



Salvador Barberà

President of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare 2002–2003

Born in 1946, Salvador Barberà graduated from the University of Bilbao in 1968 and got a PhD degree from Northwestern University in 1975. He has taught at three Spanish Universities: Autonoma de Madrid, U. of the Basque Country and Autonoma de Barcelona. He was a visiting Professor at Stanford Business School (1984–1985), Université de Toulouse (1990–1991) and California Institute of Technology (2000). He served as President of the Southern European Association for Economic Theory, and in the councils of the *Econometric Society*, the *Game Theory Society* and the *Society for Social Choice and Welfare*. He directed the *Revista Española de Economía* (1989–1998) and the *Spanish Economic Review* (1998–2000). He also served in the boards of *Econometrica*, *Economic Theory*, *Games and Economic Behavior*, *Journal of Public Economic Theory*, *Mathematical Social Sciences*, *Review of Economic Design* and *Social Choice and Welfare*. He was director of the Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies (2000–2004). He is currently Secretary General for Research and Technological Policies in the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, on leave from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

His main contributions have been in the field of social choice. He has studied strategy-proof mechanisms from different angles. He has provided new impossibility results, and also characterizations of strategy-proof rules for special domains

in a variety of contexts: the allocation of public goods, stable matchings, rationing schemes, location problems, exchange economies or random assignments. He has also investigated the consequences of extending Arrow's framework to allow for random decisions, a research that proved the remarkable robustness of Arrow's results. Some of his papers refer to the design and properties of specific voting rules, like the rule of k names or weighted indirect representation. Others probe the consistency of different mechanisms, like those used to determine the majority sizes required to pass a decision or to determine the location of sets of public facilities. Another line of work has dwelled on the dynamics of societies who change their membership by vote. Aside from social choice, individual preferences have also been a permanent concern in his research, with contributions to the characterization of rationalizable stochastic choices, and different theories regarding how people rank sets, including a new approach on preferences for flexibility.

He is a fellow of the *Econometric Society* since 1988. In 1996 he received the Rey Juan Carlos Award.