

Leadership Transition and Chinese Foreign Policy

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This essay examines the nature of China's leadership transition, contending perspectives on Chinese foreign policy, and new foreign policy orientation. By examining leadership transition and new policy development, this essay demonstrates change and continuity in Chinese foreign policy. For analyzing new policy orientation, the following points require special attention. First, the fundamental goal of Chinese foreign policy is to create a peaceful environment for socioeconomic development. Second, "do not seek enemy" has become an essential part of China's foreign policy. Third, pragmatism and professionalism are becoming key features of Beijing's diplomacy. Finally, China's new leaders are facing enormous domestic and international challenges. They must learn to balance domestic and international concerns in order to achieve peace and development.

INTRODUCTION

Leadership transition often leads to new foreign policy orientation. Following Deng Xiaoping's emergence as the top leader of China in 1978, Chinese foreign policy experienced a series of fundamental changes in principle and substance. The rise of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 with his "new political thinking" led to radical restructuring of Soviet foreign policy and the end of the Cold War. When George W. Bush became the President of the United States in 2001, neo-realism and unilateralism quickly replaced Bill Clinton's neo-liberalism and multilateralism. Political scientist Robert Putnam examined close links between domestic politics and foreign relations.¹ In almost all the countries regardless of their regime types, foreign policies tend to be affected by changeover of the national leadership.

Social scientists are puzzled by the intriguing yet critical links between leadership transition and foreign policy restructuring.² There is no definitive theory about under what conditions leadership transition will lead to fundamental change in foreign policy. It is reasonable to argue that a smooth power transition may result in more continuity than change in foreign policy. Over the long run, however, new leaders are mostly likely to change with times and make their marks on foreign policy. This article is designed to deepen our understanding of the connections between leadership transition and foreign policy change.

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LEADERSHIP TRANSITION IN 2002-2003

In 2002-2003, China experienced a significant yet incomplete transition of power from the third generation of leaders to the fourth generation.³ The rise of a new generation of leaders is the most significant development of the 16th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) National Congress held in November 2002 and the 10th National People's Congress (NPC) held in March 2003. In a significant changeover of leadership, the delegates to CCP congress elected 198 members and 158 alternate members to the new CCP Central Committee. The 356-member new CCP Central Committee features 180 new faces, with an average age of 55.4 years, almost five years younger than their predecessors when elected in 1997 at the 15th CCP congress. The new leaders are younger, better educated, and more pragmatic and open-minded.

In the First Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee, Hu Jintao was elected as General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee. In fact, among the seven standing committee members of the Politburo of the 15th CCP Central Committee, only the youngest member Hu Jintao remains in the new nine member standing committee of the 16th CCP Central Committee. His six senior colleagues including former General Secretary Jiang Zemin, NPC Chairman Li Peng and Premier Zhu Rongji all retired from CCP Central Committee. Eight new members – Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Wu Guangzheng, Li Changchun and Luo Gan – were elected onto the Politburo Standing Committee.

The Politburo Standing Committee is the most important decision making body in China. It makes important decisions regarding both domestic affairs and foreign policy. Hu, Wu Bangguo, Huang, and Wu Guanzheng were all trained as engineers in the prestigious Tsinghua University. Wen, Jia, Zeng, Li, and Luo were also all technocrats. In terms of national leaders' educational background, China today has the most outstanding technocracy in the world.⁴

At the 10th National People's Congress meeting in March 2003, Hu Jintao was elected as the President of China. Zeng Qinghong was elected as the Vice President. Wu Bangguo was elected as the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC. Wen Jiabao was nominated by Hu and elected by the NPC as the new Premier. The line-up of China's new State Council nominated by Premier Wen sailed through the first session of the 10th National People's Congress, with Huang Ju, Wu Yi, Zeng Peiyan and Hui Liangyu taking up the posts as vice-premiers, Zhou Yongkang, Cao Gangchuan, Tang Jiaxuan, Hua Jianmin and Chen Zhili as state councilors. Li Zhaoxing became the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Cao Gangchuan was appointed the Minister of National Defense. The new cabinet members are well educated and pragmatic. New Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing is a professional diplomat who has rich experience including serving as Chinese ambassador to the United Nations and the United States.

One of the most significant factors in the leadership transition is that the 77 years old Jiang Zemin was re-elected the Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission (CMC) in November 2002. Jiang's position as the head of the Chinese military was re-confirmed at the National People's Congress in March 2003.⁵ Against some speculation that Jiang might step down from his military position soon, it appears that Jiang intends to serve the whole five-year term of CMC Chairmanship. President Hu is 60 years old and continues to serve as the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. It is uncertain whether power

transition in the military will take place in the foreseeable future. As the Chairman of the CCP and State Central Military Commissions (the CCP and State Central Military Commissions are consisted of the same group of people), Jiang will continue to play a significant role in Chinese politics in general and in defense and foreign policy in particular. Due to Jiang's continued prominence in the leadership, the leadership transition is incomplete. It is most likely that Jiang will work hard to ensure some degree of continuity in foreign policy between his and Hu's leadership.⁶

The second important development of the 16th CCP National Congress was the amendment of the Party constitution. The amended Party constitution adopted the theory of "three represents." This theory states that the CCP must always represent the development trend of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people. Expanding the Party's previously assumed role as "vanguard of the working class," the amended constitution states that the Party is "also the vanguard of the whole of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation." China's socioeconomic structure has pluralized and more and more people work in the non-State sector.⁷

The party wants to improve the way of leadership to extend its authority to different areas of the society. In particular, private business has mushroomed and boomed. By the end of 2001, the number of private enterprises reached 2.02 million, involving 270 million employees.⁸ Redefinition of the Party's representation heralds the welcoming of people from beyond the previously-defined working class, including private entrepreneurs. This fits well the CCP's aim to rally all favorable factors, as well as its new pledge to "advance with the times." According to Hu Jintao, the essence of "three represents" is that the Party should dedicate itself to the interests of the public and govern for the benefit of the people. It is clear that the CCP will continue to evolve in the direction of a party of the people instead of a party for one class.

The third significant development of the 16th CCP Congress is the new agenda for economic development. The main tasks of China's economic development and reform in the next 20 years are to improve the market economy, accelerate modernization, maintain a sustained development of the national economy and steadily uplift the people's living standards. The Party put forward an ambitious goal to quadruple the nation's 2000 gross domestic product and build an all-inclusive better-off society by 2020. Hu Jintao said on November 15, 2002: "The whole Party and people from all ethnic groups will unite more closely and concentrate on construction and development so as to continue pushing forward China's reform, opening-up, and modernization drive."⁹

The fourth significant development of the Party congress is political reform and the rule of law. High on the list of priorities are undertakings such as Party building and political reforms. After being in power for more than half century, the CCP is faced with the trials of serious problems that have troubled many other veteran ruling parties: divorce from the people; the nurturing of vested interests; abuse of power; and loss of vitality. Widespread corruption seriously threatens the legitimacy of the Party. The CCP has recently been alarmed at many long-standing ruling parties in the world losing power. In order to consolidate its position as a ruling party, the CCP must conduct meaningful political reform and abide by the principle of the rule of law. Recent discussions and debate

surrounding “political civilization” and the constitution amendment might lead to new political and legal reforms.

One of the first major acts of General Secretary Hu is to emphasize the importance of the current Chinese Constitution, which has been in practice since 1982. All individuals and organizations including the CCP must act within the legal framework of the constitution. No one is above the law. The rule of law and democratic elections should provide new legitimacy to China’s leadership in the coming years. When he was elected as President of China in March 2003, Hu also pledged that he would faithfully perform the powers and functions endowed by the Constitution, scrupulously discharge his duties, work hard and industriously and serve the country and the people with utmost sincerity.

The fifth significant development is the reemphasis on pursuing the independent foreign policy of peace. Jiang emphasized this point in his political report: “No matter how the international situation changes, we will, as always, pursue the independent foreign policy of peace. The purpose of China's foreign policy is to maintain world peace and promote common development.”¹⁰

In the views of Chinese leaders today, there are three major historical tasks for China in the 21st century: to propel the modernization drive; to achieve national reunification; and to safeguard world peace and promote common development. The full significance of the leadership changeover on Chinese political, socioeconomic and diplomatic development deserves close examination and critical analysis. Before we examine new foreign policy orientation, it is important to review key theoretical perspectives on Chinese foreign policy. Next section will analyze competing theoretical perspectives.

CONTENDING PERSPECTIVES ON CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

In order to understand the changing nature of Chinese foreign policy, we should examine contending views in studying Chinese foreign policy.¹¹ A coherent and useful theory of Chinese foreign policy must be based on an integration of particulars with regularities in a prioritized fashion, and that particulars are primarily constrained by regularities.¹² It is important to examine the linkages between domestic politics and foreign policy.

The Chinese leaders attach great importance to diplomacy. A commentary by the official Xinhua New Agency points out: “Diplomacy influences the rise or fall of a nation. It is a main battlefield for safeguarding state sovereignty.”¹³ In conjunction with rapid economic growth and profound social transformation, China’s foreign policy is experiencing significant transition.

As China assumes greater prominence in world affairs, the question of how its government will approach key issues in international politics becomes increasingly critical. Thomas Kane identified several fundamental principles that guide Beijing’s policy. These principles are a robust approach to sovereignty, a determination to strengthen the ruling faction, and a continuing commitment to ideological distinctiveness.¹⁴

Some analysts claim that the guiding principle for Chinese foreign policy is Chinese national interest. Yong Deng points out that the pursuit of national interests is the legitimate goal of any state’s foreign policy. The conception of national interests lies at the core of the predominant “paradigm” governing the state’s foreign policy. Deng argues that the Chinese conception of national interests should not be considered in terms of two mutually exclusive

categories – *realpolitik* thinking and liberal values – but rather is best understood in terms of a spectrum. On the one hand, a *realpolitik* perspective will prevail as long as China's international identity is defined in terms of a nationalistic view of modern Chinese history, in which China was brutally victimized in a hostile and threatening world. On the other hand, it is possible that both China's national identity and its interests are open for contestation and redefinition.¹⁵

Thomas J. Christensen argues that Chinese analysts think about China's security like Western scholars of *realpolitik* such as Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger. Similarly, Alastair Iain Johnston contends that *realpolitik* thinking in China may have its roots in the dynastic era.¹⁶ Chinese elites' current *realpolitik* tendencies are infinitely preferable to the messianic versions of Chinese nationalism that might come to the fore if the United States treats Beijing as an enemy.¹⁷

It is interesting to examine patterns and dynamics of China's international strategic behavior. In the Maoist era, China formed an alliance with the Soviet Union in the 1950s, and engaged in a "pseudo-alliance" with the United States in the 1970s. In the era of Deng Xiaoping, China adopted a foreign policy of independence and peace. "Partnership" is a new concept in Chinese diplomacy in the post-Cold War era. China's foreign policy in the Deng era was mainly aimed at serving the national goal of modernization.¹⁸

According to Wu Xinbo, Beijing's foreign policy behavior is constantly tested by a set of conflicting variables. China views itself as a major power and wants to play a role accordingly in the world arena, while it always lacks an adequate material basis to do so. The open-door policy requires China to be fully integrated into international society, while strong concern over sovereignty makes it difficult for Beijing to embrace some of the mainstream values. These variables will continue to constrain China's foreign policy behavior while their influence will decline as a result of rapid change with China.¹⁹

Since the early 1990s, Chinese leaders have strongly endorsed China's involvement in the economic globalization process while pointing out its potential drawbacks. However, this mainstream consensus has not ended the vociferous and emotional debate in China on globalization. The opponents of globalization insist that China should opt out or drastically slow the pace of her integration into the globalization process and return to socialist values and institutions. The new leadership is committed to deepening China's participation in the globalization process. If China fails in the face of globalization, it will experience economic decline and social turbulence, which will have negative impact on China's relations with the rest of the world.²⁰ The last time when China was weak and disunited – in the era of warlordism and revolution in the first half of the twentieth century – it was a disaster, not only for China, but also for international peace and stability.²¹ Thus, a weaker China might pose more serious problems for the global community than a stronger China.

The challenge presented by a rising China is both a theoretical and policy issue. Among the various components of Chinese national identity, the one that has risen to the forefront in the 1990s is great power identity in a global context. A great power's identity focuses on the country's past, present, and future in international relations, concentrating on its capacity to project power in comparison to other countries with their own ambitions. Chinese leaders and analysts are often fixated on the balance of powers in various configurations.²²

According to Robert Ross, what is most striking about Chinese foreign policy is its effort to consolidate regional trends and promote stability. In its policies toward neighboring countries, China has emphasized cooperative measures to consolidate existing relationships rather than forceful measures to promote new patterns of relationships. China is a revisionist power, but for the foreseeable future it will seek to maintain the status quo – and so should the United States.²³

China's effort to build strong economic ties with other countries has significantly contributed to the dramatic growth of Chinese economy. The rise of China will create a huge market that will eventually make substantial contributions to scientific progress. During the process of economic globalization, the rise of China will stimulate world economic growth. China will increasingly play an important role in global affairs as China's modernization has a major impact on the world.²⁴ China seeks to establish extensive and intensive linkages with states that have overlapping, competing and common interests.²⁵

Challenging the conventional wisdom on the rise of China, Joseph Nye points out that the "rise of China" is a misnomer: "re-emergence" is more accurate. On the strength of its size and history, China has long been a major power in the Asia-Pacific region. Technologically and economically, China was a world leader (although without a global reach) from 500 to 1500; only in the last 500 years has the West overtaken it. Since 1978, China has achieved extraordinary rapid economic growth.²⁶ Nye's view coincides with Beijing leaders' call for a revival of Chinese nation and Chinese civilization.

In fact, developing Chinese economy and reviving the Chinese nation are considered as top priority by the current leadership in China. In next section we will analyze transitional Chinese foreign policy.

FOREIGN POLICY AND KEY RELATIONS IN TRANSITION

Since 1978, reform and opening to the outside world have been the driving force for Chinese foreign policy. The PRC has made great strides to join the modern world in the two decades since beginning the process of reform and opening-up in 1978. But China is still in the middle of a vast transformation that has a long way to go. Despite the enormous progress that has been registered, many deep-seated problems remain.²⁷ The 16th CCP National Congress reaffirmed economic development as the central task for China. If this growth-oriented policy continues to dominate China's political and economic agenda, it is likely that the independent foreign policy of peace will be maintained. Nevertheless, deepening of China's reform and changing international context will lead to changes in Chinese foreign policy. Thus, there are continuity and change in Chinese foreign policy.

According to Quansheng Zhao, three key words, *modernization*, *nationalism*, and *regionalism*, can be used to help us better understand the direction of Chinese foreign policy. Modernization refers to China's concentration on economic growth. Nationalism has emerged as a leading ideological current behind China's drive toward modernization and one of the primary forces behind Chinese foreign policy. Regionalism emphasizes that China has remained a regional power, concentrating its political, economic, and military activities primarily in the Asia-Pacific region, despite its global aspirations. The Beijing leadership's interpretation of the internal condition and external environment will continue to play an important role in Chinese foreign policy.²⁸

Modernization is a key in understanding Chinese foreign policy. Opening to the outside world has been a key component of modernization strategy since 1978. Few nations have benefited from participation in international trade as much as China has, or in such a brief period of time. In 1978, at the beginning of the reform era, China had about \$20 billion of foreign trade; in 2002 that figure had exceeded \$600 billion, a 30-fold increase. Foreign direct investment to China reached \$53 billion in 2002 – nearly one tenth of the world total.²⁹

The new leadership will have to develop foreign policies and strategies to cope with a changing international security environment. The new leadership will have to decide what type of role China will choose to play in the international community of nations. Will China step forward as a leader in international affairs in a manner that comports with the status and respect it demands as a nation of consequence, or will it sit on the sidelines, when convenient, and merely claim to be the world's largest developing nation?³⁰ How will China manage its relations with the United States, Russia, Japan, and other nations? Different answers to these questions will affect China's future and its role in the world.

President Hu and Premier Wen announced that they would continue to pursue an independent and peaceful foreign policy. The basic objectives of this policy are to safeguard the independence and sovereignty of the country, strive to create a long-standing and favorable international environment for China's reform, opening to the outside world and modernization drive, safeguard world peace and promote common development. The following major points reflect continuity in Chinese foreign policy:

First, Beijing leaders will decide on their approaches and policies regarding international issues independently. In international affairs, China shall decide its own stand according to its national interests and shall not yield to pressure from any big countries. Second, China is willing to establish and develop good relations with all countries on the basis of the following five principles: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Third, China actively develops friendly relations with its surrounding countries, safeguards the peace and stability of the region, and promotes economic cooperation at the regional level. Fourth, China opens to developed countries as well as to developing countries. On the basis of equality and mutual benefit, China actively conducts extensive international cooperation to promote common development. China is willing to make unremitting efforts for world peace and development, and the establishment of a new peaceful, stable, fair and reasonable international political and economic order.³¹

Building a new international political and economic order is an ambitious goal. In reality, Chinese leaders know that they have limited ability in shaping a new international system. In addition to being a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China now is a full member of the WTO and many other international institutions. As an "insider" rather than an outsider, China has a growing stake in the current international system. Beijing's leaders believe that China can gain more by working inside the international system. In this sense, China can be better understood as a "status quo power" rather than a revolutionary power in the global system.³²

Chinese analysts see the United States as a global power in historical, economic, security, and political dimensions. Beijing's attitude towards Washington has its origins in

Chinese domestic goals and needs. Despite the negative sentiments towards the US in recent years, however, the Chinese leadership has a realistic understanding of the United States in international affairs and wants to improve relations with Washington.³³ From Deng Xiaoping on, all top Chinese leaders have been strongly in favor of building a healthy Sino-American relationship.

The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 and the U.S.-led war against terrorism have a great impact on Chinese foreign policy. According to David Shambaugh, China's support for the American war on Al Qaeda and global terrorism has contributed to new stability in the relations, but improvement in bilateral ties was noticeable before September 11. The United States and China share a host of interests and concerns that bind the two nations. With nearly \$120 billion in two-way annual trade and substantial direct investment, each is of enormous economic importance to the other. If wisely managed by both sides – and if the key sensitivities of each are respected rather than provoked – the new stability in Sino-American relations may endure.³⁴

Upon learning of the attacks on the US in September 2001, Beijing immediately expressed condolences and general support to the U.S. government. President Jiang told President Bush that China opposes all manner of terrorist violence. China has urged the U.S. to conduct antiterrorism campaign through the United Nations. Support for the war on terrorism is consistent with key goals of the Chinese leadership. China has its own terrorism problem. Combating terrorism and Islamic extremism are among the main purposes of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization.³⁵ The US Department of State officially defined the East Turkistan Islamic Movement as a terrorist organization. This was a significant step that helped to consolidate U.S.-Chinese joint efforts in fight against terrorism.

In October 2002, President Jiang and President Bush had their third meeting within a year at Bush's Texas ranch. Bush made it clear that the United States opposes Taiwan independence. The 16th CCP National Congress was postponed to November from its normal September schedule. Part of the reason was to make room for the Jiang-Bush summit. This was an indicator of the great value the Chinese leader attaches to a strong U.S.-China relationship.

The new leaders in Beijing see Sino-US relations as a vital component of Chinese foreign relations. Vice President Hu Jintao's visit to the US in April 2002 was a success. President Bush and other leaders who met with Hu found him to be a dynamic and pragmatic leader. Although Beijing had reservations about the US war against Iraq, it did not lead opposition against the war. President Hu and President Bush met in Evian, France on June 1, 2003. They agreed to stay in touch and cooperate for the peaceful resolution of the nuclear program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) through dialogue. China backs the non-nuclearization of the peninsula but also stressed the security concerns of the DPRK should be addressed.

At the Evian meeting, Hu and Bush invited each other to visit their respective countries. Hu urged the United States to honor its commitment to the one-China policy, handle the Taiwan question properly and refrain from sending wrong signals to Taiwan separatist forces. Bush told Hu that his administration would continue its one-China policy, follow the three US-China joint communiqués and oppose "Taiwan independence." This policy has not changed and will not change in the future.³⁶ The Taiwan question has long been the most sensitive and important question in Sino-US relations. Premier Wen will visit

the US in late 2003.

China has built a strategic partnership with Russia. From the early 1960s to the early 1980s, China and Russia experienced two decades of rancorous verbal and sometimes lethal dispute. The new strategic partnership reflects a genuine desire on both sides to put the past behind them and forge a more friendly and mutually profitable relationship. The strategic partnership is not yet a clearly conceived design for a coordinated foreign policy toward shared international objectives. It represents, rather, a stable and meaningful commitment to bilateral aid and support. Neither partner has, nor do they share, either an ideology or a coherent international vision beyond their endorsement of multipolarity.³⁷

In July 2001, Jiang and Putin signed the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. The treaty has been hailed by China and Russia as creating a new type of non-alliance, non-confrontational and not targeting any third country relationship. Bilateral relations between China and Russia experienced a remarkable upsurge in the past decade, particularly with a relationship of strategic partnership of cooperation. During their meeting in December 2002, Putin and Hu agreed to further promote ties to benefit the fundamental interests of the two peoples, democracy in international relations as well as the regional and world peace.

On May 26, 2003, Hu left Beijing to visit Russia. Hu said choosing Russia as the first country he visited following his election as president demonstrated how much importance China attaches to its ties with Russia. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit was convened in Moscow on May 29, 2003. The SCO was formed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in June 2001. A key goal of the organization is to fight against terrorism, ethnic separatism, extreme nationalism, and transnational crimes including as drug trafficking.

According to Hu, Russia and China support each other when it comes to vital issues dealing with state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and adhere to the principle that they should respect each other's sovereignty and never be at enmity with each other. The two countries had succeeded in raising the volume of bilateral commercial operations from 6.5 billion dollars in the 1990s to \$12 billion in 2002. Hu also stressed that China strongly condemned the recent terrorist attacks in Chechnya. In return, Russia has repeatedly stated that it supports China's position on the issue of Taiwan.

China and India have a combined population that accounts for one-third of that of the world, and their shared border runs for 2,000 kilometers. The relationship between the two countries has experienced ups and downs. Though Sino-Indian relations turned sour briefly due to New Delhi's nuclear tests in May 1998, mutual understanding was enhanced and a mechanism for dialogue on security was set up in 1999. President Hu told Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee that the aim of Chinese foreign policy is to maintain world peace and promote common development.³⁸ On June 23, 2003, China and India signed a declaration that will lay down goals and guidelines for the two countries' relations and provide a blueprint for cooperation. In the declaration, the Indian government has for the first time recognized explicitly the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of China's territory. Prime Minister Vajpayee called for closer cooperation between the two countries, stressing "combined strength" and "complementarity" of the India-China partnership. "We should

focus on the simple truth that there is no objective reason for discord between us, and neither of us is a threat to the other.”³⁹

Beijing has adopted a more flexible policy towards the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in recent years. Unity of the ASEAN members will strengthen their bargaining position versus Beijing. However, differences among ASEAN members have aroused skepticism abroad over the organization as an effective regime to address general security problems in East Asia.⁴⁰ Since signing a landmark framework agreement with the ASEAN in 2002, China has started the process of establishing a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area.

On June 28, 2003, China's top legislature unanimously passed the State Council's motion of joining the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia and its two amending protocols. The approval will make China the first to join the treaty among all of the major countries outside of Southeast Asian and it will also further co-operative relations between China and the ASEAN member countries.⁴¹ China is actively building a comprehensive cooperative relationship with other countries.⁴²

NEW FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATION

The above analysis indicates that there are elements of continuity and change in Chinese foreign policy. In the foreseeable future, a new foreign policy orientation is likely to emerge as China continues its domestic reforms and adjusts its role in a changing world. For the last quarter century, the main task of China's foreign policy has been creating a peaceful international environment in order to promote economic development. That policy has served China's national interest well and should be continued as long as possible. However, China's foreign policy will experience new changes due to the following factors.

First, the post-Cold War international environment has been changing rapidly and thus requires all countries to adjust their foreign policy. China has been working to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world. As the nature of the post-Cold War system continues to change, China must adjust its policy in order to meet new challenges in an evolving international system.

Second, China's reform and opening have achieved great success and are facing new challenges. The transition to a market economy has led to unprecedented rapid growth in China and increased level of economic interdependence between China and the outside world. After more than a decade of serious efforts, China finally entered the World Trade Organization in 2001. As a result, China has increased rights and obligation in the global economic system. China's foreign policy must adapt to the opportunity and risks coming with globalization.

Third, September 11 terrorist attack on the United States and the subsequent U.S.-led war against terrorism have a profound impact on the new international system. China has been a partner in the international fight against terrorism. At the same time, however, Chinese leaders have expressed reservation about the war against Iraq because they are deeply concerned about the Bush doctrine of preemptive strike. Chinese foreign policymakers are confronting hard choices regarding the war against terrorism. How does China respond to this challenge will influence its future foreign policy.

Fourth, leadership change will have an impact on foreign policy formulation and implementation. The 16th CCP National Congress held in November 2002 was a milestone

in Chinese politics and foreign policy. The congress achieved a significant transition of power from the “third generation” to a new generation of leaders.

One way to discover the emerging new foreign policy orientation is to examine the policy statements and actions of the new leaders. From May 26 to June 5, President Hu Jintao paid visits to Russia, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia, and attended the Moscow summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the ceremony marking the foundation tri-centenary of the Russian city of St Petersburg and the South-North leaders’ informal dialogue meeting in Evian, France. One of the highlights of Hu’s Euro-Asia trip was his participation in the South-North leaders’ informal dialogue meeting on June 1 in the French resort of Evian.⁴³ It is a sign of China’s readiness to take a more active part in world affairs. While the world economy has been sliding, China has kept an encouraging growth momentum and improved its position within the world economy. For the first time, the Chinese leader attended a meeting with the Group of Eight (G8). It provides China one more channel for communication and contact with G8.

In his speech at informal leaders’ meeting between North and South held in Evian on June 1, 2003, Hu said countries should tap their potential for economic development and enhance the adjustment of macroeconomic policies for maintaining normal trade order. He stressed the importance of preserving diversity in the world, suggesting that exchanges and competition of various civilizations and development models will inject new vigor into the development of world economy. He also raised the difficulties of developing countries in making full use of the opportunities brought by globalization and asked developed countries to open up their markets, remove trade tariffs and carry out their commitments in increasing funds and technical assistance and reducing debts.⁴⁴

China’s new leadership is confronting multiple challenges. One of the toughest challenges for the new leadership is the nuclear crisis in Korean Peninsula. The re-surfacing of the nuclear issue of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was a reminder that the Korean Peninsula remains one of the world’s most capricious flashpoints. In October 2002, Washington exposed, and Pyongyang acknowledged, the existence of the north’s nuclear weapons program. China, South Korea, Russia and Japan have all appealed for a peaceful solution, urging the parties to come back to the negotiating table. While Washington prefers a multilateral talk on the North Korean nuclear issue, Pyongyang for a long time insisted on holding a direct talk with the United States. Specifically, the North Korean government demands for a non-aggression pact with the US and economic assistance.

Unless this nuclear crisis is resolved, peace on the Korean Peninsula will remain fragile. Both Beijing and Washington are deeply concerned of the frightening consequences of North Korea going nuclear. A North Korea armed with nuclear weapons will be dangerous. If the worst case scenario becomes true, the Japanese leaders might decide to break Japan’s constitutional restraint and build nuclear weapons. Right wing Japanese politicians already boasted that Japan could build a lot of nuclear weapons in a short period of time. In terms of technological and economic resources, Japan’s nuclear option is certainly viable. The real issue is political and strategic. Due to Japan’s militaristic history and past brutal invasion of its neighbors, a Japan with nuclear weapons will become a

serious threat to peace. A nuclear arms race in East Asia will certainly disrupt the balance of power in the region and threaten global peace and security.

The Bush administration has urged China to exercise its influence on Pyongyang to resolve the crisis. On this critical issue, China prefers to conduct quiet diplomacy. Beijing sponsored a talk of North Korea and the United States in April 2003. With a strong sense of urgency, Chinese envoys frequently visited Pyongyang, Washington, and Moscow in the last several months to search for rational solutions. After Beijing's active shuttle diplomacy, North Korea has finally agreed to a US demand for multilateral negotiation. The first round of six party talk including the United States, North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia was held in Beijing in August 2003. Although uncertainties remain, there is hope for a peaceful resolution of the crisis on Korean Peninsula.

Another serious challenge is to deal with new issues facing China after its entry into the World Trade Organization. Joseph Fewsmith has provided a critical analysis of the political and social implications of China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). If WTO membership will enhance the benefits that China has received from participating in the global trade system, it will also reinforce other trends apparent in China's political economy. In particular, it will help weed out inefficient state-owned enterprises, break down the bureaucratic interests that have fostered economic paternalism, erode local protectionisms and curtail industrial monopolies. Participation in WTO will, over time, have considerable impact on China's political system. Furthermore, China's entry into the WTO may strengthen China's overall relations with the United States and other trading nations.⁴⁵

Since entering the World Trade Organization in December 2001, China has made tremendous efforts to implement its commitments. Since 2001, China has greatly improved transparency in its policy making. More government areas are releasing draft regulations for comments from the public before they are finalized. So far, China has cut its average tariff rate from 15.3 percent to 12 percent. The Chinese central government has revised or abolished more than 2,300 regulations that conflicted with WTO rules, while local authorities have corrected or done away with tens of thousands of administrative regulations for the same reason. These efforts are of far-reaching significance to the country's transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy with Chinese characteristics.⁴⁶ World Trade Organization accession has improved China's market environment and will pave the way for foreigners to implement long-term investment strategies.

According to Chinese state councilor and former Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, China's diplomacy should abide by and serve its strategic goal of building a well-off society in an all-round way. Despite fruitful worldwide anti-terrorism cooperation, terrorism still runs rampant, which will surely have a profound impact on international politics, economy and security.⁴⁷ Some Chinese analysts believe that multipolarization has become an irreversible trend in the wake of the end of the Cold War. However, the path to a multipolar world has never been smooth. From Beijing's view, the world situation is complicated and full of risks and opportunity.

The main task of Chinese foreign policy is to work for a peaceful world that will be conducive for sustaining economic growth and enhancing people's living standards. So far China has benefited significantly from its increased participating in the world economy. However, there is no guarantee for sustainable economic growth and favorable international

environment. China's new leaders are facing tremendous socioeconomic problems, political uncertainty, and international development.⁴⁸

In addition to numerous traditional problems, China is also facing non-traditional threats. There are many issues of non-traditional security. Typical cases include ecological pollution, financial crisis, transnational Internet hacking, international terrorist attacks and the spread of fatal diseases like AIDS and SARS. Non-traditional security threats can be more destructive than traditional wars.⁴⁹ The rise of non-traditional security threats has affected Chinese thinking and foreign policy.

Careful analysis can reveal development in style and substance of Beijing's foreign policy. In March 2003, the low-profile President Hu and Premier Wen proposed reductions in the entourage accompanying leaders on their overseas visits and simplification of the corresponding ceremonies to send off and welcome back leaders. Their antipathy towards and endeavors to get rid of vain behavior could not but win them favorable public opinion.⁵⁰ Hu's first trip overseas as China's president took place between May 26 and June 5. He visited Russia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and France on what was the first trip in decades by a senior Chinese leader without any official formalities to send him off or welcome him back.

When confronted with the SARS epidemic crisis in Spring 2003, President Hu and Premier Wen decided to break away from the traditional secrecy in handling a matter of public interest. The new leadership's decision to share information with the public was a major boost for the global efforts to contain the spread of the life-threatening disease. The cohesion the new leaders have forged with the people in a time of crisis will prove a precious asset on the way ahead.⁵¹

The Chinese new leadership has been in power only since November 2002. It is premature to claim that a fundamentally new foreign policy has emerged. The fact of matter is Chinese foreign policy today contains elements of continuity and change. For analyzing China's new policy orientation, the following points deserve special attention.

First, the fundamental goal of Chinese foreign policy is to create a peaceful environment in service of building a "well-off society in all round way." The objectives of China's modernization are to quadruple the GDP of 2000 by 2020 (reaching US\$ 4 trillion based on 2000 exchange rate), and to become a mid-level developed country by 2050. For this purpose, development and peace are inseparable. Beijing's new leaders perceive the first two decades of the 21st century as a "strategic opportunity" for China to develop its economy.

Second, in addition to building material and spiritual civilizations, President Hu and his colleagues started discussing "political civilization."⁵² Political civilization should include more democratic governance, the rule of law, and a more open and transparent foreign policy. A more open China in the world community is likely to achieve closer cooperation with other nations.

Third, China's new leaders are more realistic about China's strengths and limitations. Both President Hu and Premier Wen worked for many years at local and provincial levels in less developed areas of China. They have an urgent sense of many complicated problems including growing disparity inside China. On the other hand, they have fully participated in the reform and opening which led to rapid economic development. As a result, the new leaders are likely to be more modest yet confident when dealing with

international economic issues. The *pingmin* (common people) background of leaders such as Hu and Wen will enable them to better understand people's needs. In order to consolidate their authority, the new leaders must be able to demonstrate that they are able to manage a more balanced and sustainable economic growth at home and act as responsible and respectable statesmen on the world stage.

Fourth, China's leaders have adopted a new concept of security featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination.⁵³ In the previous eras of Chinese foreign policy, Beijing leaders tend to emphasize "anti-imperialism (anti-US)," "anti-revisionism (anti-USSR)," and then "anti-hegemonism (anti-Soviet and sometimes also anti-US)." For the new leaders, China's foreign policy is aimed at building "peace and development," rather than opposing to someone. Of course, this fundamental shift actually started with Deng Xiaoping's opening and reform. But Deng still emphasized "anti-hegemonism" as a key component of Chinese foreign policy in the 1980s. Now *bu shu di* (do not seek enemy) has become an essential part of China's new foreign policy.

Fifth, pragmatism and professionalism are likely to become key features of Chinese foreign policy. Ideology is playing a less and less significant role in China's relations with foreign countries. For instance, China has developed a much closer economic relations with South Korea than with North Korea.⁵⁴ Chinese diplomats are becoming more professional.⁵⁵ A stronger sense of pragmatism and a higher level of efficiency should contribute to more meaningful participation of China in world affairs. Chinese diplomacy will project a more confident and open image.

Finally, China's new leadership is facing unprecedented domestic and international challenges. The lines between domestic and foreign issues are diminishing. China is undergoing marketization, urbanization, and potentially democratization in the context of globalization. It is also going through a communication revolution. There are increasing economic disparity, social tensions and political risks. China is still searching for its proper role in a world full of economic troubles, political instability, and security threats. Policymakers in Beijing will face more and more complex challenges including the following issues: serving the needs of sustainable economic development, fighting against terrorism and ethnic separatism, dealing with the war against terrorism and crisis in North Korea, managing the issue of Taiwan and seeking for national unification, and maintaining regional stability and global peace in the long term. Indeed, China is confronting serious challenges on many fronts.⁵⁶

In addressing such multiple challenges, there is no doubt that Chinese foreign policy will experience significant transition. Understanding Chinese foreign policy is an increasingly important and challenging task. In fact, policymakers and scholars both inside and outside of China are engaging in a serious learning process.⁵⁷ It is appropriate to describe this learning process as "*renzhong daoyuan*," i.e., the burden is heavy and the road is long.

Notes

¹ See Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games," *International Organization*, vol. 42, 1988, pp. 427-460.

² For a theoretical analysis of foreign policy restructuring, see Jerel A. Rosati, Joe Hagan, and Martin W.

Sampson, eds., *Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994).

³ The Chinese leadership can be divided into four generations: The first generation was led by Mao Zedong who dominated Chinese politics from 1949 until his death in 1976. At the core of the second generation was Deng Xiaoping who was the supreme leader of China from 1978 to the early 1990s. The third generation was headed by Jiang Zemin who became the General Secretary of the CPC in 1989. Jiang remains the Chairman of the Central Military Commission today. Hu Jintao is the leading figure of the fourth generation, but he has not been officially called the “core” of the fourth generation. For studies of Chinese leadership, see Cheng Li, *China's Leaders: The New Generation* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan, eds., *China's Leadership in the 21st Century: The Rise of the Fourth Generation* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2003); and Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, *China's New Rulers: The Secret Files* (New York: New York Review Books, 2002). For an in-depth analysis of the rise of Hu Jintao, see Richard Daniel Ewing, “Hu Jintao: The Making of a Chinese General Secretary,” *China Quarterly*, no. 173, 2003, pp. 18-34. The most insightful analysis of the New CCP Central Committee is provided by Li Cheng and Lynn White, “The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu Gets What?” *Asian Survey*, vol. 43, no. 4, 2003, pp. 553-597.

⁴ In fact, the transition to the technocracy was already a clear trend in the third generation. See Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997); and Li, *China's Leaders*.

⁵ Joseph Fewsmith provides an insightful analysis of Jiang's continued dominance in Chinese politics. See Fewsmith, “The Sixteenth National Party Congress: The Succession that Didn't Happen,” *China Quarterly*, no. 173, 2003, pp. 1-16.

⁶ The role of the military in Chinese politics is complex. Mao Zedong observed that “political power flows from the barrel of a gun.” As China's highest-level military organ, the CPC's Central Military Commission (CMC) is responsible for the making and coordination of defense policy. It also wields potent political influence, and it is an unwritten but general rule of Chinese politics that the country's paramount leader must also be in charge of the CMC. Whether this is still true remains to be seen.

⁷ The Sociology Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences published a *Research Report on Social Strata in Contemporary China* in 2002. From 1952 to 1999, industrial workers jumped from 6.4 percent to 22.6 percent in China's social strata. Peasants declined from 84.21 percent to 44 percent. During the same period, service people in business went up from 3.13 percent to 12 percent. Private enterprises owners increased from 0.18 percent to 0.6 percent. Technical professionals grew from 0.86 percent to 5.1 percent. See *Dangdai Zhongguo shehui jieceng yanjiu baogao (Research Report on Social Strata in Contemporary China)* (ed. by Lu Xueyi, Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2002), p. 44.

⁸ *China Daily*, November 14, 2002, p. 4.

⁹ *China Daily*, November 16, 2002, p. 1.

¹⁰ *China Daily*, November 9, 2002, p. 4.

¹¹ This part draws from the author's introduction to *Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition*, edited by Guoli Liu (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, forthcoming).

¹² Michael Ng-Quinn, “The Analytic Study of Chinese Foreign Policy,” *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 27, 1983, pp. 203-224. For an overview of literature on Chinese foreign policy, see Michael Hunt, “CCP Foreign Relations: A Guide to the Literature,” *Cold War International History Program Bulletin*, Issue 6-7, 1995, pp.129, 137-143.

¹³ Xinhua, “Pushing Peace and Development,” *China Daily*, November 15, 2002, p. 4.

¹⁴ Thomas Kane, “China's foundations: guiding principles of Chinese foreign policy,” *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 20, no. 1, 2001, pp. 45-55.

¹⁵ Yong Deng, “The Chinese Conception of National Interests and International Relations.” *China Quarterly*, 1998, pp. 308-329. For a critical review of Chinese nationalism and its impact on China's foreign policy in the post-Deng era, see Allen S. Whiting, “Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng,” *China Quarterly*, no. 142, 1995, pp. 295-316.

¹⁶ Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Cultural and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

- ¹⁷ Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 5, 1996, pp. 37-52.
- ¹⁸ Joseph Y. S. Cheng and Zhang Wankun, "Patterns and Dynamics of China's International Strategic Behavior," *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 11, no. 31, 2001, pp. 235-260.
- ¹⁹ Wu Xinbo, "Four Contradictions Constraining China's Foreign Policy Behavior," *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 10, 2001, pp. 293-301.
- ²⁰ Banning Garrett, "China Faces, Debates, the Contradictions of Globalization," *Asian Survey*, vol. 41, no. 3, 2001, pp. 409-427.
- ²¹ Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen, "China: Getting the Questions Right," *National Interest*, Winter 2000-2001, pp. 17-29.
- ²² Gilbert Rozman, "China's Quest for Great Power Identity," *Orbis*, vol. 43, no. 3, 1999, pp. 383-402.
- ²³ Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76, 2, 1997, pp. 33-45. For a contrasting view, see Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76, no. 2, 1997, pp. 18-32.
- ²⁴ Yan Xuetong, "The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes," *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 10, 2001, pp. 33-39.
- ²⁵ See Avery Goldstein, "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice," *China Quarterly*, no. 168, 2001, pp. 835-864; and Samuel S. Kim, "China's Path to Great Power Status in the Globalization Era," *Asian Perspective*, vol. 27, no. 1, 2003, pp. 35-75.
- ²⁶ Joseph S. Nye, "China's Re-emergence and the Future of the Asia-Pacific," *Survival*, vol. 39, no. 4, 1997-98, pp. 65-79.
- ²⁷ Michael Yahuda, "China's Foreign Relations: The Long March, Future Uncertain," *China Quarterly*, no. 159, 1999, pp. 650-659.
- ²⁸ Quansheng Zhao, "Modernization, Nationalism, and Regionalism in China," in *Comparative Foreign Policy: Adaptation Strategies of the Great and Emerging Powers*, edited by Steven Hook (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2002), pp. 66-91.
- ²⁹ *China Daily*, December 7, 2002
- ³⁰ See Finkelstein and Kivlehan, *China's Leadership in the 21st Century*, p. 5.
- ³¹ Tang Jiaxuan provided an interesting official statement on recent development of Chinese foreign policy. See "Tang Jiaxuan: Unprecedented rise in China's international status in the last thirteen years," www.xinhuanet.com, October 9, 2002.
- ³² For an insightful analysis of this issue, see Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" *International Security*, vol. 29, no. 4, 2003, pp. 5-56.
- ³³ Wang Jisi, "The Role of the United States as a Global and Pacific Power: A View From China," *Pacific Review*, vol. 10, no. 1, 1997, pp. 1-18. See also Yong Deng, "Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on U.S. Global Strategy," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 116, no. 3, Fall 2001, pp. 343-365; and Harry Harding, "The Uncertain Future of US-China Relations," *Asia-Pacific Review*, vol. 6, 1, 1999, pp. 7-24.
- ³⁴ David Shambaugh, "Sino-American Relations since September 11: Can the New Stability Last?" *Current History*, vol. 101, no. 656, 2002, pp. 243-249; and Aaron L. Friedberg, "11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations," *Survival*, Spring 2002, pp. 33-50.
- ³⁵ Denny Roy, "China and the War on Terrorism," *Orbis*, vol. 46, no. 3, 2002, pp. 511-521.
- ³⁶ *China Daily*, June 3, 2003.
- ³⁷ Lowell Dittmer, "The Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership," *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 10, 28, 2001, pp. 399-413. For a comprehensive survey, see Lowell Dittmer, *Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications* (University of Washington Press, 1992). For a Chinese perspective on Sino-Russian relations and an American response, see Li Jingjie, "Pillars of the Sino-Russian Partnership," *Orbis*, vol. 44, no. 4, 2000, pp. 527-539; and a response to Li by Gilbert Rozman. "A New Sino-Russian-American Triangle?" *Orbis*, vol. 44, no. 4, 2000, pp. 541-555.
- ³⁸ *Renmin Ribao*, June 6, 2003, p. 1.
- ³⁹ *China Daily*, June 24, 2003, p.1

⁴⁰ Allen S. Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension," *Asian Survey*, vol. 37, no. 4, 1997, pp. 299-322; and Rosemary Foot, "China in the Regional Forum: Organizational Process and Domestic Modes of Thought," *Asian Survey*, vol. 38, no. 5, 1998, pp. 425-440.

⁴¹ *China Daily*, June 30, 2003, p. 2. The treaty was originally signed by the members of the ASEAN in Indonesia on February 24, 1976. The treaty has been amended twice respectively in 1987 and 1998, making it open to membership for countries outside of Southeast Asia.

⁴² For China's growing ties with Europe, see Kay Moller, "Diplomatic Relations and Mutual Strategic Perceptions: China and the European Union," *China Quarterly*, no. 169, 2002, pp. 10-32. For China's relations with Africa, see Richard J. Payne and Cassandra R. Veney, "China's Post-Cold War African Policy," *Asian Survey* 38: 9 (September 1998), pp. 866-879. For China's ties with Latin America, see Frank O. Mora, "Sino-Latin American Relations: Sources and Consequences, 1977-1997," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 41: 2 (Summer 1999).

⁴³ Hu Jintao made several key foreign policy speeches during the visits. For his speech at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, see *Renmin Ribao*, May 29, 2003, p. 1.

⁴⁴ *Renmin Ribao*, June 3, 2003, p. 1.

⁴⁵ Joseph Fewsmith, "The Political and Social Implications of China's Accession to the WTO," *China Quarterly*, no. 167, 2001, pp. 573-609. See also Greg Mastel, "China, Taiwan, and the World Trade Organization," *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 24, no. 3, 2001, pp. 45-56; and Zhiqun Zhu, "China, the WTO, and U.S.-China Relations," in *New Directions in Chinese Politics for the New Millennium*, edited by Guoli Liu and Weixing Chen (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), pp. 249-273.

⁴⁶ *China Daily*, November 11 & 12, 2002.

⁴⁷ *China Daily*, December 23, 2002.

⁴⁸ For instance, unemployment has become a serious issue without ready solution. According to a recent report by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, about 14 million urban job seekers will be disappointed in 2003 because too many people are looking for too few jobs. *China Daily*, June 24, 2003, p. 3.

⁴⁹ Wang Yizhou, "Rethink approach to security threats." *China Daily*, May 29, 2003, p. 4.

⁵⁰ Yan Xizao, "New Leadership Wins Trust." *China Daily*, June 27, 2003, p. 4.

⁵¹ *China Daily*, June 27, 2003, p. 4.

⁵² Hu Jintao called for "active and steady promotion of political system reform, expansion of socialist democracy and improvement of the socialist legal system." See www.xinhuanet.com, September 30, 2003.

⁵³ "China's Document about the Position on New Security Concept," *Renmin Ribao*, August 2, 2002, p. 3.

⁵⁴ In 1992, Sino-South Korean trade was \$5 billions. The bilateral trade reached \$44 billion in 2002. Though China remains a major supplier of food and energy to North Korea, there is no active trading between the two sides. Their bilateral trade is less than \$1 billion.

⁵⁵ Xiaohong Liu, *Chinese Ambassadors: The Rise of Diplomatic Professionalism since 1949* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).

⁵⁶ For an in depth analysis of the major issues facing China, see Joseph Y.S. Cheng, *China's Challenges in the Twenty-first Century* (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2003).

⁵⁷ See Lowell Dittmer, *Learning and the Reform of Chinese Foreign Policy* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1999).