T HEORETICAL I MPLICATION S ON V ISUAL (C OLOR ) R EPRESEN TATION AN D C YTOCHROME O XID ASE B LOBS

The rich concentration of mitochondrial cytochrome oxidase (CO) blobs in the V1 (striate) primate visual cortex has never been explained. Although the distribution of CO blobs provided a persuasive example of columnar structure in the V1, there are contradictions about the existence of hypercolumns. Since photoreceptors and other retinal cells process and convey basically external visible photonic signals, it suggests that one of the most important tasks of early visual areas is to represent these external visible color photonic signals during visual perception. This representation may occur essentially in CO-rich blobs of the V1. Here we suggest that the representation of external visible photon signals (i.e. visual representation) can be the most energetic allocation process in the brain, which is reasonably performed by the highest density neuronal V1 areas and mitochondrial-rich cytochrome oxidases. It is also raised that the functional unit for phosphene induction can be linked to small clusters of CO – rich blobs in V1. We present some implications about distinction between the physics of visible photons/ light and its subjective experiences. We also discuss that amodal and modal visual completions are possible due to the visual perception induced visualization when the brain tries to interpret the unseen parts of objects or represent features of perceived objects that are not actually visible. It is raised that continuously produced intrinsic bioluminescent photons from retinal lipid peroxidation may have functional role in initial development of retinogeniculate pathways as well as initial appearance topographic organizations of V1 before birth. Finally, the metaphysical framework is the extended version of dual-aspect monism (DAMv) that has the least number of problems compared to all other frameworks and hence it is better than the materialism that is currently dominant in science.

sensory m od alities d u ring m u ltisensory integration (Calvert, Sp ence, & Stein, 2004), it is hard ly questionable that photoreceptors and other retinal cells process and convey princip ally external visible photonic inform ation to Lateral genicu late nucleus (LGN ) and then to V1 (primary visual cortex) and other visu al areas. It suggests that one of the most important tasks of early V1 area is to represent these d etected external p hotonic signals. Although vision science makes d ifference betw een achrom atic and chrom atic vision, how ever, both are subjective color experiences prod u ced by mixed visible (color) photon signals in the hu m an eye ranging from about 400 to 700 nm.
Exp licitly, in the follow ing sections, w e p oint ou t that the representation of external visible photon signals (i.e. visu al representation) might be one the mos t energetic allocation processes in the brain, w hich is reasonably performed by highest d ensity neuronal V1 areas w ith mitochond rial-rich cytochrome oxid ase (CO) areas, w hich send signals to visu al V4/ V8/ VO color-related -neural-netw ork. It is also raised that small clusters (3-4 blobs/ m m 2 ) of CO blobs might w ork as functional u nits for conscious phosp hene perception. In ad d ition, w e present some implications about d istinction betw een the physics of visible photons/ light and its subjective experiences since the latter is the mental aspect of color -related -neuralnetw ork-state; its inseparable physical aspect is the V4/ V8/ VO color-related -neu ral-netw ork and its activities. We also argue that amod al and mod al visual completions are p ossible d ue to the visu al perception ind uced visu al imagery w hen higher level regions in the brain tries to interpret the u nseen parts of objects or represent features of perceived objects that are not actu ally visible. Then, it is raised that retinal biolu minescent biophotons origin ated from natural retinal lipid peroxid ation might have imp ortant role in the d evelop ment structural organization of visu al system before birth. Since w e try to elucid ate subject experiences related to color, w e mu st clearly d isclose our metaphysics. So, finally, the m etaphysical framew ork is the extend ed version of d ual-aspect monism that has the least number of problem s. This is called the DAMv framew ork: the Dual-Aspect Monism w ith d ual-m od e and varying d egrees of the d ominance of aspects d epend ing on th e levels of entities, w here each entity has inseparable m ental and p hysical asp ects (Vim al, 2008(Vim al, , 2010aBru zzo & Vim al, 2007). This is better than the d om inant view , m aterialism , in science.

HYPERCOLUMN ID EA
The cortical colum n notion as a functional unit for m onkey somatosensory cortex w as first suggested by Mou ntcastle and co-w orkers (Mou ntcastle, 1957;Pow ell & Mou ntcastle, 1959). Soon after ocular d ominance colu mn (eye-selective cells) concept w as prop osed by H ubel and Wiesel (1962) based on record ings from cells in primary visu al cor tex of anesthetized cats and m onkeys (H ubel & Wiesel, 1962(H ubel & Wiesel, , 1974(H ubel & Wiesel, , 1977. H u bel and Wiesel also proposed that the colu mns can be assembled into larger units (i.e. hypercolu mns constructed by ad jacent ocular d ominance colu m ns) that includ e representation of all functions (a ll orientations and both eyes) w ithin each area of retinotopic sp ace (H ubel & Wiesel, 1974(H ubel & Wiesel, , 1977. The proposed w id th of a hypercolu mn is 1-2 m m . A hypercolu mn contains a cluster of neurons that resp ond to the same retinal location, but w ith d ifferent orientation preferences (H orton & Ad am s, 2005Lu & Roe, 2008. That is, hypercolum ns contains three subsystems as ocular -d ominance colu mns, iso-orientation d om ains, and blobs. The ocular-d ominance colum n is the segregation of inputs from the right and the left eye. These segregated inputs form the ocular -d om inance colu mns, w hich ru n almost parallel to one another in slabs. In the iso -orientation d om ains (or orientationpreference band s), each d omain containing cells resp ond best to a given stimulus orientation. The same hypercolu mn also includ es the representation of all orientations. The third subsystem includ es neurons that are selective for other attribu tes of the visual stimulu s, such as color and spatial frequ ency. Thus, a hypercolum n contains the representations of all attributes of a stimulus w ithin each area of retinotopic space (receptive field ). These neuronal cells are placed in the mitochond rial cytochrome oxid ase-rich blobs.
Although hypercolu mn id ea su ggested by H ubel and Wiesel can be an attractive notion, to d ate, there are d isagreements about the existence of hypercolum ns. The visu al cortex (like other p arts of the cortex) is a continuou s sheet and w e cannot find a structure that correspond s to the bord ers betw een the hypercolu m ns. H ubel mentions in his N obel Prize Lectu re that the hypercolu mns bord ers are arbitrary, but it d id n't seem to w orry him. In a recent review by Lund et al. (2003) states that there is no fixed bou nd ary to such hypercolum ns as there is a continuous change in property and mean visu al field po sition across the cortex.
In ad d ition, as p er (H orton & Ad am s, 2005), "Althou gh the colu m n has been offered as the fund amental u nit of the cortex, it has not earned this lofty d esignation. After half a century, it is still u nclear w hat precisely is meant by the term. It d oes not correspond to any single stru ctu re w ithin the cortex. It has been im p ossible to find a canonical m icrocircu it that corresp ond s to the cortical colu m n".

MITOCHON D RIAL CYTOCHROME OXID ASE-RICH BLOBS AN D COLOR REPRESEN TATION
In prim ates, the m ajor pathw ay serving visu al perception runs from the retina via the lateral genicu late nucleu s (LGN ) to V1, V2, to extra striate areas and d istribution to higher cortical regions. From V1, m ost signals are conveyed to the V2 area before d istribution to higher cortical areas.
During visu al perception and im agery, the high activity of cytochrome oxid ase (CO) is associated w ith high mitochond rial activity. CO is the last enzyme in the mitochond rial electron transport chain. The strict coupling betw een neuronal activity and oxid ative energy metabolism is the basis for the use of CO as an end ogenous metabolic marker for neurons (Wong-Riley, 1989). Because CO staining intensity correlates w ith neuronal functional activity, w hen w e talk about CO activity w e also talk about mitochond rial activity. N amely, CO activity can have d irect link w ith mitochond rial activity, d istributions, and processes (as in neu ronal activity) (Bókkon & Vim al, 2010).
Although the d istribu tion of mitochond rial CO provid ed a persu asive example of colu mnar structure in the V1, there are contrad ictions about the existence of hypercolu mns. In ad d ition, a nonlinear d istribution of mitochond rial-rich CO blobs, w ith increased enzyme activity, can be id entified in the V1. These blobs ca n also be revealed by d iverse labeling techniques such as increased expression of N -methyl-D-asp artate (N MDA) or -am ino-5hyd roxy-3-m ethyl-4-isoxazole p rop ionic acid (AMPA) recep tors, and increased activity glutam ate or ATPase, am ong others (Card er & H end ry, 1994;Card er, 1997;Wong-Riley, And erson, Liebl, & H u ang, 1998). Besid es, CO blobs appear to be com mon to all primates (Preuss & Kaas, 1996). In ad d ition, blobs and interblob are found not only in trichromatic or d ichromatic prim ates but also in nocturnal prim ates w ith single functional type of cone w ithin the retina (Wikler & Rakic, 1990). The functional CO blobs in the supragranular layers extend to layer 6, w ith the excep tion of layer 4C (Takahata, H igo, Kaas, & Yam am ori, 2009). N eu rons in the V1 blobs have low orientation selectivity bu t resp ond to color and have higher firing rates comp ared to surrou nd ing regions (interblobs) (Lu & Roe, 2008;Econom id es, Sincich, Ad am s, & H orton, 2011).
In V1, layers 2 and 3 are composed of CO-d ense blobs and surrou nd ing regions (interblobs) (Xiao & Fellem an, 2004). V2 is com p osed of alternating thin and thick CO -rich stripes and the p ale interstripe regions betw een them. Accord ing to Sincich et al. (2007), d ifferent CO comp artments in V1 and V2 are connected in p arallel and the projection from V1 CO blobs to V2 CO thin stripes is responsible for color. In addition, V1 and V2 can represent all the princip al su bmod alities of vision such as color, form, m otion, and d epth (Bartels & Zeki, 1998).
In the latest experiments by Economid es, Sincich, Ad ams, and Horton, published in Nature Neuroscience (2011), confirmed previously presented notion by Sincich and H orton (2005) that the visu al attributes of color, form, and motion are not really segregated in V1. Accord ing to Economid es et al. (2011), V1 contains local clu ster of neurons jointly sensitive to orientation and color, perhaps correspond ing to cytochrome oxid ase blobs. Economid es et al.
(2011) also m ention: "The abund ant concentration of cytochrome oxid ase in p atches or blobs of prim ate striate cortex has never been explained ".
It is lesser-know n that the highest d ensity of neurons in neocortex (nu mber of neurons per d egree of visual angle) (Rockel, H oirns, & Pow ell, 1980;O'Ku sky & Colonnier, 1982) d evoted to representing the visu al field are found in V1. H ow ever, it is hard ly accid ental that the highest m itochond rial (energetic) activity can be achieved in V1 w ith mito chond rial CO-rich regions in the brain. N amely, V1 has the highest energy allocation for the visual representation and imagery in the brain, and mitochond rial-rich CO blobs m ay represent monocu lar sites of color processing.
All things that exist in the nature and universe have (d ynamic) form (Pereira, 2012). If the (d ynamic) form is the qu intessence of our w orld it m ay support that visu al information via reflected visible photons (400-700 nm) from objects/ forms m ight play the key role in visu al perception/ representation and imagery. Ed w ald H ering (a Germ an physiologist  w ho p rop osed op p onent color theory in 1892) noted in the last centu ry that colors are alw ays spatial. "Our visu al w orld consists solely of d ifferently formed colors […] seen objects, are nothing other than colors of d ifferent kind s and form s " (H ering, 1874).

V1 MAY GUARAN TEE THE FIN EST AN D D ETAILED VISUAL REPRESEN TATION
During critical period , both visu al stimulation and intact visu al regions are necessary for normal d evelopment of visual fu nctions and im agery. Althou gh there are contrad ictions about if mental im ages and perceived stimuli are represented sim ilarly as w ell as if V1 is activated d uring visu al im agery, recent experiments support that V1 can be activated d uring these states in healthy subjects (Chen et al., 1998;Borst & Kosslyn, 2008;Klein et al., 2004;Cichy, Heinzle, & Haynes, 2012).
Our presented n otions in this p aper are related to intact V1 of healthy persons and not to the excep tional su bjects w ith d iverse V1 d am ages, lesions, and m alfu nctions. N evertheless, in exceptional V1 cases (d amages, lesions), for exam ple, as it w as revealed in blind sight phenomenon, there are further possible mechanisms byp assing or helping V1 such as compensation, neural reorganization, preserved "island s" in V1 (genicu lostriate visual pathw ay), projections to the superior colliculus and p ulvinar that can provid e ind irec t visu al input to the extrastriate areas (retinotectal visu al pathw ay) (Fend rich, Wessinger, & Gazzaniga, 1992;Ptito & Leh, 2007), and at present still unknow n V1 byp assing visu al netw orks. Recently, Boyer et al. (2005) d em onstrated that TMS ind u ces blind sight in a norm al population via an alternate genicu loextrastriate visu al pathw ay that byp asses V1, w hich can process orientation and color w ithou t conscious aw areness.
Accord ing to Ganis et al. (2003), "Many sorts of d eficits in im agery follow brain d amage, but the relation betw een the site of d am age and the type of d eficit is not simp le or straightforw ard . The d issociations in perform ance after brain d am age provid e hints regard ing the processing system und erlying im agery, but d ifficu lties in interpretation urge caution in m apping these find ings to theoretic m od els. N euroim aging techniqu es, such as PET and fMRI, open a w ind ow into the w orking brain and offer valuable information not easily accessible through the stud y of p atients, w ho, as noted , m ay have d eficits beyond those observable and m ay rely on compensation and neural reorganization ".
Lately, Ffytche and Zeki (2012) reported visu al aw areness in blind field s of three patients w ith hem ianop ic field d efects. Authors conclud ed that "the primary visual cortex or backprojections to it are not necessary for visu al aw areness", how ever, they also acknow led ged that the blind field experiences of all three subjects w ere d egrad ed and crud e.
If V1 striate cortex can be totally d am aged , the processes that w ould take place there w ou ld then take place in the next available V2 visual area. The V2 areas are also w ell retinotopically organized (Cavusoglu, Bartels, Yesilyurt, & Ulud ağ, 2012) and preserve the local spatial geometry of the retina (similarly to V1), so patterns of activation in V2 can d epict shape (Kosslyn, 1994). There are numerous further visu al areas beyond V1 and V2 in w hat is know n as the prestriate cortex, and they have larger receptive field s and crud er topograp hic organizations. V1 and V2 have comp arable surface areas in the brain (Sincich, Jocson, & H orton, 2007). A m ap of V2 ap p roxim ates a m irror im age of the V1 (Zeki, 1977). V1 send s most of its cortical output to V2 and in return receives a strong feed back projection. There are ap p roxim ately 11,000 feed back neu rons in V2 and 14,000 feed forw ard neu rons in V1 (Rockland , 1997). There are especially rap id feed forw ard and feed back processes betw een V1 and V2 w ith cond uction velocities around 3.5 m / s (Girard , H upé, & Bullier, 2001).
Accord ing to Sincich and H orton's (2005), "… along w ith p hysiological and im aging stud ies, now m ake it likely that the visu al at tributes of color, form, and motion are not neatly segregated by V1 into d ifferent stripe compartments in V2. Instead , there are ju st tw o main streams, originating from cytochrome oxid ase p atches and interp atches, that project to V2" . It suggests that V2 could rep resent the princip al subm od alities of vision such as colour, form, motion and d epth. Thus, w hen V1 can be d am aged , V2 m ay be available to take up V1 roles and prod uce similar effective visual im agery than V1 shou ld d o.
Accord ing to latest transcranial m agnetic stimu lation (TMS) experiments (Salminen-Vap aranta et al., 2012) hu man visu al aw areness cannot be generated w ithout an intact V2. It may supp ort our above m entioned notion that w hen striate cortex is d amaged , V2 m ay be able to take u p V1 roles and p rod u ce sim ilar effective visu al im agery than V1 shou ld d o.
It is also p ossible that intact V1 may gu arantee the finest visu al perception and visu al im agery, but it is d ifficult to observe d ue to the subjective reports of visu al experiments and to the significant ind ivid u al structural variability betw een normal visu al systems of subjects. For example, the mean V1 surface area is 2643 m m 2 in hu m an, but the su rface range is betw een 1986-3477 m m 2 (Ad am s, Sincich, & H orton, 2007). Is it p ossible that the size of V1 (i.e. the number and size of functional cells in V1) area can have som e influence on the visual perception and im agination?
Accord ing to Cattaneo, Bona, and Silvanto (2012), it is p ossible that fine d etails of im agery for w hich the sm all recep tive field s of V1 are suited requires the prim ary visual cortex, althou gh w hen fine d etails are not necessary, extrastriate regions are enou gh for imagery. It is a simp le but important question, w ou ld size of mitochond ria pop ulation be correlated w ith reports of phosphenes and imagery and vivid ness and ind ivid u al d ifferences in these p henom ena? This w ou ld be an im p ortant exp erim ent to d o in the fu tu re.
Energetic processes can have essential role of V1 representation mechanism s. Recent experiments su ggest (Basole, White, & Fitzpatrick, 2003Basole, Kreft-Kerekes, White, & Fitzp atrick, 2006) that p op u lation activity ((i.e. com binations of d ifferent stim u lu s featu res such as orientation, d irection, sp atial frequency) in V1 can be better revealed by a single m ap of spatiotem poral energy rather than multiple m aps of d ifferent stimulus features. Recently, w e pointed ou t that sp atiotemporal mitochond rial netw orks and processes can also reflect represented information w ithin neurons d uring sensory experiences (Bókkon & Vim al, 2010). N amely, w hile the brain processes inform ation from d ifferent perceptions, the energetic m echanism s (dynamic mitochondria networks and processes activated neurons) have to reflect the perceived inform ation processes because the energy d emand of neuronal electrical activity is realized fund amentally by mitochond rial processes. Since sensory information processes are d irectly linked to mitochond rial energetic processes, it means that information that comes from the d ifferent perceptions have to be represented not only by structural processes (such as neural networks) and neuronal electrical activity, but also by spatiotemporal energetic processes of mitochond rial netw orks w ithin neurons.

CLUSTERS OF CO-RICH BLOBS AS POSSIBLE FUN CTION AL UN ITS FOR CON SCIOUS PHOSPHEN E PERCEPTION
Phosphene light perceptions can be prod uced in the visu al hemifield contra -lateral to the stim ulated cortical hemisp here and reflect the retinotopic organization of the visual cortex (Brind ley & Lew in, 1968). TMS ind uced phosphenes can be perceived regard less of w het her subjects' eyes are opened or closed . In ad d ition, p hosphenes are only perceived by blind patients that have prior visual experience, su ggesting that early visual stimu lus is essential to maintain any level of resid ual visu al fu nction (Merabet, Theoret, & Pascu al-Leone, 2003). Visu al im agery can low er phosphene threshold (PT) (Sparing et al., 2002) su ggesting that visu al imagery and intrinsic phosp hene perception can be in d irect functional relationship.
The characteristics of phosphenes are related to the function and receptive field organization of the stimulated neurons. Phosp henes ind uced in V1, V2, and V3 visu al areas usu ally are stationary sm all blob-like forms (w ed ges, crescents, ellipses) (Kam mer, 1999). Ind uced phosp henes in V4 and V5/ MT+ visu al regions usually are larger and present a rud er retinotop ic structure, and even ad opt qu alities such as color, motion or texture (Marg & Ru d iak, 1994;Cow ey & Walsh, 2000).
The CO blobs form nonlinear repeating functional units in V1. Accord ing to Tehovnik and Slocu m , (2007), "The fu nctional u nit for p hosp hene ind u ction in V1 is m ost likely the hypercolum n, w hich is about 1 x 0.7 m m of tissue composed of layers sp anning some 2 m m of tissue from the surface of cortex." The sizes of CO blobs in m onkeys are about 514 Pm in the neonate enucleated and 560 Pm in norm al anim als (Ku ljis & Rakic, 1990;Kenned y, Dehay, & H orsbu rgh, 1990). Ku ljis and  fou nd that the center-to-center sp acing of blobs is 590 Pm in normal and 598 Pm in strabismic macaques. In ad d ition, the mean d ensity of blobs w as 3.67 blobs/ m m 2 in norm al and 3.45 blobs/ m m 2 in strabism ic macaques. Besid es, CO blobs can d evelop in the absence of external visu al cues from photoreceptors, and the CO layout of the visual cortex is not mod ifiable by visu al experiences (Kuljis & Rakic, 1990).
If w e comp are Tehovnik and Slocu m suggestion that the fu nctional unit for p hosphene ind uction is about 1 x 0.7 mm of tissue w ith (Kenned y, Dehay, & H orsburgh, 1990;Ku ljis & Rakic, 1990) experimental results that the size of blobs 514-560 Pm or 590 -598 Pm in anim als, it m ay su ggest that is m ore reasonable if the fu nctional u nit for p hosp hene ind u ction can be linked to sm all clu sters (3-4 blobs/ m m 2 ) of CO blobs and not d efinitely to the d oubtful and unproved hypercolum ns structure.
One may argue that w hy conscious p hosphene perception should be linked to small clusters of CO blobs, becau se phosp henes can be elicited not only in CO -rich V1 area but also in V2, V3, V4, V5/ MT+, intrap arietal su lcu s (IPS) regions am ong them .
First, the existence of hypercolu mns is d oubtful w hile repeating nonlinear u nits CO blobs in V1 has been presented by m any experiments (Lu & Roe, 2008, N akagam a & Tanaka, 2004Mu rp hy et al, 1998. Second , recent exp erim ents (Fried et al., 2011;Taylor, Walsh, & Eim er, 2010) suggest that all p hosphenes (that can be ind uced in various regions (such as V2, V3 V4 or V5/ MT+, IPS am ong others) are d ue to the ind uced activity of local circuits (local processes contributing to phosphene generation are ind epend ent) bu t feed -forw ard visual input from excited local circuits to V1 areas are necessary to phosphene aw areness. In ad d ition, since w e can interpret the form, color and movement of ind uced p hosphenes, it suggests that not only feed -forw ard visu al input from excited local circuits to V1 are necessary to phosp hene aw areness bu t also feed back signals from higher level association areas. Since, as w as mentioned , V1 has the highest energy allocation for the visual rep resentation and im agery; it su ggests that V1 m itoch ond rial CO-rich blobs can have especially high role in the energy allocation for the visual representation and im agery.
Accord ing to Taylor, Walsh and Eimer (2010), "While the ''early'' hyp othesis su ggests that phosphene related p otentials after occipital TMS are functionally analogous to m otor -evoked potentials follow ing M1 (prim ary m otor cortex) TMS, the ''late'' hyp othesis claim s that consciou s phosphene perception and its associated phosphene-related potentials are similar to the consciou s perception of external visual stimu li and its electrophysiological correlates". It suggests that the processing of phosphene perception is very similar to mod el of the reverse hierarchy vision (Ahissar & H ochstein, 1997;H ochstein & Ahissar, 2002).
Accord ing to reverse hierarchy hyp othesis (H ochstein & Ahissar, 2002), …"ou r initial consciou s p ercep t-vision at a glancem atches a high-level, generalized , categorical scene interpretation, id entifying "forest before trees." For later vision with scrutiny, reverse hierarchy routines focu s attention to specific, active, low -level units, incorp orating into consciou s perception d etailed information available there. Reverse H ierarchy Theory d issociates betw een early explicit perception and implicit low -level vision, explaining a variety of phenomena". H ow ever, this hypothesis can supp ort that visu al apperception has the highest energy allocation as w e also elucid ated in our previou sly paper (Bókkon & Vim al, 2010). This extra energy allocation of explicit perception m ight serve the d etailed (holistic (H ochstein et al., 2004) representation of d etected visu al inform ation in V1 (d etermines w hether that inform ation reaches aw areness (Silvanto, Cow ey, Lavie, & Walsh, 2005).
One of the m ost imp ortant questions in neuroscience is "The Bind ing Problem ". N amely, how encod ed item s can be com bined for coherent p ercep tion, d ecision, and action by d istinct brain regions. During object perception, sep arated visu al features must be correctly integrated . Accord ing to feature integration assu mption (Treism an, 1996), visu al stimulation activates feature d etectors in striate and extrastriate regions that link au tomatically to the object nod es in the temp oral lobe. Latest stud ies su p port that reentrant processing betw een higher areas and early (V1) visual cortex is critical factor for visu al bind ing and necessary for consciou s (and unconsciou s) visu al perception (Koivisto, Mäntylä, & Silvanto, 2010;Koivisto & Silvanto, 2012). It m ay also su p p ort the notion that early (V1) v isu al cortex is critical for consciou s visu al perception as w ell as for conscious phosphene perception.

PSYCHOPHYSICS AN D N EUROPHYSIOLOGY OF COLOR VISION
Trichom ats have 3 psychop hysical visu al channels (Kaiser & Boynton, 1996): Luminance/ Achrom atic channel, Red -Green color channel, and Yellow -Blue color channel. Achrom atic and chromatic perceptions and rep resentations are processed by the lu m inance/ achrom atic channel and the tw o chrom atic channels (Red -Green color channel, and Yellow -Blu e color channel), resp ectively. Each has a nu m ber of tu ned m echanism s in orientation (Vim al, 1997), sp atial frequ ency (Vim al, 1998a(Vim al, , 1998b(Vim al, , 2002b, tem p oral frequ ency (Metha & Mu llen, 1996Vim al, Pand ey & McCagg, 1995), and spectral/ color tuning (De Valois & Jacobs, 1984;Engel, Zhang, & Wand ell, 1997). As p er (Vim al, 2011a), "A psychophysical entity is an abstract m athem atical construct d erived by mod eling the experimental d ata related to psychop hysics and neurophysiology. For exam ple, there are 3 psychophysical visu al (card inal (Krauskopf, William s, & H eeley, 1982)) channels (su ch as the Red -Green, the Yellow -Blue, and the achrom atic or luminance channels) d erived from psychophysical and p hysiological d ata (H urvich & Jameson, 1957;Kaiser & Boynton 1996; Krau skop f, William s, & H eeley, 1982). [...] The genu ine first-p erson m easu rem ents lead to the su bjective exp erience of color qu alia su ch as redness to greenness (see also (Dennett, 2003)). The third -person measurements w ill reveal the p hysical attributes such as neural activities in related neural-netw ork that includ es visual red -green (R-G) color area 'V4/ V8/ VO'. In ad d ition, the experience of hue, saturation and brightness (first -person d ata) (Vim al et al, 1987) correlates w ith the activity of its neural-netw ork and the properties of associated color stim u li (third -p erson d ata) (Bartels & Zeki, 2000;H ad jikhani et al, 1998;Kaiser & Boynton, 1996;Krau skop f et al, 1982;Tootell, Tsao, & Vand u ffel, 2003;Vim al, 1998bVim al, , 2002bWand ell, 1999). This psychophysical entity (such as the R-G channel) p rovid es a link betw een firstperson d ata (phenomenal or mental aspect, su ch as redness to greenness) and third -person d ata (physical aspect, su ch as 'V4/ V8/ VO R-G color neu ral-netw ork'). Subjective experiences (SEs) redness to greenness and 'V4/ V8/ VO R-G color neu ral-netw ork' are cau sally related via the Red -Green channel. That is, active 'V4/ V8/ VO R-G color neu ral-netw ork' cau ses SEs redness to greenness up on the presentation of equilu minant red -green patterns via the spatial frequency (SF) tu ned mechanism s of the Red -Green channel (Vim al, 1998b(Vim al, , 2002b; these are external stimulu s d riven SEs. Subjective experience of color can also occur by internal activation, such as electrical stimu lation, transcranial m agnetic stim ulation (TMS), and 'm ed itation-ind uced cortical phosp henes w ith eyes closed ' (Vim al & Pand ey-Vim al, 2007).
[…] The color-contrast-constancy is p artly achieved at high contrasts and the information processing at suprathreshold levels is d ifferent from that at the threshold levels (Vim al, 2000). Color and lum inance SF d iscrim ination threshold s have a d ifferent SF d epend ence; w hile color appears to perform better than lu minance vision at low SFs, this effect is lost or even reversed at high SFs; color and form interact, but color and motion are largely s egregated (i.e. they w eakly interact) (Vim al, 2002a)."

COLOR AS SUBJECTIVE VISUAL EXPERIEN CE
It is w ell-know n that hum ans have three d ifferent types of cones in their eyes that perceive the blue, green, and red visible photons reflecting from objects.  (N eitz, Geist, & Jacobs, 1989). Dogs cannot see red , orange or green colors bu t red , orange and green app ear as yellow or blue to them. N amely, d ogs can see yellow , blue, and grey colors. Several types of bird s have a fourth type of retinal cone p hotoreceptor cells (tetrachrom atic UV (Ultraviolet), 300 nm), so their vision is more refined as comp ared to hum an color vision.
When w e can see a red ap ple at the same time, d ogs can see this apple w ith yellow -like color. So the question can emerge, this apple in Figure 1 is red or yellow -like. A d og's subjective visu al experience can be that this app le is yellow -like bu t a hu man's subjective visu al experience is red . The correct d efinition could be that this app le und er norm al photopic circum stances for people w ith intact vision makes a red visu al sense. So a color is not a physical feature of an given object but a subjective visu al experience that is d epend on the long w avelength sensitive (LWS or red ) cone, mid d le w avelength sensitive (MWS or green) cone, and short w avelength sensitive (SWS or blue) cone/ p ho toreceptor and visu al processes and also on the context of apple.

ACHROMATIC AN D CHROMATIC VISION
Electrom agnetic light w aves (photons) visible to the hum an eye range from abou t 400 to 700 nm. Attributes of visible p hotons/ light, such as w avelength and intensity, are physics; bu t color and its attributes (such as hue, saturation, and brightness (Vim al et al, 1987)) are subjective experiences, w hich are the mental aspect of color-related -neural-netw ork-state (Vim al, 2008(Vim al, , 2010a. A hu e is a p u re color, i.e. one w ith no black or w hite in it. In ou r p reviou s p ap er , w e elaborated that the w hite light (visible electrom agnetic photons) is a mixture of all colors. Black or w hite, it's not an all or nothing case in everyd ay life. White objects are w hite because the m ost of the light that falls on th em is reflected by the material. Black objects absorb light of all frequencies but a little light (electrom agnetic photons) is reflected from them. Thu s, black is also a mixture of all colors! White and black have the same hue and saturation, and the light ness is all that is d ifferent. The sensation of black is not the same as absence of light is one of the central tenets of H ering's teaching (H ering, 1874).

Figure 2. The sam e p hoto by colors (A) and by black (grey) and w hite (B).
When you can see the p hoto in Figure 2a u nd er photop ic level, you say that is a color photo that is your subjective experience (SE) about this photo d ue to the reflected mixture of visible "color" photons (mixture of electrom agnetic p hotons visible to the hu man eye range from abou t 400 to 700 nm w avelength).
When you can see the same photo in Figure 2b u nd er photopic level, you say that is a black and w hite photo. H ow ever, this is also your su bjective experience about this ph oto bu t your blackness and w hiteness subjective experiences about the p hoto of Figure 2b are also d ue to the reflected mixture of visible "color" photons (mixture of electromagnetic photons visible to the hum an eye range from about 400 to 700 nm w avelength s).
In the hu man retina there are rod s and three types of cones p hotoreceptors, each of w hich absorbs d ifferent range w avelengths (Figure 3 We can read essentially in the m ost of scientific literatures that rod s d o not d iscern colors like cones d o (i.e., rod vision is achromatic night vision), although they are highly sensitive to light, and usu ally the photon absorption curve for rod is show n by black d otted curves., long w avelength sensitive cone by red curve, m id d le w avelength sensitive cone by green curve, and short w avelength sensitive cone by blue cu rve (see in Figure 3). H ow ever, rod photoreceptors convey electrom agnetic visible photonic signals in the hu man eye ranging from abou t 400 to 700 nm w avelength; similarly for cones w ith limited range. Cones are for color vision, nevertheless, rod s also absorb sim ilar color photons as cones d o, and they also could contribute to subjective color perception (Stabell & Stabell, 1994;Cao, Pokorny, Smith, & Zele, 2008) to certain extent, but not like d ay color vision via 3 cones. In other w ord s, but rod s convey electrom agnetic visible color mixed p hotonic signals in the hum an eye ranging from abou t 400 to 700 nm these prod uce subjective black and w hite exper ience in the brain. Although vision science m akes practical d ifference betw een achrom atic and chromatic vision, both are subjective experiences are prod uced by mixed visible color photon signals in the hu m an eye ranging from abou t 400 to 700 nm .

MODAL AND AMODAL VISUAL COMPLETION
Although recent experiments provid ed evid ence that visu al, aud itory, and somatosensory integrations take place p arallel at numerous levels along brain p athw ays (Giard & Peronnet, 1999;Macalu so, Frith, & Driver, 2000;Calvert, Sp ence. & Stein, 2004) and in ou r everyd ay perception most objects and events can be seen, heard , and touched , i.e. these are primarily interm od al perception, i.e. inform ation from events or objects available to multiple senses simu ltaneously, for the und erstand ing of our thou ghts presented here w e focus to visu al perception per se.
A major challenge of vision research is to make it clear how the visu al system can complete missing structures d uring visu al perception. In our everyd ay aw areness of the surrou nd ing w orld in alm ost all cases of visu al percep tion includ e one or m ore amod al parts. In amod al completion, there is a completion of an object that is not completely visible because it is covered (occlud ed , hid d en) by something else (Kanizsa & Gerbino, 1982). In mod al comp letion p henom enon a shape can be perceived that is occlud ing other shapes even w hen the shape itself is not d raw n (Figure 4). For examp le the triangle that appears to be occlud ing three d isks in the Kanizsa triangle.
Accord ing to (N anay, 2007), "am od al perception relies heavily on our backgrou nd know led ge of how the occlud ed parts of the object (may) look. If I have never seen a cat, I w ill have d ifficu lties attributing properties to its tail behind the fence". N anay states that w hen w e represent features of perceived objects that are not actu ally visible to u s, w e can use mental im agery. It is also true for visual im agery. If w e w ant to visualize an object w e mu st know how this look. In ad d ition, our ind ivid u al belief also can contribute to the representation of non-visible object features (Briscoe, 2011). Since d uring am od al comp letion as w ell as d uring mod al visu al comp letion w e can experience such physical features of an object that are not d ue to the external visible photon signals absorbed by retinal photoreceptors, it sup ports that these processes are achieved by intrinsic mechanism s betw een V1 and higher level areas.
It seems that amod al visual completions are d ue to the visual perception ind uced visu alization processes w hen our brain tries to interpret the unseen p arts of objects or in mod al visu al completions the brain represent featu res of perceived objects that are not actu ally visible. These processes essentially d epend on our background visu al k now led ge (and also our ind ivid ual belief), namely, essentially d epend on stored long -term (visual) mem ory. Thus w e agree w ith N anay that am od al visu al perception can be a version of visu alization, i.e. visu alize the unseen parts of objects w e are looking a t.
Recent experiments by Mu rray et al. (2002,2004) revealed that in hu mans both mod al and am od al comp letion processes share a comm on initial neurophysiological sp atiotem poral m echanism , bu t w ith d ifferential p rocessing latencies. It is p ossible that feed forw ard visu al signals from V1 and V2 are sent to higher visual areas that mod ulate V1 and V2 responses to visu al stim u li, w hich finally can p rod u ce m od al com p letion or am od al com p letion (Albert, 2007;Mu rray et al., 2002Mu rray et al., , 2004. This m od u lation of V1 and V2 resp onses to external visu al stim uli essentially d epend on stored long-term visu al memory (background visu al know led ge). It is also p ossible that the completion of occlud ed contours (filling -in) phenomena are d epend ent on the sp atial scale of the occlusion; local processing can accou nt for small gaps or occlusions while larger gaps or occlusions m ost likely d epend on feed back signals arising from neurons w ith significantly larger receptive field s.
One may argue that w hat allow s us to see is the perception of surfaces and layout, these are am od al features, can be w ithout color at all and can be achieved throu gh su ggesting ed ges or contours, as in the pow erful d emonstration of subjective contours, geometry/ form has very little to d o w ith color per se, surface and ed ges are w hat show shape to the visu al system.
N evertheless, it is not true. As mentioned above, photoreceptors and various retinal cells process and convey essentially external visible electromagnetic (color) photonic inform ation to LGN and to V1 and other visu al areas that is mod ulated by ad d itional sensory m od alities d uring multisensory integration. It is p ossible that first steps of visu al perception (and representation) are basically nothing other than representation of external visible (color) electrom agnetic photons achieved in V1 CO-rich visual areas. During visual perception, information originated from surfaces and ed ges is also d ue to the external visible (color) electrom agnetic p hotons.
During visual mod al com pletion or am od al comp letion the first step s that d etected external (color) photon signals are run from the retina via the LGN to V1, V2 and then signals conveyed to extrastriate and to higher level visu al and association areas. N ext, feed back signals (d epend s on our backgrou nd visu al know led ge originated from long term (visu al) mem ory and also on ou r ind ivid u al belief, Figure 5) m od ulate original d etected and represented object in retinotop ic V1, w hich finally makes m od ified perception, i.e. mod al completion or amod al com pletion. This process is also consistent w ith the reverse hierarchy theory of vision. Accord ing to recent electroencep halogram (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) exp erim ents (Scholte, Jolij, Fahrenfort, & Lam m e, 2008), textu re bound aries are d etected in a feed forw ard m anner and are represented at increasing la tencies by higher visu al regions. In ad d ition, surface segregation is represented by reverse hierarchical processes that arise from feed back signals to early visu al areas such as V1. The triangle that appears to be occlud ing three d isks in the Kanizsa triangle.

SPATIAL VISUAL PERCEPTION AN D IMAGERY
Some researchers argue that visu al and sp atial im agery can be represented d ifferently (Farah, H am m ond , Levine, & Calvanio, 1988;Vannu cci and Mazzoni 2009). N evertheless, accord ing to their recent fMRI stud ies, Golomb and Kanw isher (2011) state, "d esp ite ou r subjective impression that visu al information is spatiotopic, even in higher level visu al cortex, object location continues to be represented in retinotopic coord inates ". In ad d ition, they suggested that there is a not explicit hard -w ired sp atiotopic map in the brain and the sp atiotopic object position can be comp uted not d irectly and continu ally reconstructed by each eye movement.
It is p ossible that ou r cap acity for sp atial visu al p ercep tion and im agery are learned ability that performed / computed by higher level visual and association areas (linked to other sensory m od alities), but first steps of visu al perception (and representation) is essentially nothing other than perception (and representation) of external visible electrom agnetic p hotons achieved basically in retinotop ic V1 m itochond rial-rich CO areas.

POSSIBLE ROLE OF BIOLUMIN ESCEN T RETIN AL BIOPHOTON S IN THE D EVELOPMEN T OF RETIN OGEN ICULATE PATHWAYS AN D IN ITIAL APPEARAN CE TOPOGRAPHIC MAP FORMATION OF V1 AN D CO BLOBS BEFORE BIRTH
Early visu al experience is fund amental to shape the m aturation of cortical circu its and is also ind ispensable to norm al color and visu al perception d uring d evelop ment (Sugita, 2004). Experiments revealed that retinogeniculate pathw ays and CO blobs emerge before birth and visu al experience is not essential for the initial appearance or early d evelopment of CO blobs in cats and m acaques, w hich suggests that CO blobs could reflect an innate and structural organization of early visu al cortex (Kuljis & Rakic, 1990;Murphy, Duffy, Jones, & Mitchell, 2001). Besid es, the CO layout of the visual cortex is not m od ifiable by visu al experiences (Mu rp hy, Du ffy, Jones, & Mitchell, 2001).
It is generally believed that retinal w aves play a m ajor instructive role in the maturation of the visu al system. During d evelopment of the visual system, in the higher and low er vertebrates, ganglion cells in the imm ature and light -insensitive retina spontaneously and synchronou sly creates end ogenously w aves (action potentials) that are transm itted to the lateral genicu late nucleus (H uberman, Feller, & Chap m an, 2008). Am acrine cells also particip ate in the correlated activity p atterns. Spontaneou s retinal w aves are conveyed to t he visu al cortex and w here can trigger end ogenou s spind le bursts.
Chalup a (2009) pointed out that retinal w aves are d oubtful to have such a role, and suggested that eye-specific molecular cues in com bination w ith neuronal activity are probably involved in the d evelopment of eye-specific retinogeniculate pathw ays.
N evertheless, several experiments proved (Kobayashi et al., 1999;Kataoka et al., 2001;N arici et al., 2009Catalá, 2006;Ad am , Kazakov, & Kazakov, 2005;N akano, 2005) that natural lip id peroxid ation is one of the m ain sources of sp ontaneou s ultraw eak (bio)lum inescent biop hotons. Und er regulated circu mstances, lip id peroxid ation i s a natural process in cells and also in retinal membranes. Since the natural lipid peroxid ation is one of the m ain sources of biolu minescent biophotons and the photoreceptors have the highest oxygen d emand and polyu nsaturated fatty acid (PUFA) concentration in the bod y (N ielsen, Maud e, H u ghes, 1986; You d im, Martin, & Josep h, 2000), there can be a perm anent, low -level biolu minescent biop hoton emission w ithin the retina w ithout any external light stim ulation in the retinal of fetus in the uterus.
In ad d ition, recently w e  presented the first experimental evid ence of the existence of sp ontaneou s and visible light ind uced (also called as d elayed lu minescence) ultraw eak biophoton emission from in vitro freshly isolated rat's whole eye, lens, vitreou s humor and retina. Our resu lts support our previou sly pred ictions (Bókkon, 2008;Bókkon & Vimal, 2009) that retinal d iscrete d ark noise as w ell as retinal phosphenes can be d ue to the natural biolu minescent biop hotons originated w ithin the retinal system ( Figure 6).
If w e consid er the above mentioned , it might su ggest that continuously generated biolu minescent biop hotons from retinal lipid peroxid ation m ay also have functional role in early d evelopment of retinogeniculate pathw ays and initial appearance topograp hic organizations of V1 and CO blobs before birth, becau se retinal sp ontaneou s biophotons can continu ou sly send intrinsic signals via p hototransd u ction cascad e to the V1 area that interprets these retinal biop hotons as if they originated in the external visu al w orld . Figure 6. Biolum inescent biop hotons from natural retinal lipid peroxid ation ind icated by red jagged arrow s. It is p ossible that a given rod or cone emits a biolu minescent biop hoton that changes its d irection, and subsequently can absorb its ow n bioluminescent photon. A rod or cone can absorb biolu minescent biop hotons from the lipid peroxid atio n of ad jacent rod s or cones.

METAPHYSICS
Since w e are trying to exp lain subject experiences related to color (such red ness), w e mu st clearly d isclose our metap hysics. (Vim al, 2012) d iscu sses it as follow s: One could categorize all entities of our u niverse in tw o categories 1 : physical (P: such as ferm ions, bosons and their com p osites inclu d ing classical inert entities and neu ral netw orks (N N s) in objective third person perspective (3pp)) and mental entities (M: such as subjective experiences, self, thou ghts, attention, intention, and other non -physical entities in subjective first person perspective (1pp)). This categorization entails 4 major philosophical p ositions: (i) M from P (P is p rim itive/ fu nd am ental; exp eriences em erge from the interactions of feed forw ard and feed back signals in neural-netw orks or id entical w ith brain -states): naturalistic/ p hysicalistic/ materialistic nond u al monism, physicalism, mat erialism, red uctionism, non-red uctive physicalism, naturalism, or Cārvāka/Lokāyata (800-500 BCE (BCE = Before Com m on Era; BC = Before Christ; For exam p le 400 BC is 400 BCE)); (ii) P from M (M is primitive; matter-in-itself is 'congealed ' m ind ): id ealism, m entalistic nond ual m onism, or A dvaita (788-820 AD (AD = Anno Dom ini, referring to the year of Christ's birth));(iii) P and M are ind epend ent but can interact w hen w e are alive (both P and M are equ ally primitive: interactive substance d u alism, Prakṛti and Puruṣa of Sāṃkhya (1000-600 BCE or even before Gītā (3000 BCE) 2 ; and (iv) P and M are tw o inseparable aspects of a state of an entity (fund amental entity, such as fermions and bosons, the 'p rim itive' qu antu m field / p otential 3 : d ual-aspect m onism, neutralism, Kashmir Shaivism (860-925 CE (CE = Com mon Era, recent term)) and V iśiṣṭādvaita (1017-1137 CE: m ind (cit) and m atter (acit) are ad jectives of Brahman).
The subjective 1p p -mental aspects of the states of entities w ere further investigated by Titchener (1867Titchener ( -1927 w ho proposed structuralism (influenced from Wu nd t's theory of volu ntarism: 'w ill' is superior to intellect and emotion and is the basic factor both in the universe and in hu man cond uct), w here the structure of experience w as stud ied by using subjective analytic introsp ection to d isclose the bu ild ing blocks of mental entities. H e proposed three types of mental elements constituting consciou s experience: Sensations (elem ents of p ercep tions: m ore than 44,000 d ifferent sensations), Im ages (elem ents o f id eas), and affections (elements of emotions). These elements could be broken d ow n into their resp ective attribu tes: qu ality, intensity, d u ration, clearness, and extent (Sheehy, 2003, p p .224 -226). The attribute 'qu ality' d ifferentiates sensations; the 'intensity' and the 'd uration' attributes refer to "the strength of an experience" and "the period an experience lasts", respectively; the 'clearness' attribute specifies "how m uch an experience stand s out from its back grou nd " and the 'extent' attribu te refers to "experience in term s of spatial d imension" (Sheehy, 2003, p .227). Both sensations and im ages contain all of these qu alities; how ever, affections lack in clearness and extensity/ extent; the id ea of associationism (the association of one mental state w ith its successor states for the operation of mental processes) entails how the mental elements combined and interacted w ith each other to form conscious experience; the law of contiguity (things that occur near each other in time or sp ace are read ily associated ) im plies that "the thou ght of something w ill tend to cause thou ghts of things that are usu ally experienced along w ith it".

4
The objective 3pp -p hysical aspects of the states of entities w ere further investigated by Boring (1886Boring ( -1968 w ho attempted to accomm od ate behaviorism by view ing sensations throu gh their 3pp -physical mechanisms from his monist p hysicalism perspective (Boring, & Gard ner, 1967); he focused on a p hysical brain rather than the abstract m ind . This view may seem in d irect opposition to mentalist and d u alist perspective of his mento r Titchener, but it is complementary in our view because 3pp -physcial and 1pp -mental aspects of a state of brain is inseparable in our extend ed d ual-aspect monism framew ork.
The fram ew ork (i)-m aterialism is the d om inant view in science, and (ii)-id ealism and (iii)interactive-substance-d ualism are the d om inant view s in religions; all (i)-(iii) have seriou s problem s. The framew ork (iv)-DAM has the least num ber of problem s; the proposed DAMv framew ork is the extension/ mod ification of DAM (DAM = Du al-Aspect Monism): As per (Vim al, 2011b), "The DAMv framew ork consists of three essential comp onents: (1) the D u al-Aspect Monism (Vim al, 2008), w here each entity has inseparable mental and physical aspects; (2) d u al-m od e (Vim al, 2010a); and (3) varying d egrees of the d ominance of aspects d epend ing on the levels of entities (Vimal, 2012)." As p er , "The mental aspect is from the subjective first person perspective and the physical aspect is from the objective third person perspective. This framework is optimal becau se it has the least number of problems (Vim al, 2010a)." Dual aspect monism in this interpretation would mean that there is certain kind of reality that enables to prod uce mental experience and its correspond ing p hysical level. Critique can question: Is there something w hich presents ad vantage of this view for empirical sciences? Yes, there is ind eed a great ad vantage on more realistic quantu m physics based extend ed d ual-aspect m onism (DAMv) metap hysics compared to the obsolete classical physics based m aterialism . The DAMv fram ew ork (Vim al, 2008(Vim al, , 2010a has the least nu m ber of problem s compared to all other types of metap hysics (such as m aterialism, id ealism, and interactive su bstance d u alism ). The p roblem s are d iscu ssed in (Vim al, 2010b). Even neuroscientists Koch (2012) and Tononi (2004) have now changed their metap hysical view from m aterialism to d u al-aspect m onism because this is closest to Fu nd amental Truth; this is sum marized in .
The d ominant metaphysics of science is m aterialism, which has problem s: As per (Vimal 2010b), "In [the id entity theory of] materialism, a specific experience (SE: such as redness) is identical with a specific state (such as the red ness-related state cau sed by long w avelength light) of a specific neural-netw ork (such as red -green V4/ V8/ VO-neural-net) (Levin, 2006;Levin, 2008;Loar, 1990Loar, , 1997Pap ineau , 2006). In [the em ergence or red u ction theory of m aterialism ...], qu alia/ su bjective exp eriences (su ch as redness) are assumed to mysteriou sly em erge or red u ce to ... relevant states of neu ral-nets ... The m ajor p roblem is Levine's explanatory gap (Levine, 1983): the gap betw een exp eriences and scientific d escriptions of those experiences (Vimal, 2008). In other w ord s, how can our experiences emerge (or arise) from non-experiential m atter such as the neural-netw orks of our brain or organismenvironm ent interactions? [...] Furtherm ore, m aterialism / em ergentism has 3 m ore assumptions (Skrbina, 2009): matter is the ultim ate reality, and m aterial reality is essentially objective and non-experiential. These assu mptions need justification." A specific SE is the realization of related potential SE. Potential SEs are superp osed in the mental aspect of each entity-state in the DAMv framew ork (Vim al, 2008(Vim al, , 2010a. A specific SE is realized by (i) satisfying the necessary ingred ients of consciousness (Vim al 2011a) elaborated later, and (ii) m atching and selection m echanism s (Vim al, 2010a): (a) matching/ interaction of stimulus-d epend ent feed forw ard signals and cognitive feed back signals and (b) then selecting a specific SE related to stimu lus from the virtual reservoir, w hich is the storage area for the potential SEs in superposed form in the mental asp ect of each entity-state (elaborated later). An entity could be anything from quantu m p article/ field to brain's neural-netw orks. A color stimulu s is a reflected light (from abou t 400 to 700 nm w avelength) and / or m ixed visible photons of various w avelengths and intensit ies. These photons are absorbed in your photoreceptors and processed by retinal, LGN, and cortical neurons of variou s visu al areas, specifically color -related V4/ V8/ VO-neural netw ork (N N ) elaborated below . A brain's N N -state has insep arable mental aspect (such as SE red ness) and physical aspect (such as color-related V4/ V8/ VO-N N and its activities).

CRITIQUES
13.1. Critique 1: The m anu scrip t is w ell articu lated and w ou ld m ake an excellent contribu tion to the literature on philosophy of the mind . There are tw o minor issues. First, you have not shown that subjective visu al experience m ust be exclud ed from materialism. Materialism is not simply the structure of the neural netw orks, but also the d ynamics d riven by the ionic comp osition and the electrical p atterns that can manifest from the neural structure. Therefore, experience can emerge from non -experiential m atter such as neural netw orks d ue to d ynam ic continu ity. Second , you have not inclu d ed selectionism (neu ral Darw inism ) as a process of subjective experience. Finally throughout the m anu script there are nu merou s statements and assertions w ithout supp orting evid ence. Therefore the m anuscript should be revised so that assertions or hypothesis are supp orted by the literature; otherw ise it shou ld be m ad e clear that su ch are not yet scientifically p roven.

Reply:
(1) Experiences cannot emerge from non -experiential m atter by d efinition. An entity-state m ust have d ual-aspect nature. The hypothesis of emergence is still mysteriou s but is ad d ressed to some extent in (Vim al, 2010a) and . The d ynam ics d riven by the ionic comp osition and the electrical p atterns that can manifest from the neural structure is d iscu ssed in (Vim al, 2010a). (2) The selectionism (neu ral Darw inism ) as a p rocess of subjective experience is d iscussed in (Vim al, 2010a) along w ith the m atching and selection of specific experience. (3) The assertions or hyp othesis are not sup ported by the literature are not yet scientifically p roven.

SUMMARY
Briefly sum m arized some important thoughts are show n below . x The hypercolu mn notion suggested by H ubel and Wiesel m ay be attractive, but to d ate, there are d isagreements about the existence of hypercolu m ns.
x During visu al perception and imagery, the high activity of cytochrome oxid ase (CO) is associated w ith high m itochond rial activity.
x The strict coupling betw een neuronal activity and oxid ative energy metabolism is the basis for the use of CO as an end ogenous metabolic marker for neurons.
x V1 contains local clu ster of neurons jointly sensitive to orientation and color, perhaps correspond ing to CO blobs. x The highest d ensity of neurons in neocortex (nu mber of neurons per d egree of visual angle) and the highest volu me of gray matter of the retino-geniculostriate pathw ay d evoted to represen ting the visu al field are found in V1.
x It is probable that the visu al attributes of color, form , and m otion are not neatly segregated by V1 into d ifferent stripe comp artments in V2.
x The CO blobs form nonlinear repeating fu nctional units in V1. x Feed -forw ard visu al inp u t from excited local circu its to V1 is necessary to phosp hene aw areness.
x Attributes of visible p hotons/ light, such as w avelength and intensity, are physics; but color and its attribu tes such as hue, saturation, and brightness are subjective exp eriences.
x Although vision science makes d ifference betw een achrom atic and chromatic vision, both are subjective experiences are prod uced by mixed visible color photon signals in the hu m an eye ranging from about 400 to 700 nm.
x Reentrant processing betw een h igher areas and early (V1) visu al cortex is necessary for consciou s and u nconsciou s visu al p ercep tion as w ell as for phosphene perception.
H ere w e argued that the visu al perception and rep resentation are essential based on perception and representation of colors (colors as external visible electrom agnetic p hoton signals). This representation is the most energetic allocation proced ure in the brain, w hich is logically achieved by highest d ensity neuronal V1 regions w ith m itochond rial-rich CO blobs. Of course, perceived and represented colors (as visible electrom agnetic photons) in V1 areas (and in CO blobs) are mod u lated by other sensory m od alities d uring multisensory integration and are interp reted by superior level processes that finally prod uce subjective visu al experiences.
It w as suggested that the functional u nit for p hosphene ind uction can be linked to sm all clu sters (3-4 blobs/ m m 2 ) of CO blobs in V1 and not to the hypercolu mns structures. Although vision research makes d ifference betw een achrom atic and chromatic vision, both are su bjective color experiences prod uced by m ixed visible (color) photon signals in the hum an eye ranging from about 400 to 700 nm. In ad d ition, w e presented some thou ghts related to the physics of visible photons/ light and its sub jective experiences.
During visual mod al com pletion or am od al comp letion the first step s that d etected external (color) photon signals are run from the retina via the LGN to V1, V2 and then signals conveyed to extrastriate and to higher level visual and association areas. Then, feed back signals (d epend ing on our backgrou nd visual know led ge originated from long term (visu al) mem ory and also on our ind ivid ual belief) mod ulate original d etected and represented object in retinotopic V1, w hich finally m akes mod ified perception, i. e. mod al comp letion or amod al completion. This process is also consistent w ith the reverse hierarchy theory of vision.
Becau se biolu m inescent biop hotons can continu ou sly send intrinsic signals to the V1 area that interprets these retinal biop hotons as if they originated in the external visual w orld , w e also raised that constantly prod uced biophotons from retinal lipid peroxid ation might also have functional role in early d evelop ment of retinogenicu late p athw ays as w ell as initial appearance top ographic organizations of V1 and CO blobs before birth, The link betw een structure (such as V4/ V8/ VO -N N ), function (such as d etection and d iscrim ination of color), and subjective experiences (such as red ness and greenness) w as explained best by the DAMv metaphysical framew ork because it has the least nu mber of problem s.

D ECLARATION OF IN TEREST
The authors report no conflicts of interest. The authors alone are resp onsible for the content.