_i = \theta_i^* = 1/2$ captures the case of global pollution where both (all) countries are equally affected buy a unit of pollution, irrespectively of where it is generated.

$$E(p, q, r, u) = \min \{c_1 + pc_2 + qc_3 : U(c_1, c_2, c_3, r) \geq u\}.$$

The $E(\cdot)$ function captures the minimum expenditure required to achieve a given utility level u , at prices p and q and level of global pollution r . The household's *marginal willingness to pay for reduction in pollution* or the *marginal environmental damage* is given by $\frac{\partial E}{\partial r} = E_r$ and is positive since pollution confers disutility, e.g., Copeland (1994), Ulph (1997), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014). By Shepard's Lemma, the partial derivative of the minimum expenditure function with respect to p , i.e., $\frac{\partial E}{\partial p} = E_p (= c_2)$, gives the compensated demand for the tradable good 2, and $\frac{\partial E}{\partial q} = E_q (= c_3)$ gives the compensated demand for the non-tradable good 3. The minimum expenditure function is strictly concave in commodity prices, i.e., $E_{pp} < 0$ and $E_{qq} < 0$, and is strictly convex in r , i.e., $E_{rr} > 0$. $E_{pq} = E_{qp} > 0 (< 0)$ indicates that the importable and the non-tradable goods are substitutes (complements) in consumption. We assume that all income effects fall on the numeraire commodity 1, i.e., $E_{pu} = E_{qu} = 0$, and that commodity demands are independent of pollution, i.e., $E_{pr} = E_{qr} = 0$. A utility function compatible with this specification of the minimum expenditure function is an additive and separable, in pollution, function, e.g., $U(c_1, c_2, c_3, r) = F(c_1, c_2, c_3) - v(r)$. We assume that the sub-utility $F(c_1, c_2, c_3) = f(c_2, c_3) + c_1$ is quasi-linear and increasing in consumptions, with income effects falling on the *numeraire* commodity 1, and $v(r)$ is increasing and convex in r , e.g., Bandyopadhyay et al. (2013), Vlassis (2013), Tsakiris et al. (2014). Foreign's minimum expenditure function for its representative household is given by $E^*(p, r, u^*) = \min \{c_1^* + pc_2^* : U^*(c_1^*, c_2^*, r) \geq u^*\}$, with similar properties applying.

The two-country world economy is characterized by Eqs. (1) and the following equilibrium conditions:

$$E_p(\cdot) - R_p(\cdot) + E_p^*(\cdot) - R_p^*(\cdot) = 0, \tag{2}$$

$$E_q(\cdot) = R_q(\cdot), \tag{3}$$

$$E(p, q, r, u) \equiv R(p, q, z), \tag{4}$$

$$E^*(p, r, u^*) \equiv R^*(p, z^*(p)). \tag{5}$$

Equilibrium condition (2), is the world market clearing condition by which the world demand for the tradable good 2, $E_p + E_p^*$, must equal its world supply $R_p + R_p^*$. Equilibrium condition (3) captures the equilibrium in Home's non-tradable good market, requiring that domestic demand E_q for the non-tradable good 3 must be equal to its domestic supply R_q . Conditions (4) and (5), respectively, give the income-expenditure identity, i.e., the budget constraint, for Home and Foreign's representative household. The representative households' budget constraints require that consumption expenditure equals income from the production of the goods produced in the country.

The model comprises a six-equilibrium conditions system containing the unknowns (u, u^*, r, r^*, p, q) and the policy parameter \bar{z} , i.e., Home's upper limit of allowable emissions. In the analysis to follow, we examine the effects of changes, e.g., a reduction, in the allowable level of emissions by Home, i.e., $d\bar{z} < 0$, denoting a stricter environmental policy, on prices of goods 2 and 3, and we derive the country's optimal unilateral environmental policy level. Furthermore, the discussion to follow assumes that Home uses the environmental policy strategically in the sense of improving its terms of trade, i.e., targeting the

reduction in the world price of its importable good 2 via the stricter environmental policy, i.e., $\frac{dp}{d\bar{z}} > 0$.

3 The Price Effects of Environmental Policy

In this section we examine how changes in the level of allowable emissions affects Home's terms of trade, and the price q of the non-tradable good. Using Eq. (A.1) in the Appendix, we obtain:

$$\frac{dp}{d\bar{z}} = \left(R_{pz} - \Phi_{pq} R_{qz} \Phi_{qq}^{-1} \right) \Phi_{qq} \Delta^{-1}, \text{ and} \quad (6)$$

$$\frac{dq}{d\bar{z}} = \left(R_{qz} - \Phi_{qp} R_{pz} H^{-1} \right) H \Delta^{-1}. \quad (7)$$

$\Delta > 0$ is the determinant of the left-hand side coefficient of the system (A.1) in the Appendix. $H = \Phi_{pp} + \Phi_{pp}^*$, $\Phi_{pp} = E_{pp} - R_{pp}$ and $\Phi_{pp}^* = E_{pp}^* - R_{pp}^*$. Φ_{pp} and Φ_{pp}^* , respectively, denote the effect of changes in p on the compensated excess demand for good 2 in the two countries. $\Phi_{qq} = E_{qq} - R_{qq}$ captures the effect of changes in q on Home's compensated excess demand for the non-tradable commodity 3. By the properties of the GDP and minimum expenditure functions, $\Phi_{pp} < 0$, $\Phi_{pp}^* < 0$, $\Phi_{qq} < 0$, thus, $H < 0$. $\Phi_{pq} = (E_{pq} - R_{pq})$ is the effect of changes in q on Home's compensated excess demand for the importable commodity 2. By our assumptions, if Home's importable good 2 and the non-tradable good 3 are substitutes in consumption, i.e., $E_{pq} > 0$, and production, i.e., $R_{pq} < 0$ then, $\Phi_{pq} > 0$. Hereon, when $\Phi_{pq} > 0$ we define goods 2 and 3 as *general equilibrium substitutes*, else when $\Phi_{pq} < 0$ we define the two commodities as *general equilibrium complements*, i.e., complements in consumption and production.

Equations (6) and (7) indicate that the effect of a change in the level of \bar{z} on Home's terms of trade and price of the non-tradable good, depends on (i) the emissions intensity of the importable and non-tradable goods, i.e., R_{pz} and R_{qz} , and (ii) on whether the two goods are *general equilibrium complements* or *substitutes*, i.e., depending on whether $\Phi_{pq} \geq 0$.

Given these specifications, we examine sufficient, albeit not necessary conditions, under which a tighter environmental regulation $d\bar{z} < 0$, improves Home's terms of trade, i.e., $\frac{dp}{d\bar{z}} > 0$. We state and discuss these conditions in Lemma 1.

Lemma 1 *A stricter environmental policy in the form of a lower level of \bar{z} , reduces the world price of the tradable good 2 and leads to an improvement in Home's terms of trade, in the following cases: (I) the tradable good 2 is non-emissions-intensive, the non-tradable good 3 is emissions-intensive, and the two goods are general equilibrium complements, or (II) goods 2 and 3 are emissions-intensive, general equilibrium complements, and the more emissions-intensive the non-tradable good is relative to the importable, or (III) the tradable good 2 is emissions-intensive, the non-tradable good 3 is non-emissions-intensive, the two goods are general equilibrium substitutes, and the larger is the increase in the output of good 3 relative to the reduction of good 2 with the reduction in allowable emissions.*

Discussion: Case (I): Eq. (6) indicates that the tighter level of allowable emissions entails a direct negative effect on the world price of the tradable, *non-emissions-intensive*, good 2, i.e., $R_{pz} \Phi_{qq} \Delta^{-1} > 0$. Further to it, the lower level \bar{z} entails an indirect effect

on p , via (i) its impact on the demand for and supply of the non-tradable, *emissions-intensive*, good 3, and (ii) the general equilibrium relationship of goods 2 and 3. Specifically, the lower level \bar{z} reduces the production of good 3, i.e., $R_{qz} > 0$, affecting, *ceteris paribus*, positively its price. As a result, the compensated excess demand for good 3 falls. Since goods 2 and 3 are assumed *general equilibrium complements*, the compensated excess demand for good 2 also falls, entailing a further, to the direct, decrease in the world price of good 2, i.e., $-(\Phi_{pq}R_{qz}\Phi_{qq}^{-1})\Phi_{qq}\Delta^{-1} > 0$. Overall, under the conditions of Case (I), the lower \bar{z} improves Home's terms of trade, i.e., $\frac{dp}{dz} > 0$.

A similar reasoning applies for the effect of the lower \bar{z} on q , the price of the non-tradable *emissions-intensive* good 3, as depicted in Eq. (7). The lower level of \bar{z} entails an increase in q , i.e., $R_{qz}H\Delta^{-1} < 0$, due to lower production of good 3. The indirect effect of the lower \bar{z} on q emerges via (i) its impact on the demand for and supply of the tradable, *non-emissions-intensive* good 2, and (ii) the general equilibrium relationship of goods 2 and 3. The lower \bar{z} increases the production of the tradable good 2, i.e., $R_{pz} < 0$, affecting, *ceteris paribus*, negatively its price. As a result, the compensated excess demand for good 2 increases. Since the two goods are assumed *general equilibrium complements*, the excess demand for good 3 also increases entailing a further increase in the price of the non-tradable good 3, i.e., $-(\Phi_{qp}R_{pz}H^{-1})H\Delta^{-1} < 0$. Overall, under the conditions of Case (I), lower \bar{z} call for an increase in the price of the non-tradable, *emissions-intensive*, good 3.

Case (II): By the conditions stated in Lemma 1 we have $R_{pz} > 0$, $R_{qz} > 0$ and $\Phi_{pq} < 0$. Now, the decrease in the allowable level of emissions reduces Home production of both goods 2 and 3. The lower level of \bar{z} entails a positive impact on the world price of the tradable good 2, i.e., $R_{pz}\Phi_{qq}\Delta^{-1}$, in Eq. (6), and, likewise, it entails a positive impact on the price of the non-tradable good 3, i.e., $R_{qz}H\Delta^{-1}$ in Eq. (7). For both prices, however, the lower level of \bar{z} also entails a negative impact, rendering, an overall ambiguous price effect. Specifically, as far as this second effect of the lower \bar{z} on p is concerned, i.e., $-(\Phi_{pq}\Phi_{qq}^{-1}R_{qz})\Phi_{qq}\Delta^{-1}$, the lower \bar{z} leads to a reduction of the world price of the tradable good 2, following the reasoning of this effect presented in Case (I) above. If so, then, the more *emissions-intensive* good 3 is relative to good 2, i.e., $R_{qz} \gg R_{pz}$, the more likely it is that, overall, the lower \bar{z} reduces p , i.e., $\frac{dp}{dz} > 0$, signifying an improvement in Home's terms of trade. Along the lines of the previous reasoning, and in accordance with Eq. (7), on the one hand, the lower level of \bar{z} , reduces the production of the non-tradable good 3 and increases its price (q). On the other hand, however, the lower level of \bar{z} by increasing the price of good 2, reduces the compensated excess demand for good 2, thus also, the compensated excess demand for good 3, since the goods are assumed *general equilibrium complements*. The latter effect entails a negative impact on the price q of the non-tradable good. Then, overall, the lower level of \bar{z} increases (decreases) the price of the *emissions-intensive* non-tradable good 3, the more (less) *emissions-intensive* this good is relative to good 2.

Case (III): By the conditions stated in Lemma 1 we have $R_{pz} > 0$, $R_{qz} < 0$, and $\Phi_{pq} > 0$. A stricter environmental policy, in the form of lower level of allowable emissions, by Home, lowers the production of good 2 and increases the production of the non-tradable good 3. Following the discussions of the previous two Cases, the lower \bar{z} entails a positive impact on the world price of the tradable good 2, i.e., $R_{pz}\Phi_{qq}\Delta^{-1}$, and a negative one, i.e., $-\Phi_{pq}R_{qz}\Delta^{-1}$. Overall, the lower \bar{z} improves Home's terms of trade, i.e., $\frac{dp}{dz} > 0$, assuming that goods 2 and 3 are *general equilibrium substitutes*, i.e., $\Phi_{pq} > 0$, and that the larger is

the increase in the output of good 3 with the reduction in allowable emissions, i.e., $R_{pz} \ll |R_{qz}|$.¹⁴

In the absence of non-tradable goods the standard result of the literature is that a laxer environmental policy improves a country's terms of trade, e.g., Copeland (2011), Jakob et al. (2013), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014). Böhringer et al. (2014), Balistreri et al. (2019), Montagna et al. (2020). In the presence of non-tradable goods, Böhringer et al. (2017) show that when, a priori, the emission tax is set at the Pigouvian level, then, other policy instruments such as a consumption tax and an output-based rebating of emissions tax payments, are required to improve a country's terms of trade. Contrary to this literature, we show that in the presence of non-tradable goods and the use of allowable emissions only, it is a stricter rather than a laxer level of such allowable emissions which can improve a country's terms of trade. This result depends on the emissions intensity of the importable and the non-tradable goods and on, what we call, the general equilibrium relationship between these goods.

Accordingly, a laxer environmental policy, captured by a higher level of allowable emissions, i.e., $d\bar{z} > 0$, improves Home's terms of trade in the following cases that are summarized in Lemma 2.

Lemma 2 *A laxer environmental policy in the form of a higher level of \bar{z} , improves Home's terms of trade in the following cases: (I) the tradable good 2 is emissions-intensive, the non-tradable good 3 is non-emissions-intensive, and the two goods are general equilibrium complements, or (II) goods 2 and 3 are emissions-intensive and general equilibrium substitutes, or (III) good 2 is non-emissions-intensive, good 3 is emissions-intensive, the two goods are general equilibrium substitutes, and the larger is the increase in the output of good 3 relative to the reduction of good 2 with the increase in allowable emissions.*

The discussion of Lemma 2 can be built along the lines of that for Lemma 1.¹⁵

4 Environmental Policy, Aggregate Pollution, and Emission Leakage Mitigation

As a result of its environmental policy, Home realizes two effects. The first effect, described in the previous section, is the *terms of trade effect*, which entails changes in both countries' patterns of production, thus, changes in the use of inputs, among which changes in the use of pollution emissions. The second effect, related to the induced terms of trade effect, is the so-called *emission leakage effect*, due to the assumed cross-border pollution between the two countries. For the purposes of our analysis, we focus on the emission leakage effect from Foreign to Home due to the latter country's unilateral environmental policy. From a policy stand point, we argue that Home can exploit the use of allowable emissions in production in order to maximize the country's welfare via two strategic motives, (i) an

¹⁴ Although not discussed, for brevity, the effect of changes in \bar{z} on the price of the non-tradable good 3, in case (III), the reasoning follows the one developed for case (I).

¹⁵ The analytical discussion of Lemma 2 is omitted since the stated results are in line with standard results of the relevant literature, by which an improvement in a country's terms of trade emerges due to a laxer environmental regulation, i.e., in our context, $d\bar{z} > 0$ and $\frac{dp}{d\bar{z}} < 0$.

improvement in the terms of trade, and (ii) the induced emission leakage effect. The analysis of this section nests the results of Lemmas 1 and 2 in Sect. 3, regarding an improvement in Home’s terms of trade due to a lower level of allowable emissions.

Using the results of the previous section, here, we discuss the impact of Home’s stricter unilateral environmental policy on aggregate pollution in the two countries, and we examine Home’s optimal level of \bar{z} when emissions are an input in the production of tradable and non-tradable goods.

Regarding the impact of a lower level of \bar{z} on overall pollution we note the following. Under Lemma 1, pollution generated in Home, i.e., z , falls due to the country’s stricter unilateral environmental policy, and pollution generated in Foreign, i.e., $z^*(p)$, also falls. The reason is that the fall in p signifies a worsening in Foreign’s terms of trade, leading in a reduction in production of its exportable good 2, hence, reduction in the use of emissions. Under Lemma 2, however, the impact of a higher level of \bar{z} on aggregate pollution is ambiguous. Specifically, pollution generated in Home increases due to its laxer unilateral environmental policy, while in Foreign, pollution falls due to the policy induced worsening in the country’s terms of trade. We state the following *Lemma*.

Lemma 3 *Under the conditions of Lemma 1, aggregate pollution in the two countries unambiguously falls with a unilateral stricter level of allowable emissions.*

Next, we examine Home’s optimal unilateral environmental policy. Totally differentiate Eq. (4), using Eqs. (1)¹⁶ and (6) we obtain the welfare effects of a lower level of emissions (\bar{z}) allowed, as follows:

$$E_u \frac{du}{d\bar{z}} = \underbrace{-(E_r - R_z)}_{\text{domestic environmental effect}} - \underbrace{(E_p - R_p) \frac{dp}{d\bar{z}}}_{\text{terms of trade effect}} - \underbrace{\alpha E_r z_p^* \frac{dp}{d\bar{z}}}_{\text{emission leakage effect}}. \tag{8}$$

Recall that by the structure of the model, $z_p^* > 0$. Equation (8) indicates that a lower level of allowable \bar{z} impacts Home’s welfare via three channels. First, it raises welfare if the marginal environmental damage of domestically generated emissions is higher than its marginal abatement cost, i.e., $E_r > R_z$. We call this, the *domestic environmental effect*, captured by the first right-hand-side term of the equation. The second right-hand side term, is the *terms of trade effect*, and it captures the welfare impact of the lower level of allowable \bar{z} via the induced changes in the country’s terms of trade. Provided that good 2 is Home’s importable good, its compensated excess demand is positive, i.e., $E_p - R_p > 0$, and an improvement in the terms of trade is denoted by a reduction of its world relative price, i.e., $\frac{dp}{d\bar{z}} > 0$. Under the conditions set in Lemma 1, the terms of trade effect exerts a positive impact on Home’s welfare, thus, attaining the first strategic motive of Home’s stricter environmental regulation. The third right-hand side term is the *emission leakage effect* of the lower level of allowable \bar{z} on Home’s welfare. Home’s government, by lowering \bar{z} induces a decline in the the world relative price of good 2. This in turn, leads to a decline in its production and the use of pollution as input in Foreign. In this way, via the lower level of \bar{z} , Home attains its second strategic motive, that is, the mitigation of cross-border pollution generated in Foreign. Based on our model’s specification, when $d\bar{z} < 0$ and $\frac{dp}{d\bar{z}} > 0$, Home’s

¹⁶ Totally differentiating Eq. (1) we obtain $dr = dz + \alpha z_p^* \frac{dp}{dz}$.

welfare improvement is larger the closer is cross-border pollution to being perfect, i.e., $\alpha \simeq 1$.

Home's welfare maximizing unilateral environmental policy is obtained by setting $\frac{du}{d\bar{z}} = 0$ in Eq. (8) to obtain:

$$R_z = E_r + \underbrace{(E_p - R_p)}_{\text{terms of trade effect}} \frac{dp}{d\bar{z}} + \underbrace{\alpha E_r z_p^*}_{\text{emission leakage effect}} \frac{dp}{d\bar{z}}. \quad (9)$$

To better understand the emerging result, we first consider the case where Home is a small open economy unable to affect through its environmental policy the world price of the tradable good 2, i.e., $\frac{dp}{d\bar{z}} = 0$. In this case, Eq. (9) reduces to the standard result $R_z = E_r$. That is, since the world relative price remains unaffected, the country sets its welfare maximizing level of \bar{z} so that the marginal environmental damage of a unit of pollution is equal to the marginal abatement cost.

Next, we allow for the case where Home is a large open economy, and world prices are affected by its environmental policy, i.e., $\frac{dp}{d\bar{z}} \neq 0$. Then, the country can use strategically the environmental policy in order to capture both the terms of trade and the emission leakage motives. Both these effects emerge via the policy induced changes in the world relative price of good 2. The sign of these two strategic effects determine whether, relative to the case where the terms of trade are fixed i.e., $\frac{dp}{d\bar{z}} = 0$, and $R_z = E_r$, Home sets a laxer policy resulting in $R_z < E_r$ or it sets a stricter policy which leads to $R_z > E_r$.

Lemma 1 presents cases (I)–(III) under which when Home adopts a stricter level of allowable emissions, i.e., $d\bar{z} < 0$, the world relative price for the tradable good 2 falls, and the country's terms of trade improve, i.e., $\frac{dp}{d\bar{z}} > 0$. In these cases, Home, in order to capture the terms of trade and emission leakage motives has a strategic incentive to allow for the use of a lower level of emissions as an input in production, relative to the case where the world relative price of the tradable good 2 is fixed. Furthermore, Home's incentive is stronger, the closer pollution is to being perfectly transboundary. Lemma 2 presents cases (I)–(III) under which when Home allows for the use of a laxer level of emissions in production, i.e., $d\bar{z} > 0$. Then, the world relative price for the tradable good 2 falls, and the country's terms of trade improve, i.e., $\frac{dp}{d\bar{z}} < 0$. This, again, implies that Home has an incentive to unilaterally set a laxer environmental policy strategically, to the case when $\frac{dp}{d\bar{z}} = 0$, so as to reduce the world price of its importable good, and capture the terms of trade and emission leakage effects. We state the following Proposition.

Proposition 1 *It is the emissions intensities of tradable and non-tradable goods, and their relationship in production and consumption which, under the conditions of Lemma 1, call for a stricter level of allowable emissions in order to capture the terms of trade and emission leakage strategic motives.*

The standard result in the relevant literature is that in the presence of endogenous terms of trade and transboundary pollution, but in the absence of non-tradable goods, governments can attain both the terms of trade and emission leakage motives via a laxer environmental policy. Through it, governments provide an implicit subsidy to their import competing sector, thus, manipulating the terms of trade to their advantage by reducing the world price of the importable good. The reduction in the world price of a country's importable, reduces production and production-generated pollution abroad, e.g., Copeland (2011),

Jakob et al. (2013), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014), Böhringer et al. (2014), Balistreri et al. (2019), Montagna et al. (2020). This result attains the country's second strategic objective, namely, the emission leakage mitigation.

In the presence of non-tradable goods, Böhringer et al. (2017), show that when, a priori, the emission tax is set at the Pigouvian level, then, other policy instruments such as a consumption tax and an output-based rebating of emissions tax payments, are required to maximize a country's welfare by capturing the terms of trade and emission leakage motives. Within our context, it is the emissions intensities of tradable and non-tradable goods and their general equilibrium relationship, i.e., their relationship in production and consumption, which, under the conditions of Lemma 1, meet the strategic objectives with a stricter environmental policy, while, under the conditions of Lemma 2, meet these strategic objectives with a laxer environmental policy. For analytical tractability our model considered the presence of non-tradable goods only in one country. The present model can be extended to include non-tradable goods in both countries, but at the expense of considerable analytical complexities. We state the following Proposition.

Proposition 2 *It is the emissions intensities of tradable and non-tradable goods, and their relationship in production and consumption which, under the conditions of Lemma 2, call for a laxer level of allowable emissions in order to capture the terms of trade and emission leakage strategic motives.*

A notable policy implication of this result is the following. In our framework a unilateral environmental policy by a country may be effective in reducing pollution, without exacerbating environmental damages in the presence of terms of trade and emission leakage motives. This result, policy wise, does not necessitate the use of additional policy instruments, e.g., either BCAs or rebates of emissions tax payments, in order to control for the emission leakage.

5 Concluding Remarks

An extensive theoretical and empirical literature advocates that in the presence of cross-border pollution and endogenous terms of trade, when countries are restricted from the use of trade policy instruments, then, unilateral tighter environmental measures may fail to reduce global pollution levels. This is because the presence of strategic motives, such as terms of trade gains and emission leakage mitigation, induce countries to weaken their environmental policies. In this paper we show that, despite the presence of such strategic objectives, it is a stricter rather than a laxer level of allowable emissions which can lead to lower levels of emissions leakage. In the current context accounting for both tradable and non-tradable goods, and for the use of emissions as an input in production, it is the emissions intensities in production of tradable and non-tradable goods, and their relationship in production and consumption which bring this result. Understanding the conditions under which carbon leakage is positive or negative is critical also in the light of the proposal of the European Commission of a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism as part of the European Green Deal (COM 2021). We suggest that a possible failure to understand and measure these factors can lead to the establishment of excessively high taxes that can harm trade flows and consumer welfare. On top of that, in an era where global environmental

agreements are disputed, such features may attest to the design of pollution mitigating and welfare improving unilateral environmental policies.

We view our findings as a first step where relative emissions intensities are important in determining the magnitude and the direction of carbon leakage with an active policy maker. However, a more detailed analysis where potential polluters decide about pollution by taking into account the actions of others (e.g., Xepapadeas 2022) among policy makers can bring into light additional features. Feedback loops are particularly relevant to the issue of carbon leakage, as the relocation of emissions-intensive activities to less regulated countries can lead to further emissions in those countries, resulting in a further leakage of emissions. This has a knock-on effect on the environment, as these emissions are often produced in countries with weaker environmental regulations, resulting in an increase in global emissions and a decrease in the effectiveness of environmental policies. Therefore, the strategic response of these countries over time deserves also some attention in future research endeavors.

Our findings can contribute to the ongoing debate of the quantitative literature discussed in the introduction. In a future research endeavor, our theoretical results could be quantified by applying a two-step process. First, provide a ranking in terms of relative emissions intensities of the importable and the non-tradable sectors. Second, characterize the general equilibrium relations between the goods produced by these sectors, as general equilibrium complements or substitutes. To this end, two testable hypotheses, TH1 and TH2, could be examined. TH1: Tighter regulation leads to a negative emission leakage. TH2: Tighter regulation leads to a positive emission leakage. The first testable hypothesis, TH1, is verified when the two-step process yields that the non-tradable sector is relatively more emissions-intensive compared to the importable sector and the two goods are general equilibrium complements. The second testable hypothesis, TH2, can be realized when one of the following conditions applies. The importable good is more emissions-intensive compared to the non-tradable good and the two goods are general equilibrium complements, or when the two goods are both emissions-intensive and general equilibrium substitutes.

Appendix

Totally differentiating the Eqs. (2) and (3), we obtain the following comparative statics results:

$$\begin{bmatrix} H & \Phi_{pq} \\ \Phi_{qp} & \Phi_{qq} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} dp \\ dq \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} R_{p\bar{z}} \\ R_{q\bar{z}} \end{bmatrix} d\bar{z}, \quad (\text{A.1})$$

The determinant of the left-hand-side matrix is $\Delta = H\Phi_{qq} - \Phi_{pq}^2 > 0$, where $H = \Phi_{pp} + \Phi_{pp}^* < 0$. Since the expenditure functions are concave and the GDP functions are convex in prices, it follows that $\Phi_{pp}\Phi_{qq} - \Phi_{pq}^2 > 0$, thus Δ is positive.

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