

SOVIET STEEL — 1962

Achievements and problems encountered by the steel industry of the Soviet Union during the first half of 1962.

Translated by Walter Carroll

Metal—our strength, our wealth. The greater its flow the firmer the peace, the more machines and tools, industrial enterprises, and living homes, and the better the life of the people.

The Achievements

The metallurgists are going forward confidently. The results of carrying out the government laws for the first half of 1962 show that the foremost profession of heavy industry—ferrous metallurgy—is going up hill steadily; this is shown by the following figures:

	Production 1st half of 1962, million metric tons	Production 1st half 1962 compared to 1st half 1961, pct	Production of all of 1953, million metric tons
Pig Iron	27.1	108	27.4
Steel	37.6	108	38.1
Rolled Steel	29.1	107	29.4
Steel Pipe	3.3	112	3.0
Iron Ore	62.1	108	59.7
Coke, 6 per cent moisture	3.0	104	

Thus, the volume of production for the first half of 1962 compares favorably with that for all of 1953.

In the first half of 1962 the large blast furnaces at the Novotulsky and Novolipetsky plants went into operation leading the open hearths and electric furnaces into operation. The Tagangovsky works put in operation rugged mills for continuous welded pipe equipped with the newest facilities for modernization and automation. The Zhanovsky plant (Ilych) made the first turn of the largest completely mechanized and automated slabbing mill, and a group of new open-hearth furnaces started. At the Orsko-Khalilovsky combine, the large blooming mill began operating.

The problems

The metallurgists performed great work during the first half year, but all of the resources have not been exhausted by far. Several enterprises permitted violations of the government discipline—non-fulfillment of the plans—for example, the Cherepovetsky (Ilych) Novolipetsky, Chelyabinsky, and Makiesky plants, the Nzerbaigansky tube mill, the Orsko-Khalilovsky, and Nizhne-Tagilsky combines. It is impossible to tolerate these.

Analyses of the causes of the non-fulfillment of the plans show that the individual designers misjudged the starting times of the new objectives and

thus caused the deficiencies. Some ferrous metallurgical plants still violate the established technology of production; their leaders do not adopt opportune measures to strengthen their production and technological discipline. There is insufficient scheduling of plant operations and proper attention is not given to the improvement of the organization and production work. Preparations for the rebuilding of blast furnaces, open hearths, coke ovens, bar and tube mills, and beneficiation equipment were inadequate and poorly timed. The procedures for preventative maintenance are not observed according to the approved chart. Serious deficiencies in the maintenance of equipment led to breakdowns and lost time. Instances of shut-down and break-downs occur often in the lines of power industries. The Magnitogorsky, Nizhne-Tagilsky, Kuznetsky, Orsko-Khalilovsky metallurgical combines, the Cherepovetsky, Chelyabinsky, Zaporozhestal, and other metallurgical plants had deficiencies in the provision of heat, gas, oxygen, and industrial water.

With the gross deficiencies in the operation of individual metallurgical enterprises there appeared violations of the planned market discipline. Thus, in the first half of 1962 numerous conflicts occurred because of the delivery of metal products by the Ukraine Republic's metallurgical plants to the consumers of its own republic at the expense of the government plans for the delivery to the other Soviet republics and for all-union requirements. In the first half of 1962 more than 200,000 metric tons of mill products and 9000 metric tons of steel tubes in excess of the planned orders were shipped by the Ukraine plants to consumers of their own republic. At the same time, and in spite of the overfulfillment of the plans, the production was deficient for the orders of the Soviet republics and the all-union requirements by almost 185,000 metric tons of mill products and more than 26,000 metric tons of steel tubes. This harmful practice, unfortunately, reaches a significant figure. It disorganizes the operations of those enterprises not receiving the metals according to the planned orders and builds up serious harm to the national economy of the country. This practice must be stopped positively, and the indebtedness of the factory contractors terminated in short order.

But the production of ferrous metals is being increased at a rate much higher than that specified in the seven year plan. During the first three and one half years of the seven year plan more production was achieved than was projected for this period.

Surpassing the assignments of the seven year plan, achieved through the self-denial of the workers and supervisors of Soviet metallurgy, conclusively shows that the seven year plan for ferrous metallurgy will be surpassed.

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