# The fixed point and the Craig interpolation properties for sublogics of IL 

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#### Abstract

We study the fixed point property and the Craig interpolation property for sublogics of the interpretability logic IL. We provide a complete description of these sublogics concerning the uniqueness of fixed points, the fixed point property and the Craig interpolation property.


Keywords Interpretability logic • Fixed point property • Uniqueness of fixed points • Craig interpolation property

Mathematics Subject Classification 03B45 - 03F45

## 1 Introduction

De Jongh and Sambin's fixed point theorem [12] for the modal propositional logic GL is one of notable results of modal logical investigation of formalized provability. For any modal formula $A$, let $v(A)$ be the set of all propositional variables contained in $A$. A logic $L$ is said to have the fixed point property (FPP) if for any modal formula $A(p)$ in which the propositional variable $p$ appears only in the scope of $\square$, there exists a modal formula $B$ such that $v(B) \subseteq v(A) \backslash\{p\}$ and $L \vdash B \leftrightarrow A(B)$. De Jongh and

[^0]

Fig. 1 Sublogics of IL

Sambin's theorem states that GL has FPP, and this is understood as a counterpart of the fixed point theorem in formal arithmetic (see [4]). Bernardi [2] also proved the uniqueness of fixed points (UFP) for GL.

A logic $L$ is said to have the Craig interpolation property (CIP) if for any formulas $A$ and $B$, if $L \vdash A \rightarrow B$, then there exists a formula $C$ such that $v(C) \subseteq v(A) \cap v(B)$, $L \vdash A \rightarrow C$, and $L \vdash C \rightarrow B$. Smoryński [13] and Boolos [3] independently proved that GL has CIP. Smoryński also made an important observation that FPP for GL follows from CIP and UFP.

The interpretability logic IL is an extension of GL in the language of GL equipped with the binary modal operator $\triangleright$, where the modal formula $A \triangleright B$ is read as " $T+B$ is relatively interpretable in $T+A$ ". It is natural to ask whether $\mathbf{I L}$ also has the properties that hold for GL. Indeed, de Jongh and Visser [8] proved UFP for IL and that IL has FPP. Also Areces, Hoogland, and de Jongh [1] proved that IL has CIP.

Ignatiev [5] introduced the sublogic $\mathbf{C L}$ of IL as a base logic of the modal logical investigation of the notion of partial conservativity, and proved that $\mathbf{C L}$ is complete with respect to relational semantics (that is, usual Veltman semantics). Kurahashi and Okawa [9] also introduced several sublogics of IL, and showed the completeness and the incompleteness of these sublogics with respect to relational semantics.

In this paper, we investigate UFP, FPP, and CIP for sublogics of IL shown in Fig. 1.
Moreover, for technical reasons, we introduce and investigate the notions of $\ell$ UFP and $\ell$ FPP that are restricted versions of UFP and FPP with respect to some particular forms of formulas, respectively. Table 1 summarizes a complete description of these sublogics concerning $\ell$ UFP, UFP, $\ell$ FPP, FPP, and CIP.

The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 3, we show that UFP holds for extensions of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{4}_{+}\right)$, and that UFP is not the case for sublogics of $\mathbf{I L} \mathbf{L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{1}, \mathbf{J 5})$. We also show that $\ell$ UFP holds for extensions of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$. In Sect. 4, we prove that the logic $\mathbf{I L}{ }^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 2_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ has CIP by modifying a semantical proof of CIP for IL by Areces, Hoogland, and de Jongh. We also notice that CIP for IL easily follows from CIP for $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$. In Sect. 5, we observe that FPP for $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ immediately follows from our results in the previous sections. Also, we give a syntactical proof of FPP for $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$. Moreover, we prove that $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 4}, \mathbf{J 5})$ has $\ell$ FPP. In Sect. 6, we provide counter models of $\ell$ FPP for $\mathbf{C L}$ and $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} 1, \mathbf{J 5})$ and a counter model of FPP for $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 1, \mathbf{J} 4_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$.

Table $1 \ell$ UFP, UFP, $\ell$ FPP, FPP, and CIP for sublogics of IL

|  | $\ell$ UFP | UFP | $\ell$ FPP | FPP | CIP |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathrm{IL}^{-}$ | $\checkmark$ | $\times$ | $\times$ | $\times$ | $\times$ |
| $\mathrm{IL}^{-}(\mathrm{J} 1)$ | $\checkmark$ | $\times$ | $\times$ | $\times$ | $\times$ |
| $\mathrm{IL}^{-}$(J5) | $\checkmark$ | $\times$ | $\times$ | $\times$ | $\times$ |
| $\mathrm{IL}^{-}(\mathbf{J 1}, \mathrm{J5})$ | $\checkmark$ | $\times$ | $\times$ | $\times$ | $\times$ |
| $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{4}_{+}\right)$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\times$ | $\times$ | $\times$ |
| $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 1}, \mathbf{J} 4_{+}\right)$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\times$ | $\times$ | $\times$ |
| $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}\right)$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\times$ | $\times$ | $\times$ |
| CL | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\times$ | $\times$ | $\times$ |
| $\mathrm{IL}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}{ }_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\times$ | $\times$ |
| $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 1}, \mathbf{J 4}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\times$ | $\times$ |
| $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| IL | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ [8] | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ [8] | $\checkmark$ [1] |

As a consequence, we also show that CIP is not the case for these sublogics except $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ and IL.

## 2 Preliminaries

### 2.1 IL and its sublogics

The interpretability logic IL is a base logic of modal logical investigations of the notion of relative interpretability (see $[15,16]$ ). The language of IL consists of propositional variables $p, q, \ldots$, the propositional constant $\perp$, the logical connective $\rightarrow$, the unary modal operator $\square$, and the binary modal operator $\triangleright$. Other logical connectives, the propositional constant $T$, and the modal operator $\diamond$ are introduced as usual abbreviations. The formulas of IL are generated by the following grammar:

$$
A::=\perp|p| A \rightarrow A|\square A| A \triangleright A .
$$

For each formula $A$, let $\square A \equiv A \wedge \square A$.
Definition 1 The axioms of the modal propositional logic IL are as follows:
L1 All tautologies in the language of $\mathbf{I L}$;
L2 $\square(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow(\square A \rightarrow \square B)$;
L3 $\square(\square A \rightarrow A) \rightarrow \square A$;
J1 $\square(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A \triangleright B$;
J2 $(A \triangleright B) \wedge(B \triangleright C) \rightarrow A \triangleright C$;
$\mathrm{J} 3(A \triangleright C) \wedge(B \triangleright C) \rightarrow(A \vee B) \triangleright C$;
J4 $A \triangleright B \rightarrow(\diamond A \rightarrow \diamond B)$;
J5 $\diamond A \triangleright A$.
The inference rules of $\mathbf{I L}$ are Modus Ponens $\frac{A \quad A \rightarrow B}{B}$ and Necessitation $\frac{A}{\square A}$.

The conservativity logic $\mathbf{C L}$ is obtained from IL by removing the axiom scheme $\mathbf{J 5}$, that was introduced by Ignatiev [5] as a base logic of modal logical investigations of the notion of partial conservativity. Several other sublogics of IL were introduced in [9]. The basis for these newly introduced logics is the logic $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$.

Definition 2 The language of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$is that of $\mathbf{I L}$, and the axioms of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$are L1, L2, L3, J3, and J6: $\square A \leftrightarrow(\neg A) \triangleright \perp$. The inference rules of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$are Modus Ponens, Necessitation, $\mathbf{R 1} \frac{A \rightarrow B}{C \triangleright A \rightarrow C \triangleright B}$, and $\mathbf{R} \mathbf{2} \frac{A \rightarrow B}{B \triangleright C \rightarrow A \triangleright C}$.

For schemata $\Sigma_{1}, \ldots, \Sigma_{n}$, let $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\Sigma_{1}, \ldots, \Sigma_{n}\right)$ be the logic obtained by adding $\Sigma_{1}, \ldots, \Sigma_{n}$ as axiom schemata to $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$. The following schemata $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}$and $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{4}_{+}$were introduced in [9] and [15], respectively:
$\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}(A \triangleright(B \vee C)) \wedge(B \triangleright C) \rightarrow A \triangleright C$;
$\mathbf{J 4} \mathbf{4}_{+} \square(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow(C \triangleright A \rightarrow C \triangleright B)$.
In this paper, we mainly deal with logics consisting of some of the axiom schemata $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{1}, \mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J} \mathbf{4}_{+}$, and $\mathbf{J 5}$ (see Fig. 1 in Sect. 1). Then, we have the following proposition.

Proposition 1 Let $A, B$, and $C$ be any formulas.

1. $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash \square \neg A \rightarrow A \triangleright B$.
2. $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash \square(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow(B \triangleright C \rightarrow A \triangleright C)$.
3. $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash(\neg A \wedge B) \triangleright C \rightarrow(A \triangleright C \rightarrow B \triangleright C)$.
4. $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 4_{+}\right) \vdash \mathbf{J} 4$.
5. $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}\right) \vdash \mathbf{J} \mathbf{2} \wedge \mathbf{J} \mathbf{4}_{+}$.
6. $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}\right) \vdash(A \triangleright B) \wedge((B \wedge \neg C) \triangleright C) \rightarrow(A \triangleright C)$.
7. $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{1}) \vdash A \triangleright A$.
8. $\mathbf{C L}$ is deductively equivalent to $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 1, \mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}\right)$.
9. IL is deductively equivalent to $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{1}, \mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J} 5\right)$.

Proof Except clause 3, see [9]. For 3, by J3, $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash((\neg A \wedge B) \triangleright C) \wedge(A \triangleright C) \rightarrow$ $((\neg A \wedge B) \vee A) \triangleright C$. Since $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash B \rightarrow((\neg A \wedge B) \vee A)$, we have $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash((\neg A \wedge B) \vee$ $A) \triangleright C \rightarrow B \triangleright C$ by the rule R2. Thus, $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash((\neg A \wedge B) \triangleright C) \wedge(A \triangleright C) \rightarrow B \triangleright C$.

The following lemma (Lemma 1) plays an important role in our proofs of CIP and FPP for $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ in Sects. 4 and 5.

Fact 1 (See [17]) For any formula $A$,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash(A \vee \diamond A) \leftrightarrow((A \wedge \square \neg A) \vee \diamond(A \wedge \square \neg A)) .
$$

Lemma 1 Let $A$ and $C$ be any formulas.

1. $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} 2, \mathbf{J 5}) \vdash((A \wedge \square \neg A) \triangleright C) \leftrightarrow(A \triangleright C)$.
2. $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right) \vdash(C \triangleright(A \wedge \square \neg A)) \leftrightarrow(C \triangleright A)$.

Proof In this proof, let $B \equiv(A \wedge \square \neg A)$.

1. $(\leftarrow)$ : Since $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash B \rightarrow A$, we have $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash A \triangleright C \rightarrow B \triangleright C$ by R2.
$(\rightarrow)$ : Since $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 5}) \vdash \diamond B \triangleright B$, we have $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} 2, \mathbf{J 5}) \vdash B \triangleright C \rightarrow \diamond B \triangleright C$.
Hence, by J3,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}, \mathbf{J 5}) \vdash B \triangleright C \rightarrow(B \vee \diamond B) \triangleright C
$$

By Fact 1 and R2, we obtain

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}, \mathbf{J} \mathbf{5}) \vdash B \triangleright C \rightarrow(A \vee \diamond A) \triangleright C .
$$

Since $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash A \rightarrow(A \vee \diamond A)$, we obtain

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} 2, \mathbf{J 5}) \vdash B \triangleright C \rightarrow A \triangleright C
$$

by $\mathbf{R 2}$.
2. $(\rightarrow)$ : This is immediate from $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash B \rightarrow A$ and $\mathbf{R 1}$.
$(\leftarrow)$ : Since $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash A \rightarrow(A \vee \diamond A)$, we obtain

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash C \triangleright A \rightarrow C \triangleright(A \vee \diamond A)
$$

by R1. Then, by Fact 1 and R1,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash C \triangleright A \rightarrow C \triangleright(B \vee \diamond B) .
$$

Since $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 5}) \vdash \diamond B \triangleright B$, we obtain

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right) \vdash C \triangleright A \rightarrow C \triangleright B
$$

because $(C \triangleright(\diamond B \vee B)) \wedge(\diamond B \triangleright B) \rightarrow C \triangleright B$ is an instance of $\mathbf{J} 2_{+}$.

### 2.2 IL $^{-}$-frames and models

Definition 3 We say that a system $\left\langle W, R,\left\{S_{w}\right\}_{w \in W}\right\rangle$ is an $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-frame if it satisfies the following three conditions:

1. $W$ is a non-empty set;
2. $R$ is a transitive and conversely well-founded binary relation on $W$;
3. For each $w \in W, S_{w}$ is a binary relation on $W$ with

$$
\forall x, y \in W\left(x S_{w} y \Rightarrow w R x\right)
$$

A system $\left.\left\langle W, R,\left\{S_{w}\right\}_{w \in W}, \Vdash\right\rangle\right\rangle$ is called an $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-model if $\left\langle W, R,\left\{S_{w}\right\}_{w \in W}\right\rangle$ is an $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-frame and $\Vdash$ is a usual satisfaction relation on the Kripke frame $\langle W, R\rangle$ with the following additional condition:

$$
w \Vdash A \triangleright B \Longleftrightarrow \forall x \in W\left(w R x \& x \Vdash A \Rightarrow \exists y \in W\left(x S_{w} y \& y \Vdash B\right)\right) .
$$

A formula $A$ is said to be valid in an $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-frame $\left\langle W, R,\left\{S_{w}\right\}_{w \in W}\right\rangle$ if $w \Vdash A$ for any satisfaction relation $\Vdash$ on the frame and any $w \in W$.

For each $w \in W$, let $R[w]:=\{x \in W: w R x\}$.
Proposition 2 (See [9] and [15]) Let $\mathcal{F}=\left\langle W, R,\left\{S_{w}\right\}_{w \in W}\right\rangle$ be any $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-frame.

1. J1 is valid in $\mathcal{F}$ if and only if for any $w, x \in W$, if $w R x$, then $x S_{w} x$.
2. $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}$is valid in $\mathcal{F}$ if and only if $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{4}_{+}$is valid in $\mathcal{F}$ and for any $w \in W, S_{w}$ is transitive.
3. $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{4}_{+}$is valid in $\mathcal{F}$ if and only if for any $w \in W, S_{w}$ is a binary relation on $R[w]$.
4. $\mathbf{J 5}$ is valid in $\mathcal{F}$ if and only if for any $w, x, y \in W, w R x$ and $x R y$ imply $x S_{w} y$.

Theorem 1 (See [5], [7] and [9]) Let L be one of logics shown in Fig. 1 in Sect. 1. Then, for any formula $A$, the following are equivalent:

1. $L \vdash A$.
2. A is valid in all (finite) $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-frames in which all axioms of $L$ are valid.

### 2.3 The fixed point and the Craig interpolation properties

For each formula $A$, let $v(A)$ be the set of all propositional variables contained in $A$.
Definition 4 We say that a formula $A$ is modalized in a propositional variable $p$ if every occurrence of $p$ in $A$ is in the scope of some modal operators $\square$ or $\triangleright$.

Definition 5 A logic $L$ is said to have the fixed point property (FPP) if for any propositional variable $p$ and any formula $A(p)$ which is modalized in $p$, there exists a formula $F$ such that $v(F) \subseteq v(A) \backslash\{p\}$ and $L \vdash F \leftrightarrow A(F)$.

Definition 6 We say that the uniqueness of fixed points (UFP) holds for a logic $L$ if for any propositional variables $p, q$ and any formula $A(p)$ which is modalized in $p$ and does not contain $q$,

$$
L \vdash \backsim(p \leftrightarrow A(p)) \wedge \odot(q \leftrightarrow A(q)) \rightarrow(p \leftrightarrow q) .
$$

Theorem 2 (De Jongh and Visser [8])

1. IL has FPP.
2. UFP holds for $\mathbf{I L}$.

In particular, de Jongh and Visser showed that a fixed point of a formula $A(p) \triangleright B(p)$ is $A(T) \triangleright B(\square \neg A(T))$. Then, a fixed point of every formula $A(p)$ which is modalized in $p$ is explicitly calculable by a usual argument.

Definition 7 A logic $L$ is said to have the Craig interpolation property (CIP) if for any formulas $A$ and $B$, if $L \vdash A \rightarrow B$, then there exists a formula $C$ such that $v(C) \subseteq v(A) \cap v(B), L \vdash A \rightarrow C$, and $L \vdash C \rightarrow B$.

Theorem 3 (Areces, Hoogland, and de Jongh [1]) IL has CIP.

## 3 Uniqueness of fixed points

In this section, we investigate the uniqueness of fixed points for sublogics. Firstly, we show that UFP holds for extensions of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right)$. Secondly, we prove that UFP is not the case for sublogics of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 1}, \mathbf{J 5})$. Then, we investigate the newly introduced notion that a formula $A(p)$ is left-modalized in a propositional variable $p$. We prove that UFP with respect to formulas which are left-modalized in $p$ ( $\ell$ UFP) holds for all extensions of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$. Finally, we discuss Smoryński's implication "CIP + UFP $\Rightarrow$ FPP" in our framework.

### 3.1 UFP

By adapting Smoryński’s argument [14], de Jongh and Visser [8] showed that UFP holds for every logic closed under Modus Ponens and Necessitation, and containing L1, L2, L3, E1, and E2, where

E1 $\square(A \leftrightarrow B) \rightarrow(A \triangleright C \leftrightarrow B \triangleright C)$;
E2 $\square(A \leftrightarrow B) \rightarrow(C \triangleright A \leftrightarrow C \triangleright B)$.
Since E1 and E2 are easy consequences of Proposition 1.2 and $\mathbf{J} 4_{+}$respectively, we obtain the following theorem.

Theorem 4 (UFP for $\left.\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right)\right)$UFP holds for every extension of the logic $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right)$.
As shown in [8], in the proof of Theorem 4, the use of the following substitution principle is essential.

Proposition 3 (The Substitution Principle) Let $A, B$, and $C(p)$ be any formulas.

1. $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right) \vdash \square(A \leftrightarrow B) \rightarrow(C(A) \leftrightarrow C(B))$.
2. If $C(p)$ is modalized in $p$, then $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right) \vdash \square(A \leftrightarrow B) \rightarrow(C(A) \leftrightarrow C(B))$.

Proposition 3.2 shows that every extension $L$ of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right)$proves $\square(A \leftrightarrow B) \rightarrow$ $(C(A) \leftrightarrow C(B))$ for any formula $C(p)$ which is modalized in $p$. We show that the converse of this statement also holds.

Proposition 4 Let $L$ be any extension of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$. Suppose that for any formula $C(p)$ which is modalized in $p, L \vdash \square(A \leftrightarrow B) \rightarrow(C(A) \leftrightarrow C(B))$. Then, $L \vdash \mathbf{J} \mathbf{4}_{+}$.

Proof Let $A, B$, and $C$ be any formulas and assume $p \notin v(C)$. Then, the formula $C \triangleright p$ is modalized in $p$. By the supposition, we have

$$
L \vdash \square(A \leftrightarrow A \wedge B) \rightarrow(C \triangleright A \leftrightarrow C \triangleright(A \wedge B)) .
$$

Since $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash \square(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow \square(A \leftrightarrow A \wedge B)$ and $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash C \triangleright(A \wedge B) \rightarrow C \triangleright B$, we obtain $L \vdash \square(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow(C \triangleright A \rightarrow C \triangleright B)$.

On the other hand, we show that UFP does not hold for sublogics of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} 1, \mathbf{J 5})$ in general.

Fig. 2 A counter model of UFP for $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{1}, \mathbf{J 5})$


Proposition 5 Let $p, q$ be distinct propositional variables. Then,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{1}, \mathbf{J} 5) \nvdash \odot(p \leftrightarrow(\top \triangleright \neg p)) \wedge \boxminus(q \leftrightarrow(\top \triangleright \neg q)) \rightarrow(p \leftrightarrow q) .
$$

Proof We define an $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-frame $\mathcal{F}=\left\langle W, R,\left\{S_{w}\right\}_{w \in W}\right\rangle$ as follows:

- $W:=\{w, x, y\} ;$
$-R:=\{\langle w, x\rangle\} ;$
$-S_{w}:=\{\langle x, x\rangle,\langle x, y\rangle\}, S_{x}:=\emptyset, S_{y}:=\emptyset$.
Obviously, by Proposition $2, \mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{1}, \mathbf{J 5})$ is valid in $\mathcal{F}$. Let $\Vdash$ be a satisfaction relation on $\mathcal{F}$ satisfying the following conditions:
$-w \Vdash p$ and $w \nVdash q$;
$-x \Vdash p$ and $x \Vdash q$;
$-y \nVdash p$ and $y \Vdash q$.
We prove $w \Vdash \square(p \leftrightarrow(T \triangleright \neg p)) \wedge \square(q \leftrightarrow(T \triangleright \neg q)) \wedge \neg(p \leftrightarrow q)$. Since $w \Vdash p$ and $w \nVdash q, w \Vdash \neg(p \leftrightarrow q)$ is obvious. We show $w \Vdash(p \leftrightarrow(\top \triangleright \neg p)) \wedge$ $(q \leftrightarrow(\top \triangleright \neg q))$. Since $w \Vdash p$ and $w \nVdash q$, it suffices to prove $w \Vdash \top \triangleright \neg p$ and $w \Vdash \neg(T \triangleright \neg q)$.
$-w \Vdash T \triangleright \neg p$ : Let $z \in W$ be any element with $w R z$. Then, $z=x$. Since $x S_{w} y$ and $y \Vdash \neg p$, we obtain $w \Vdash \top \triangleright \neg p$.
$-w \Vdash \neg(\top \triangleright \neg q)$ : Let $z \in W$ be any element with $x S_{w} z$. Then, $z=x$ or $z=y$. In either case, we obtain $z \Vdash q$. Since $x R y$, we conclude $w \Vdash \neg(T \triangleright \neg q)$.

At last, we show $w \Vdash \square(p \leftrightarrow(T \triangleright \neg p)) \wedge \square(q \leftrightarrow(T \triangleright \neg q))$. Let $z \in W$ be such that $w R z$. Then, $z=x$. Since there is no $z^{\prime} \in W$ such that $x R z^{\prime}, x \Vdash(T \triangleright \neg p) \wedge(T \triangleright \neg q)$. Since $x \Vdash p$ and $x \Vdash q$, we have $x \Vdash(p \leftrightarrow(T \triangleright \neg p)) \wedge(q \leftrightarrow(\top \triangleright \neg q))$. Hence, we obtain $w \Vdash \square(p \leftrightarrow(T \triangleright \neg p)) \wedge \square(q \leftrightarrow(\top \triangleright \neg q))$.

Therefore, $w \Vdash \square(p \leftrightarrow(\top \triangleright \neg p)) \wedge \square(q \leftrightarrow(\top \triangleright \neg q)) \wedge \neg(p \leftrightarrow q)$.

## 3.2 eUFP

Even for extensions of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$, Proposition 1.2 suggests that the uniqueness of fixed points may hold with respect to formulas in some particular forms. From this perspective, we introduce the notion that formulas are left-modalized in $p$.

Definition 8 We say that a formula $A$ is left-modalized in a propositional variable $p$ if $A$ is modalized in $p$ and $p \notin v(C)$ for any subformula $B \triangleright C$ of $A$.

Then, we obtain the following version of the substitution principle.
Proposition 6 Let $A, B$, and $C(p)$ be any formulas such that $p \notin v(E)$ for any subformula $D \triangleright E$ of $C$.

1. $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash \square(A \leftrightarrow B) \rightarrow(C(A) \leftrightarrow C(B))$.
2. If $C(p)$ is left-modalized in $p$, then $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash \square(A \leftrightarrow B) \rightarrow(C(A) \leftrightarrow C(B))$.

Proof 1. This proposition is proved by induction on the construction of $C(p)$. We only prove the case $C(p) \equiv D(p) \triangleright E$ (By our supposition, $p \notin v(E)$ ). For any subformula $D^{\prime} \triangleright E^{\prime}$ of $D$, it is also a subformula of $C$, and hence $p \notin v\left(E^{\prime}\right)$. Then, by the induction hypothesis, we obtain

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash \backsim(A \leftrightarrow B) \rightarrow(D(A) \leftrightarrow D(B))
$$

Then, $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash \square(A \leftrightarrow B) \rightarrow \square(D(A) \leftrightarrow D(B))$. Therefore, by Proposition 1.2,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash \square(A \leftrightarrow B) \rightarrow(D(A) \triangleright E \leftrightarrow D(B) \triangleright E) .
$$

Since $p \notin v(E)$, we find $C(A) \equiv(D(A) \triangleright E)$ and $C(B) \equiv(D(B) \triangleright E)$. Therefore,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash \square(A \leftrightarrow B) \rightarrow(C(A) \leftrightarrow C(B)) .
$$

2. This follows from our proof of clause 1 .

We introduce our restricted versions of UFP and FPP.
Definition 9 We say that $\ell$ UFP holds for a logic $L$ if for any formula $A(p)$ which is left-modalized in $p, L \vdash \square(p \leftrightarrow A(p)) \wedge \square(q \leftrightarrow A(q)) \rightarrow(p \leftrightarrow q)$.

Definition 10 We say that a logic $L$ has $\ell$ FPP if for any formula $A(p)$ which is leftmodalized in $p$, there exists a formula $F$ such that $v(F) \subseteq v(A) \backslash\{p\}$ and $L \vdash F \leftrightarrow$ $A(F)$.

Then, $\ell$ UFP holds for every our sublogic of IL.
Theorem 5 ( $\ell \mathrm{UFP}$ for $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$) $\ell U F P$ holds for all extensions of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$.
Proof Let $A(p)$ be any formula which is left-modalized in $p$. Then, by Proposition 6.2, $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash \square(p \leftrightarrow q) \rightarrow(A(p) \leftrightarrow A(q))$. Therefore,

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash \square(p \leftrightarrow A(p)) \wedge \boxtimes(q \leftrightarrow A(q)) & \rightarrow(\square(p \leftrightarrow q) \rightarrow(A(p) \leftrightarrow A(q))) \\
& \rightarrow(\square(p \leftrightarrow q) \rightarrow(p \leftrightarrow q)) \\
& \rightarrow(\square(\square(p \leftrightarrow q) \rightarrow(p \leftrightarrow q))) \\
& \rightarrow \square(p \leftrightarrow q) \\
& \rightarrow(p \leftrightarrow q) .
\end{aligned}
$$

### 3.3 Applications of Smoryński's argument

We have shown that UFP and the substitution principle hold for extensions of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{4}_{+}\right)$(Theorem 4 and Proposition 3). Then, by applying Smoryński's argument [13], we prove that for any appropriate extension of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right)$, CIP implies FPP.

Lemma 2 Let $L$ be any extension of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right)$that is closed under substituting a formula for a propositional variable. If L has CIP, then L also has FPP.

Proof Suppose $L \supseteq \mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right)$and $L$ has CIP. Let $A(p)$ be any formula modalized in $p$. Then, by Theorem 4,

$$
L \vdash \backsim(p \leftrightarrow A(p)) \wedge \backsim(q \leftrightarrow A(q)) \rightarrow(p \leftrightarrow q) .
$$

We have

$$
L \vdash \odot(p \leftrightarrow A(p)) \wedge p \rightarrow(\odot(q \leftrightarrow A(q)) \rightarrow q) .
$$

Since $L$ has CIP, there exists a formula $F$ such that $v(F) \subseteq v(A) \backslash\{p\}, L \vdash \square(p \leftrightarrow$ $A(p)) \wedge p \rightarrow F$ and $L \vdash F \rightarrow(\odot(q \leftrightarrow A(q)) \rightarrow q)$. Since $q \notin v(F)$, we have $L \vdash F \rightarrow(\odot(p \leftrightarrow A(p)) \rightarrow p)$ by substituting $p$ for $q$. Then,

$$
L \vdash \odot(p \leftrightarrow A(p)) \rightarrow(F \leftrightarrow p) .
$$

By substituting $A(F)$ for $p$, we get

$$
\begin{equation*}
L \vdash \square(A(F) \leftrightarrow A(A(F))) \rightarrow(F \leftrightarrow A(F)) . \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

Then

$$
L \vdash \square(A(F) \leftrightarrow A(A(F))) \rightarrow \square(F \leftrightarrow A(F)) .
$$

Since $A(p)$ is modalized in $p$, by Proposition 3.2,

$$
L \vdash \square(A(F) \leftrightarrow A(A(F))) \rightarrow(A(F) \leftrightarrow A(A(F))) .
$$

Then, by applying the axiom scheme $\mathbf{L 3}$, we obtain $L \vdash A(F) \leftrightarrow A(A(F))$. From this with (1), we conclude $L \vdash F \leftrightarrow A(F)$. Therefore, $F$ is a fixed point of $A(p)$ in $L$.

Also, we have shown that $\ell$ UFP and the substitution principle with respect to leftmodalized formulas hold for extensions of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$(Theorem 5 and Proposition 6). Thus, our proof of Lemma 2 also works for proving the following lemma.

Lemma 3 Let L be any extension of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$that is closed under substituting a formula for a propositional variable. If $L$ has CIP, then $L$ also has $\ell F P$.

## 4 The Craig interpolation property

In this section, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6 (CIP for $\left.\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)\right)$ The logic $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 2_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ has CIP.
Our proof of Theorem 6 is based on a semantical proof of CIP for IL due to Areces, Hoogland, and de Jongh [1].

### 4.1 Preparations for our proof of Theorem 6

In this subsection, we prepare several definitions and prove some lemmas that are used in our proof of Theorem 6. Only in this section, we write $\vdash A$ instead of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right) \vdash A$ if there is no confusion. Notice that by Proposition 1, $\vdash \mathbf{J} \mathbf{2} \wedge \mathbf{J 4} \wedge \mathbf{J} 4_{+}$.

For a formula $A$, we define the formula $\sim A$ as follows:

$$
\sim A: \equiv\left\{\begin{array}{l}
B \quad \text { if } A \equiv \neg B \text { for some formula } B \\
\neg A \text { otherwise }
\end{array}\right.
$$

For a set $X$ of formulas, by $\mathcal{L}_{X}$ we denote the set of all formulas built up from $\perp$ and propositional variables occurring in formulas in $X$. We simply write $\mathcal{L}_{A}$ instead of $\mathcal{L}_{\{A\}}$. For a finite set $X$ of formulas, let $\bigwedge X$ be a conjunction of all elements of $X$. For the sake of simplicity, only in this section, $\vdash \wedge X \rightarrow A$ will be written as $\vdash X \rightarrow A$.

For a set $\Phi$ of formulas, we define

$$
\Phi_{\triangleright}:=\{A \text { : there exists a formula } B \text { such that } A \triangleright B \in \Phi \text { or } B \triangleright A \in \Phi\} .
$$

Definition 11 A set $\Phi$ of formulas is said to be adequate if it satisfies the following conditions:

1. $\Phi$ is closed under taking subformulas and the $\sim$-operation;
2. $\perp \in \Phi_{\triangleright}$;
3. If $A, B \in \Phi_{\triangleright}$, then $A \triangleright B \in \Phi$;
4. If $A \in \Phi_{\triangleright}$, then $\square \sim A \in \Phi$.

Our notion of adequate sets is essentially the same as that introduced by de Jongh and Veltman [7].

Note that for any finite set $X$ of formulas, there exists the smallest finite adequate set $\Phi$ containing $X$. We denote this set by $\Phi_{X}$.

Definition 12 1. A pair ( $\Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2}$ ) of finite sets of formulas is said to be separable if for some formula $I \in \mathcal{L}_{\Gamma_{1}} \cap \mathcal{L}_{\Gamma_{2}}, \vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow I$, and $\vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow \neg I$. A pair is said to be inseparable if it is not separable.
2. A pair $\left(\Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2}\right)$ of finite sets of formulas is said to be complete if it is inseparable and

- For each $F \in \Phi_{\Gamma_{1}}$, either $F \in \Gamma_{1}$ or $\sim F \in \Gamma_{1}$;
- For each $F \in \Phi_{\Gamma_{2}}$, either $F \in \Gamma_{2}$ or $\sim F \in \Gamma_{2}$.

We say a finite set $X$ of formulas is consistent if $\nvdash X \rightarrow \perp$. If a pair $\left(\Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2}\right)$ is inseparable, then it can be shown that both of $\Gamma_{1}$ and $\Gamma_{2}$ are consistent.

In the rest of this subsection, we fix some sets $X$ and $Y$ of formulas. Put $\Phi^{1}:=\Phi_{X}$ (resp. $\Phi^{2}:=\Phi_{Y}$ ) and $\mathcal{L}_{1}:=\mathcal{L}_{X}$ (resp. $\mathcal{L}_{2}:=\mathcal{L}_{Y}$ ). Let $X^{\prime} \subseteq \Phi^{1}$ and $Y^{\prime} \subseteq \Phi^{2}$. It is easily proved that if $\left(X^{\prime}, Y^{\prime}\right)$ is inseparable, then for any formula $A \in \Phi^{1}$, at least one of $\left(X^{\prime} \cup\{A\}, Y^{\prime}\right)$ and $\left(X^{\prime} \cup\{\sim A\}, Y^{\prime}\right)$ is inseparable. Also, a similar statement holds for $\Phi^{2}$ and $Y^{\prime}$. Then, we obtain the following proposition.

Proposition 7 If $(X, Y)$ is inseparable, then there exists some complete pair $\Gamma^{\prime}=$ ( $\Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2}$ ) such that $X \subseteq \Gamma_{1} \subseteq \Phi^{1}$ and $Y \subseteq \Gamma_{2} \subseteq \Phi^{2}$.

Let $K\left(\Phi^{1}, \Phi^{2}\right)$ be the set of all complete pairs ( $\Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2}$ ) satisfying $\Gamma_{1} \subseteq \Phi^{1}$ and $\Gamma_{2} \subseteq \Phi^{2}$. Note that the set $K\left(\Phi^{1}, \Phi^{2}\right)$ is finite. For each $\Gamma \in K\left(\Phi^{1}, \Phi^{2}\right)$, let $\Gamma_{1}$ and $\Gamma_{2}$ be the first and the second components of $\Gamma$, respectively.

Definition 13 We define a binary relation $\prec$ on $K\left(\Phi^{1}, \Phi^{2}\right)$ as follows: For $\Gamma, \Delta \in$ $K\left(\Phi^{1}, \Phi^{2}\right)$,

$$
\Gamma \prec \Delta: \Leftrightarrow \begin{aligned}
& \text { For } i=\{1,2\}, \text { if } \square A \in \Gamma_{i}, \text { then } \square A, A \in \Delta_{i}, \text { and } \\
& \text { there exists some } \square B \text { such that } \square B \in \Delta_{1} \cup \Delta_{2} \text { and } \square B \notin \Gamma_{1} \cup \Gamma_{2} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Then, $\prec$ is a transitive and conversely well-founded binary relation on $K\left(\Phi^{1}, \Phi^{2}\right)$.
Definition 14 Let $\Gamma, \Delta \in K\left(\Phi^{1}, \Phi^{2}\right)$ and $A \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{1} \cup \Phi_{\triangleright}^{2}$. We say that $\Delta$ is an $A$-critical successor of $\Gamma$ (write $\Gamma \prec_{A} \Delta$ ) if the following conditions are met:

1. $\Gamma \prec \Delta$;
2. If $A \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{1}$, then

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Gamma_{1}^{A}:= & \left\{\square \sim B, \sim B: B \triangleright A \in \Gamma_{1}\right\} \subseteq \Delta_{1} ; \\
\Gamma_{2}^{A}:= & \left\{\square \sim C, \sim C: C \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{2} \text { and for some } I \in \mathcal{L}_{1} \cap \mathcal{L}_{2},\right. \\
& \left.\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow(I \wedge \neg A) \triangleright A \& \vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow C \triangleright I\right\} \subseteq \Delta_{2} .
\end{aligned}
$$

3. If $A \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{2}$, then

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Gamma_{1}^{A}:= & \left\{\square \sim B, \sim B: B \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{1} \text { and for some } I \in \mathcal{L}_{1} \cap \mathcal{L}_{2},\right. \\
& \left.\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow B \triangleright I \& \vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow(I \wedge \neg A) \triangleright A\right\} \subseteq \Delta_{1} ; \\
\Gamma_{2}^{A}:= & \left\{\square \sim C, \sim C: C \triangleright A \in \Gamma_{2}\right\} \subseteq \Delta_{2} .
\end{aligned}
$$

The notion of $A$-critical successors is originally introduced by de Jongh and Veltman [7]. Our definition is based on a modification due to Areces, Hoogland, and de Jongh [1].

From the following claim, Definition 14 makes sense.

Proposition 8 If $A \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{1} \cap \Phi_{\triangleright}^{2}$, then the sets $\Gamma_{1}^{A}$ in clauses 2 and 3 of Definition 14 coincide. This is also the case for $\Gamma_{2}^{A}$.

Proof We prove only for $\Gamma_{1}^{A}$. It suffices to show that for any formula $B$, the following are equivalent:

1. $B \triangleright A \in \Gamma_{1}$.
2. $B \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{1}$ and for some $I \in \mathcal{L}_{1} \cap \mathcal{L}_{2}, \vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow B \triangleright I$, and $\vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow(I \wedge \neg A) \triangleright A$.
$(1 \Rightarrow 2)$ : Suppose $B \triangleright A \in \Gamma_{1}$, then $B \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{1}$. By Proposition 1.1, we have $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash(A \wedge \neg A) \triangleright A$ because $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash \square \neg(A \wedge \neg A)$. Since $A \in \mathcal{L}_{1} \cap \mathcal{L}_{2}$, the clause 2 holds by letting $I \equiv A$.
$(2 \Rightarrow 1)$ : Assume that clause 2 holds. Then, $A \triangleright B \in \Phi^{1}$ because $A, B \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{1}$. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that $\neg(B \triangleright A) \in \Gamma_{1}$. By Proposition 1.6, $\vdash(B \triangleright$ $I) \wedge((I \wedge \neg A) \triangleright A) \rightarrow B \triangleright A$. Then, we obtain $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow \neg((I \wedge \neg A) \triangleright A)$. This contradicts the inseparability of $\Gamma$ because $(I \wedge \neg A) \triangleright A \in \mathcal{L}_{1} \cap \mathcal{L}_{2}$. Hence, $\neg(B \triangleright A) \notin \Gamma_{1}$. Since $\Gamma$ is complete, $B \triangleright A \in \Gamma_{1}$.

Lemma 4 For $\Gamma, \Delta \in K\left(\Phi^{1}, \Phi^{2}\right)$, if $\Gamma \prec \Delta$, then $\Gamma \prec \perp \Delta$.
Proof Notice that $\perp \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{1} \cap \Phi_{\triangleright}^{2}$. By Proposition 8, it suffices to show that if $C \triangleright \perp \in$ $\Gamma_{1}$ (resp. $\Gamma_{2}$ ), then $\square \sim C, \sim C \in \Delta_{1}$ (resp. $\Delta_{2}$ ). Suppose $C \triangleright \perp \in \Gamma_{1}$. Then, by (J6), $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow \square \sim C$. Note that $\square \sim C \in \Phi^{1}$, and hence $\square \sim C \in \Gamma_{1}$. By $\Gamma \prec \Delta$, $\square \sim C, \sim C \in \Delta_{1}$. The case $C \triangleright \perp \in \Gamma_{2}$ is proved similarly. Therefore, $\Gamma \prec \perp \Delta$.

Lemma 5 For $\Gamma, \Delta, \Theta \in K\left(\Phi^{1}, \Phi^{2}\right)$ and $A \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{1} \cup \Phi_{\triangleright}^{2}$, if $\Gamma \prec_{A} \Delta$ and $\Delta \prec \Theta$, then $\Gamma \prec_{A} \Theta$.

Proof We only prove the case $A \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{1}$. Let $\Gamma_{1}^{A}$ and $\Gamma_{2}^{A}$ be the sets as in Definition 14. If $\square \sim B, \sim B \in \Gamma_{1}^{A}$, then $\square \sim B \in \Delta_{1}$ because $\Gamma \prec_{A} \Delta$. Thus, $\square \sim B, \sim B \in \Theta_{1}$ because $\Delta \prec \Theta$. Similarly, if $\square \sim C, \sim C \in \Gamma_{2}^{A}$, then $\Theta_{2}$ contains $\square \sim C$ and $\sim C$. This means $\Gamma \prec_{A} \Theta$.

In order to prove the Truth Lemma (Lemma 4.2), we show the following two lemmas.

Lemma 6 Let $\Gamma \in K\left(\Phi^{1}, \Phi^{2}\right)$. If $\neg(G \triangleright F) \in \Gamma_{1} \cup \Gamma_{2}$, then there exists a pair $\Delta \in K\left(\Phi^{1}, \Phi^{2}\right)$ such that:

1. $\Gamma \prec_{F} \Delta$;
2. $G, \square \sim F \in \Delta_{1} \cup \Delta_{2}$.

Proof Suppose $\neg(G \triangleright F) \in \Gamma_{1}$. Let

$$
\begin{aligned}
X^{\prime}:= & \Gamma_{1} \cup\{G, \square \sim G, \square \sim F\} \cup\left\{\square \sim A, \sim A: A \triangleright F \in \Gamma_{1}\right\} ; \\
Y^{\prime}:= & \square \Gamma_{2} \cup\left\{\square \sim B, \sim B: B \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{2} \text { and for some } I \in \mathcal{L}_{1} \cap \mathcal{L}_{2},\right. \\
& \left.\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow(I \wedge \neg F) \triangleright F \& \vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow B \triangleright I\right\},
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\square \Gamma_{i}(i=1,2)$ denotes the set $\left\{\square C, C: \square C \in \Gamma_{i}\right\}$.

We claim $\square \sim G \notin \Gamma_{1} \cup \Gamma_{2}$. Assume $\square \neg G \in \Gamma_{1}$. Then, $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow \square \neg G$. By Proposition 1.1, $\vdash \square \neg G \rightarrow G \triangleright F$. Hence, $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow G \triangleright F$. This implies that $\Gamma_{1}$ is inconsistent, a contradiction. Thus, $\square \sim G \notin \Gamma_{1}$. Moreover, if $\square \sim G \in \Gamma_{2}$, then $\diamond G$ separates $\left(\Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2}\right)$ because $\forall G \in \mathcal{L}_{1} \cap \mathcal{L}_{2}$. This contradicts the inseparability of $\Gamma$. Hence, $\square \sim G \notin \Gamma_{2}$.

We show that ( $X^{\prime}, Y^{\prime}$ ) is inseparable. Suppose, for a contradiction, that $J \in \mathcal{L}_{1} \cap \mathcal{L}_{2}$ separates $\left(X^{\prime}, Y^{\prime}\right)$. From $\vdash Y^{\prime} \rightarrow \neg J$,

$$
\vdash \backsim \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow\left(J \rightarrow \bigvee_{j \in \kappa}\left(\diamond B_{j} \vee B_{j}\right)\right)
$$

where $\kappa$ is an appropriate index set for $Y^{\prime}$ such that for each $j \in \kappa, B_{j} \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{2}$ and there exists a formula $I_{j} \in \mathcal{L}_{1} \cap \mathcal{L}_{2}$ such that

$$
\begin{align*}
& \vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow\left(I_{j} \wedge \neg F\right) \triangleright F, \text { and }  \tag{2}\\
& \vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow B_{j} \triangleright I_{j} . \tag{3}
\end{align*}
$$

Then

$$
\vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow \square\left(J \rightarrow \bigvee_{j \in \kappa}\left(\diamond B_{j} \vee B_{j}\right)\right)
$$

By Proposition 1.2,

$$
\vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow\left(\left(\bigvee_{j \in \kappa}\left(\diamond B_{j} \vee B_{j}\right)\right) \triangleright \bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j} \rightarrow J \triangleright \bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j}\right) .
$$

By (3), J2, J3, and J5, we have $\vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow\left(\bigvee_{j \in \kappa}\left(\diamond B_{j} \vee B_{j}\right)\right) \triangleright \bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j}$. Hence

$$
\begin{equation*}
\vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow J \triangleright \bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j} \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

On the other hand, from $\vdash X^{\prime} \rightarrow J$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \vdash \square \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow\left(\neg J \wedge G \wedge \square \neg G \rightarrow \bigvee_{A \triangleright F \in \Gamma_{1}}(\diamond A \vee A) \vee \diamond F\right), \\
& \vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow \square\left(\neg J \wedge G \wedge \square \neg G \rightarrow \bigvee_{A \triangleright F \in \Gamma_{1}}(\diamond A \vee A) \vee \diamond F\right),
\end{aligned}
$$

(By Proposition 1.2)

$$
\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow\left(\left(\bigvee_{A \triangleright F \in \Gamma_{1}}(\diamond A \vee A) \vee \diamond F\right) \triangleright F \rightarrow(\neg J \wedge G \wedge \square \neg G) \triangleright F\right)
$$

By J2, J3, and J5, we have $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow\left(\bigvee_{A \triangleright F \in \Gamma_{1}}(\diamond A \vee A) \vee \diamond F\right) \triangleright F$. Hence, we obtain $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow(\neg J \wedge G \wedge \square \neg G) \triangleright F$. By Proposition 1.3, $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow$ $(J \triangleright F \rightarrow(G \wedge \square \neg G) \triangleright F)$. By Lemma 1.1, $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow(J \triangleright F \rightarrow G \triangleright F)$. Since $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow \neg(G \triangleright F)$, we get $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow \neg(J \triangleright F)$. From (2) and J3, we obtain $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow$ $\left(\bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j} \wedge \neg F\right) \triangleright F$. By Proposition 1.6, $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow\left(J \triangleright \bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j} \rightarrow J \triangleright F\right)$. Hence,

$$
\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow \neg\left(J \triangleright \bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j}\right)
$$

From this and (4), we conclude that $\neg\left(J \triangleright \bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j}\right)$ separates $\left(\Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2}\right)$, a contradiction. Therefore, $\left(X^{\prime}, Y^{\prime}\right)$ is inseparable.

Now let $\Delta \in K\left(\Phi^{1}, \Phi^{2}\right)$ be a complete pair extending $\left(X^{\prime}, Y^{\prime}\right)$. We have $\Gamma \prec_{F} \Delta$ and $G, \square \sim F \in \Delta_{1}$. The other case where $\neg(G \triangleright F) \in \Gamma_{2}$ is proved in a similar way.

Lemma 7 Let $\Gamma, \Delta \in K\left(\Phi^{1}, \Phi^{2}\right)$. Suppose that $\Gamma \prec_{A} \Delta, G \triangleright F \in \Gamma_{1} \cup \Gamma_{2}$ and $G \in \Delta_{1} \cup \Delta_{2}$. Then, there exists a pair $\Theta \in K\left(\Phi^{1}, \Phi^{2}\right)$ such that:
$-\Gamma \prec_{A} \Theta$;
$-F \in \Theta_{1} \cup \Theta_{2}$;
$-\square \sim A, \sim A \in \Theta_{1} \cup \Theta_{2}$.
Proof Suppose $G \triangleright F \in \Gamma_{1}$. From $G \in \Delta_{1} \cup \Delta_{2}$ and $G \in \Phi_{1}$, we obtain $G \in \Delta_{1}$ by the inseparability of $\Delta$. We distinguish the following two cases:
(Case 1): Assume $A \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{1}$. Then, $G \triangleright A \in \Phi^{1}$. If $G \triangleright A \in \Gamma_{1}$, then $\sim G \in \Delta_{1}$ because $\Gamma \prec_{A} \Delta$. This contradicts the consistency of $\Delta_{1}$. Therefore, $G \triangleright A \notin \Gamma_{1}$. Since $\Gamma$ is complete, we have $\neg(G \triangleright A) \in \Gamma_{1}$.

Let:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& X^{\prime}:=\square \Gamma_{1} \cup\{\square \sim F, F, \square \sim A, \sim A\} \cup\left\{\square \sim B, \sim B: B \triangleright A \in \Gamma_{1}\right\} ; \\
& Y^{\prime}:=\boxtimes \Gamma_{2} \cup\left\{\square \sim C, \sim C: C \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{2} \text { and for some } I \in \mathcal{L}_{1} \cap \mathcal{L}_{2},\right. \\
&\left.\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow(I \wedge \neg A) \triangleright A \& \vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow C \triangleright I\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

We show $\square \sim F \notin \Gamma_{1} \cup \Gamma_{2}$. If $\square \sim G \in \Gamma_{1}$, then $\sim G \in \Delta_{1}$ because $\Gamma \prec \Delta$. This contradicts the consistency of $\Delta_{1}$. Hence, $\square \sim G \notin \Gamma_{1}$. Since $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow(G \triangleright F) \wedge \diamond G$, we have $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow \diamond F$ by J4. Therefore, $\square \sim F \notin \Gamma_{1}$. Moreover, if $\square \sim F \in \Gamma_{2}$, then $\diamond F$ would separate ( $\Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2}$ ), a contradiction. Thus, $\square \sim F \notin \Gamma_{2}$.

We show that $\left(X^{\prime}, Y^{\prime}\right)$ is inseparable. Suppose, for a contradiction, that for some $J \in \mathcal{L}_{1} \cap \mathcal{L}_{2}, \vdash X^{\prime} \rightarrow J$ and $\vdash Y^{\prime} \rightarrow \neg J$.

From $\vdash Y^{\prime} \rightarrow \neg J$,

$$
\vdash \boxtimes \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow\left(J \rightarrow \bigvee_{j \in \kappa}\left(\diamond C_{j} \vee C_{j}\right)\right)
$$

where $\kappa$ is an appropriate index set such that for each $j \in \kappa, C_{j} \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{2}$ and there exists a formula $I_{j} \in \mathcal{L}_{1} \cap \mathcal{L}_{2}$ such that $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow\left(I_{j} \wedge \neg A\right) \triangleright A$ and $\vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow C_{j} \triangleright I_{j}$. Then,

$$
\vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow \square\left(J \rightarrow \bigvee_{j \in \kappa}\left(\diamond C_{j} \vee C_{j}\right)\right)
$$

Since $\vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow\left(\bigvee_{j \in \kappa}\left(\diamond C_{j} \vee C_{j}\right)\right) \triangleright \bigvee I_{j}$, by Proposition 1.2, we obtain

$$
\begin{equation*}
\vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow J \triangleright \bigvee I_{j} \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

On the other hand, from $\vdash X^{\prime} \rightarrow J$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \vdash \square \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow\left(\neg J \wedge \square \neg F \wedge F \wedge \neg A \rightarrow \diamond A \vee \bigvee_{B \triangleright A \in \Gamma_{1}}(\diamond B \vee B)\right), \\
& \vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow \square\left(\neg J \wedge \square \neg F \wedge F \wedge \neg A \rightarrow \diamond A \vee \bigvee_{B \triangleright A \in \Gamma_{1}}(\diamond B \vee B)\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

Then, by Proposition 1.2, we obtain $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow(\neg J \wedge \square \neg F \wedge F \wedge \neg A) \triangleright A$ because $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow\left(\diamond A \vee \bigvee_{B \triangleright A \in \Gamma_{1}}(\diamond B \vee B)\right) \triangleright A$. By Proposition 1.3, $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow$ $(J \triangleright A \rightarrow(\square \neg F \wedge F \wedge \neg A) \triangleright A)$. By Lemma 1.2, we have $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow G \triangleright(\square \neg F \wedge$ $F)$. Then, by Proposition 1.6, we obtain $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow((\square \neg F \wedge F \wedge \neg A) \triangleright A \rightarrow G \triangleright A)$. Thus, $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow(J \triangleright A \rightarrow G \triangleright A)$. Since $\neg(G \triangleright A) \in \Gamma_{1}$, we get $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow \neg(J \triangleright A)$. Since $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow\left(\bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j} \wedge \neg A\right) \triangleright A$, we have $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow\left(J \triangleright \bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j} \rightarrow J \triangleright A\right)$ by Proposition 1.6. Therefore,

$$
\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow \neg\left(J \triangleright \bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j}\right)
$$

From this and (5), we conclude that $\neg\left(J \triangleright \bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j}\right)$ separates $\left(\Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2}\right)$, a contradiction.
(Case 2): Assume $A \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{2}$. Let:

$$
X^{\prime}:=\square \Gamma_{1} \cup\{\square \sim F, F\}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \cup\left\{\square \sim B, \sim B: B \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{1} \text { and for some } I \in \mathcal{L}_{1} \cap \mathcal{L}_{2},\right. \\
&\left.\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow B \triangleright I \& \vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow(I \wedge \neg A) \triangleright A\right\} ; \\
& Y^{\prime}:=\square \Gamma_{2} \cup\{\square \sim A, \sim A\} \cup\left\{\square \sim C, \sim C: C \triangleright A \in \Gamma_{2}\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

As in Case 1, it can be shown $\square \sim F \notin \Gamma_{1} \cup \Gamma_{2}$. We prove that ( $X^{\prime}, Y^{\prime}$ ) is inseparable. Suppose, for a contradiction, that for some $J \in \mathcal{L}_{1} \cap \mathcal{L}_{2}, \vdash X^{\prime} \rightarrow J$ and $\vdash Y^{\prime} \rightarrow \neg J$. From $\vdash X^{\prime} \rightarrow J$,

$$
\vdash \square \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow\left(\square \neg F \wedge F \wedge \neg J \rightarrow \bigvee_{j \in \kappa}\left(\diamond B_{j} \vee B_{j}\right)\right),
$$

where $\kappa$ is an appropriate index set such that for each $j \in \kappa, B_{j} \in \Phi_{\triangleright}^{1}$ and there exists a formula $I_{j} \in \mathcal{L}_{1} \cap \mathcal{L}_{2}$ such that $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow B_{j} \triangleright I_{j}$ and $\vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow\left(I_{j} \wedge \neg A\right) \triangleright A$. Then,

$$
\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow \square\left(\square \neg F \wedge F \wedge \neg J \rightarrow \bigvee_{j \in \kappa}\left(\diamond B_{j} \vee B_{j}\right)\right)
$$

Since $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow\left(\bigvee_{j \in \kappa}\left(\diamond B_{j} \vee B_{j}\right)\right) \triangleright \bigvee I_{j}$, we have

$$
\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow(\square \neg F \wedge F \wedge \neg J) \triangleright \bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j}
$$

by Proposition 1.2. Then,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow\left(\square \neg F \wedge F \wedge \bigwedge_{j \in \kappa} \neg I_{j} \wedge \neg J\right) \triangleright\left(\bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j} \vee J\right), \\
& \vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow\left(\square \neg F \wedge F \wedge \neg\left(\bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j} \vee J\right)\right) \triangleright\left(\bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j} \vee J\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

Since $G \triangleright F \in \Gamma_{1}$, by Lemma 1.2, we obtain $\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow G \triangleright(\square \neg F \wedge F)$. Therefore, by Proposition 1.6, we obtain

$$
\begin{equation*}
\vdash \Gamma_{1} \rightarrow G \triangleright\left(\bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j} \vee J\right) \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

On the other hand, from $\vdash Y^{\prime} \rightarrow \neg J$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \vdash \square \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow\left(J \wedge \neg A \rightarrow \diamond A \vee \bigvee_{C \triangleright A \in \Gamma_{2}}(\diamond C \vee C)\right), \\
& \vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow \square\left(J \wedge \neg A \rightarrow \diamond A \vee \bigvee_{C \triangleright A \in \Gamma_{2}}(\diamond C \vee C)\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

Since $\vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow\left(\diamond A \vee \vee_{C \triangleright A \in \Gamma_{2}}(\diamond C \vee C)\right) \triangleright A$, we obtain $\vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow(J \wedge \neg A) \triangleright A$ by Proposition 1.2. Since $\vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow\left(\bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j} \wedge \neg A\right) \triangleright A$, we have

$$
\vdash \Gamma_{2} \rightarrow\left(\left(\bigvee_{j \in \kappa} I_{j} \vee J\right) \wedge \neg A\right) \triangleright A
$$

From this and (6), we conclude $\sim G \in \Delta_{1}$ because $\Gamma \prec_{A} \Delta$. This contradicts the consistency of $\Delta_{1}$.

In both cases, $\left(X^{\prime}, Y^{\prime}\right)$ is inseparable, and hence we can obtain a complete pair $\Theta \in K\left(\Phi^{1}, \Phi^{2}\right)$ which extends $\left(X^{\prime}, Y^{\prime}\right)$ and satisfies the desired conditions.

### 4.2 Proof of Theorem 6

We are ready to prove Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 6 Suppose that the implication $A_{0} \rightarrow B_{0}$ has no interpolant, and we would like to show $\nvdash A_{0} \rightarrow B_{0}$. It follows that ( $\left\{A_{0}\right\},\left\{\neg B_{0}\right\}$ ) is inseparable. Let $\Phi^{1}$ (resp. $\Phi^{2}$ ) be the smallest finite adequate set containing $A_{0}$ (resp. $\neg B_{0}$ ), and put $K:=K\left(\Phi^{1}, \Phi^{2}\right)$. There exists $\Gamma^{\prime} \in K\left(\Phi^{1}, \Phi^{2}\right)$ such that $A_{0} \in \Gamma_{1}^{\prime}$ and $\neg B_{0} \in \Gamma_{2}^{\prime}$. For $\Gamma \in K$, we define inductively the rank of $\Gamma$ (write $\operatorname{rank}(\Gamma)$ ) as $\operatorname{rank}(\Gamma):=\sup \{\operatorname{rank}(\Delta)+1: \Gamma \prec \Delta\}$, where $\sup \emptyset=0$. This notion is well-defined because $\prec$ is conversely well-founded.

For finite sequences $\tau$ and $\sigma$ of formulas, let $\tau \subseteq \sigma$ mean that $\sigma$ is an end-extension of $\tau$. Let $\tau *\langle A\rangle$ be the sequence obtained from $\tau$ by adding $A$ as the last element.

We define an $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-model $M=\left\langle W, R,\left\{S_{w}\right\}_{w \in W}, \Vdash_{-}\right\rangle$as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& W:=\{\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle: \Gamma \in K \text { and } \tau \text { is a finite sequence of elements of } \\
& \left.\Phi_{\triangleright}^{1} \cup \Phi_{\triangleright}^{2} \text { with } \operatorname{rank}(\Gamma)+|\tau| \leq \operatorname{rank}\left(\Gamma^{\prime}\right)\right\} ; \\
& \langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle R\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle: \Leftrightarrow \Gamma \prec \Delta \text { and } \tau \subsetneq \sigma ; \\
& \langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle S_{\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle}\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle \\
& : \Leftrightarrow\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle R\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle,\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle R\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle \text { and } \\
\text { if } \tau *\langle A\rangle \subseteq \sigma, \Gamma \prec_{A} \Delta \text { and } \square \sim A \in \Delta_{1} \cup \Delta_{2}, \\
\text { then } \tau *\langle A\rangle \subseteq \rho, \Gamma \prec_{A} \Theta \text { and } \square \sim A, \sim A \in \Theta_{1} \cup \Theta_{2} ; \\
\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle \Vdash p: \Longleftrightarrow p \in \Gamma_{1} \cup \Gamma_{2} .
\end{array}\right.
\end{aligned}
$$

Claim $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ is valid in the frame of $M$.
Proof It is clear that $R$ is transitive and conversely well-founded.

- Suppose $\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle S_{\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle}\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle$. Then, we have $\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle R\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle$ by the definition of $S_{\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle}$. Therefore, $\mathbf{J 4}_{+}$is valid in the frame of $M$.
- Suppose $\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle S_{\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle}\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle S_{\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle}\langle\Lambda, \pi\rangle$. Then, we have $\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle R\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle$ and $\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle R\langle\Lambda, \pi\rangle$.
Assume $\tau *\langle A\rangle \subseteq \sigma, \Gamma \prec_{A} \Delta$, and $\square \sim A \in \Delta_{1} \cup \Delta_{2}$. $\operatorname{By}\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle S_{\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle}\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle$, we obtain $\tau *\langle A\rangle \subseteq \rho, \Gamma \prec_{A} \Theta$, and $\square \sim A \in \Theta_{1} \cup \Theta_{2}$. $\operatorname{By}\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle S_{\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle}\langle\Lambda, \pi\rangle$, we conclude $\tau *\langle A\rangle \subseteq \pi, \Gamma \prec_{A} \Lambda$, and $\square \sim A, \sim A \in \Lambda_{1} \cup \Lambda_{2}$.
Thus, $\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle S_{\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle}\langle\Lambda, \pi\rangle$. We obtain that $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}$is valid in the frame of $M$.
- Suppose $\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle R\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle R\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle$. Then, $\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle R\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle$, and hence $\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle R\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle$ by the transitivity of $R$.
Assume $\tau *\langle A\rangle \subseteq \sigma, \Gamma \prec_{A} \Delta$, and $\square \sim A \in \Delta_{1} \cup \Delta_{2}$. Since $\sigma \subseteq \rho$, we have $\tau *\langle A\rangle \subseteq \rho$. Since $\Delta \prec \Theta$, we have $\square \sim A, \sim A \in \Theta_{1} \cup \Theta_{2}$. Also, by Lemma 5, $\Gamma \prec_{A} \Theta$.
Thus, $\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle S_{\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle}\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle$. We conclude that $\mathbf{J 5}$ is valid in the frame of $M$.
Claim (The Truth Lemma) For $B \in \Phi^{1} \cup \Phi^{2}$ and $\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle \in W$, the following are equivalent:

1. $B \in \Gamma_{1} \cup \Gamma_{2}$.
2. $\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle \Vdash B$.

Proof The lemma is proved by induction on the construction of $B$. We only prove for $B \equiv G \triangleright F$.
$(1 \Rightarrow 2)$ : Assume $G \triangleright F \in \Gamma_{1} \cup \Gamma_{2}$. Let $\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle \in W$ be any element such that $\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle R\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle$ and $\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle \Vdash G$. By the induction hypothesis, $G \in \Delta_{1} \cup \Delta_{2}$. We distinguish the following two cases:
(Case 1): Assume that $\tau *\langle A\rangle \subseteq \sigma, \Gamma \prec_{A} \Delta$, and $\square \sim A \in \Delta_{1} \cup \Delta_{2}$. By Lemma 7, there exists a pair $\Theta \in K$ such that $\Gamma \prec_{A} \Theta, F \in \Theta_{1} \cup \Theta_{2}$, and $\square \sim A, \sim A \in \Theta_{1} \cup \Theta_{2}$.

Take $\rho:=\tau *\langle A\rangle$. By $\Gamma \prec \Theta, \operatorname{rank}(\Theta)+1 \leq \operatorname{rank}(\Gamma)$. We have

$$
\operatorname{rank}(\Theta)+|\rho|=\operatorname{rank}(\Theta)+1+|\tau| \leq \operatorname{rank}(\Gamma)+|\tau| \leq \operatorname{rank}\left(\Gamma^{\prime}\right)
$$

It follows that $\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle \in W$, and we have $\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle S_{\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle}\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle$. By the induction hypothesis, $\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle \Vdash F$. Therefore, $\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle \Vdash G \triangleright F$.
(Case 2): Otherwise, by Lemma 4, we have $\Gamma \prec \perp \Delta$. By Lemma 7, there exists a pair $\Theta \in K$ such that $\Gamma \prec \perp \Theta$ and $F \in \Theta_{1} \cup \Theta_{2}$.

Take $\rho:=\tau *\langle\perp\rangle$. Then, we have $\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle \in W$ by a similar argument as in Case 1. By the definition of $S_{\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle}$ and induction hypothesis, $\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle S_{\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle}\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle$ and $\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle \Vdash F$. Therefore, $\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle \Vdash G \triangleright F$.
$(2 \Rightarrow 1)$ : Assume $G \triangleright F \notin \Gamma_{1} \cup \Gamma_{2}$. Then, $\neg(G \triangleright F) \in \Gamma_{1} \cup \Gamma_{2}$ because $\Gamma$ is complete. By Lemma 6, there exists a pair $\Delta \in K$ such that $\Gamma \prec_{F} \Delta$ and $G, \square \sim F \in$ $\Delta_{1} \cup \Delta_{2}$. Let $\sigma:=\tau *\langle F\rangle$. We have $\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle \in W$. By the induction hypothesis, $\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle \Vdash G$. It suffices to show that for any $\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle \in W$, if $\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle S_{\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle}\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle$, then $\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle \nVdash F$. Suppose $\langle\Delta, \sigma\rangle S_{\langle\Gamma, \tau\rangle}\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle$. Since $\tau *\langle F\rangle \subseteq \sigma, \Gamma \prec_{F} \Delta$, and
$\square \sim F \in \Delta_{1} \cup \Delta_{2}$, we have $\sim F \in \Theta_{1} \cup \Theta_{2}$ (and hence $F \notin \Theta_{1} \cup \Theta_{2}$ ). By the induction hypothesis, $\langle\Theta, \rho\rangle \nVdash F$.

Let $\epsilon$ be the empty sequence, then $\left\langle\Gamma^{\prime}, \epsilon\right\rangle \in W$ because $\operatorname{rank}\left(\Gamma^{\prime}\right)+|\epsilon| \leq \operatorname{rank}\left(\Gamma^{\prime}\right)$. By the Truth Lemma (Lemma 4.2), $\left\langle\Gamma^{\prime}, \epsilon\right\rangle \Vdash A_{0} \wedge \neg B_{0}$, and therefore $A_{0} \rightarrow B_{0}$ is not valid in $M$. It follows that $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ does not prove $A_{0} \rightarrow B_{0}$.

### 4.3 Consequences of Theorem 6

In this subsection, we prove some consequences of Theorem 6 on interpolation properties. Firstly, we prove that $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ has a version of the $\triangleright$-interpolation property. Secondly, we notice that CIP for IL easily follows from Theorem 6.

Before them, we show the so-called generated submodel lemma. Let $M=$ $\left\langle W, R,\left\{S_{w}\right\}_{w \in W}, \Vdash\right\rangle$ be any $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-model such that $\mathbf{J 4}_{+}$is valid in the frame of $M$. For each $r \in W$, we define an $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-model $M^{*}=\left\langle W^{*}, R^{*},\left\{S_{w}^{*}\right\}_{w \in W^{*}}, \Vdash^{*}\right\rangle$ as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& -W^{*}:=R[r] \cup\{r\} ; \\
& -x R^{*} y: \Longleftrightarrow x R y ; \\
& -y S_{x}^{*} z: \Longleftrightarrow y S_{x} z ; \\
& -x \Vdash^{*} p: \Longleftrightarrow x \Vdash p .
\end{aligned}
$$

We call $M^{*}$ the submodel of $M$ generated by $r$. It is easy to show that if $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{1}$ is valid in the frame of $M$, then it is also valid in the frame of $M^{*}$. This is also the case for $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}$ and $\mathbf{J 5}$. Also, the following lemma is easily obtained.

Lemma 8 (The Generated Submodel Lemma) Suppose that $\mathbf{J 4}_{+}$is valid in the frame of an $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-model $M=\left\langle W, R,\left\{S_{w}\right\}_{w \in W}, \Vdash\right\rangle$. For any $r \in W$, let $M^{*}=$
 and formula $A, x \Vdash A$ if and only if $x \Vdash^{*} A$.

Proof This is proved by induction on the construction of $A$. We only prove the case $A \equiv(B \triangleright C)$.
$(\Rightarrow)$ : Suppose $x \Vdash B \triangleright C$. Let $y \in W^{*}$ be any element such that $x R^{*} y$ and $y \Vdash^{*} B$. Then, $x R y$, and by the induction hypothesis, $y \Vdash B$. Hence, there exists $z \in W$ such that $y S_{x} z$ and $z \Vdash C$. Since $\mathbf{J} 4_{+}$is valid in the frame of $M, x R z$. Since $r R x$, we have $r R z$. Thus, $z \in W^{*}$. It follows $y S_{x}^{*} z$. By the induction hypothesis, $z \Vdash^{*} C$. Therefore, $x \Vdash^{*} B \triangleright C$.
$(\Leftarrow)$ : Suppose $x \Vdash^{*} B \triangleright C$. Let $y \in W$ be any element with $x R y$ and $y \Vdash B$. Since $x \in W^{*}$, we have $y \in W^{*}$, and hence $x R^{*} y$. By the induction hypothesis, $y \Vdash^{*} B$. Then, for some $z \in W^{*}, y S_{x}^{*} z$ and $z \Vdash^{*} C$. We have $y S_{x} z$. By the induction hypothesis, $z \Vdash C$. Thus, we conclude $x \Vdash B \triangleright C$.

Proposition 9 For any formulas A and B, the following are equivalent:

1. $\vdash A \triangleright B$.
2. $\vdash A \rightarrow \diamond B$.

Proof $(1 \Rightarrow 2)$ : Suppose $\nvdash A \rightarrow \diamond B$. Then, by Theorem 1, there exist an IL $^{-}$-model $M=\left\langle W, R,\left\{S_{w}\right\}_{w \in W}, \Vdash\right\rangle$ and $r \in W$ such that $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ is valid in the frame of $M$ and $r \Vdash A \wedge \square \neg B$. By the Generated Submodel Lemma, we may assume that $r$ is the root of $M$, that is, for all $w \in W \backslash\{r\}, r R w$.

We define a new $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-model $M^{\prime}=\left\langle W^{\prime}, R^{\prime},\left\{S_{w}^{\prime}\right\}_{w \in W^{\prime}}, \Vdash^{\prime}\right\rangle$ as follows:

- $W^{\prime}:=W \cup\left\{r_{0}\right\}$, where $r_{0}$ is a new element;
$-x R^{\prime} y: \Longleftrightarrow \begin{cases}x R y & \text { if } x \neq r_{0}, \\ y \in W & \text { if } x=r_{0} ;\end{cases}$
$-y S_{x}^{\prime} z: \Longleftrightarrow \begin{cases}y S_{x} z & \text { if } x \neq r_{0}, \\ y R z & \text { if } x=r_{0} ;\end{cases}$
$-x \Vdash^{\prime} p: \Longleftrightarrow x \neq r_{0}$ and $x \Vdash p$.
Then, $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ is also valid in the frame of $M^{\prime}$. Also, it is easily shown that for any $x \in W$ and any formula $C, x \Vdash C$ if and only if $x \Vdash^{\prime} C$.

Then, $r \Vdash^{\prime} A \wedge \square \neg B$. Let $x \in W^{\prime}$ be any element such that $r S_{r_{0}}^{\prime} x$. Then, $r R x$, and hence $r R^{\prime} x$. We have $x \nVdash^{\prime} B$. Therefore, we obtain $r_{0} \nVdash '_{\prime} A \triangleright B$. It follows $\nvdash A \triangleright B$.
$(2 \Rightarrow 1)$ : Suppose $\vdash A \rightarrow \diamond B$, then $\vdash \diamond B \triangleright B \rightarrow A \triangleright B$ by R2. Thus, $\vdash A \triangleright B$.

Areces, Hoogland, and de Jongh [1] proved that IL has the $\triangleright$-interpolation property. Namely, for every formulas $A$ and $B$ with $\mathbf{I L} \vdash A \triangleright B$, there exists a formula $C$ such that $v(C) \subseteq v(A) \cap v(B), \mathbf{I L} \vdash A \triangleright C$, and $\mathbf{I L} \vdash C \triangleright B$. We prove that $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ has a version of the $\triangleright$-interpolation property.

Corollary 1 (A version of the $\triangleright$-interpolation property) Let $A$ and $B$ be any formulas. $I f \vdash A \triangleright B$, then there exists a formula $C$ such that $v(C) \subseteq v(A) \cap v(B), \vdash A \rightarrow C$, and $\vdash C \triangleright B$.

Proof Suppose $\vdash A \triangleright B$. Then, by Proposition $9, \vdash A \rightarrow \diamond B$. By Theorem 6, there exists a formula $C$ such that $v(C) \subseteq v(A) \cap v(B), \vdash A \rightarrow C$, and $\vdash C \rightarrow \diamond B$. By Proposition 9 again, we obtain $\vdash C \triangleright B$.

Problem 1 Does the logic $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ have the original version of the $\triangleright$ interpolation property?

For each formula $A$, let $\operatorname{Sub}(A)$ be the set of all subformulas of $A$. Also, let $\operatorname{PSub}(A):=\operatorname{Sub}(A) \backslash\{A\}$. We prove that IL is embeddable into $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ in some sense.

Proposition 10 For any formula $A$, the following are equivalent:

1. $\mathbf{I L} \vdash A$.
2. $A$ is valid in all finite $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-frames in which all axioms of $\mathbf{I L}$ are valid.
3. $\vdash \backsim \bigwedge\{B \triangleright B: B \in \operatorname{PSub}(A)\} \rightarrow A$.

Proof $(1 \Rightarrow 2)$ is obvious.
( $3 \Rightarrow 1$ ) follows from Proposition 1.7.
(2 $\Rightarrow$ 3): Suppose $L \nvdash \boxtimes \bigwedge\{B \triangleright B: B \in \operatorname{PSub}(A)\} \rightarrow A$. Then, by Theorem 1, there exist a finite $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-model $M=\left\langle W, R,\left\{S_{w}\right\}_{w \in W}, \Vdash\right\rangle$ and $r \in W$ such that $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ is valid in the frame of $M$ and $r \Vdash \square \bigwedge\{B \triangleright B: B \in \operatorname{PSub}(A)\} \wedge \neg A$. By the Generated Submodel Lemma, we may assume that $r$ is the root of $M$.

We define an $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-model $M^{\prime}=\left\langle W^{\prime}, R^{\prime},\left\{S_{w}^{\prime}\right\}_{w \in W^{\prime}}, \Vdash^{\prime}\right\rangle$ as follows:

- $W^{\prime}:=W$;
$-x R^{\prime} y: \Longleftrightarrow x R y$;
$-y S_{x}^{\prime} z: \Longleftrightarrow y S_{x} z$ or ( $x R y$ and $z=y$ );
$-x \Vdash^{\prime} p: \Longleftrightarrow x \Vdash p$.
Claim IL is valid in the frame of $M^{\prime}$.
Proof By Proposition 1.8, it suffices to show that $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{1}, \mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}$, and $\mathbf{J 5}$ are valid in the frame of $M^{\prime}$.

J1: Suppose $x R y$. Then, $y S_{x}^{\prime} y$ by the definition of $S_{x}^{\prime}$. Thus, J1 is valid.
$\mathbf{J} 4_{+}$: Suppose $y S_{x}^{\prime} z$. Then, $y S_{x} z$ or $(x R y$ and $y=z)$. If $y S_{x} z$, then $x R z$ because $\mathbf{J} 4_{+}$is valid in the frame of $M$. If $x R y$ and $y=z$, then $x R z$. Hence, in either case, we have $x R z$. Therefore, $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{4}_{+}$is valid.
$\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}$: Suppose $y S_{x}^{\prime} z$ and $z S_{x}^{\prime} u$. We distinguish the following four cases.

- (Case 1): $y S_{x} z$ and $z S_{x} u$. Since $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}$is valid in the frame of $M, y S_{x} u$.
- (Case 2): $y S_{x} z, x R z$ and $z=u$. Then, $y S_{x} u$.
- (Case 3): $x R y, y=z$ and $z S_{x} u$. Then, $y S_{x} u$.
- (Case 4): $x R y, y=z, x R z$ and $z=u$. Then, $x R y$ and $y=u$.

In either case, we have $y S_{x}^{\prime} u$. Since $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{4}_{+}$is valid, we obtain that $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}$is valid in the frame of $M^{\prime}$.

J5: Suppose $x R^{\prime} y$ and $y R^{\prime} z$. Then, $x R y$ and $y R z$. Since $\mathbf{J 5}$ is valid in the frame of $M, y S_{x} z$. Then, $y S_{x}^{\prime} z$. Therefore, $\mathbf{J 5}$ is valid.

Claim For any $B \in \operatorname{Sub}(A)$ and $x \in W, x \Vdash B$ if and only if $x \Vdash^{\prime} B$.
Proof We prove the claim by induction on the construction of $B$. We only give a proof of the case that $B$ is $C \triangleright D$.
$(\Rightarrow)$ : Suppose $x \Vdash C \triangleright D$. Let $y \in W$ be such that $x R y$ and $y \Vdash^{\prime} C$. By the induction hypothesis, $y \Vdash C$. Then, there exists $z \in W$ such that $y S_{x} z$ and $z \Vdash D$. Then, $y S_{x}^{\prime} z$ and by the induction hypothesis, $z \Vdash^{\prime} D$. Therefore, $x \Vdash^{\prime} C \triangleright D$.
$(\Leftarrow)$ : Suppose $x \Vdash^{\prime} C \triangleright D$. Let $y \in W$ be such that $x R y$ and $y \Vdash C$. By the induction hypothesis, $y \Vdash^{\prime} C$. Hence, there exists $z \in W$ such that $y S_{x}^{\prime} z$ and $z \Vdash^{\prime} D$. By the induction hypothesis, $z \Vdash D$. By the definition of $S_{x}^{\prime}$, we have either $y S_{x} z$ or $(x R y$ and $y=z)$. If $y S_{x} z$, then $x \Vdash C \triangleright D$. If $x R y$ and $y=z$, then $x R y$ and $y \Vdash D$. Here either $x=r$ or $r R w$. Since $D \in \operatorname{PSub}(A)$, we obtain $x \Vdash D \triangleright D$ because $r \Vdash \square \bigwedge\{B \triangleright B: B \in \operatorname{Sub}(A)\}$. Thus, for some $z^{\prime} \in W, y S_{x} z^{\prime}$ and $z^{\prime} \Vdash D$. We conclude $x \Vdash C \triangleright D$.

Since $r \nVdash A$, we obtain $r \nVdash^{\prime} A$ by the claim. Thus, $A$ is not valid in some finite $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-frame in which all axioms of IL are valid.

Proof of Theorem 3 Suppose IL $\vdash A \rightarrow B$. Then, by Proposition 10,

$$
\vdash \backsim \bigwedge\{C \triangleright C: C \in \operatorname{PSub}(A \rightarrow B)\} \rightarrow(A \rightarrow B) .
$$

Since $\operatorname{PSub}(A \rightarrow B)=\operatorname{Sub}(A) \cup \operatorname{Sub}(B)$, we have

$$
\vdash \square \bigwedge\{C \triangleright C: C \in \operatorname{Sub}(A)\} \wedge A \rightarrow(\square \bigwedge\{C \triangleright C: C \in \operatorname{Sub}(B)\} \rightarrow B)
$$

By Theorem 6, there exists a formula $D$ such that $v(D) \subseteq v(A) \cap v(B)$,

$$
\vdash \backsim \bigwedge\{C \triangleright C: C \in \operatorname{Sub}(A)\} \wedge A \rightarrow D
$$

and

$$
\vdash D \rightarrow(\backsim \bigwedge\{C \triangleright C: C \in \operatorname{Sub}(B)\} \rightarrow B)
$$

Then, by Proposition 1.7, we obtain IL $\vdash A \rightarrow D$ and $\mathbf{I L} \vdash D \rightarrow B$.

## 5 The fixed point property

In this section, we investigate FPP and $\ell$ FPP. First, we study FPP for the logic $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$. Then, we prove that $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 4}, \mathbf{J 5})$ has $\ell F P P$.

### 5.1 FPP for IL $^{-}\left(\mathrm{J} 2_{+}, \mathrm{J} 5\right)$

From Theorem 6 and Lemma 2, we immediately obtain the following corollary.
Corollary $2\left(\right.$ FPP for $\left.\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 2_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)\right) \mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 2_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ has FPP.
Moreover, we give a syntactical proof of FPP for $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ by modifying de Jongh and Visser's proof of FPP for IL. Since the Substitution Principle (Proposition 3) holds for extensions of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right)$, as usual, it suffices to prove that every formula of the form $A(p) \triangleright B(p)$ has a fixed point in $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 2_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$. As a consequence, we show that every formula $A(p)$ which is modalized in $p$ has the same fixed point in $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ as given by de Jongh and Visser. That is,

Theorem 7 For any formulas $A(p)$ and $B(p), A(\top) \triangleright B(\square \neg A(T))$ is a fixed point of $A(p) \triangleright B(p)$ in $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$.

Theorem 7 follows from the following five lemmas.
Lemma 9 Let $L$ be any extension of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$. For any formulas $A$ and $B$, if $L \vdash \square \neg A \rightarrow$ $(A \leftrightarrow B)$, then $L \vdash(A \wedge \square \neg A) \leftrightarrow(B \wedge \square \neg B)$.

Proof Suppose $L \vdash \square \neg A \rightarrow(A \leftrightarrow B)$. Then, $L \vdash \square \neg A \rightarrow(\square \neg A \leftrightarrow \square \neg B)$ and hence $L \vdash \square \neg A \rightarrow \square \neg B$. By combining this with our supposition, we obtain

$$
L \vdash(A \wedge \square \neg A) \rightarrow(B \wedge \square \neg B)
$$

On the other hand, $L \vdash \neg B \rightarrow(\square \neg A \rightarrow \neg A)$. Hence, by the axiom scheme $\mathbf{L 3}$, $L \vdash \square \neg B \rightarrow \square \neg A$. Therefore, by our supposition,

$$
L \vdash(B \wedge \square \neg B) \rightarrow(A \wedge \square \neg A)
$$

Lemma 10 For any formulas $A$ and $C$,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right) \vdash(A(\mathrm{~T}) \wedge \square \neg A(\mathrm{~T})) \leftrightarrow(A(A(\mathrm{~T}) \triangleright C) \wedge \square \neg A(A(\mathrm{~T}) \triangleright C)) .
$$

Proof By Proposition 1.1, $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash \square \neg A(T) \rightarrow A(T) \triangleright C$. Therefore, we obtain $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash$ $\square \neg A(T) \rightarrow(\top \leftrightarrow(A(T) \triangleright C))$. Then, $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash \square \neg A(T) \rightarrow \square(\top \leftrightarrow(A(T) \triangleright C))$.
Therefore, by Proposition 3.1, we obtain

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right) \vdash \square \neg A(\mathrm{~T}) \rightarrow(A(\mathrm{~T}) \leftrightarrow A(A(\mathrm{~T}) \triangleright C)) .
$$

The lemma directly follows from this and Lemma 9.
Lemma 11 For any formulas $A, C$, and $D$,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 2, \mathbf{J} \mathbf{4}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right) \vdash(A(\mathrm{~T}) \triangleright D) \leftrightarrow(A(A(\mathrm{~T}) \triangleright C) \triangleright D) .
$$

Proof By Lemma 10 and $\mathbf{R 2}$, we obtain

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right) \vdash((A(\mathrm{~T}) \wedge \square \neg A(\mathrm{~T})) \triangleright D) \leftrightarrow((A(A(\mathrm{~T}) \triangleright C) \wedge \square \neg A(A(\mathrm{~T}) \triangleright C)) \triangleright D) .
$$

Therefore, by Lemma 1.1, we obtain

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 2, \mathbf{J} 4_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right) \vdash(A(\top) \triangleright D) \leftrightarrow(A(A(T) \triangleright C) \triangleright D) .
$$

Lemma 12 For any formulas $B$ and $C, \mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right)$proves

$$
(B(\square \neg C) \wedge \square \neg B(\square \neg C)) \leftrightarrow(B(C \triangleright B(\square \neg C)) \wedge \square \neg B(C \triangleright B(\square \neg C))) .
$$

Proof Since $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash \square \neg B(\square \neg C) \rightarrow \square(\perp \leftrightarrow B(\square \neg C))$,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right) \vdash \square \neg B(\square \neg C) \rightarrow(C \triangleright \perp \leftrightarrow C \triangleright B(\square \neg C)) .
$$

Then, by J6, $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right) \vdash \square \neg B(\square \neg C) \rightarrow(\square \neg C \leftrightarrow C \triangleright B(\square \neg C))$ and hence $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right) \vdash \square \neg B(\square \neg C) \rightarrow \square(\square \neg C \leftrightarrow C \triangleright B(\square \neg C))$. Therefore, by Proposition 3.1, we obtain

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right) \vdash \square \neg B(\square \neg C) \rightarrow(B(\square \neg C) \leftrightarrow B(C \triangleright B(\square \neg C))) .
$$

The lemma is a consequence of this with Lemma 9.
Lemma 13 For any formulas $B, C$, and $D$,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right) \vdash(D \triangleright B(\square \neg C)) \leftrightarrow(D \triangleright B(C \triangleright B(\square \neg C))) .
$$

Proof By Lemma 12 and $\mathbf{R 1}, \mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right)$proves

$$
D \triangleright(B(\square \neg C) \wedge \square \neg B(\square \neg C)) \leftrightarrow D \triangleright(B(C \triangleright B(\square \neg C)) \wedge \square \neg B(C \triangleright B(\square \neg C))) .
$$

Therefore, by Lemma 1.2,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right) \vdash(D \triangleright B(\square \neg C)) \leftrightarrow(D \triangleright B(C \triangleright B(\square \neg C))) .
$$

Proof of Theorem 7 Let $F \equiv A(\top) \triangleright B(\square \neg A(T))$. By Lemma 11 for $C \equiv D \equiv$ $B(\square \neg A(T))$, we obtain

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}, \mathbf{J} \mathbf{4}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right) \vdash F \leftrightarrow(A(F) \triangleright B(\square \neg A(\top))) .
$$

Furthermore, by Lemma 13 for $C \equiv A(\mathrm{~T})$ and $D \equiv F$,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right) \vdash(A(F) \triangleright B(\square \neg A(\top))) \leftrightarrow(A(F) \triangleright B(F)) .
$$

We conclude

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right) \vdash F \leftrightarrow A(F) \triangleright B(F) .
$$

## 5.2 lFPP for $^{\text {IL }}$ (J4, J5)

From Lemma 11, we immediately obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3 For any formulas $A(p)$ and $B$, if $p \notin v(B)$, then $A(T) \triangleright B$ is a fixed point of $A(p) \triangleright B$ in $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 2, \mathbf{J} 4_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$.

Therefore, $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}, \mathbf{J} 4_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ has $\ell F P P$. Moreover, we prove the following theorem.

Theorem 8 ( $\ell$ FPP for $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} 4, \mathbf{J 5})$ ) For any formulas $A(p)$ and $B$, if the formula $A(p) \triangleright B$ is left-modalized in $p$, then $A(\square \neg A(T)) \triangleright B$ is a fixed point of $A(p) \triangleright B$ in $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 4}, \mathbf{J 5})$. Therefore, $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 4}, \mathbf{J 5})$ has $\ell F P P$.

Before proving Theorem 8, we prepare two lemmas.
Lemma 14 For any formula $A(p)$ such that $\square A(p)$ is left-modalized in $p$,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash \square A(\mathrm{~T}) \leftrightarrow \square A(\square A(\mathrm{~T})) .
$$

Proof This is proved in a usual way by using Proposition 6.
Lemma 15 Let $A(p)$ and $B$ be any formulas such that $p \notin v(E)$ for any subformula $D \triangleright E$ of $A(p)$. Then,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 4}, \mathbf{J 5}) \vdash(A(\square \neg A(p)) \triangleright B) \leftrightarrow(A(A(p) \triangleright B) \triangleright B) .
$$

Proof By Proposition 1.1, $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash \square \neg A(p) \rightarrow A(p) \triangleright B$. On the other hand, since $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 4}) \vdash A(p) \triangleright B \rightarrow(\diamond A(p) \rightarrow \diamond B)$, we have $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 4}) \vdash \square \neg B \rightarrow(A(p) \triangleright$ $B \rightarrow \square \neg A(p))$. Hence, $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 4}) \vdash \square \neg B \rightarrow(\square \neg A(p) \leftrightarrow A(p) \triangleright B)$. Then,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} 4) \vdash \square \neg B \rightarrow \square(\square \neg A(p) \leftrightarrow A(p) \triangleright B) .
$$

By Proposition 6.1, we obtain

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} 4) \vdash \square \neg B \rightarrow(A(\square \neg A(p)) \leftrightarrow A(A(p) \triangleright B)) .
$$

Thus,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} 4) \vdash(A(\square \neg A(p)) \vee \diamond B) \leftrightarrow(A(A(p) \triangleright B) \vee \diamond B) .
$$

By R2, we obtain

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 4}) \vdash((A(\square \neg A(p)) \vee \diamond B) \triangleright B) \leftrightarrow((A(A(p) \triangleright B) \vee \diamond B) \triangleright B) .
$$

Therefore, we conclude

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 4}, \mathbf{J 5}) \vdash(A(\square \neg A(p)) \triangleright B) \leftrightarrow(A(A(p) \triangleright B) \triangleright B) .
$$

Proof of Theorem 8 Let $F: \equiv \square \neg A(T)$. Since $\square \neg A(p)$ is left-modalized in $p$, $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \vdash F \leftrightarrow \square \neg A(F)$ by Lemma 14. Since $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} 4) \vdash \square(F \leftrightarrow \square \neg A(F))$, by Proposition 6.2, we have

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} 4) \vdash(A(F) \triangleright B) \leftrightarrow(A(\square \neg A(F)) \triangleright B)
$$

By Lemma 15,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 4}, \mathbf{J 5}) \vdash(A(\square \neg A(F)) \triangleright B) \leftrightarrow(A(A(F) \triangleright B) \triangleright B) .
$$

Therefore,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 4}, \mathbf{J 5}) \vdash(A(F) \triangleright B) \leftrightarrow(A(A(F) \triangleright B) \triangleright B) .
$$

## 6 Failure of $\ell$ FPP, FPP, and CIP

In this section, we provide counter models of $\ell$ FPP for $\mathbf{C L}$ and $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} 1, \mathbf{J 5})$, and also provide a counter model of FPP for $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 1, \mathbf{J} \mathbf{4}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$. We also show that CIP is not the case for our sublogics except $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ and IL. Let $\omega$ be the set $\{0,1,2, \ldots\}$ of all natural numbers.

### 6.1 A counter model of $\ell$ FPP for $C L$

In this subsection, we prove that $\mathbf{I L}^{-}, \mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{1}), \mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right), \mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 1, \mathbf{J 4}_{+}\right), \mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}\right)$, and CL have neither $\ell$ FPP nor CIP.

Theorem 9 The formula $p \triangleright q$ which is left-modalized in $p$ has no fixed points in $\mathbf{C L}$. That is, for any formula $A$ which satisfies $v(A) \subseteq\{q\}$,

$$
\mathbf{C L} \nvdash A \leftrightarrow A \triangleright q .
$$

Proof We define an $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-frame $\mathcal{F}=\left\langle W, R,\left\{S_{w}\right\}_{w \in W}\right\rangle$ as follows:
$-W:=\left\{x_{i}, y_{i}: i \in \omega\right\} ;$
$-R:=\left\{\left\langle x_{i}, x_{j}\right\rangle,\left\langle x_{i}, y_{j}\right\rangle,\left\langle y_{i}, x_{j}\right\rangle,\left\langle y_{i}, y_{j}\right\rangle \in W^{2}: i>j\right\} ;$

- For each $i \in \omega$ and $w_{i} \in\left\{x_{i}, y_{i}\right\}, S_{w_{i}}:=\left\{\langle a, a\rangle: w_{i} R a\right\} \cup\{\langle a, b\rangle$ : there exists an even number $k<i-1$ such that $\left(\left(a=x_{k}\right.\right.$ or $\left.a=y_{k}\right)$ and $\left.\left.b=x_{k+1}\right)\right\}$.
For example, $S_{x_{3}}, S_{y_{3}}, S_{x_{4}}$, and $S_{y_{4}}$ are shown in the following figure (Fig. 3). In the figure, $R$ relations and $S$ relations are drawn by solid lines and broken lines, respectively. Since $R$ is transitive, we draw only solid lines connecting the immediately preceding and succeeding elements.

It is easy to show that $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{1}$ and $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}$are valid in $\mathcal{F}$. Thus, $\mathbf{C L}$ is valid in $\mathcal{F}$ by Proposition 1.9. Let $\Vdash$ be a satisfaction relation on $\mathcal{F}$ such that for any $i \in \omega$, we have $x_{i} \Vdash q$ and $y_{i} \nVdash q$. For each $w \in W$, we say that $i \in \omega$ is an index of $w$ if either $w=x_{i}$ or $w=y_{i}$.

Claim 1 For any formula $A$ with $v(A) \subseteq\{q\}$, there exists an $n_{A} \in \omega$ satisfying the following two conditions:

1. Either $\forall m \geq n_{A}\left(x_{m} \Vdash A\right)$ or $\forall m \geq n_{A}\left(x_{m} \nVdash A\right)$;


Fig. 3 A counter model of $\ell$ FPP for CL
2. Either $\forall m \geq n_{A}\left(y_{m} \Vdash A\right)$ or $\forall m \geq n_{A}\left(y_{m} \nVdash A\right)$.

Proof We prove the claim by induction on the construction of $A$.
$A \equiv \perp$ : Then, $n_{A}=0$ and $\forall m \geq n_{A}\left(x_{m} \nVdash A\right.$ and $\left.y_{m} \nVdash A\right)$.
$A \equiv q$ : Then, $n_{A}=0$ and $\forall m \geq n_{A}\left(x_{m} \Vdash q\right.$ and $\left.y_{m} \nVdash q\right)$.
$A \equiv B \rightarrow C$ : By the induction hypothesis, there exist $n_{B}, n_{C} \in W$ satisfying the statement of the claim for $B$ and $C$, respectively. Let $n_{A}=\max \left\{n_{B}, n_{C}\right\}$. We distinguish the following three cases.
$-\forall m \geq n_{A}\left(x_{m} \nVdash B\right)$ : Then, $\forall m \geq n_{A}\left(x_{m} \Vdash B \rightarrow C\right)$.
$-\forall m \geq n_{A}\left(x_{m} \Vdash C\right)$ : Then, $\forall m \geq n_{A}\left(x_{m} \Vdash B \rightarrow C\right)$.
$-\forall m \geq n_{A}\left(x_{m} \Vdash B\right)$ and $\forall m \geq n_{A}\left(x_{m} \nVdash C\right)$ : Then, $\forall m \geq n_{A}\left(x_{m} \nVdash B \rightarrow C\right)$.
In a similar way, it is proved that either $\forall m \geq n_{A}\left(y_{m} \Vdash B \rightarrow C\right)$ or $\forall m \geq n_{A}\left(y_{m} \nVdash\right.$ $B \rightarrow C$ ).
$A \equiv \square B$ : We distinguish the following two cases.

- There exists an $n \in W$ such that either $x_{n} \nVdash B$ or $y_{n} \nVdash B$ : Then, $n_{A}=n+1$ and $\forall m \geq n_{A}\left(x_{m} \nVdash \square B\right.$ and $\left.y_{m} \nVdash \square B\right)$.
- For all $n \in W, x_{n} \Vdash B$ and $y_{n} \Vdash B$ : Then, $n_{A}=0$ and $\forall m \geq n_{A}\left(x_{m} \Vdash \square B\right.$ and $\left.y_{m} \Vdash \square B\right)$.
$A \equiv B \triangleright C$ : We distinguish the following five cases.
- (Case 1): There exists an even number $k$ such that $x_{k} \Vdash B, x_{k} \nVdash C$, and $x_{k+1} \nVdash C$. Let $n_{A}=k+2$ and $m \geq n_{A}$. Then, $x_{m} R x_{k}$ and $x_{k} \Vdash B$. For any $v \in W$ with $x_{k} S_{x_{m}} v$, either $v=x_{k}$ or $v=x_{k+1}$ by the definition of $S_{x_{m}}$. Thus, $v \nVdash C$. Therefore, we obtain $x_{m} \nVdash B \triangleright C$. Since $y_{m} R x_{k}$, we also obtain $y_{m} \nVdash B \triangleright C$ in a similar way.
- (Case 2): There exists an even number $k$ such that $y_{k} \Vdash B, y_{k} \nVdash C$, and $x_{k+1} \nVdash C$. It is proved that $n_{A}=k+2$ witnesses the claim as in Case 1 .
- (Case 3): There exists an odd number $k$ such that $x_{k} \Vdash B$ and $x_{k} \nVdash C$. Let $n_{A}=k+1$ and $m \geq n_{A}$. Then, $x_{m} R x_{k}$ and $x_{k} \Vdash B$. For any $v \in W$ with $x_{k} S_{x_{m}} v$, we have $v=x_{k}$ by the definition of $S_{x_{m}}$. Thus, $v \nVdash C$. Therefore, we obtain $x_{m} \nVdash B \triangleright C$. Since $y_{m} R x_{k}, y_{m} \nVdash B \triangleright C$ is also proved.
- (Case 4): There exists an odd number $k$ such that $y_{k} \Vdash B$ and $y_{k} \nVdash C$. It is proved that $n_{A}=k+1$ witnesses the claim as in Case 3 .
- (Case 5): Otherwise, all of the following conditions are satisfied.
(I) For any even number $k$, if $x_{k} \Vdash B$, then either $x_{k} \Vdash C$ or $x_{k+1} \Vdash C$.
(II) For any even number $k$, if $y_{k} \Vdash B$, then either $y_{k} \Vdash C$ or $x_{k+1} \Vdash C$.
(III) For any odd number $k$, if $x_{k} \Vdash B$, then $x_{k} \Vdash C$.
(IV) For any odd number $k$, if $y_{k} \Vdash B$, then $y_{k} \Vdash C$.

By the induction hypothesis, there exists an $n_{B} \in \omega$ which is a witness of the statement of the claim for $B$. Now, we prove that there exists a natural number $n_{A} \geq 1$ such that for each $i \geq n_{A}-1$, we have $x_{i} \Vdash \neg B \vee C$ and $y_{i} \Vdash \neg B \vee C$. We distinguish the following four cases.
$-\forall m \geq n_{B}\left(x_{m} \Vdash B\right.$ and $\left.y_{m} \Vdash B\right)$ : Then, by (III) and (IV), there are infinitely many odd numbers $k$ such that $x_{k} \Vdash C$ and $y_{k} \Vdash C$. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, there exists an $n_{C} \in \omega$ such that $\forall m \geq n_{C}\left(x_{m} \Vdash C\right.$ and $\left.y_{m} \Vdash C\right)$. Then, we define $n_{A}:=n_{C}+1$.
$-\forall m \geq n_{B}\left(x_{m} \Vdash B\right.$ and $\left.y_{m} \nVdash B\right)$ : Then, by (III), there are infinitely many odd numbers $k$ such that $x_{k} \Vdash C$. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, there exists an $n_{C} \in \omega$ such that $\forall m \geq n_{C}\left(x_{m} \Vdash C\right)$. Then, we define $n_{A}:=$ $\max \left\{n_{B}, n_{C}\right\}+1$.
$-\forall m \geq n_{B}\left(x_{m} \nVdash B\right.$ and $\left.y_{m} \Vdash B\right)$ : Then, by (IV), there are infinitely many odd numbers $k$ such that $y_{k} \Vdash C$. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, there exists an $n_{C} \in \omega$ such that $\forall m \geq n_{C}\left(y_{m} \Vdash C\right)$. Then, we define $n_{A}:=$ $\max \left\{n_{B}, n_{C}\right\}+1$.
$-\forall m \geq n_{B}\left(x_{m} \nVdash B\right.$ and $\left.y_{m} \nVdash B\right)$ : We define $n_{A}:=n_{B}+1$.
We prove that $n_{A}$ witnesses the claim. Let $m \geq n_{A}$ and $z \in W$ be such that $x_{m} R z$ and $z \Vdash B$. We show that there exists a $v \in W$ such that $z S_{x_{m}} v$ and $v \Vdash C$. Let $i$ be an index of $z$. If $i$ is odd, then $z S_{x_{m}} z$ and $z \Vdash C$ by (III) and (IV). Assume that $i$ is even. We distinguish the following two cases.
$-n_{A}-1 \leq i<m$ : We obtain $z \Vdash \neg B \vee C$ by the choice of $n_{A}$. Since $z \Vdash B$, we have $z \Vdash C$. By the definition of $S_{x_{m}}$, we find $z S_{x_{m}} z$.
$-i<n_{A}-1$ : Then, $i<m-1$. Therefore, $z S_{x_{m}} z$ and $z S_{x_{m}} x_{i+1}$. Furthermore, by (I) and (II), we obtain $z \Vdash C$ or $x_{i+1} \Vdash C$.

In any case, there exists $v \in W$ such that $z S_{x_{m}} v$ and $v \Vdash C$. Therefore, we obtain $x_{m} \Vdash B \triangleright C$. Similarly, we have $y_{m} \Vdash B \triangleright C$.

We suppose, towards a contradiction, that there exists a formula $A$ such that $v(A) \subseteq$ $\{q\}$ and $\mathbf{C L} \vdash A \leftrightarrow A \triangleright q$. Since $\mathbf{C L}$ is valid in $\mathcal{F}, A \leftrightarrow A \triangleright q$ is valid in $\mathcal{F}$. Moreover, the following claim holds.

Claim 2 For any $w \in W$ whose index is $n, n$ is even if and only if $w \Vdash A$.
Proof We prove the claim by induction on $n$. Let $w \in W$ be any element whose index is $n$.

For $n=0$, since there is no $w^{\prime} \in W$ such that $w R w^{\prime}$, we obtain $w \Vdash A \triangleright q$ and hence, $w \Vdash A$. Suppose $n>0$ and that the claim holds for any natural number less than $n$.
$(\Leftarrow)$ : Assume that $n$ is an odd number. Then, $w R y_{n-1}$. Since $n-1$ is even, $y_{n-1} \Vdash A$ by the induction hypothesis. Let $v$ be any element in $W$ satisfying $y_{n-1} S_{w} v$. By the definitions of $S_{w}$ and $\Vdash$, we obtain $v=y_{n-1}$ and $v \nVdash q$. Therefore, $w \nVdash A \triangleright q$ and hence $w \nVdash A$.
$(\Rightarrow)$ : Assume that $n$ is an even number. Let $v$ be any element in $W$ with $w R v$ and $v \Vdash A$. Let $m$ be the index of $v$. Since $m<n$ and $v \Vdash A, m$ is even by the induction hypothesis. Since $n$ is also even, $m<n-1$ and hence $v S_{w} x_{m+1}$. Furthermore, $x_{m+1} \Vdash q$ by the definition of $\Vdash$. Therefore, we obtain $w \Vdash A \triangleright q$ and hence, $w \Vdash A$.

This contradicts Claim 1. Therefore, for any formula $A$ with $v(A) \subseteq\{q\}$, we obtain $\mathbf{C L} \nvdash A \leftrightarrow A \triangleright q$.

Corollary 4 Let L be any logic that is closed under substituting a formula for a propositional variable and satisfies $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \subseteq L \subseteq \mathbf{C L}$. Then, $L$ has neither $\ell F P P$ nor CIP.

Proof By Theorem 9, every sublogic of CL does not have $\ell$ FPP. By Lemma 3, every logic $L$ such that $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \subseteq L \subseteq \mathbf{C L}$ does not have CIP.

### 6.2 A counter model of $\ell$ FPP for IL-(J1, J5)

In this subsection, we prove that $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 5})$ and $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} 1, \mathbf{J 5})$ have neither $\ell$ FPP nor CIP.
Theorem 10 The formula $p \triangleright q$ which is left-modalized in $p$ has no fixed point in $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} 1, \mathbf{J 5})$. That is, for any formula $A$ which satisfies $v(A) \subseteq\{q\}$,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} 1, \mathbf{J 5}) \nvdash A \leftrightarrow A \triangleright q .
$$

Proof We define an $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-frame $\mathcal{F}=\left\langle W, R,\left\{S_{w}\right\}_{w \in W}\right\rangle$ as follows:
$-W:=\omega \cup\{v\} ;$


Fig. 4 A counter model of $\ell$ FPP for $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{1}, \mathbf{J 5})$
$-R:=\left\{\langle x, y\rangle \in W^{2}: x, y \in \omega\right.$ and $\left.x>y\right\} ;$
$-S_{v}:=\emptyset$ and for each $n \in \omega, S_{n}:=\left\{\langle x, y\rangle \in W^{2}: n R x\right.$ and $(y=x$ or $x R y$ or $(x$ is even, $x<n-1$ and $y=v)$ ) $\}$.
For instance, the relations $S_{3}$ and $S_{4}$ are shown in the following figure (Fig.4). In the case of $x R y$ for $x, y<n, x S_{n} y$ holds, and the corresponding broken lines are omitted in the figure.

Then, $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} 1, \mathbf{J 5})$ is valid in $\mathcal{F}$. Let $\Vdash$ be a satisfaction relation on $\mathcal{F}$ such that $v \Vdash q$ and for each $n \in \omega, n \nVdash q$.

Claim 1 For any formula $A$ with $v(A) \subseteq\{q\}$, there exists an $n_{A} \in \omega$ such that

$$
\forall m \geq n_{A}(m \Vdash A) \text { or } \forall m \geq n_{A}(m \nVdash A) .
$$

Proof We prove the claim by induction on the construction of $A$. We only prove the case of $A \equiv B \triangleright C$. We distinguish the following three cases.

- Case 1: There exists an even number $k$ such that $k \Vdash B$, for all $j \leq k, j \nVdash C$ and $v \nVdash C$ : Let $n_{A}=k+1$ and $m \geq n_{A}$. Then, $m R k$ and $k \Vdash B$. For any $w \in W$ with $k S_{m} w$, since either $w \leq k$ or $w=v$, we obtain $w \nVdash C$. Therefore, $m \nVdash B \triangleright C$.
- Case 2: There exists an odd number $k$ such that $k \Vdash B$ and for all $j \leq k, j \nVdash C$ : Let $n_{A}=k+1$ and $m \geq n_{A}$. Then, $m R k$ and $k \Vdash B$. For any $w \in W$ with $k S_{m} w$, we have $w \nVdash C$ because $w \leq k$. Therefore, $m \nVdash B \triangleright C$.
- Case 3: Otherwise: Then, the following conditions (I) and (II) are fulfilled.
(I) For any even number $k$, if $k \Vdash B$, then there exists a $j \leq k$ such that $j \Vdash C$ or $v \Vdash C$.
(II) For any odd number $k$, if $k \Vdash B$, then there exists a $j \leq k$ such that $j \Vdash C$.

By the induction hypothesis, there exists an $n_{B} \in \omega$ such that $\forall m \geq n_{B}(m \Vdash B)$ or $\forall m \geq n_{B}(m \nVdash B)$. We may assume that $n_{B}$ is an odd number. We distinguish the following two cases.
$-\forall m \geq n_{B}(m \Vdash B)$ : Let $n_{A}=n_{B}+1$ and $m \geq n_{A}$. Let $k$ be any element in $W$ satisfying $m R k$ and $k \Vdash B$. Since $n_{B}$ is odd and $n_{B} \Vdash B$, there exists a $j_{0} \leq n_{B}$ such that $j_{0} \Vdash C$ by (II). We distinguish the following three cases.

- $k$ is odd: By (II), there exists a $j_{1} \leq k$ such that $j_{1} \Vdash C$. Then, $k S_{m} j_{1}$ and $j_{1} \Vdash C$.
- $k$ is even and $k \geq n_{B}$ : Since $k \geq j_{0}$, we have $k S_{m} j_{0}$ and $j_{0} \Vdash C$.
- $k$ is even and $k<n_{B}$ : By (I), there exists a $j_{1} \leq k$ such that $j_{1} \Vdash C$ or $v \Vdash C$. Since $k<n_{B} \leq m-1$, we obtain $k<m-1$. Hence, $k S_{m} j_{1}$ and $k S_{m} v$.
In any case, there exists a $w \in W$ such that $k S_{m} w$ and $w \Vdash C$. Therefore, $m \Vdash B \triangleright C$.
$-\forall m \geq n_{B}(m \nVdash B)$ : Let $n_{A}=n_{B}+1$ and $m \geq n_{A}$. Let $k$ be any element in $W$ satisfying $m R k$ and $k \Vdash B$. Then, $k<n_{B}$ because $k \Vdash B$. We distinguish the following two cases.
- $k$ is odd: Since there exists a $j \leq k$ such that $j \Vdash C$ by (II). Then, $k S_{m} j$.
- $k$ is even: $\mathrm{By}(\mathrm{I})$, there exists a $j \leq k$ such that $j \Vdash C$ or $v \Vdash C$. Since $k<n_{B} \leq m-1$, we obtain $k<m-1$ and hence $k S_{m} j$ and $k S_{m} v$.

In any case, there exists a $w \in W$ such that $k S_{m} w$ and $w \Vdash C$. Therefore, $m \Vdash B \triangleright C$.

We suppose, towards a contradiction, that there exists a formula $A$ such that $v(A) \subseteq$ $\{q\}$ and $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 1}, \mathbf{J 5}) \vdash A \leftrightarrow A \triangleright q$. Since $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J} 1, \mathbf{J 5})$ is valid in $\mathcal{F}$, we have that $A \leftrightarrow A \triangleright q$ is also valid in $\mathcal{F}$. Then, the following claim holds.

Claim 2 For any $n \in \omega, n$ is even if and only if $n \Vdash A$.
Proof We prove the claim by induction on $n$.
For $n=0$, since obviously $0 \Vdash A \triangleright q$, we have $0 \Vdash A$. Suppose $n>0$ and the claim holds for any natural number less than $n$.
$(\Leftarrow)$ : Assume that $n$ is odd. Then, $n R n-1$ and since $n-1$ is even, $n-1 \Vdash A$ by the induction hypothesis. Let $w$ be the any element in $W$ which satisfies $n-1 S_{n} w$. By the definition of $S_{n}$, we find $w \leq n-1$ and hence $w \nVdash q$. Therefore, $n \nVdash A \triangleright q$, and thus $n \nVdash A$.
$(\Rightarrow)$ : Assume that $n$ is even. Let $m$ be the any element in $W$ which satisfies $n R m$ and $m \Vdash A$. By the induction hypothesis, $m$ is even and hence $m<n-1$. Then, $m S_{n} v$ and $v \Vdash q$. Therefore, $n \Vdash A \triangleright q$ and hence, $n \Vdash A$.

This contradicts Claim 1. Threfore, for any formula $A$ with $v(A) \subseteq\{q\}$, we obtain $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 1}, \mathbf{J 5}) \nvdash A \leftrightarrow A \triangleright q$.

As in Corollary 4, we obtain the following corollary.

Corollary 5 Let L be any logic that is closed under substituting a formula for a propositional variable and satisfies $\mathbf{I L}^{-} \subseteq L \subseteq \mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 1}, \mathbf{J 5})$. Then, $L$ has neither $\ell F P P$ nor CIP.

### 6.3 A counter model of FPP for IL $^{-}\left(\mathrm{J} 1, \mathrm{J4}_{+}, \mathrm{J} 5\right)$

In Theorems 9 and 10, we proved that the logics $\mathbf{C L}$ and $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 1}, \mathbf{J 5})$ do not have $\ell$ FPP. On the other hand, we proved in Theorem 8 that $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 4}, \mathbf{J 5})$ has $\ell$ FPP. Thus, we cannot provide a counter model of $\ell$ FPP for extensions of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 4}, \mathbf{J 5})$. In this subsection, we prove that the logics $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{4}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ and $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 1, \mathbf{J} 4_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ have neither FPP nor CIP.

Theorem 11 The formula $T \triangleright \neg p$ has no fixed point in $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 1}, \mathbf{J} 4_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$. That is, for any formula $A$ with $v(A)=\emptyset$,

$$
\mathbf{I L}^{-}(\mathbf{J 1}, \mathbf{J 4}+\mathbf{J 5}) \nvdash A \leftrightarrow \top \triangleright \neg A .
$$

Proof We define an $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$-frame $\mathcal{F}=\left\langle W, R,\left\{S_{w}\right\}_{w \in W}\right\rangle$ as follows:
$-W:=\omega ;$
$-x R y: \Longleftrightarrow x>y$;

- For each $n \in W, S_{n}:=\left\{\langle x, y\rangle \in W^{2}: x, y<n\right.$ and $(x \geq y$ or $(x=0$ and $(y$ is even or $y=n-1)$ )) $\}$.

We draw the relations $S_{3}$ and $S_{4}$. As in the proof of Theorem 10, in the case of $x R y$ for $x, y<n, x S_{n} y$ holds, and the corresponding broken lines are omitted in the figure (Fig. 5).

Then, $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{1}, \mathbf{J 4} \mathbf{4}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ is valid in $\mathcal{F}$. Let $\Vdash$ be an arbitrary satisfaction relation on $\mathcal{F}$.

Claim 1 For any formula $A$ with $v(A)=\emptyset$, there exists an $n_{A} \in W$ such that

$$
\forall m \geq n_{A}(m \Vdash A) \text { or } \forall m \geq n_{A}(m \nVdash A) .
$$

Proof This is proved by induction on the construction of $A$. We prove only the case of $A \equiv B \triangleright C$. We distinguish the following three cases.

- Case 1: There exists an $n>0$ such that $n \Vdash B$ and for all $k \leq n, k \nVdash C$. Let $n_{A}=n+1$ and $m \geq n_{A}$. Then, $m R n$ and $n \Vdash B$. Also, for any $k \in W$, if $n S_{m} k$, then $k \leq n$ because $n \neq 0$. Therefore, $k \nVdash C$. Thus, $m \nVdash B \triangleright C$.
- Case $2: 0 \Vdash B$ and for all even numbers $k, k \nVdash C$. By the induction hypothesis, there exists an $n_{C} \in W$ such that $\forall m \geq n_{C}(m \Vdash C)$ or $\forall m \geq n_{C}(m \nVdash C)$. Since there are infinitely many even numbers $k \in W$ such that $k \nVdash C$, we obtain $\forall m \geq n_{C}(m \nVdash C)$. Let $n_{A}=n_{C}+1$. Then, for any $m \geq n_{A}$, we have $m R 0$ and $0 \Vdash B$. Let $k \in W$ be such that $0 S_{m} k$. Then, $k$ is even or $k=m-1$ by the definition of $S_{m}$. By our supposition, if $k$ is even, then $k \nVdash C$. If $k=m-1$, then $m-1 \nVdash C$ because $m-1 \geq n_{C}$. Therefore, in either case, $k \nVdash C$. Thus, $m \nVdash B \triangleright C$.

Fig. 5 A counter model of FPP for $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 1, \mathbf{J} 4_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$


- Case 3: Otherwise: Then, the following conditions (I) and (II) are fulfilled.
(I) For any $n>0$, if $n \Vdash B$, then there exists a $k \in W$ such that $k \leq n$ and $k \Vdash C$.
(II) If $0 \Vdash B$, then there exists an even number $k \in W$ such that $k \Vdash C$.

We distinguish the following two cases.
$-0 \nVdash B$ : Let $n_{A}=0$ and $m \geq n_{A}$. For any $n \in W$ satisfying $m R n$ and $n \Vdash B$, since $n \neq 0$, there exists a $k \leq n$ such that $k \Vdash C$ by the condition (I). Since $n S_{m} k$, we obtain $m \Vdash B \triangleright C$.
$-0 \Vdash B$ : By the condition (II), there exists an even number $k$ such that $k \Vdash C$. Let $n_{A}=k+1$ and $m \geq n_{A}$. Let $n \in W$ be such that $m R n$ and $n \Vdash B$. If $n \neq 0$, then there exists a $k^{\prime} \leq n$ such that $k^{\prime} \Vdash C$ and $n S_{m} k^{\prime}$ by the condition (I). If $n=0$, then since $k$ is even and $k<m$, we obtain $n S_{m} k$ and $k \Vdash C$. Therefore, $m \Vdash B \triangleright C$.

We suppose, towards a contradiction, that there exists a formula $A$ such that $v(A)=$ $\emptyset$ and $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 1}, \mathbf{J 4} \mathbf{H}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right) \vdash A \leftrightarrow \top \triangleright \neg A$. Then, $A \leftrightarrow \top \triangleright \neg A$ is valid in $\mathcal{F}$ because so is $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 1}, \mathbf{J 4} 4_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$. Then, the following claim holds.

Claim 2 For any $n \in W, n$ even if and only if $n \Vdash A$.
Proof We prove the by induction on $n$. For $n=0$, obviously $0 \Vdash A$. Suppose $n>0$ and the claim holds for any natural number less than $n$.
$(\Leftarrow)$ : Assume that $n$ is odd. Then, $n R 0$. For any $k \in W$ which satisfies $0 S_{n} k$, since $n$ is odd, $k$ is even and $k<n$. By the induction hypothesis, $k \Vdash A$. Thus, we obtain $n \nVdash \top \triangleright \neg A$ and hence, $n \nVdash A$.
$(\Rightarrow)$ : Assume that $n$ is even. Let $m \in W$ be such that $n R m$. We distinguish the following three cases.
$-m=0$ : Then, $0 S_{n} n-1$. Since $n-1$ is odd, $n-1 \Vdash \neg A$ by the induction hypothesis.
$-m$ is even and $m \neq 0$ : Then, $m S_{n} m-1$. Since $m-1$ is odd, $m-1 \Vdash \neg A$ by the induction hypothesis.
$-m$ is odd: Then, $m S_{n} m$. Since $m$ is odd, $m \Vdash \neg A$ by the induction hypothesis.
In any case, there exists a $w \in W$ such that $m S_{n} w$ and $w \Vdash \neg A$. Therefore, we obtain $n \Vdash \vdash \triangleright \neg A$ and hence, $n \Vdash A$.

This contradictions Claim 1. Therefore, there is no formula $A$ such that $v(A)=\emptyset$ and $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 1}, \mathbf{J} 4_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right) \nvdash A \leftrightarrow \top \triangleright \neg A$.

Corollary 6 Every sublogic of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 1, \mathbf{J 4} \mathbf{4}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ does not have FPP. Furthermore, if $L$ is closed under substituting a formula for a propositional variable and satisfies $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{4}_{+}\right) \subseteq L \subseteq \mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{1}, \mathbf{J} 4_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$, then $L$ does not have CIP.

Proof By Theorem 11, every sublogic of $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 1, \mathbf{J 4}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ does not have FPP. By Lemma 2, every logic $L$ that is closed under substituting a formula for a propositional variable and satisfies $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{4}_{+}\right) \subseteq L \subseteq \mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{1}, \mathbf{J} \mathbf{4}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ does not have CIP.

## 7 Concluding remarks

In this paper, we provided a complete description of twelve sublogics of IL concerning UFP, FPP, and CIP. In particular, for these sublogics $L$, we proved that $L$ has FPP if and only if $L$ contains $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$. On the other hand, there are many other logics between $\mathbf{I L}^{-}$and IL. For instance, Kurahashi and Okawa [9] introduced eight sublogics such as $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 2, \mathbf{J} 4_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ that are not in Fig. 1, and proved that these eight logics are not complete with respect to usual Veltman semantics but complete with respect to generalized Veltman semantics. Then, it is natural to investigate a sharper threshold for FPP in a larger class of sublogics. Then, for example, we propose a question if $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}$can be weakened by $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}$ in the statement of Corollary 2.

Problem 2 Does the logic $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}, \mathbf{J} 4_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}\right)$ have FPP?
In our proofs of Theorems 6,7 , and 8 , the use of the axiom scheme $\mathbf{J 5}$ seems inevitable. In fact, $\mathbf{C L}\left(=\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 1, \mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}\right)\right)$fails to have $\ell$ FPP. From this observation, in an earlier version of the present paper, we had proposed the question whether J5 is necessary or not for $\ell$ FPP and FPP. Later on, the third author of the present paper settled this question. For each $n \geq 1$, let $\mathbf{J} \mathbf{5}^{n}$ be the following axiom scheme:
$\mathbf{J 5}^{n} \diamond^{n} A \triangleright A$.
Concerning $\mathbf{J 5}^{n}$, the following result is established.

Theorem 12 (Okawa [11]) Let $n \geq 1$.

1. $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J 5}^{n}\right) \vdash \mathbf{J 5}^{n+1}$ and $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} \mathbf{2}_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}^{n+1}\right) \nvdash \mathbf{J 5}^{n}$.
2. $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 2_{+}, \mathbf{J 5}^{n}\right)$ and $\mathbf{I L}^{-}\left(\mathbf{J} 4, \mathbf{J 5}^{n}\right)$ have FPP and $\ell F P P$, respectively.

Furthermore, the authors have already developed several studies related to the present paper (cf. [6, 10]).

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## Declarations

Conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
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