The European Commission and the “Europeanisation” of EU trade diplomacy: the case of EU-China relations, 1999–2021

In recent times, the European Commission has shown to have increasing difficulty keeping up its central position in trade diplomacy towards China, in the face of a growing wariness and assertiveness of the member states. In this article, we observe a changing balance, a development from EU diplomacy towards European diplomacy, meaning a growing influence of EU member states in the process. We call this the “Europeanisation” of EU economic diplomacy. This is not limited to China and reflects a broader development, as is visible in the politicisation of the negotiation processes towards the (failed) Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the (provisionally applied) Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada, and also in the trend towards mixed agreements that require member state ratification. However, it was particularly in the relations with China that such trends became visible for the first time and have continued to manifest themselves throughout the years. Apart from the member states assembled in the Council, also the European Parliament has strengthened its position in the process at the expense of the Commission.


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regarding the historical development of EU trade diplomacy with distinct references to China-EU relations.
The research is based on a study of literature and primary sources on the topic, in combination with some interviews with (anonymous) stakeholders. So far, publications on the Commission's role in EU-China trade diplomacy have been scarce. The European Commission is covered widely in the academic literature (Spence and Edwards 2006;Ellinas and Suleiman 2012;Kassim et al. 2013;Wille 2013;Ban 2013, to name just a few), but the focus on China and trade is minimal in these works. The same could be said about the area of economic diplomacy: many publications have seen the light, also from a European perspective (e.g. Woolcock 2011Woolcock , 2012, but mostly without detailed coverage of China-EU relations. An exception is the research done by the British political scientist Michael Smith, who published two important articles on the topic (Smith 2014 and, but while addressing EU-China economic diplomacy, Smith gives no explicit attention to the role played by the European Commission. A similar omission applies to two relevant articles focussing on the Chinese side (Men 2013 andZhang 2014). Moreover, the literature on the activities of the Commission's delegation (since 2009: EU delegation) in Beijing is again limited and also more general in scope than focused on trade relations (Austermann 2012).
The main argument put forward in the following is that, in recent times, the European Commission has experienced increasing difficulty keeping up its central role and influence in economic diplomacy towards China. We observe a changing balance, a development from EU diplomacy towards European diplomacy, meaning a growing influence of EU member states in the process. This is not limited to China and reflects a broader development, but it was particularly in the relations with China that such trends became visible for the first time-see, for example, the debate on the market economy status around 2005 and the controversy on textiles. It is true that in the latter case, the Commission was able after all to settle the issue, but this clearly did not convince the member states, who continued to promote their own concerns, thus Europeanising EU economic diplomacy. Related to this development, we observe that individual policymakers within the European Commission managed to make their mark, but nowadays they can no longer be seen as the main drivers in shaping EU-China trade relations.
The set-up of this article is as follows: after defining different forms of economic diplomacy, we provide a brief history of the EU's Common Commercial Policy. Subsequently, we address the impact of the Commission's trade policies on the interinstitutional and legal levels (Sect. 3). In the fourth section we dive deeper into the specificities of EU-China trade relations, followed by a final conclusion.

Difference between EU and European economic diplomacy
Economic diplomacy plays a crucial role in the economic relations between China and the EU. There is arguably an interactive aspect to it related to the bilateral dynamics between two actors. However, this contribution focuses mostly on one single actor and defines economic diplomacy, unilaterally rather than interactively,

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The European Commission and the "Europeanisation" of EU trade… as the ability of this actor, the European Commission, to shape international trade relations in general and trade relations with China in particular. EU economic diplomacy formally differs from European economic diplomacy. The former looks at how the EU institutions reach (or fail to reach) common positions or objectives that they subsequently seek to promote in interaction with third parties, in our case China (Woolcock 2011 and. In both stages-consensus formation and interactionmember states play a role only through the EU institutions in which they are represented, most importantly the Council of Ministers. European economic diplomacy is different because it reserves a more prominent position for the member states, operating independently and separately from the European institutions, sometimes even in conflict with these institutions (Okano-Heymans and Montesano 2016). In this paper, we start with a focus on EU economic diplomacy because of the EU's exclusive competence over trade policy, in which the EU Commission traditionally has been playing the leading role. However, we try to show that, in the course of time, the growing involvement of the member states has affected the Commission's guiding position, also and especially in its relations with China.
While economic diplomacy covers many particular issues (including, for example, monetary cooperation), this contribution is exclusively concerned with what falls under the EU's Common Commercial Policy. After all, this is the field where the question of the balance of influence between member states and EU institutions is most relevant and consequential.

Historical background: Common Commercial policy and the change of focus towards FTAs
The EU has a long history in economic diplomacy. For decades, it has manifested itself as the world's largest trader in manufactured goods and services. Economics and trade are the most important expressions of the EU's weight in the global arena, instigated by the early emphasis the then-EC countries placed on the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), which started in the 1960s. Under CCP, the member states have delegated considerable authority to the European supranational institutions to supervise their trade relations, with the aim of increasing trade among themselves and strengthening their bargaining power vis-a-vis the rest of the world (Smith 2014). This arrangement particularly benefited the European Commission, with its exclusive right of initiative in trade matters.
Since the 1960s, economic diplomacy has grown in importance and complexity, mostly because international economic exchange of all sorts expanded immensely in this period. Trade agreements need the formal and informal approval of an ever larger group of actors (both state and non-state). From the early 1990s, the European Union, empowered by its increasing size and scope, started to pursue leadership aspirations in global commerce. As a matter of fact, by shaping the Doha Development Agenda, launched in 2001, the Union openly showed its ambitions (Evenett 2007). Doha failed to materialize, also due to controversies on EU agricultural subsidies, but it did not prevent the EU from continuing to pursue a pro-active agenda, increasingly focusing on region-to-region trade rather than multilateral strategies in 1 3 an attempt to export the European model of post-Westphalian international relations to other regions of the world. However, this block-to-block strategy produced disappointing results, and since 2011, the EU has turned to a policy of negotiating bilateral preferential or free trade agreements with individual countries, such as South Korea, Singapore, Canada, and Japan (European Commission 2006a).
Against this background, the Union has also tried to launch a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with China to update the 1985 Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement, but the negotiations between the two parties have become deadlocked for a long time due to mutual divergences and political sensitivities. We will come back to this later in the article.

Inter-institutional balance and legal developments
How well positioned is the European Commission to play a leading role in the EU's economic diplomacy? To analyse this, we first take a look at (inter-) institutional developments, the position of the Directorate-General (DG) Trade vis-à-vis other actors, and the influence of legal/treaty changes on the Commission's role in international trade. Subsequently, Sect. 4 will narrow this down to the concrete implications for EU-China trade relations.
Since the early days, the Commission's activities in the field of economic diplomacy have been steadily centred around DG Trade. DG Trade, formerly DG I (External Economic Relations), is the core of EU policy-making in international trade. Even the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the appointment of a High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy have not produced major institutional changes in the fundamental structure of European economic/trade diplomacy (Smith 2014). Indicative is that DG Trade has managed to survive all rounds of internal organisational reform in the Commission, like the abolition of the DG External Relations (RELEX) in 2010 (which was merged into the EEAS), the introduction of a new cluster structure under President Juncker (2014-2019), or the working of project teams in the present Von der Leyen Commission.
The importance of international trade within the Commission is reflected in the prominence of the individual commissioners who have held the portfolio during the period under discussion. The position is generally seen as one of the more prestigious posts in the College of Commissioners, perhaps comparable only with the portfolios of competition, economic, and financial affairs, and formerly agriculture. As a result, some eminent individuals have been called to the job. Particularly Pascal Lamy (1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004), former chef de cabinet under President Delors and later to become Director-General of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), was considered a heavyweight in and outside the Commission bureaucracy, and also Peter Mandelson (many times UK government minister under PMs Blair and Brown) was rated as an influential Commissioner (Elsig and Dupont 2012). Lamy helped to facilitate China's WTO membership in 2001, and Mandelson (2004-2008 played an important role in resolving, at least temporarily, the textile conflict with China in the mid-2000s. The prestige of the job of Trade Commissioner was illustrated by Leon

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The European Commission and the "Europeanisation" of EU trade… Brittan, Lamy's predecessor, who commented that 'Frankly, it is more important than most [national] cabinet jobs' (Burson-Marsteller Insights & Reports 2006).
The Commission's (and DG Trade's) central position made it possible-at least for a long time-to depoliticise trade policy, with beneficial effects for the EU in terms of output efficiency. The EU's exclusive competence furthered expediency and pragmatism in decision-making-a development that is more visible in trade than in other Europeanised policy areas like environment or financial market regulation, where we rather find mixed or shared competences (Woolcock 2011).
The Commission's centrality does not imply that it can claim unilateral authority in trade matters. There is a continuous interaction between the European institutions, the member states, and other actors. Within the Commission, DG Trade has to take account of the preferences of other DGs with sometimes strongly diverging viewpoints, like DG Grow (internal market, industry, entrepreneurship, and SMEs) and DG Employment & Social Affairs. For example, with regard to China, we witness conflicts of competence between DG Trade and DG Competition on the important dossier of digital policies (Korteweg 2019).
The Commission stays also in direct contact with interest groups, particularly European federations like BusinessEurope and EUROFER (as in the long-lasting steel dispute with the US and China). In the mid-2000s, the European Confederation of the Footwear Industry (CEC) and the European Trade Union Federation (textiles, clothing, and leather) lobbied the Commission successfully to impose antidumping measures on footwear imports from China and Vietnam (Heron 2007;Eckhardt 2011). In the EU-China solar panel conflict of 2012/2013, Commissioner Karel de Gucht had to manoeuvre delicately between defensive pressures from European industry and actors that gave support to China.
Most importantly, the member states, assembled in the Council, have consistently managed to keep a substantial finger in the pie. In the area of international trade, the mandates that authorise the Commission, as a supranational body, to engage in formal negotiations are discussed within the intergovernmental Trade Policy Committee (TPC), which represents top civil servants of the various member states, and approved by member states in the EU Council. After a TPC agreement, authorisation on the Commission's mandate is given by the Council. TPC assists the Commission also in the process of negotiating with third countries. The negotiations themselves are the domain of civil servants of DG Trade, but there is a constant exchange with the member states. In some cases, the Commission's powers are limited. Although it has considerable discretion in antidumping and other trade defence matters, the Commission always has to move within the framework of existing rules and regulations. For example, in the early 2000s, in the consultations with China on the latter's market economy status (MES), the Commission was not in the position to play its favoured role of double negotiator (within the EU and with the outside partner) because of successful opposition of a few (in this case: southern) member states. It turned out to be difficult to arrive at a "deal" with China, as relevant regulations contained specific criteria that disciplined decisions on MES. In fact, since the Commission had no negotiating mandate concerning MES, it could never engage in formal negotiations, even though it obviously consulted the Chinese side on many occasions (Gaenssmantel 2012).
Ideological divisions between member states persistently shape the making of trade policy, international consultations, and the conduct of trade negotiations. Despite the Union's exclusive competence and the Commission's right of initiative, the national governments keep claiming a substantial share in EU economic diplomacy, especially when they manage to form powerful coalitions among themselves and with interest groups. Trade orientations of the member states are diffuse, ranging from the liberal free-market position of most Northern and some Eastern members to neo-mercantilist attitudes among Southern members, with the most important member country, Germany, positioned somewhere in-between (Woolcock 2012). With regard to China, Fox and Godement have identified four groups of EU countries: ideological free traders (Sweden, the Netherlands, etc.), accommodating mercantilists (mostly Southern members), assertive industrialists (like Germany under Merkel), and European followers (countries like Belgium and Ireland) (Fox and Godement 2009). As a result, it is difficult for the Commission to find an adequate mix between "value-creating" (liberal) and "value-claiming" (protectionist) strategies in the EU (Woolcock 2011).
Since 2005, the European Parliament has also become involved in inter-institutional procedures through the participation of the International Trade Committee (INTA). Initially, INTA had difficulty to play a similar influential role as TPC has. This has changed with the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), which gave the EP the right of consent (and therefore veto power) over all trade-related agreements. It also placed commercial policy under the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP), i.e. the EP is now involved in decisions on rules on imports, including, for example, antidumping regulations and rules on non-market economies contained in them. This has direct implications for China and the Commission: since the EP is known for its Chinacritical track record, it makes any revision of the existing regulatory framework in favour of China or in favour of more leeway for the Commission to make pragmatic deals with China less likely. A striking example of its rising power is the EP's rejection-with a large majority-of the Commission-sponsored European investment agreement with China (in May 2021), whereby Xinjiang-related sanctions and counter-sanctions helped the hawks (China critics) in the EP.
Consequently, for the European Commission, the outcomes of the Lisbon Treaty are mixed. On the one hand, the institution has strengthened its hand in that issues like trade in services, intellectual property, and investments are no longer "shared competences" but now fall under its direct responsibility. On the other hand, as just mentioned, the shift to OLP also for trade has weakened the Commission's traditional pre-dominance. In the old system, where the Council could confirm at qualified majority but needed unanimity to revise a proposal, the exclusive right of initiative put the Commission in a very strong position. Nowadays, even if it still disposes of the exclusive right to initiate legislation, the way forward in principle depends on how Council and EP manage to make a deal. De facto, the Commission continues to be the dominant force in the renowned "trilogues" (tripartite meetings between the Commission, Council, and Parliament), but it no longer occupies the same steering position as it did before.
What also has changed recently is the role of the European Council, which has successfully claimed increasing involvement in international trade policy. As a result of the public outcry surrounding the negotiations on TTIP and CETA, the heads of state and government have become more concerned about the voice of the citizen in issues of external trade. They feel that the European Council, more than the Commission, is in the position to take real account of the concerns of citizens and increase transparency in trade matters (Werts 2016). All this confirms that in legal and institutional terms, the Commission's primacy in international trade is increasingly challenged. How does this play out in the relationship with China?

EU-China trade relations
The trade relationship between China and the EU is characterised by a far-reaching form of institutional proliferation, ranging from regular summits at the highest political level to the so-called high-level economic and trade dialogue, other sectoral dialogues, working groups, networks, platforms, etc. The most established framework is the Joint Committee, created by the first EC-China Framework Agreement of 1978 (which was replaced by the Cooperation Agreement of 1985). The Joint Committee oversees the entire commercial relationship between the two parties involved being the main body for accompanying and developing Sino-European trade relations. Meetings alternate between Beijing and Brussels, and the chair of the committee also rotates between the two sides. The European Union is represented by the European Commission, assisted by representatives of the member states.
Policy-making in the EU vis-a-vis China is thus a complicated and interwoven process of formulating a common interest that spans different levels of governance. Various actors with specific interests cooperate both horizontally (between the institutions of the EU as well as among the member states) and vertically (between the European, national, and subnational levels) to jointly agree on problem-solving mechanisms and how to use them. To highlight its position on EU-China relations, the Commission regularly sends reports (called "communications") to the European Parliament and the (European) Council (e.g. European Commission 2006b, 2006c. The EU has proved to be successful mostly in those cases where it managed to remain united behind the Commission. A concrete example: in the late 1990s/ early 2000s, one of the main topics on the agenda was the accession of China to the GATT/WTO. The primary role in the bilateral negotiations on the European side was with the Commission, due to the legal provisions laid down in the European Treaties. Already in 1988, the Commission had asked the Council of Ministers for authorisation to start negotiations with China on the latter's accession to the GATT. With the Council's consent, the central role was played by DG Trade, headed by the forceful Commissioner Pascal Lamy and closely assisted by Commission delegation leader Endymion Wilkinson. Lamy had substantial leeway in that, in the critical final phase, he negotiated directly with the Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji. Other DGs were involved only when topics affecting their responsibilities were touched upon. In practice, this concerned mainly external affairs, internal market, industry, and telecommunication. During the entire negotiation process, the Commission coordinated its position closely with the member states and respective industrial sectors, like the automotive sector, banking and insurance, and telecommunications. Furthermore, representatives from European companies in China were also involved. At decisive stages of the negotiation process, it proved to be most helpful to have high-level meetings at the ministerial level (Algieri 2002, 65-74). What was noteworthy in this process was that the EU managed to remain a relatively unified actor under the Commission's guidance.
Another important occasion where the EU managed to keep the ranks closed was in the talks with China on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). In this case, the EU agreed on working with model agreements (similar for all partners), which included sensitive political clauses like conditionality. However, these EU-desired clauses proved unacceptable for China, as a result of which the negotiations became deadlocked for a long period of time. Despite this, it showed that the Commission was able to control internal divergences and uphold the Union's exclusive competence, even if it concerned a politically delicate topic as the PCA.
An early illustration of a changing landscape-affecting the central role of the Commission-was the issue of managing textile imports from China at a time (mid-2000s) when the European market became swamped with cheap Chinese products. Commissioner Mandelson initially succeeded in settling the "Bra War", but it soon turned out that the bilateral arrangement concluded with China failed to fully convince the member states, who insisted on promoting their own concerns, thereby undermining the Commission's authority. French President Sarkozy characterised Mandelson's China policy as "too naïve" and demanded the end of naivety and reciprocity (Zhang 2014). Protectionist critique mixed with liberal reservations. In the aftermath of the textile agreement, it was particularly the West-European importers of Chinese textiles who continuously exerted pressure on the Commission to extend the quota on imports from China.
In the second half of 2007, Dreyer and Erixon observe a remarkable change of strategy in the European Commission with regard to external trade issues. Previously, the Commission had been rather "unresponsive" to calls from more protectionist-leaning countries in Europe about the need for a "tough approach" on China. However, in this period, Commissioner Mandelson made a "u-turn" and "moved away from his traditionally free-trade spirited logic", in the words of Dreyer and Erixon. In a speech in the autumn of 2007, the Commissioner said that China behaved like a "juggernaut" in the world economy, spinning "out of control"-expressions that were interpreted as "China-bashing" on the part of the Commission. From then on, countries in favour of free trade were no longer certain of automatic Commission support-they had to "pick their fights" to prevent the Commission from tougher rhetoric and policy (Dreyer and Erixon 2008). Particularly alarming, in the view of the two authors, was the case of introducing antidumping tariffs on Chinese air compressors. Remarkably, the Commission had decided on these tariffs against the will of the member-states, which confronted the actors involved with a new situation. Previously, it was the member states that asked the Commission for punitive measures; now it was the Commission itself that decided to do so. Dreyer and Erixon warned that this would affect the standard defence by the Commission-"Don't blame us, blame the member states"-in "politicised cases where serious questions are being raised about the merits of antidumping" (Dreyer and Erixon 2008). Issues like this one did not help to increase the credibility of the Commission vis-à-vis the member states and made the latter more eager to question the Commission's authority in matters of external trade.
This manifested itself, for example, in the solar panel conflict with China, which resulted from European complaints about Chinese dumping practices. Commissioner de Gucht (2010 tried to solve the issue by means of proactive antidumping and antisubsidy policies based on technical-legal standards. However, in the course of time, he was forced to give in to the member states, which refused to support the Commission's guiding role on this dossier. Germany in particular criticised the way de Gucht had handled the solar panel case. German Economy Minister Rösler called the heavy trade duties proposed by the Commission "a grave mistake" because of the expected harmful effects on bilateral trade relations (DW Asia 2013). Allegations like this one underlined the change in atmosphere and stimulated the process of "Europeanising" EU trade policy.
Smith has argued that given the hybrid nature of the EU, the Union's economic diplomacy vis-à-vis China is more a space of contestation than an established set of procedures (Smith 2014, 39). Ideological divisions between member states reach high visibility in the trade issues with China-probably more in the relationship with this country than with other third countries. Internal tensions stemming from differences between complementary economies and economies with overlapping activities are particularly present with regard to China. Another issue that complicates matters is the difference between countries holding a trade deficit with China and the very few (like Germany) that enjoy a trade surplus (Goulard 2020). Such divergences tend to further challenge Commission leadership, which is strongly dependent on member state consensus.
Three recent examples are meant to illustrate the above-mentioned development. The first one concerns the 17 + 1 agreement between China and 17 (currently 16, since Lithuania's deflection, see below) European states in the context of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). With attractive offers of infrastructure support for specific regions and countries, China has-intentially or not-managed to expose divisions in Europe and the EU. Northern and Western European countries blame Central and Eastern Europe (including the Western Balkans) for having been too eager to respond positively to China's overtures made under the BRI programme. The Commission, apprehensive of a disruption of European unity, voiced severe criticism of the 17 + 1 arrangement, warning that Beijing could turn countries in the Western Balkans region into "Trojan horses that would one day be European Union members" (Pavlicevic 2019). The fear was that the deepened economic ties and the provision of funds to the region would allow China to increasingly influence the policies of both established member states and potential members. An alarming example hereof-in the Commission's view-was the watering down of EU statements on the South China Sea and China's human rights record by countries like Hungary and Greece-both BRI beneficiaries and parties to a Memorandum of Understanding with China (Mohan 2018). The Commission also observed large imbalances between China and most of the 17 CEEC countries, noting that the trade relationship benefitted the former rather than the latter (Pepermans 2018).
Another proof of growing divergence between the Commission and the member states is the boycott imposed by China on member state Lithuania after the latter's implicit diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. The establishment of a Taiwan (instead of Taipei) representation in Vilnius in the summer of 2021 provoked a unilateral Chinese blockage of imports of Lithuanian products. Also, in this case, the EU reacted in a divided manner. Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis pleaded for the creation of a new instrument that should give the Commission the authority to act quickly in conflicts like the Lithuanian one and retaliate against the aggressor (China) with special taxes and other punitive trade measures. However, the member states appeared to be unwilling to grant the Commission such authority. Unanimity being required, free-trading countries like Sweden and the Netherlands dissented, worrying that European muscle-flexing could easily provoke a "tormenting cycle" of retaliations between the EU and China, potentially causing heavy damage to mutual trade relations. Disappointed, and as a second-best solution, the Commission then referred the Lithuanian case to the World Trade Organisation-a procedure that will probably take a long time and is much less likely to impress the Chinese government (NRC 2022). Although the EU countries in this case were united in condemning China's behaviour, they were unable to agree on a joint Commission-led strategy to tackle the problem.
A third indication of the changed institutional setting was offered by the finalisation of the long-lasting attempt to forge a Comprehensive Investment Agreement between the EU and China. This project was launched in November 2013 but dragged on for more than 7 years, in part because of technical difficulties to replace existing bilateral arrangements between the EU member-states and China with a generic agreement but also due to EU demands to go beyond a classical investment agreement and include rules on investment tribunals. Predictably, the Commission played a leading role during the lengthy deliberations with the Chinese delegation. However, the final breakthrough required a political intervention, and a compromise was eventually found during a video conference between Chinese and EU top leaders (European Commission 2020). The German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the French President Emmanuel Macron played a crucial role in making this happen, against the opposition of the American government and, eventually, with limited input from the European Commission and its Trade Commissioner (compare this with the authoritative position of Commissioner Lamy all the way to the conclusion of the WTO negotiations). The Commission's impact was further compromised by the EP's decision in May 2021 to freeze the investment treaty as a result of broader political tensions, focusing on the human rights situation in Xinjiang and the curtailing of democratic procedures in Hong Kong. In the course of time, particularly since the installation of the Xi presidency in 2013, the relationship with China has become more and more politicised-a development that has strengthened the involvement of EU member states and EP, to the detriment of the Commission.
As sketched above, the Europeanisation of EU trade policy is caused mostly by internal reasons, in the form of divisions between member states and the Commission's difficulties in keeping the ranks closed. But what also counts are the more external or cognitive factors-those of trust, responsiveness, and learning-key considerations penetrating the core of communication and negotiations with third parties. Michael Smith has argued that within the European Commission, there is a tendency to define problems "in terms of EU needs and institutional formula rather than on the basis of a deep understanding of the target country". Despite EU efforts to generate programmes designed to train and develop expertise relevant to EU-China relations, there are doubts about the "effectiveness of European attempts to raise levels of cultural awareness and sensitivity" (Smith 2014, 41). One of the problems faced by EU economic diplomacy is that of framing appropriate understandings and expectations of Chinese behaviour and of the ways in which European behaviour is received and responded to by Beijing (interview EU 1 2019). What is at play here is the historical development of bilateral relations. The Commission's long experience in economic diplomacy has led to a situation whereby it is used to play the role of instigator and rule-maker, finding it difficult to pay due respect to new power blocks like China that have the ambition to be rule-maker as well rather than remaining just taker of rules (Men 2013).
A related issue concerns the amount of staff working on trade issues with China. Despite growing numbers, European Commission staff, both in Brussels and Beijing, is still relatively small and sometimes overburdened, which makes it all the more expedient to step up efforts to train personnel in order to bridge the still-existing cultural divide between the EU and China (interview EU 2, 2019). This could be seen as yet another, more organisational reason for Europeanisation.
To come back to the problematic relationship between rule-maker and ruletaker: the Commission often claims to be not just defending EU interests but also the rule of international trade law. Within the Commission, as the main guardian of the European treaties, there is an aversion to any abuse of legitimate trade defence tools. In China, legalisation is on the rise: many new trade and labour laws have been developed in the period after WTO entry in 2001. However, also for historical reasons (Western dissemination of 19th-century international law and of early post-war international trade law), the PRC still has a preference for a more limited degree of legalisation, emphasising vague standards rather than precise rules and delegating powers but without immediate domestic application (Voogsgeerd 2017, pp. 69-70). For the European Commission, this is hard to accept. Whereas in some areas the Commission seems to be more flexible than other EU-institutional actors (e.g. in the case of granting Market Economy Status to China) and while it pragmatically favours concrete economic results, it is adamant where it concerns the strict observance of and compliance with international legal standards. As a consequence, the Commission's regulation-based approach sometimes clashes heavily with the PRC's position, like in the solar panel case of 2012/2013, which the Commission perceived as a technical-legal matter, while the Chinese side tried to politicise the issue, linking it to the overall relationship between China and the EU. In the end, Trade Commissioner de Gucht was forced by some of the member states (particularly Germany) to give up his principled legal stance and go back to the negotiation table to settle the issue (Gaenssmantel and Liu 2017, 108-111).
This being said, most European state officials tend to appreciate the Commission's "legal extremism". In their view, the Commission should just do this: ensure adherence to all formal rules and laws and refrain as much as possible from a broader politico-diplomatic role, which should remain the privilege of the member states. As a matter of fact, in the course of time, the latter have shown an increasing ability and willingness to play such a role.
China and the EU thus have different appreciations of the inviolability of international trade law, with a strong feeling in Europe that China is not "playing by the rules" and that the Commission is unable to make China play by the rules. This is reinforced by the Chinese government's continuous involvement in support of its internationally operating companies (both state-owned and private) and the alleged lack of level playing field and reciprocity resulting from such support, coupled with European complaints about forced technology transfers ("technology theft") and inadequate protection of intellectual property rights (Lexology 2020). On top of this, nowadays, increasing attention needs to be given to security and strategic concerns, also in relation to trade and investment, as shown, for example, in the conflict with China's telecommunication company Huawei over the installation of 5G networks in Europe. These are all sensitive areas where member states prefer to take the lead at the expense of the Commission.

Conclusion
Throughout the years, the European Commission has taken up a central position in handling the EU's trade diplomacy towards China, but in the most recent period, it has encountered an increasing set of obstacles to maintaining such a privileged position. The obstacles are posed by China but also by the EU itself. The main internal problems have to do with diversity among the member states and the difficulty of keeping the ranks closed.
Some of the issues at stake are technical in nature, and these are the ones where the Commission and DG Trade are still able to play their traditionally guiding role. However, many others have political and security connotations as well, which makes it more problematic for the Commission to operate autonomously and successfully. The increasing politicisation of the international trade arena-also fostered by the America-first strategy of President Trump (2017-2021)-is harmful to the Commission's position. In such a context characterised by a fundamental dispute on core values, the European Council, the Council of Ministers, and the individual member states tend to be the main beneficiaries. Politicisation has also helped to strengthen the EP's position in trade diplomacy, as confirmed by the Treaty of Lisbon. The introduction of the Ordinary Legislative Procedure for the Common Commercial Policy complicates EU economic diplomacy by reducing the influence of the Commission in favour of the European Parliament. Whereas China is not unhappy with the increasing (often divisive) input of the individual member states, it feels much less comfortable about the EP's growing involvement. China's problematic human rights record (Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong) has become explicitly linked to trade issues, leading to even more politicisation.
This does not mean that the Commission is a passive observer in a changing political landscape. Most day-to-day trade diplomacy is still done by DG Trade, which disposes of the required experience and know-how to keep making its mark. This is not going to be affected. Moreover, cooperation with China is not impossible, as proven, for example, by the joint efforts of the two blocks to keep the WTO afloat against US opposition under the Trump administration. Finally, the Commission has proceeded to a proactive personnel policy with the appointment of profiled personalities in the positions of Trade Commissioner and Director-General of Trade, Valdis Dombrovskis and Sabine Weyand (Von der Burchard 2019).
This being said, the centrality of the Commission in trade diplomacy is certainly under discussion. Currently, trade agreements are no longer only about economic value but also and increasingly about political values. The EU's trade strategy of October 2015 has explicitly linked political tools to economic ends (Okano-Heymans and Montesano 2016), which has made DG Trade's position more vulnerable (interview EU 3 2019). This seems to be particularly the case in the relationship with China. The growing tendency towards politicisation, coupled with changing regulations and inter-institutional relations, has contributed to the greater involvement of EU member states and a "Europeanised" EU-China trade diplomacy.