Abstract
LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin presented a strong security model for authenticated key agreement, namely the \(\mathrm {eCK}\) model. They also constructed a protocol, namely the NAXOS protocol, that enjoys a simple security proof in the \(\mathrm {eCK}\) model. However, the NAXOS protocol uses a random oracle-based technique to combine the long-term secret key and the per session randomness, so-called NAXOS trick, in order to achieve the \(\mathrm {eCK}\) security definition. For NAXOS trick-based protocols, the leakage of per session randomness modeled in the \(\mathrm {eCK}\) model is somewhat unnatural, because the \(\mathrm {eCK}\) model leaks per session randomness, while the output of the NAXOS trick computation remains safe. In this work, we present a standard model \(\mathrm {eCK}\)-secure protocol construction, eliminating the NAXOS trick. Moreover, our protocol is a generic construction, which can be instantiated with arbitrary suitable cryptographic primitives. Thus, we present a generic \(\mathrm {eCK}\)-secure, NAXOS-free, standard model key exchange protocol. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper on generic transformation of a \(\mathrm {CCA2}\)-secure public-key encryption scheme to an \(\mathrm {eCK}\)-secure key exchange protocol in the standard model.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to acknowledge Colin Boyd, Douglas Stebila and Tatsuaki Okamoto for valuable discussions on authenticated key exchange protocols. Moreover, I am grateful to the handling editor Sherman S. M. Chow and the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments to polish-up the paper. Further, I am supported by the National Research Council (NRC), Sri Lanka Postdoctoral Fellowship grant NRC 16-020.
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Alawatugoda, J. Generic construction of an \(\mathrm {eCK}\)-secure key exchange protocol in the standard model. Int. J. Inf. Secur. 16, 541–557 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-016-0346-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-016-0346-9