Abstract
I shall present in this article a double negation account of the distinction between causes and background conditions. Such an account will be based on the idea that, unlike causes, background conditions allow for certain effects by way of double prevention. In Sect. 1 I shall introduce objective and non-objective theories of the causes-background conditions distinction and I shall discuss and reject some non-objective theories. In Sect. 2 I shall examine some existing objective theories and argue that they need to be supplemented in two relevant respects. In Sect. 3 I shall present my double negation account. Background conditions will be taken to allow for their effects by acting as early double preventers, late double preventers or effect double preventers. In Sect. 4 I shall deal with two main problems, i.e., the possibility of interpreting background conditions as purely indirect causes and the introduction of negative entities in my account, and with further issues.
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Notes
My use of the “grounding” terminology here and elsewhere is non-committal. Namely, I am not committed to the truth of theories of metaphysical grounding (see Bliss and Trogdon 2021).
Is it also exhaustive? This depends on the category to which both causes and background conditions are taken to belong. For example, if both causes and background conditions belonged to the category of entities responsible for the occurrence of an effect, then the distinction could be exhaustive, since everything that is responsible for the occurrence of an effect either is a cause or a background condition.
I concede that, when one talks of in principle interventions—without restricting them to the physical capacities of human beings—the theory may turn out to be objective. However, this does not imply that the resulting distinction between causes and background conditions turns out to be adequate. For in principle interventions are possible both with respect to causes and with respect to background conditions. On interventionist theories of causation, see for example Woodward (2016).
One may object that, if the epistemic interest of a knowing subject only consisted in knowing the truth about the external world, a real and objective way of distinguishing between causes and BG-conditions could turn out to be grounded on such an interest. Therefore, the resulting theory would turn out to be non-objective. I reply that this scenario is incoherent. If a knowing subject is only interested in knowing the truth about the external world, it is a real and objective way of distinguishing between causes and BG-conditions that grounds the fulfilment of that interest, not the other way round.
Strevens (2008) treats BG-conditions as presuppositions behind explanatory frameworks. Unlike causes, BG-conditions do not act as difference-makers within those frameworks. Strevens’ theory may be interpreted either in the first way, or in the second way.
This second interpretation is more in line with Dretske (2010).
Skow fully endorses this claim in Skow (2018).
In the neighbourhood of this theory and with respect to actions, Dancy (2006) distinguishes between favouring/disfavouring conditions, enabling/disabling conditions and intensifiers/attenuators. The former favour/disfavour actions. Enabling/disabling conditions enable/disable something else to/from be(ing) a favouring/disfavouring condition. Intensifiers/attenuators intensify/attenuate something else’s being a favouring/disfavouring condition. Austin (2019: 79–84) distinguishes between causal responsibility and causal relevance. Causally responsible items make it the case that the causally relevant factors are causally relevant and that they are causally relevant in specific ways.
Of course, if by “preventer” we point to the actual occurring of the preventive action (e.g., that someone destroys the matches), then it turns out to be legitimate to talk of the absence of preventers. However, first, this does not grasp the intuitive idea behind preventers and double preventers. In order for double preventers to be in place, not only must their corresponding preventers be absent (i.e., non-occurring), but the latter must also be possibly occurring—were it not for double preventers. Secondly, talking of the absence of preventers restricts our field of investigation. On the contrary, it is also possible to single out positive BG-conditions—and positive (early) double preventers.
Of course, the relevant “something else” which is prevented should be at least nomologically incompatible with the presence of the resources at stake. It may be objected that resources behave like causes. Indeed, even causes—like resources—should just be present in order for the effect to take place. But resources—unlike causes—need not ‘just be present’ in order for the effect to take place. Resources must be present beyond a certain threshold, i.e., they must be ‘no less than enough’ in order for the effect to take place—or, better, in order to prevent something else that could prevent the causal process/the cause/the effect.
But see Paolini Paoletti (2021).
A necessary condition for indirect causes to qualify as bona fide causes of their effect is the transitivity of causation, i.e., that if c causes d and d causes e, then c causes e. However, the transitivity of causation is not sufficient for having indirect causes. A certain cause by transitivity c may just qualify as a cause simpliciter of e, without the need to introduce any further distinction between direct and indirect causes. On the transitivity of causation, see for example Paul and Hall (2013) and Gallow (2022).
For a discussion of negative entities (and more specifically of negative properties and facts) see Paolini Paoletti (2017).
It may be argued that, in this scenario, the preventer (i.e., the sear’s being up) may also count as a cause of the spring’s being cocked. Therefore, it also counts as an indirect cause of the cocked spring’s getting uncoiled and of the bullet’s leaving the gun. However, this does not endanger our theory. For the double preventer (i.e., pulling the trigger) does not cause the sear’s being up, so that it cannot count as an indirect cause of the relevant effects.
See for example McGrath (2005).
I assume here, as I have done above, that the causal processes going from the direct causes to the effects do not contain further causes. Otherwise, the direct causes at stake would turn out to be indirect.
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Funding was provided by Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca (Grant No. PRIN 2017 "The Manifest Image and the Scientific Image").
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Paolini Paoletti, M. Causes Versus Background Conditions: A Double Negation Account. glob. Philosophy 33, 1 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-023-09664-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-023-09664-4