Abstract
We test whether analysts display multiple biases in forecasting the Institute for Supply Management’s manufacturing purchasing manager’s index (PMI). We adopt a test that does not require knowledge of the forecaster’s prior information set and is robust to rational clustering, correlated forecast errors and outliers. We find that analysts forecast the PMI poorly and display multiple biases when forecasting. In particular, forecasters anti-herd and anti-anchor. Anti-herding supports a reputation-based notion that forecasters are rewarded not only for forecast accuracy but also for being the best forecast at a single point in time. Anti-anchoring is consistent with forecasters overreacting to private information. The two biases show a strong positive correlation suggesting that the incentives that elicit anti-herding also elicit anti-anchoring behavior. Both biases result in larger absolute errors, although the effect is stronger for anti-herding.
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Notes
Loungani (2002) states “the record of failure to predict recessions is virtually unblemished.” This conclusion was based on the finding that only two of the 60 recessions that occurred around the world during the 1990s were predicted by forecasters a year in advance. About 40 of the 60 impending recessions remained undetected seven months before they occurred.
Baumohl (2013 p. 184) writes that a PMI reading of 50 is “believed to be consistent with real GDP growth of about 2.5%. Every full point in the index above 50 can add another 0.3 percentage points or so of growth every year.”
The ISM Web site cites Joseph E. Stiglitz, former chairman of President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisors, as saying, “The [ISM] Manufacturing [index]...has one of the shortest reporting lags of any macro-economic series and gives an important early look at the economy. It also measures some concepts (such as lead times and delivery lags) that can be found nowhere else. It makes an important contribution to the American statistical system and to economic policy.” Lahiri and Monokroussos (2013) add that “..because of their nature as survey responses, ISM data are typically subject to small revisions at most. As such, they preserve most of the real-time nature that is crucial in many estimation and forecasting exercises...”
When we asked an award-winning analyst what the incentive was to turn in a forecast to Bloomberg, he replied, “Pride, publicity, and career advancement via name recognition from the Bloomberg posting.”
They use the term herding to denote the tendency to produce a range of forecasts which is narrower than that which would likely be observed if the forecasts were produced on a strictly independent basis because a forecaster takes the previous consensus mean into account.
The backlog index compares current month unfilled orders with the prior month. The inventory index compares current month units on hand, not the dollar value, with the prior month.
Specifically, five types of choices are offered as follows: for new orders, production and exports, the choices are better/same/worse; for employment, inventories, prices and imports, the choices are higher/same/lower; for supplier deliveries, the choices are slower/same/faster; for customer inventories, the choices are too high/about right/too low; and for order backlogs, the choices are greater/same/less.
While consensus forecasts are available going back to 1992, individual analyst forecasts are only available from June 1998.
We also examined the impact of forecast number on forecast bias. We collected all the first forecasts of firms, then all the second forecasts and so on. We truncated the sample where we had minimally 10 analysts/firms, i.e., at 168 forecasts. We found pervasive anti-herding.
Pierdzioch et al. (2016) examined herding to the previous period’s consensus on grounds that expectation formation shows features of adaptive learning. Although we disagree with this approach to testing for herding, we reexamined the overall sample results for herding to the previous period’s median forecast and found pervasive anti-herding.
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Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Argyros School of Business at Chapman University and a summer research grant from the College of Business at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.
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Broughton, J.B., Lobo, B.J. Herding and anchoring in macroeconomic forecasts: the case of the PMI. Empir Econ 55, 1337–1355 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-017-1306-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-017-1306-6