Ukraine’s EU Integration: A Long Way Home

It is time to admit that while Russia remains an empire and has nuclear weapons, it will always be an existential threat to democracies.

Since 2014, the majority of Ukrainians support European integration. EU membership will become an anchor for the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine, which will require not only physical reconstruction but also modernisation of institutions. Ukraine has strong economic and personal ties with Europe (see Figures 1, 2 and 3), and given that fi ve million refugees are now hosted in the EU, these ties will become even stronger.

Economic relations
The EU has always been one of the main trading partners of Ukraine, and since 2014 it is the main trading partner (Figures 1 and 2). After Russia attacked Ukraine in 2014, the EU became the main destination for Ukrainian labour migrants: In 2014-2019 the EU issued 2.8 million permits to Ukrainians for remunerated activities (Dubenko and Kravchuk, 2021).
The EU accounts for about 70% of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ukraine (although this is partially Ukrainian money previously transferred to Cyprus or other off shores, see Figure 3). And, according to the National Bank of Ukraine data, over 90% of FDI from Ukraine goes to the EU.
The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) opened new opportunities for Ukrainian businesses -in 2020, 40% of them reported that the EU integration was benefi cial for them, about 6% felt worse off , and the rest Forum    did not feel any changes (European Pravda, 2020). As it is unlikely that Ukraine will renew economic ties with Russia any time soon, the importance of the European market for Ukraine will increase, and Ukraine will become more economically and logistically integrated with the EU.

Popular perception
Looking at the past period since 1991, we can say that until recently Ukraine's progress was driven by a motivated minority. Indeed, in 1991 communists held a majority in the fi rst democratically elected parliament of Ukraine. Despite this, the national democrats, backed by thousands of people in the streets, managed to persuade communists to vote for Ukraine's independence, which was later supported by the majority of Ukrainians in a referendum (84% participated in the referendum and over 90% said "yes" to independence (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1992)).
In the early 2000s, European integration was promoted by a few people within the government who were concentrated in the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs and the Ministry of Economy and European Integration (Wolczuk, 2003) while president Kuchma was pursuing his "multi-vector" policy. Nevertheless, at that time an important work on the harmonisation of Ukraine's legislation with EU laws was implemented.
An Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF) survey performed in September 2004 showed that 49% of Ukrainians believed that Ukraine would be better off in a union with Russia and Belarus while 29% believed that it would be better off in the EU (DIF, 2004). Yet, two months later Ukrainians came to the streets to protect their electoral choice and democracy. In 2007-08, public opinion moved towards the EU: Polls taken at the time show that the majority of those who would participate in a referendum on joining the EU would vote in favour (DIF, 2008). However, when a survey question included a choice between the EU and Russia, we can see that until 2014 many Ukrainians believed that it was possible to integrate in both directions ( Figure 4). 1 Other surveys corroborate this result. For example, the IRI (Rating Group Ukraine, 2019) and KIIS surveys (Petrenko, 2016) show that in 2012-13 the shares of Ukrainians who favoured joining the EU and the Customs Union led by Russia were roughly equal. But supporters of EU integration (as well as Putin) understood that the signing of the Association Agreement would be the "point of no return" for Ukraine (Spiliopoulos, 2014). More importantly, they were ready to actively protect their interests.
About 20% of Ukraine's population participated in Euromaidan in all regions of Ukraine (DIF, 2014). This is a Forum minority but it changed the course of the country. Since the Euromaidan, a clear majority of Ukrainians have been supporting EU integration ( Figure 4). Perhaps some of these people were "convinced" by the Russian attack on Ukraine in 2014. A recent survey suggests that Russia became even more "convincing" -the share of supporters of EU integration increased from 55%-65% in 2016-2020 to 91% in March 2022 (Rating Group Ukraine, 2022).
What about the Europeans? Are they ready to welcome Ukrainians in the EU? Recent surveys show that between 66% and 71% of Europeans support Ukraine's admission (Eurobarometer, 2022;Finchelstein et al., 2022).

Ukraine's reforms
The EU, along with the IMF, the World Bank, other governments and international organisations, have been promoting the reforms in Ukraine since the early 1990s -fi rst under the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States programme, later under Twinning and other arrangements. Within the macrofi nancial assistance programme, the EU disbursed nearly €6 billion to Ukraine since 2014. Since the start of the full-scale attack on Ukraine, the EU provided Ukraine €1.2 billion under this programme and promised to secure an additional loan of €9 billion in 2022 (European Commission, 2022a).
After 2014 the reforms have considerably intensifi ed. The major factors behind this were the signing of the Association Agreement (AA) with the EU, the existential threat for the country, increased civic activism and "money in exchange for reforms" programmes implemented by the IMF and the EU. Latest studies show that Ukraine was rather successful in implementing the AA. Emerson et al. (2021) suggest that of 26 AA Chapters, Ukraine implemented 17 at a score 2 or higher (on a scale from 1 to 3). The most problematic areas in their view are anti-corruption, rule of law and transport, while civil society received the highest score.
The Ukrainian government estimates that as of 2021, Ukraine implemented 63% of the AA clauses with the highest progress in political dialogue, humanitarian policy as well as justice, freedom and security and human rights protection, while fi nancial cooperation, labour relations and transport lag behind (Ukraine-Europe, 2021).
As Lough et al. (2017) note, the Association Agreement and DCFTA were designed to bring Ukraine closer to the EU (without promising full membership), and some of the clauses were overly complicated given the state of institutional development of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the progress of reforms since 2014 has been substantial. According to VoxUkraine estimates, 2 between January 2015 and June 2022, almost 1,300 reformist legislative acts have been adopted with the most progress in business environment and governance. Of these legislative acts, 127 tackled corruption, 59 indirectly, i.e. by changing the procedures (the most prominent example is the public procurement reform), opening data or deregulating certain spheres. As a result, Ukraine's corruption perception score improved from 25 in 2013 to 32 in 2021; for comparison, Hungary's score fell from 54 to 43 over the same period (Transparency International, 2021).
Since 2014, Ukraine has shown a lot of improvement not only in public attitude to corruption (the share of people who gave bribes declined, while the share of people who cannot justify corruption under any circumstances grew -see  but also in the establishment of formal institutions that fi ght corruption. Thus, National Anti-Corruption Bureau (2021) reports about 859 active investigations in the second half of 2021, and the Higher Anti-Corruption Court completed hearings on more than 110 cases since its launch in 2019; 58 people were convicted. 3 There were attempts by the establishment to reverse some of the anti-corruption developments but the active civil society position helped to reverse those attempts (Euronews, 2020). Certainly, there are remaining problems, of which the unfi nished judicial reform is the most important. This reform, as well as anti-corruption reform, is high on the popular agenda. For example, a DIF (2019)   Forum portant reforms for Ukrainian citizens are anti-corruption (63%), healthcare (57%), pension and social security reform (52%), reform of judiciary and prosecution (37%) and lustration (33%). Certainly, today Ukrainians care most about winning the war. For if there is no Ukraine then the level of corruption would not matter. However, during the reconstruction, which hopefully will be led by the EU, the interests of Ukrainians and the European institutions will be very much aligned (European Commission, 2022b).
Despite these problems, Ukraine is as qualifi ed for candidate status as the Western Balkan states . Provision of the candidate status has no downsides since this status does not foresee any specifi c admission dates. At the same time it has a huge upside: It gives moral support to the Ukrainian people during the war and, more importantly, provides an anchor for further reforms (an additional bonus is proving Putin, who said that Ukraine would never become an EU member (VoxUkraine, 2021), wrong). Ukraine's path for reforms is rather clear and has been described, for example, in the IMF programmes, European Commission (2020) recommendations or papers on Ukraine reconstruction (Becker et al., 2022). As already mentioned, the most important is completion of the judicial reform, followed by reform of the public service (the decision-making in the public sphere) and reforms that develop markets, including antitrust. Continuing decentralisation is also very important -this is one of the most successful and most popular reforms.
Ukraine's admission to the EU would be benefi cial not only for Ukraine but also for the EU itself. One obvious benefi t is security: If Ukraine was not currently fi ghting, Russian tanks would probably already be in Warsaw or Tallinn. In peaceful times, there are many opportunities for cooperation. Obvious spheres are food security and energy production; besides, Ukraine has a lot of human capital and entrepreneurial talent, and it is quite advanced in IT, machine building and other industries that require high-level technical skills. Ukrainian culture is rich and authentic.
However, during the admission process not only Ukraine will change. The EU itself will reform in response to the new challenges. And it will need to answer a few important questions.
How to modernise the EU?
The necessity of reforms strengthening European unity has been discussed for quite a while. This discussion includes several issues. First, a mechanism of decisionmaking other than unanimity (Morcos, 2022). As the situation with the sixth package of sanctions showed, Russia can fi nd a "weak link" in the EU and eff ectively block its decision or cause discord. Second, common or much more aligned fi scal policy (Sapir, 2022). The latest debt crisis in Greece required a lot of money and eff ort for the sake of saving the eurozone (Gorodnichenko and Korenok, 2015). Third, common foreign policy, a part of which is further EU enlargement, e.g. there is a proposal on staged accession to the EU in order not to discourage Balkan states . If adopted, this procedure can be also applied to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.
At the same time, adoption of the EU regulations by candidate states may revitalise the debate on the review of European regulations. Deregulation would make the EU more competitive compared to the US or China.
In short, a larger EU requires more effi cient decision-making mechanisms. At the same time, the EU that speaks with one voice can become a much stronger international player. Since the EU is based on values such as respect for human rights, freedom and democracy, this will help to make the world a more democratic and safer place (democracies are less likely to unleash wars, see e.g. Mintz and Geva (1993)). This has direct implications for regional and global security. Recall that the EU was based on the very simple idea of preventing another war in Europe by making European countries as economically intertwined as possible. This did not work with Russia because it is not a democracy. Thus, it is time to rethink the basic idea of the EU and at the same time answer other important questions.
What to do with Russia?
The realpolitik idea rooted in the mid-20th century proved to be wrong. Turning a blind eye to violations of human rights and international laws did not pacify Russia (nor will they pacify China or other autocracies).
The European Council (2022) in its recent statement seems to realise this. At least it demands that Russia withdraw its troops from the entire territory of Ukraine and recognises the need to reduce the EU strategic dependence on Russia.
However, this is not enough. It is time to admit that Russia's values are the opposite of EU basic values. There is no respect for human rights in Russia, no freedom or democracy and no rule of law. Moreover, Russia, as well as the USSR before 1991, tries to undermine these values whenever it can. In fact, today's Russia is nothing new. It is the same as Germany in the 1930s or the USSR throughout its history (Marayev and Guz, 2022). Its exter-Forum nal and intenal policy is terror supported by a large part of the population (Levada Center, 2022;Zholud and Sologoub, 2022). 4 Therefore, it should be recognised as a terrorist state and treated accordingly.
To become a "normal" nation, the Russian imperial project should be defeated in the same way as Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. And this is not only a Ukrainian endeavor. The outcome of this war will have longlasting implications for both the EU and the world. While economic implications of the war for the EU seem rather modest (They are smaller than the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of GDP decline, see Blanchard and Pisani-Ferry (2022)), its political and security consequences will be huge. Russia's threat to the Eastern European states as well as to Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan is very real. Other countries, fi rst of all China, are now discovering the ability of the collective West to protect its values. Thus, any scenario that involves further "appeasement" of Russia will be a threat not only to millions of Ukrainians. This scenario will enable multiple armed confl icts around the world (many of them will be spurred by Russia).
It is time to admit that while Russia remains an empire and has nuclear weapons, it will always be an existential threat to democracies. Thus, the EU should start communications with the civil society and possible leaders of the new independent states that will emerge after the demise of Russia (the obvious candidates are Ichkeria (Chechnya) that fought for its independence for over a decade (Roland, 2022), as well as Karelia, Tatarstan, Komi and Yakut Republics that declared their independence in 1989-90 (Corbet and Gummich, 1990)). As the example of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan shows, it is much easier to convince nation states to give up their nuclear weapons compared to the state that considers itself a "superpower" . Generally, the "superpower" concept is outdated. If we believe that modern states are based on principles of equal rights and rule of law, these principles should apply not only to people but also to nations. How can we ensure this?
How to reform the world security system?
The reform of the UN has also been discussed for quite a while. Many countries are upset by the veto power and by the fact that some countries have more rights than others. Many observers are outraged by Russia's conduct and impunity as 4 During Stalin's Great Terror campaign people were writing delations about their neighbours and friends knowing that they will be repressed and likely killed. Many Russians are still in favour of punishing "traitors". a permanent security council member. If today's war is not a suffi cient incentive to fi nally start the UN reform, then what is?
Stating the obvious, rules are useless if they are not enforced. Thus, there should be a mechanism that immediately punishes the aggressor state if it attacks another country. If such a mechanism was in place in 2014, then asset freezes and oil embargos as well as a ban on imports would have been automatically applied to Russia as soon as it annexed Crimea. When such a mechanism is created, it would increase the cost of war for authoritarian states (since these are more likely to attack other countries (see Coleman, 2004)) and limit their ability to wage a war.
The world is becoming a more complicated place. A place where the role of natural resources 5 is fading and the role of human capital is rising. Since human capital can be utilised to the full extent only in an environment of personal freedoms and protected human rights, logically the states that provide this environment will win the battle for the future. However, as the war of Russia on Ukraine shows, sometimes nations not only prefer to stay in the past but also try to prevent modernisation of others.

Conclusions
The current ongoing war is the war for the future. Thus, Ukraine must win. This victory will benefi t Europe, the entire world and even (paradoxically) Russia. But today Ukraine urgently needs weapons to reduce the human cost of this victory.