ERRATA

The following endnotes were omitted inadvertently from William T. Tow's article, "U.S.-Japan Military Technology Transfers: Collaboration or Conflict?" which appeared in volume 2, number 4. We regret the error.

46. Interview with NHK TV Tokyo and reprinted in British Broadcasting Corporation, *Summary of World Broadcasts* FE/7267/C/1, February 25, 1983, p. A-3.
47. "Nakasone Affirms Arms Export Ban, Diet Informed," *JT*, March 9, 1983, p. 1. Background on opinion polls in Japan indicating a drop in Nakasone's political support attributable to the military technology transfer issue is presented by Stokes, "Dip in Nakasone Backing Tied to Arms Stand," *The New York Times*, February 20, 1983, p. 21.
48. "U.S. Survey Mission Will Come to Japan This Autumn; Aiming to Materialize Military Technology Exchange," *Tokyo Shimbun*, July 9, 1983, p. 1 as reprinted in *DSJP* July 15, 1983, p. 9.
49. "Japan, U.S. Officials to Meet on Hi-Tech," *JT*, August 17, 1983, p. 1; "U.S. Officials Propose Less Hi-Tech Red Tape," *JT*, August 18, 1983, p. 1; and "U.S. Still Prefers Simplifying Tech Transfers: Official," *JT*, August 19, 1983, p. 4.
50. "Japan-U.S. High Tech Working Group Agrees on Abolition of Tariff on IC's; Heading Toward Demanding Reduction by EC Too," *Tokyo Shimbun*, September 9, 1983, p. 3 as reprinted in *DSJP*, September 13, 1983, p. 16.
51. "U.S. Already Promotes 'Industrial Policies', Department of Defense Fosters NC Machine Tool Industry, etc.," *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, and "Japan-U.S. Industrial Policy Joint Committee; To Be Wound Up, for Time Being, at Tokyo Conference This Autumn 'Understanding Has Been Promoted'; To Put An End Due to Arguments Running Along Convergent Lines," *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, August 13, 1983, p. 3 as reprinted in *DSJP*, August 17, 1983, p. 6.
52. The Commerce Department, DOD, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are all directing efforts toward Japanese and European enterprises to tighten up on their business dealings with the Soviet Union and its allies according to "Flow of High Tech to East Worries U.S.," *Mainichi Daily News*, November 23, 1983, p. 1. Raymond S. Mathieson has described Japan's compromise of militarily-related technology to the USSR as "severe," Mathieson, *Japan's Role in Soviet Economic Growth* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), p. 233.
53. For background, see Leslie Maitland Werner, "West Germany Seizes U.S. Computer Ready for Shipment to Soviet Union," *IHT*, November 16, 1983, p. 1; Robert Gillette, "Mistake by a Tass Computer Reveals Soviet Hunger for High Technology," *IHT*, November 18, 1983, p. 5; and Robert C. Toth, "Soviet Computer Piracy May Have Military Aims," *IHT*, December 19, 1983, p. 2.
54. Walter Guzzardi, Jr., "Cutting Russia's Harvest of U.S. Technology," *Fortune*, 107, No. 11 May 30, 1983, p. 108; and David Buchan, "Japan to Control Robot Exports to USSR," *FT*, September 28, 1983, p. 7.
55. The Stratton Act is analyzed by "Ban on Sales of Technology Won't Affect Defense Ties," *AEN*, January 22, 1982, p. 1; and in conjunction with other U.S. protectionist moves within and outside Congress by Richard Nation, "Call for a Curtain," *FEER*, 117 No. 37 (September 10, 1983), pp. 64-65 and "Threat of the Rising Sun," *ibid.*, p. 66.
56. As quoted by Allen S. Whiting in *Siberian Development and East Asia* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1981), p. 153.
57. Stephen Sternheimer, *East-West Technology Transfer: Japan and the Communist Bloc*, Washington Paper #76 (London/Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1980), p. 69.
58. An account of Nakasone's address is by Jurek Martin, "Nakasone Calls for Stable Ties With Moscow," *FT*, September 12, 1983, p. 2.

59. An excellent assessment of these functions and their evolution is found in Theodore J. Eckert's *The Transfer of U.S. Technology to Other Countries: An Analysis of Export Control Policy and Some Recommendations* Research Monograph #47 (Princeton, New Jersey: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, June 1981); especially pp. 16–21.
60. Stephen Woolcock, *Western Policies on East-West Trade*, Chatham House Paper #15 (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), pp. 10–11.
61. As illustrated by Sternheimer, *op. cit.*, Chapter II, especially p. 48.
62. For a quasi-official Japanese explanation of its universalist trading rationales' compatibility with its long-range security objectives, see The Comprehensive National Security Study Group, *Report on Comprehensive National Security* (English text—Unpublished version), July 1980. J.W.M. Chapman notes that a "withholding of vital supplies of goods, materials, and services to Japanese enterprises at home or abroad . . ." may constitute a situation where " . . . those who at any given time appear in the guise of friends may be capable of damaging Japanese interests as much, if in different ways, than those who appear in the guise of enemies." Comprehensive national security includes major threats to Japanese economic livelihood and standard of living. As such, U.S. trade sanctions or protectionist legislation has a sharp impact on Japanese security perceptions. Chapman, "Dependence," in Chapman, R. Drifte, and I.T.M. Gow, *Japan's Quest For Comprehensive Security* (London: Francis Pinter, 1983), p. 149. For a review of rising Japanese-Chinese economic/strategic relations, see William T. Tow, "Sino-Japanese Security Cooperation: Evolution and Prospects," *Pacific Affairs* 56, No. 1 (Spring 1983), pp. 51–83.
63. This lack of COCOM consensus is described particularly well by Woolcock, *op. cit.*, pp. 77–78.
64. "Japan Sells USSR Goods U.S. Refuses; Sen. Garn," *JT*, March 17, 1983, p. 6.
65. "Baldrige Sees Wider Trade Rift," *IHT*, May 21–22, 1983, p. 11.
66. Stewart Fleming, "State Department Trade Chief Quits in Row Over COCOM," *FT*, September 27, 1983, p. 4.
67. As noted by Jill Hills, the issues of defense technology and trade are "inextricably linked" in Japan and, despite widespread domestic opposition, the Japanese government may come under increased pressure from domestic manufacturers to export weapons in order to pay for future raw materials—especially in the context of its Southeast Asian markets. American pressures on Japan's defense production base can, without careful consultation and policy planning, exacerbate problems in this regard. Hills, "Foreign Policy and Technology: The Japan-U.S., Japan-Britain, and Japan EEC Technology Agreements," *Political Studies* XXXI, (June 1983), p. 219.
68. See Kinhide Mushakoji, "Japan: A Case for Revising the Old Link to America," *IHT*, December 20, 1983, p. 4.