CORRECTIONS

The following corrections should be made to the article “Nash Equilibrium in a Special Case of Symmetric Resource Extraction Games,” by I. V. Sylenko, Vol. 57, No. 5, pp. 809–819, September–October, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10559-021-00406-1>.

1. Page 809, paragraph 2, row 5 of the Introduction should read:

“At the same time, coefficients of the combination are allowed to depend on a players’ joint investment at a current stage of the game.”

2. Page 809, paragraph 3, row 1 of the Introduction should read:

“The proposed game model of this paper is symmetric, in which the utility functions need not be bounded, the state space is expanded to $[0; +\infty]$,”

3. Page 810, paragraph 2, row 1 should read:

“The power utility function together with the chosen transition probabilities allows us to prove a symmetric stationary Nash equilibrium existence by constructing converging sequences of Nash equilibriums and the appropriate payoffs in the corresponding finite horizon games.”

4. Page 810, paragraph 4 of Section 1 should read:

“A2 is as follows: if $x_t = (x_{t1}, x_{t2}, \dots, x_{im})$ are players’ decisions at time t , then the next state is determined from the preceding value s_t by the equation

$$s_{t+1} = \left(s_t - \sum_{i=1}^m x_{ti} \right) \cdot \xi,$$

where ξ is a non-negative random variable with a known distribution;”

5. Page 811, paragraph 3, row 2 should read:

“...if no unilateral deviations from it are profitable ...”

6. Page 811, paragraph 4 should read:

“...the equilibrium is called symmetric.”

7. Page 811, Proof, paragraph 2 should read:

“In this case, we must show the existence of a vector $\bar{a} = (a, \dots, a)$, $a \in A(s)$ such that $\forall i \dots$ ”

8. Page 812, paragraph 1 should read:

“The second partial derivative is negative in the interior of the domain and does not exist at certain boundary points. However, due to the function g being continuous, these properties are sufficient to conclude that $g(\cdot, y)$ with a fixed second argument is strictly concave in $A(s)$.”

9. Page 812, Proof, paragraph 2 should read:

“Here, as well as in what follows, the expectation operator is taken with respect to the probability measure of the random variable ξ .”

10. Page 813, paragraph 5, row 3 should read:

“Since strategies $\pi_i^{(n)}$ ($i=1, \dots, m$) are identical, the equilibrium is symmetric.”

11. Page 814, the last row should read:

“therefore, π^* is a symmetric stationary Nash equilibrium in the game G with the initial state $s_1 \in S$.”