BOOK REVIEWS

Jonathan S. Burgess, *The Tradition of the Trojan War in Homer and the Epic Cycle* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), XVI + 295 pp.

This book's basic claim, as B. puts it in his conclusion, is that "[t]he Cyclic poems were not Homeric spin-offs and [that they] seem to represent their larger tradition better than the Homeric poems do" (174). Re-evaluating the relationship between the Cycle, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and the heroic tradition centering on the Troy saga is an interesting and important project. B. follows in the footsteps of general attempts, with which this reviewer largely sympathizes, and which argue for complex histories, rather than for "X is older and better and thus the source of Y" type narratives. But this particular book is not always a satisfying read, and its pointed arguments are not always as persuasive as one would have liked them to be.

There are three parts to B.'s study. In the first he attempts to reconstruct the development of the Epic Cycle. B. sensibly shuns a single date of composition. He conceives the formation of the Cycle as a process that begins in oral performance traditions early on, and later in written editorial practice, broadly following the lines of Gregory Nagy's evolutionary model for the development of Homeric epic (see p. 11, 172, etc.). The later stages B. describes repeatedly as the "manufacture" of the Cycle, which involves the "interference with fixed texts by individuals who stood outside any authentic compositional or performance tradition for these poems" (p. 13). B's claim that the Cycle was manipulated into a "collective whole" is attractive. But one would have wanted greater clarity and sophistication in the arguments. For example, he assumes a conceptual dichotomy between "authentic" oral composition and literate stages (hence the term "manufacturing"?). But this dichotomy was already challenged decades ago, e.g., by Finnegan. Indeed, Gregory Nagy's work, which B. repeatedly invokes, works against such a dichotomy too.

In the second chapter B. aims to downplay the influence of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* in the Archaic age, to play up independent early development of Cycle material, and thus to argue against the Epic Cycle as derivative poetry designed to "fill in the gaps" in Homer. One of my more general difficulties here is that, if we are arguing that both traditions are in flux at the earlier stages, how exactly do we, indeed, *why should we* draw a sharp distinction between "Cyclic" and "Homeric" material at this stage?

In the third chapter of his study B. examines the relations between the two traditions. Eventually, B. claims, there is a divergence on the grounds of "narrative strategies and cultural functions," a division (again following Nagy) between the Cycle's local perspectives and the Panhellenism of Homeric epic.

B. covers an enormous amount of ground. Some discussions are good (e.g., the simile of generations as leaves, 117ff.), but many others are presented with dissatisfying haste. For example, he discusses *Od.* 11.134-35 and the phrase *ex halos* in Teiresias' prophecy of Odysseus' death. It means either "away from the sea" or "from the sea" (153-54). The latter is possibly significant for the *Telegony*, since of course Telegonus accidentally kills his father with an arrow whose poison comes from a stingray. B. claims that the Odyssean passage is an allusion to a traditional story, rather than a case of misuse of the Homeric source by the *Telegony*. Given the argument for com-

plexity, one would want this to be the case, but B.'s argument as it stands is insubstantial (e.g., "this weapon is plausible if we understand it to be poisonous"). And in his haste he sometimes misses important and interesting opportunities. For example, very briefly: we know of a lost Sophoclean Play *Odysseus Akanthoplêx* (452 Radt). One point here is that neither this title as a whole nor the word *akanthoplêx* scan in hexameter, thus perhaps hinting at other, in this case non-epic, traditions of the fish-tale?

One important aspect of the book is the use of visual evidence. This is especially significant given the general paucity of evidence, especially for earlier periods. But at least in this reviewer's opinion some of the arguments are not fully convincing (cf., e.g., p. 37, arguments for the identification of a helmsman as Phrontis in Athens Nat. Mus. 14935).

The book's methodological observations rely, for the most part, on work within Homer studies. The bibliography is substantial, and very heavily referenced in dense footnotes that occupy almost sixty pages.

A few more general modern approaches are noted, some deeply misunderstood (e.g., intertextuality, on page 132-33. I would recommend a quick read through, e.g., Kristeva or even through a basic handbook entry). There are useful appendices and a detailed index.

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Deborah Tarn Steiner, *Images in Mind. Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought* (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), XVIII + 360 pp.

The idea that classical antiquity should be studied through a comprehensive project incorporating all the disciplines—the model of *Altertumswissenschaft*—has never won complete acceptance. Even when the goal is embraced, attempts to extend the scope of scholarly inquiry beyond single categories of cultural production are too often superficial: works of Greek art are used as wallpaper to decorate otherwise completely literary scholarship; conversely, decontextualized texts are made to serve as "testimonia" to document archaeological material. One of the major achievements of the methodological revolution that has taken place in classical studies during the past quarter-century is a renewed commitment to interdisciplinary inquiry, and among the most fruitful areas of such research is the relationship between the verbal and the visual. Even at this disciplinary checkpoint, however, communication remains uneven, largely because the questions that occupy literary scholars and the methods they use often differ from the concerns of those whose primary interest is visual art; additionally, the range and complexity of the respective corpora offer many pitfalls to the non-specialist. Steiner's book, which brings together many of the most serious attempts to integrate the "two worlds" of classical studies, provides an opportunity to consider the state of the interdisciplinary project.

Steiner's aim is to examine the role of statues in Archaic and Classical texts "as cognitive and hermeneutic devices"—in other words, in the popular phrase, "as objects 'good to think with'" (xi). Five chapters and an Epilogue rehearse many of the concepts and themes (e.g., metaphor, the gaze, eros, etc.) that have become standard

within the critically informed discourse of classical studies. Twenty-eight figures of serviceable quality join the abundant textual evidence offered in support of the argumentation. Like the scholarship from which it draws, the approach taken is strongly literary in conception and execution, placing statuary within a system of meaning that mirrors the preoccupations of contemporary critical discourse.

The first chapter, "Replacement and Replication," establishes one of the themes that recurs throughout the book: the function of statues considered in terms of the categories of metaphor and metonymy. Consideration of these themes leads quickly to fundamental aspects of the concept of representation, which are further explored in the second chapter, "Inside and Out." Discussion of the topos of appearance in contrast to inner qualities receives special attention, as do opposing conceptions of the statue as something that resembles and something that contains. The role of the cult statue is particularly underlined, and the link between the visual qualities of such images and the essential qualities of the gods is further explored in the third chapter, "The Quick and the Dead," in which the question of animation receives extended treatment. The fourth chapter, "For Love of a Statue," focusses on issues of desire in connection with "agalmatophilia." Much in these chapters concerns topics related to "word and image," preparing the reader to approach the fifth chapter, "The Image in the Text," with a sense of what is involved when statues appear in literary works. The Epilogue, "Lucian's Retrospective," shows how that author "redeploy[s]" (295) some earlier conceptions about statues in the radically different social and intellectual climate of the Imperial age.

The thematic structure of the book has the merit of organizing a great range of secondary literature, primary texts, and works of art in a way that allows connections to be made among disparate material and showcases the pervasiveness of fundamental conceptions. The difficulty of the task should not be underestimated. Anyone who deals with the Greek reception of the visual arts is aware of a curious dichotomy: immense amounts of effort and resources were devoted to the creation of artifacts great and small; yet, as Paul Oscar Kristeller noted, "Antiquity knew no Muse of painting or of sculpture; they had to be invented by the allegorists of the early modern centuries."[1] The conceptual gap between ourselves and the ancients signalled by what Steiner calls the "reticence concerning the experience of looking at art" (208 n. 74) is exacerbated by the fragmentary state of the monumental record, a problem to which she likewise draws attention (xi), and which is no less the case for texts. How, then, are we to proceed? She straightforwardly acknowledges that she must on occasion make use of texts that lie outside the periods under consideration and of "Roman copies of lost Greek originals" (xiv), but she notes the importance of recognizing the perils of employing anachronistic evidence. Her aim is to explore "some of the questions that the objects generated" and "the preoccupations that sculpture helped contemporary artists, writers, and viewers to articulate" (xiv). It is in this connection that some readers may question the reliance on modern concepts and categories to conceive and organize the topic.

The power of critical concepts to open new interpretive possibilities is equalled by their capacity to create self-contained systems in which internal coherence trumps the phenomena under consideration. No interpretive method arises outside historical and

1. P.O. Kristeller, "The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics (I)," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 12 (1951) 506.

intellectual context, yet many such approaches invite acceptance as universally valid. To adopt overall interpretive strategies without evaluating their applicability is as hazardous as accepting particular concepts without question. Steiner's consistent privileging of concepts over texts and images gives rise to some difficulties. For example, she adopts the binary opposition of metaphor and metonymy associated primarily with Roman Jakobson (3 n. 1) as a means to explore several aspects of Greek thought about statues. Jakobson's linguistic theories (which he applied to painting and sculpture) reflect the particular conditions in which Russian Formalism arose and should not be used without question. Just as the categories have proved less than wholly satisfactory for the analysis of literature,[2] so, too, do they disappoint in interpreting sculpture; in one case, "The image's relation to the original turns out to combine both metonymy and metaphor" (5), a conclusion that says more about the categories than about the statues. Long-established concepts can prove equally problematic. For example, the function of gorgoneia as "apotropaia" is accepted without question (173-179), even though the concept of "apotropaic" in such connection is not without difficulties.[3] Similarly, the familiar notion of the "cult image" (chs. 2, 3, and passim) is not a category beyond question; it is a construction founded on anachronistic concepts and flawed ethnographic comparisons, historiographically comprehensible but not a satisfactory basis for understanding Greek attitudes and practices.[4]

The primacy of literary categories in the conception of the book affects the treatment of the specific statues adduced as evidence for them. The tendency to bypass the question of what works of art look like in favor of generalized conclusions about processes poses considerable hazards at every level of interpretation. The discussion of "replacement" with which the book begins, for example, sidesteps important problems in portraiture. The subject is Pliny's famous anecdote (*HN* 35.151) of the invention of portraits in clay: the potter Boutades' daughter, in love with a youth who was about to leave the country, traced the outline of his shadow, and her father filled the outline with clay and fired the resulting relief. In Steiner's view (3-4), resemblance is only one way in which this image functions; in the other (3), the success of such a substitute "depends on a particular construction of the bond between the subject and the figurine, a bond that need not rest on any visible mimetic likeness, but on a notion of substitution, equivalence, or sympathy. In Pliny's tale, the beloved and his image do not so much resemble one another as exist in a relation of metonymy, both formal and more loosely defined; here the face of the youth stands proxy for his entire person, but any portion of his person, any object associated with or belonging to him, could do as well." In the anecdote, however, not association but likeness is the issue; if, in the eyes of the girl who knew and loved him, the image of the youth did not look like him, would it have "done"? What are the criteria for satisfactory visible likeness? Leaving aside the particular complexities attending the traditions of Roman portraiture, the issue of visible resemblance is central to the representational project of Greek art and cannot be so easily separated from the consideration of visual qualities. Nor can it be separated from the consideration of style. As Steiner recognizes (passim), an important

2. See, e.g., D. Lodge, *The Modes of Modern Writing: Metaphor, Metonymy, and the Typology of Modern Literature* (Ithaca, NY, 1977) 73-124, especially for the importance of context in attempts to apply Jakobson's theory.
3. See J.L. Benson, "The Central Group of the Corfu Pediment," in *Gestalt und Geschichte. Festschrift Karl Schefold* (ed. M. Rohde-Liegle et al.), *Antike Kunst* Beiheft 4 (Bern, 1967) 48-60.
4. A.A. Donohue, "The Greek Images of the Gods," *Hephaistos* 15 (1997) 31-45.

and persistent criterion for Greek judgements on the representational arts is "lifelikeness," and neither the idea that statues can represent social and ethical qualities (passim) nor the traditional schemes of experimentation, innovations, developments, and technical advances in sculpture (26-27) account for the way that images that differ widely in appearance seem to have fulfilled the desideratum. The nature of style and of stylistic change has been at the heart of art history since the eighteenth century and resists explanation even now.

The close examination of images is necessary if the arguments for which they serve as evidence are to stand. For example, in discussing the "paradigmatic quality of images" (37), Steiner follows Paul Zanker in seeing the Borghese Anacreon in Copenhagen as a Roman copy of an image seen by Pausanias on the Athenian Acropolis and "probably raised during Perikles' tenure of power" (38). It "offers the viewer an account that visibly incarnates the social ideal prized by the elite (and those wishing to join their ranks) in the contemporary polis" (39). The statue, however, displays features that make it not a Roman copy, but a Roman creation; it would therefore, presumably, embody a quite different set of social ideals.[5] In discussing the "evolution in portraiture" from "the beautification of the subject to a more accurate mimesis" as attested by Pliny, Steiner cites "a bronze head of an old man recovered from a shipwreck of c. 400" that "presents an individual in all his (unattractive) physical immediacy and uses the physiognomic features to suggest the personality of the man" (62). Presumably it is the bronze head from the Porticello wreck that is referred to; if so, the features in question have been shown by Brunilde Ridgway to mark it as neither a "true portrait" nor a "character portrait", but as a representation of "an elderly and probably mythologico/monstrous creature"; it thus belongs to an iconographic tradition not directly connected with human portraiture.[6] Steiner follows the long-held interpretation of a scene in the Ionic frieze of the temple of Apollo at Bassae (fig. 28) as showing Lapith women seeking refuge at the feet of an "idol" (93): one woman "has sought refuge by an unprotecting idol of Artemis and lets her head loll back in despair as her attacker tears away her ripped garment, laying bare the naked, heavy body framed against its robe" (247), and Steiner sees here an example of "what [Linda] Nochlin has called . . . the 'binary division between male energy, tension and concentration as opposed to female resignation, flaccidity and relaxation'" (n. 214). As Brian Madigan has pointed out, however, the woman does not turn toward the statue, and her robe passes behind it: she "holds the statue against her body and cloaks it protectively in her peplos, against the centaur's sacrilege." She is no suppliant, then, but the priestess of Artemis who protects the image of the goddess.[7]

The organization by critical themes and concepts encourages multiple readings of images and their visible qualities within self-contained discourses. For example, the "defining physical characteristics" of the kouroi correspond to those of heroic young warriors in epic, notably "legs and thighs, the locus of a warrior's speed and battle strength" (12); the same features, "stout thighs and calves," combine with other qualities to establish the kouroi primarily as ideal targets of homoerotic desire (215). What

5. B.S. Ridgway, "An Issue of Methodology: Anakreon, Perikles, Xanthippos," *American Journal of Archaeology* 102 (1998) 717-738.

6. In C.J. Eiseman and B.S. Ridgway, *The Porticello Shipwreck: A Mediterranean Merchant Vessel of 415-385 B.C.* (College Station, 1987) 100-106.

7. B.C. Madigan, *The Temple of Apollo Bassitas* (ed. F.A. Cooper) II. *The Sculpture* (Princeton, 1992) 80-81.

is the relationship between the readings? Both are solidly supported by explicit textual evidence, raising the question of the situation in which intersecting, coexisting, or even competing understandings could arise in antiquity. In reading Steiner's book, it becomes clear that the ancient reception of visual art tends to be conceived, even in subtle studies like the fundamental work of Jesper Svenbro (cited with justifiable frequency), largely in terms of the solitary reader or observer inherited from the Romantic tradition. Yet it is striking that in ancient accounts of confrontations with art, the process is collective.[8] Although Steiner discusses "real-world viewing" (esp. 207-250), the focus remains on explicating the response of individual viewers. There do exist texts that allow us to observe the collective process in some detail. The locus classicus for Classical times is the excited discussion by the chorus in Euripides' *Ion* (184-218), who identify to each other the personages and stories shown in the sculpture of the temple at Delphi. Steiner does not cite the passage in this connection, but it suggests more tellingly than do current models of critical reading the context in which statues "not only speak, but more frequently still provoke discourse on the part of their viewers" (294).

Steiner's presentation of current approaches to Greek thinking about statuary shows that, despite assertions of the importance of the visual component of culture, the dominant critical attitudes still reflect Ernst Robert Curtius' opinion: "*Pindars Gedichte zu verstehen, kostet Kopfzerbrechen; der Parthenonfries nicht.*"[9] It is far from easy, however, even to establish the most basic information about surviving works of ancient art. The monumental corpus is fully as complex as the textual and requires equal effort to master and equally exacting interpretive approaches. Steiner's book may in this way serve the function of the statues she discusses: to "provoke discourse" on the part of her readers.

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Matthew Gumpert, *Grafting Helen: The Abduction of the Classical Past* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001), XIV + 338 pp.

In an era when discussions about cloning and transplantations have become intense, a book focusing on the notion of *graft* in Western literary tradition constitutes a welcome contribution to the study of the appropriation and *mythologiques* of the classical past in medieval, early modern, and, to some extent, modern French literature and culture, as well as a stimulating exploration of the re-'writing' of Helen's myth in ancient Greece. Also a Derridean term, *graft* is a versatile and polyvalent notion, which

8. An exception is J.M. Hurwit, "The Words in the Image: Orality, Literacy, and Early Greek Art," *Word and Image* 6.2 (1990) 180-197, in which sociable contexts are explored. See also T.J. Rusnak, "The Active Spectator: Art and the Viewer in Ancient Greece" (diss. Bryn Mawr College, 2001), emphasizing the social and collective contexts of the ancient interpretation of art.

9. E.R. Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Bern, 1948) 23; tr. W.R. Trask, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages* (New York, 1953) 15: "To understand Pindar's poems requires severe mental effort—to understand the Parthenon Frieze does not."

in this book assumes various metamorphoses and nuances. Matthew Gumpert aptly chooses Helen as the focus of his book, a figure both subversively marked and unmarked in ancient Greek tradition. Seen in the context of modern scholarly interest in the myth of Helen and its transmutations in ancient, medieval, and modern western traditions, *Grafting Helen* is a challenging, theoretically informed, and insightful book on the Western tradition of literary and cultural grafts, or, to put it in Derrida's term, of *la greffe textuelle*.[1] Compared to Linda Lee Clader's *Helen: The Evolution from Divine to Heroic in Greek Epic Tradition* (Leiden 1976), Mihoko Suzuki's *Metamorphoses of Helen: Authority, Difference, and the Epic* (Ithaca, NY 1989), and Norman Austin's *Helen of Troy and her Shameless Phantom* (Ithaca, NY 1994),[2] Gumpert's book is by far more ambitious in scope and method. Engaging with post-structuralist critical theory in a most thought-provoking manner, Gumpert provides a subtle study of the complex process of the grafting of the epistemologically, ontologically, and ethically elusive figure of Helen into the Western literary tradition.

The book focuses on the concept of *imitatio*, but it defines it in much broader perspectives. In effect, *imitatio* itself is supplanted by the concept of *graft* in the logic of *supplementarity* explored by Derrida in "La double scéance"[3] and employed by Gumpert in his third chapter ("Supplement"). The book further examines the indeterminacy and multifariousness of the figure of Helen in ancient Greek tradition. In his preface, Gumpert sets out to show that Helen can be viewed as a 'figure' for the appropriation of antiquity by Western cultures (medieval and modern France is his main focus), which often claim a seamless continuity between past and present. In the first part of the book ("Helen in Greece"), he investigates the multiplicity of the presence of Helen in the Homeric epics (ch. 1 and 2), Stesichorus, Plato's *Phaedrus*, and Euripides' *Helen* (ch. 3), Sappho (ch. 4 and 6), and Gorgias and Euripides' *Trojan Women* (ch. 5), taking into account various other texts that range from Herodotus to Aristotle, and arguing that there can be no "origins" in the construction of the myth of Helen, no "true" or "phantom" Helens, but only a multitude of *muthoi*. Helen makes her textual debut in Western literature in *Iliad* 3 and becomes a synechdoche for the Homeric epics. But this Helen is no more real than any other Helens represented in the Homeric epics (for example, the Helen of Sparta in *Odyssey* 4 who remembers Helen of Troy recollecting the former and future life of Helen of Sparta) or elsewhere (in Euripides' *Helen*). Even Stesichorus' *Palinode* is read not as a 'literary' act that resists the dominance of a hegemonic Homeric tradition, but as a normative literary move, a literary supplement that replaces any 'original' Helen and weakens binary oppositions between real and unreal, which in any event the elusiveness of the figure of Helen itself irretrievably undermines. In the second part ("Helen in France"), which consists again of six chapters, Gumpert perceptively analyzes French claims for a seamless literary and cultural connection to the past. An example from Joachim du Bellay's *La deffence et illustration de la langue françoyse*, an epigraph at the beginning of Gumpert's book, is suggestive: "And so, Frenchmen, march bravely toward that proud Roman city: and with her spoils (just as you have done on more than one occasion), adorn your temples and

1. J. Derrida, *La dissémination*, Paris 1972, p. 230 (also quoted by Gumpert, p. xiv).
2. Cf. Robert E. Meagher's *Helen: Myth, Legend, and the Culture of Misogyny*, New York 1995. See also N. Worman, "The Body as Argument: Helen in Four Greek Texts," *Classical Antiquity* 16 (1997), pp. 151-203.
3. In *La dissémination*, Paris 1972.

altars . . . . Take Greece, that impostor, and sow there once again the great city of Gallo-Greeks." In this part, Gumpert argues that *prélèvement*, removal [i.e., citational graft], is always *enlèvement*, abduction. French nationalistic, literary appropriations, abductions, imitations, and rehandlings of the Greek past are explored. Among the most interesting areas that are studied in this part are 'grafting' stategies in medieval French troubadour poetry (ch. 7) and late medieval and early modern French romance (especially Benoît de Sainte-Maure in ch. 8 and Jean Lemaire in ch. 9), early modern French lyric (Ronsard's late sonnets: ch. 10), eighteenth- to twentieth-century French literature (André Chénier, Gérard de Nerval and the importation of Goethe's *Faust* into France, Valéry and Mallarmé: ch. 11), and nineteenth- and early twentieth-century novels and dramatic works (Zola, Anatole France, Flaubert, Meilhac and Halévy's *opéra bouffe, La Belle Hélène*, Jules Lemaître's comedy *La Bonne Hélène*, Giraudoux, Camus, and Proust: ch. 12). The book concludes with a *prosthesis*, an appendix on Helen in (modern) Greece, and a brief, particularly interesting treatment of graft as related to contemporary ideas about transplantation and artificial intelligence.

There is much in the argumentation of this book with which to agree and indeed to disagree. Among the most perceptive discussions is that in "Anamnesis" (ch. 2), where Gumpert takes issue with Auerbach's "Odysseus' Scar," the first chapter in his influential 1946 book *Mimesis*. Auerbach's thesis is that Homeric epic is an eternal present without temporal perspective,[4] while Gumpert argues that "Homeric epic is an eternal present that is achieved only by virtue of a temporal perspective that is repeatedly collapsed but to which it repeatedly alludes" (25). However, when Gumpert finds analogies between the *teichoscopia* in *Iliad* 3 and Plato's allegory of the cave in the *Republic* ("Mimesis" [ch. 1]), or associates Aristotle's distinction between economics and chrematistics with a "chrematistic economy" that, as he argues, Helen stimulates ("Speculation" [ch. 4]: see his discussion of Sappho fr. 16 V.), he is less persuasive. The language used in the book is sometimes overly metaphorical, and, although this is somewhat understandable given the nature of its subject, cases such as "graft" defined as desire and dialectic and metaphor and several other broad concepts may seem forced. Chapters 2 and 3 provide subtle analyses of the Homeric Helen in the *Odyssey*, Stesichorus' *Palinode*, and Euripides' *Helen*, but the strength of analysis in chapter 2, for example, is weakened by a strong anti-climax created by the concluding quotation from an essay by Froma Zeitlin.[5] The book is fraught with repetition and rhetorical figures that occasionally accentuate the rhetoricity of the arguments advanced. I will quote one instance: "Helen herself is a shimmering figure: now a woman, now goddess; now real, now illusory; now here, now there (where? Sparta? Troy? Egypt?); now Greek, now Trojan; now guilty, now innocent; now subject, now object. This epistemological, ontological, and ethical indeterminacy, teasing us, moving us back and forth, from *on the one hand* to *on the other*, is the painful and seductive crisis (from the Greek *krinein*, to separate, to distinguish) of mimesis . . . " (p. 4; an idea often reformulated in

4. "But any . . . subjectivistic-perspectivistic procedure, creating a foreground and background, resulting in the present lying open to the depths of the past, is entirely foreign to the Homeric style; the Homeric style knows only a foreground, only a uniformly illuminated, uniformly objective present," E. Auerbach, *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature*, trans. W. R. Trask, Princeton, NJ 1953, p. 7.

5. "Travesties of Gender and Genre in Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazousae*," in ead., *Playing the Other: Gender and Society in Classical Greek Literature*, Chicago 1996, pp. 375-416.

other parts of the book). The least persuasive and well-argued section is the *prosthesis*, the appendix on the modern Greek reception of Helen. Here several stereotypes about nineteenth-century Greece are adopted and explored in favor of arguments based on a partial and non-representative selection of examples from (mainly) twentieth-century Greek literature. One wonders why Gumpert does not go back to earlier Greek texts, which would help him contextualize his twentieth-century material. For example, Greek romanticism is entirely excluded from his treatment. Further, in his discussion of the ancient Greek reception of Helen, Gumpert falls prey to the ideological construct he himself criticizes: the abduction of the Greek past by Western tradition. As noted above, he entitles the first part of his book "Helen in Greece," not "Helen in ancient Greece," while his appendix bears the title "Helen in (modern) Greece." This is obviously an essentialised definition of Greece, in which antiquity represents the "origins" that do not need to be modified by an adjective. Also, throughout the book there is a conspicuous tendency for definition and re-definition (rather, re-formulation) of the aims of the book itself, in the form of "*Grafting Helen* is . . . ," a fact that occasionally makes it seem self-indulgent.[6]

All in all, however, this is an ambitious and thought-provoking book, replete with original insights. Readers familiar with the post-structuralist lexicon will delve into its chapters with considerable profit. Less theoretically inclined readers will find much of interest in this subtle and daring approach to literary history and cultural criticism.

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Silvia Montiglio, *Silence in the Land of Logos* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), X + 313 pp.

"The ancient Greeks had a culture of the spoken word." Montiglio pursues the import of that statement—the first sentence in her book—through archaic epic and epinician poetry and on to classical Athenian speeches and plays. Aware that her readers are likely to harbor misconceptions about ancient silence drawn from the later Western Tradition (expectations cultivated by contemporary muteness in prayer, by solitary reading of literature, and by familiarity with dramatically pregnant pauses in music and drama), Montiglio is careful to distinguish between modern and ancient ideas. To speak about silence, an ephemeral and necessarily empty space, even in one's own culture, is a daunting task. The author's ingenuity lies in excavating language about silence in search of what the Greeks made of it, and her general conclusion is that they considered it disturbing and avoided it wherever possible.

Consistently arguing that silence was the exception to the rule in a society that valued sonorous and powerful voices, the author presents a cogent and well-documented study of the ineffable, and by studying surrounding *logoi* draws our attention to those moments when silence threatens to descend. Yet this is far from being a book about mere lapses in speech, although 'failure of speech' (rather than 'silence that

6. I should note that this well-produced book has a few minor misprints, mostly in ancient Greek texts.

speaks volumes') captures a common Greek conception of human quietness. Montiglio finds that ritual silence, purposeful and reverent (Chapter One), is to be distinguished from later ideas of silence before an ineffable God, and that in ancient Greek religious thought, silence expresses respect and concern for the power of language "which must be kept under control in the presence of the gods (10)."

Outside ritual contexts, silence was far more often spoken about than actually performed. Chapters on Homer and Pindar (Chapters Two, Three, and Eight) do not build upon the ritual silence of Chapter One, but carefully build cases of their own for the impossibility of silent heroism and the threat silence represents to heroic, athletic, and poetic *kleos*. What is shameful or blameworthy in archaic poetry remains in quiet oblivion, yet the muteness performed is (or even must be) alluded to in words; thus the Homeric hero veils his head and sits, the picture of impotent dejection, while the potent hero's voice resonates over battlefield and assembly. Pindar's silences are not real pauses or moments of stillness, but allusions to paths of song not taken, and these turning points modulate the mythic version chosen even as they hint at dangers lying outside any one configuration of song.

When Montiglio turns to classical Athens, she focuses first on Athenian orators (Chapter Four) and their use of *praeteritio* and other figures implying rhetorical restraint. Such figures of speech always redound to the positive credit of the speaker and to the detriment of the speaker's opponent, as insults (of another) are implied and praise (of oneself) suggestively "passed over." As is true of religious silence, Athenian rhetorical silence is a unique expression of its culture and must be distinguished carefully from modern practice. Thus Montiglio's keen discussion of forbidden words and *euphêmia* would have been improved if ancient definitions of figures of speech (which appear halfway through the chapter) had come at its beginning.

Turning from performance in the assembly to theatrical performance, three chapters on tragedy and comedy (Chapters Five, Six, and Seven) argue that the Athenian dramatic stage was never empty and never quiet. Montiglio (in the company of other scholars) contends that no considerable silence ever descended in the midst of tragic or comic dialogue, monologue, or song, but that continuous sound filled the audience's ears from first to last. Thus, like oratorical silence, dramatic silence is spoken about, but not actually performed, for talking about silence is dramatically more effective and far less dangerous than actual quiet moments during a performance. Montiglio deduces that actors and chorus members, like speakers in assembly, had constantly to fear losing the audience's attention and thus sympathy; while voters could create an unmistakable *thorubos*, theatergoers might simply become inattentive. Neither group could be trusted to bridge any pause with their own understanding. This unprovable hypothesis informs, but does not obscure, detailed discussion of the silences of tragic women in which Phaedra and Cassandra take pride of place while Aristophanic passages serve as supporting evidence for the light they cast on tragedy. The author attends to ill, shrouded, and hidden (as well as silent) dramatic bodies here, and finds that the gestures associated with silence, and the pathologies it represents, are typically female. Hippocratic evidence and the familiar Sophoclean and Thucydidean idea that silence 'becomes' women underlies Montiglio's analysis of characters who suffer temporary muteness or the final silencing of death. The last chapter (Chapter Eight) returns to Odysseus as the "master of cunning silence" whose deceptiveness will come to exemplify the classical Athenian ideological uneasiness about silence and secrecy.

Montiglio is at her best when dealing with archaic and classical literary *topoi*. It

must be said that the author does not address the valuable body of research conducted by social scientists who study silence and stillness as message-conveying processes; thus a valuable opportunity for interdisciplinary discussion is missed. But *Silence in the Land of Logos* is not so much about silence as about words circumlocuting silence, and this last remark is simply a way of saying that Montiglio's readers are likely to be intrigued and to want to hear more after this book falls silent. The author is to be commended for a provocative, thorough, and careful study that will hopefully serve as a harbinger of more such work to come.

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Helene P. Foley, *Female Acts in Greek Tragedy*, ser. Martin Classical Lectures (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), X + 410 pp.

The individual impulse for the respective mode of the study and reception of Greek tragedy seems to shift in accordance with the paradigms of each period of cultural production in the Western world. In particular, the interest in Greek tragedy in the twentieth century, attested by classical scholarship as well as literature and stage productions by theatres and opera houses, seems to be at least partly due to the increasing upsurge of women's voices in contemporary cultural discourses. For, like no other literary genre, Greek tragedy is dominated by the action of female characters. Yet, as soon as we approach this phenomenon from a historical perspective, we encounter a puzzling paradox. While the activities of women in the public domain of Classical Athens are restricted to the extent that women are more or less invisible, we are confronted with the pre-eminence of female protagonists at the performance of one of the most important festivals of the city-state. The paradox continues even further: The roles of these female protagonists are not only designed by male dramatists, but they are also put on stage by male actors, and presented to an (almost) exclusively male audience.

In her most recent book, Helene P. Foley engages with this paradox and presents a highly sophisticated solution combining an anthropological approach with a close reading of the dramatic texts as well as reflections on their original stage performance. Her aim is to illuminate this paradox by exploring how the specific social roles defined for women in Athenian culture interact with the appearance of female characters in tragedy.

Foley presents here articles already published elsewhere in the last thirteen years as well as a range of new studies. This ensemble builds up to a complete whole that is apt to support her general thesis explaining the puzzling paradox of 'Female acts in Greek Tragedy' in a breathtaking and awe-inspiring complex way. Foley modifies the historical and structuralist solutions offered hitherto in classical scholarship for nearly three decades. On the one hand, the apparent gap between the social reality of women and their appearance on stage has been interpreted as a temporary inversion testifying to an implicit norm and indirectly asserting contemporary cultural standards. On the other hand, the specific appearance of women enacted by men on the Athenian stage has been considered as a means to explore male identity (Froma Zeitlin: *Playing the*

Other, Chicago 1996), offering anti-models in the form of female protagonists, again for the only sake of re-asserting the established cultural norms of male behaviour. Foley takes a rather different stance by reminding us of the perception of ancient viewers who clearly see a socially disruptive potential at work in tragedy rather than a reinforcement of established values. Her theory explains the pre-eminence of female characters on the tragic stage of Classical Athens in the following way: "Greek male writers are using fictional women to think in a challenging fashion. [. . .] Women in tragedy [. . .] reveal in a positive sense important social and ethical alternatives and in a negative sense the social consequences of actions undertaken from a marginal, morally questionable, or socially resistant position" (116).

The argument unfolds in a tripartite structure: In the first two parts, Foley engages with two particular sections of Athenian culture which especially defined women's social roles and set a frame for female acts in the social reality of the fifth century: Lamentation over the dead and Marriage. Either chapter is introduced by a detailed account of the history and actual formation of the social practices of honouring the dead or marriage and inheritance respectively. Thus, Foley puts the constitution of female roles in society in a diachronic as well as a synchronic perspective, taking into account the transition from an aristocratic to a democratic social structure that has its continuing repercussions in the ongoing conflict between *polis* and *oikos* in the city-state.

Apart from identifying reflections of these systems in the way that female roles are portrayed in tragedy, this approach appears here already as a most useful tool for reading the text itself which proves to be superior to a merely text-immanent approach or a modern psychological conception of tragic characters. Foley's reading of Antigone's lament at her departure for death in Sophocles' play may serve as an example: Rather than interpreting this lament as indicating a moral collapse of the female hero and a change of heart in the face of impending death, Foley suggests that Antigone uses lamentation "to make a public and politically motivated display of injustice" (p. 31). In Foley's view, Antigone does so by adopting a genre of female speech that is part and parcel of the performance of funeral rites in archaic Greek society and is set in a public context during that period, but is legally prohibited in the Athenian city-state since Solon's funeral legislation in the sixth century. Furthermore, the choice of this speech genre is particularly suited to Antigone's position in the conflict with Creon in which she defends the rights of the family to bury their relations. Finally, through this lament for herself, Antigone is able to expose Creon's hypocrisy in imprisoning her alive in her tomb rather than killing her straight away. As for the paradox, it seems to be increased at this point through the very historical approach: "Tragedy permits male choruses and actors not only to imitate female behavior but to imitate female behavior forbidden to contemporary women in a public context" (51).

Both the full force of Foley's complex approach, which not only includes anthropological models and historical evidence but also draws on modern considerations of morality, and the specification of her theory are encountered in the third part of her book. Foley examines here the way in which female characters are presented to make difficult moral choices on the tragic stage. The main concern of this part is the meaning created by the interaction of the social framework, set out in parts one and two, with the dramatic presentation of female characters. In five case studies (Sophocles' *Electra* and *Antigone*, the Clytemnestras of all of the three major tragedians, Euripides' *Medea*,

and the mothers taking centre stage in Euripides' *Suppliants*, *Phoenissae*, and *Hecuba*), Foley presents as many very specific variations of her theory that the Greek tragedians locate in their female protagonists standards of social interaction which are either qualified as outmoded by the new ideology of the city state, or politically uncalled for because they defend the claims of those who through the political behaviour of Classical Athens find themselves in a position which does not allow them successfully to speak up for themselves. The significance of female acts in Greek tragedy, therefore, is not only viewed with respect to women's own marginal position, nor simply seen as the threatening other to male identity. Female acts in Greek tragedy are rather related to sentiments based on ethical models of the archaic or heroic past still present in Classical Athens and to the interests of other members of society who are equally marginalized or subdued through the discourse of the city-state.

The reader of this book is overwhelmed by the complexity and acuteness of its thought, the wealth of historical evidence adduced, and the extensive and constant dialogue with both the tragic texts and modern scholarship pertaining to them. It certainly answers the question in which way an anthropological approach can illuminate literature without depriving it of its own right. However, in exploring Greek tragedy as "the other" to our own culture, it makes us aware of those points in our study and reception of Greek models where we are prone to appropriate these to our own ends. If nothing else, this will certainly tell us where our own interests lie when we engage with *Female Acts in Greek Tragedy*.

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Scott Consigny, *Gorgias: Sophist and Artist*, ser. Studies in Rhetoric/Communication (Columbia. University of South Carolina Press, 2001), XIII + 242 pp.

This book urges that 'Gorgias is a sophisticated thinker and an accomplished artist' (p. 203); more, that he is 'a seminal thinker and artist who provides us with a compelling way to integrate our own notions of language, inquiry, truth, selfhood, community, and art' (p. 210).

An introductory chapter discusses the evidence, sketches the difficulties, indicates the main differences among interpreters, and proposes a 'hermeneutic model' and an interpretative strategy.

The business of the book is done in three parts. Part I looks at Gorgias' views on truth, knowledge, and language. It rejects a 'subjectivist' interpretation, and also an 'empiricist' version: it urges that Gorgias should be seen as an 'antifoundationalist'. Part II turns to ethics and politics: there Gorgias was neither a hedonist, nor an irrationalist, nor yet a humanitarian liberal. Rather, and in line with his antifoundationalism, he was a conventionalist—and the fundamental conventions were those which governed 'the *agon*'. He was also a vigorous Panhellenist. Part III looks at Gorgias' style. He aimed in his language neither to imitate the irreducible subjectivity of things, nor yet to produce a lucid reflection of empirical fact. Rather, his style is that of epideictic performance—a performance which at once reveals and reinforces his antifoundationalism.

A coda eulogizes the antifoundationalist Gorgias, and offers a few remarks on his

modern inheritors; but the book does not purport to analyse Gorgias' place in the development of the classical tradition.

Each of the three Parts begins with a critical and destructive chapter. 'My goal is to articulate an account of Gorgias that is more compelling than other accounts currently articulated in the scholarly community' (p. 20) Hence Consigny paraphrases his rivals and then explodes them. He is often successful (some of his rivals have produced the most frightful stuff); but his success is illusory: although his bibliography is large, it is exclusively anglophone; and he has missed not only the best recent work on Gorgias, but also such classics as Heinrich Gomperz' *Sophistik und Rhetorik* (Leipzig & Berlin 1912; repr. Stuttgart 1965).

Nor does Consigny know Greek. The book contains trivial howlers: *'de on'* is a phrase meaning 'duty' (p. 112), *'narthekas'* is nominative singular (p. 178); and Consigny writes *'paro-nomasia'* (p. 177) and *'dipla onoma'* (p. 179). Such things irritate. Rather more serious is the fact that Consigny has little inkling of the nature of the disparate texts which he cites: he thinks that 'all of Gorgias' "actual words" are lost' (p. 12); and he treats the various items in the Diels-Kranz collection as more or less equal. (To be sure, he also supposes that 'there is no original and determinate text to be discovered': p. 18.) But the Greeklessness is most serious in Part III, where Consigny describes and evaluates Gorgias' style without having read what Gorgias wrote. The results are sometimes comic—for example, he suggests that Gorgias' use of antithesis has parallels in Parmenides (p. 159). He is a professor of English: what would he say of an essay on Shakespeare's style written by someone who had no English?

None of this would matter so much were Consigny's central thesis plausible. So was Gorgias an antifoundationalist? And first, what is antifoundationalism? It is a position allegedly occupied by such luminaries as Wittgenstein and Rorty, Derrida and Lyotard, and Stanley Fish (p. 60), and it insists on 'the mediated, constructed, partial, socially constituted nature of all realities, whether they be phenomenal, linguistic or psychological' (p. 169). Thus Consigny characterizes Gorgias as

> an antifoundationalist who depicts language as a family of tropes or maneuvers, who sees inquiry as a process of debate in socially sanctioned agons, and who construes truth as a label of endorsement awarded by communities to those accounts they deem most persuasive. (p. 149)

The construal of truth is what counts; for Gorgias

> rejects as misguided the project of discovering an objective or subjective truth and ... instead sees truth as a label of endorsement awarded by a community to an account that it finds most persuasive. (p. 60)

You might think that it's true that pigs can fly if and only if pigs can fly. Not a bit of it: it's true that pigs can fly if and only if some community endorses the proposition that pigs can fly—the pigs themselves have no say in the matter.

Tosh, Fish. But Gorgias was a sophist—so why not also a tosh-monger? Well, the evidence for ascribing antifoundationalism to Gorgias consists in a single phrase at the end of the first sentence of his *Helen*:

> κόσμος πόλει μὲν εὐανδρία, σώματι δὲ κάλλος, ψυχῇ δὲ σοφία, πράγματι δὲ ἀρετή, λόγῳ δὲ ἀλήθεια.

What adorns a speech—what makes it a good speech, an admirable speech—is truth (rather than, say, fine words or learned footnotes); just as what makes a soul excellent is wisdom (and not, say, passion or a versatile imagination). The sentiment is trite—but ne'er so well expressed. And there is a certain piquancy in the offing.

But what on earth has it to do with antifoundationalism? Consigny explains:

> In Gorgias' succinct phrase, the fairest 'ornament' of *logos* is truth. Just as a community decorates or ornaments its heroes, so it decorates the account of the victorious rhetor with the ornament of 'truth'. In opposition to the foundationalist, who views truth as existing outside all human contexts and serving as a criterion for assessing various claims, Gorgias holds that truth is an accolade or ornament (*kosmos*) awarded by a community to an assertion or argument it finds persuasive. (p. 89)

Consigny repeats the explanation twice (pp. 135, 169); but as an interpretation of Gorgias it is fantastical. Gorgias' antifoundationalism has no foundation.

This ridiculous misinterpretation is not an isolated slip. In another anodyne sentence from the *Helen* Consigny discovers the theory that 'to iterate a name . . . is to reify, to create the illusion that the object named "exists" independently of the naming' (p. 181). He thinks that Plato, *Meno* 71E-72A conveys or implies a general theory of meaning (p. 78). He discovers a remark about agriculture in B 16 = Arist. *Rhet* 1406b9-11 (p. 136). He takes B 29 (= *Gnom Vat* 166—probably not Gorgian) to imply that philosophy is 'a form of seduction' (p. 37). And so on.

Not that all Consigny's exegesis rests on misunderstandings—some of it rests on nothing at all. For example, he asserts that 'to Gorgias, morality is demonstrated by participation in the community's sanctioned agons, the customs or conventions of the agonistic community' (p. 134). There is no trace of such a thought in Gorgias. He asserts that Gorgias 'repeatedly affirms that we are quite warranted in our belief that ordinary things truly exist' (p. 48). Gorgias does not affirm it once—he does not even mention 'our belief'. And so on.

This work of unscholarship, repetitive and ill-written to boot, has no adornment and merits no endorsement.

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Sulochana R. Asirvatham, Corinne Ondine Pache, and John Watrous (eds.), *Between Magic and Religion: Interdisciplinary Studies in Ancient Mediterranean Religion and Society* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), XXIX + 212 pp.

The ten pieces by a group of junior (with the exception of S. Cole, female) scholars published here proceed from a colloquium held in 1998. The standard is high throughout, and no contributor can be said to let her fellows down. The volume is perhaps betrayed a little, however, by its title and its blurb. Many will groan on sight of the former, threatening, as it does, yet more inconclusive, ponderous verbiage on the tired old magic/religion debate. The impression is enhanced by the improbable unattributed claim printed underneath Gregory Nagy's foreword and on the back cover: 'No

reader will ever think of magic and religion in the same way after reading through the findings presented in this book'. This will be ascribed most charitably to an overexcited advertising department. But it is a relief to discover that the magic-religion linkage serves principally here as a flag of convenience under which to unite papers on a highly disparate range of subjects, which range from Classical Athens through twelfth-century France and on to seventeenth-century America. The substantial introduction, to which discussion of the debate is largely confined, has to work hard to find any shape or coherence in this diverse material, but rises to the challenge at the rhetorical level at any rate. In fact the emphasis of the volume is heavily on the religion side, with a number of pieces making no use of the term 'magic' whatsoever. Given the great diversity of content, the volume is most fairly viewed as a sum of good parts.

C.O. Pache ("Barbarian Bond: Thracian Bendis among the Athenians" [pp. 3-11]) reviews the (fairly meager) evidence for the worship of the Thracian goddess Bendis at Athens and applies to it what she is pleased to call 'the rhetoric of alterity.' The Artemis-like goddess was worshipped in the city by both Athenian citizens and Thracians, but the two groups were kept apart in separate yet parallel cults. Pache sees religious practice as a key factor in Greek-self-definition, and accordingly contends that this arrangement reflects the ambivalence of the Athenians' attitudes towards Thracians, who were sometimes seen as 'same' and sometimes seen as 'other.' The argument might have been enriched by more detailed consideration of the case of Zalmoxis, who is only mentioned in passing here as an example of weird Thracian 'otherness' (4); but what of his complex integration into the traditions of Pythagoras and the Greek 'shamans' (Herodotus 4.94-6)? And there has been much work on Philochorus' heavily featured fragment on the *orgeônes* since Ferguson's in the first half of the last century (8).

Z. Várhelyi ("Magic, Religion, and Syncretism at the Oracle of Claros" [pp. 13-31]) investigates the five fascinating responses (preserved in inscriptions) given by Clarian Apollo to Asia-Minor cities consulting it about the great plague of the 160s AD, namely Sardis (if Graf's identification is correct), Hierapolis, Callipolis, Caesarea Trocetta and Pergamon. The response to Sardis brings in Artemis to melt the mage's voodoo dolls that are here said to be the cause. The responses to Hierapolis, Callipolis and Caesarea seek to placate angry chthonic powers. The plague-causation this implies may or may not be compatible with that of the Sardis response. But the response to Pergamon makes appeal only to Olympian gods, and evidently works with a very different notion of the cause. Várhelyi plausibly concludes that these variations indicate that it was the different petitioning cities themselves that were offering to Claros for ratification their own causes of and solutions to their own plights, each one making its approach in terms that made sense within its own local religious culture. The value of the Graf-inspired abstract framework in which this good work is wrapped remains dubious, however.

P.J. Jones ("Saving Water: Early Floods in the Forum" [pp. 35-46]) argues that in Augustan literature the waters of Rome, in particular the Tiber, acted as a numinous buffer against threats to the Roman state. Her case rests principally upon the myths of Tarpeia and Mettius Curtius and tales of the construction of the Cloaca Maxima under Tarquinius Priscus. The Tarpeia example, as laid out, is less compelling than the others.

K. Blair-Dixon ("Magic, Dreams, and Ritual in the Iroquois Conversion" [pp. 47-63]) discusses the Jesuit missionaries' attempts to convert the Iroquois in the seven-

teenth century. They responded to Iroquois religion in accordance with the models offered them by attitudes toward paganism expressed by the late-antique Christian writers with whom they were familiar, chiefly Augustine and Gregory the Great. Augustine had established a radical separation between the true Christian religion, and the evil, demonic and magical religion of paganism. Gregory, by contrast, encouraged the incorporation of pagan elements into Christianity. Implicit within both models was the narrative of Christianity's ultimate triumph.

S. Cole ("The Dynamics of Deification in Horace's *Odes* 1-3" [pp. 67-91]) investigates the role — crucial, as he sees it — played by Augustus' poets, Virgil and Horace, in reshaping Greek ruler cult to furnish their emperor with immortality. For him the poets' work, here subjected to close reading, was itself constitutive of this new ideology, but even so interrogated it as they tended to slide the emperor back and forth along the continuum between man and god. But the all-too-familiar, simplistic notion that such interrogations are covert challenges to Augustus' position, with clever liberal poets putting one over on their stolid and unsophisticated master, is here happily eschewed. Rather, we are told, they are indicative of 'the cultural uncertainty of moving into uncharted territory'.

In the volume's most substantial piece S. R. Asirvatham ("Olympias' Snake and Callisthenes' Stand: Religion and Politics in Plutarch's *Life of Alexander*" [pp. 93-125]) contends that Plutarch uses 'the motif of Alexander's divinity as a way of demarking [sic] the line between the "Greek" and "barbarian" elements in Alexander's character'. The Macedonians in general are projected as poised between Hellenism and barbarism. Alexander is shown to move, in the course of his life, in an arc away from barbarism toward Hellenism and back again to barbarism. His early Hellenic tendencies are contrasted with the foil of his parents' supposed depravities and superstitions in connection with Olympias' snake. At Siwah Alexander took an appropriately detached Hellenic attitude toward the notion of his divinity, in which he saw it as a tool to be used in the subjection of the barbarians. But his eventual adoption of Persian obeisance, which now signified his personal devotion to the idea of his divinity, moved Alexander back toward barbarism, and this is in turn contrasted with the foil of the philosophical Callisthenes' Hellenic protests about it.

E.B. Aitken ("The Cult of Achilles in Philostratus' *Heroikos*: A Study in the Relation of Canon and Ritual" [pp. 127-135]) writes on Philostratus' third-century *Heroicus*, building on her recently published collaborative translation of this interesting text for the Society of Biblical Literature (Atlanta 2001). She contends that it is shaped by concerns that were shared with the Christians of the day. The *Heroicus* and the early church alike are anxious to identify the 'right' story, whether it be the true story of the Trojan-war heroes or the establishment of the scriptural canon. Both are interested in the right way to perform cultic activities to ensure the prosperity of their societies, the proper attitudes of cultic participants and the ethics appropriate to their respective communities. And both make appeal to the authority of their respective risen hero, be it Achilles or Christ.

M.M. Fulghum ("Coins Used as Amulets in Late Antiquity" [pp. 139-147]) discusses the iconography of coins and contorniates pierced and worn as amulets in the early Byzantine period. Original pagan iconography can be retained on these but reinterpreted. Winged Victory is transformed into an angel, Alexander on horseback into Solomon, who trampled a Lilith-type demon (such an image could protect pregnancies and small children). I was a little surprised to find no reference here to Siri

Sande's piece on contorniates, 'Famous persons as bringers of good luck', in D.R. Jordan *et al.*, eds., *The World of Ancient Magic* (Papers from the Norwegian Institute at Athens 4, Bergen, 1999) 227-38.

A. Walker contributes "A Reconsideration of Early Byzantine Marriage Rings" (pp. 149-164). Her piece is well illustrated with these splendid gold objects. She champions Kitzinger's view that they served to protect the bond of love between husband and wife, against that of Vikan that they were designed to promote the fertility of the union. In parallel with the coins discussed by Fulghum, these rings could retain originally pagan legends where these were considered Christian-compatible, such as 'harmony' or 'grace'. Scenes too in which the married couple receive a blessing were retained, but the role of the pagan deity was supplanted by Christ, the cross or the Virgin Mary. Rings employing exclusively Christian imagery need not have been considered to be any part of 'magic' by their faithful wearers.

In the final chapter A. Luyster ("The *Femme-aux-Serpents* at Moissac: Luxuria [Lust] or a Bad Mother?" [pp. 165-191]) studies a relief panel in the porch of a twelfth-century church at Moissac. This portrays an unfortunate woman with snakes hanging from her breasts and toads bursting forth from her mouth and her genitals. She is accompanied by a hideous demon-tormentor. The figure-type (deriving originally from classical representations of Earth personified, suckling her chthonic snakes) is generally seen as an allegory for the punishment of lust, but the specifics of this image tempt Luyster to a more nuanced interpretation of it. Paying particular attention to the toad's association with reproduction across the medieval world, she finds that the image suggests also the figure of the Bad Mother. Within the wider system of reliefs in the porch the Bad Mother and her demon constitute a hellish inversion of the annunciation scene, and at the same time parallel the representation of Avarice. However, Luyster cautiously confines this reading to the realm of 'reader-response.'

A worthy volume, though the diversity of its essays may limit its market to university libraries and the more dogged ancient-religion collectors.

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Devin Stauffer, *Plato's Introduction to the Question of Justice* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001), VII + 144 pp.

However grave their subject matter, Platonic dialogues lay claim to such buoyancy of form that some corresponding lightness in the commentary might be expected – as in Joseph Cropsey's closing remark on the *Protagoras*: "The two men exchange good-natured civilities, and Socrates departs on the wings of a small myth."[1] But for well known reasons, scholars rarely stay so close to the ways of their author. It is a real pleasure, then, to receive Devin Stauffer's *Plato's Introduction to the Question of Justice.* The writer is at ease in Plato's world and engages with the paramount issues of the *Republic* in good nature; the result is a fresh meditation on the most familiar of Platonic

1. Joseph Cropsey, *Plato's World: Man's Place in the Cosmos* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 26.

works. This is a book that knows its place – with first-time readers of the *Republic*, with seasoned scholars of Plato, and with readers and writers of contemporary political theory.

Stauffer addresses perplexities in the early *Republic* without being heavy-handed in resolving them. His recounting of its myriad puzzles may bring to mind one's own early encounters with Book 1 – alternately vexed by its seemingly haphazard ways or tempted into feelings of superiority toward the interlocutors. A common first reaction to the text is to wait it out: surely Socrates will conclude with a firm definition of justice, even if he digresses along the way, taunts his respective challengers, and works his audience to a pitch of anticipation. This expectation is thwarted, as Socrates does *anything* but dispose of the question, and insists rather "that the question be neither settled nor abandoned too easily" (Stauffer, 20). It turns out that only when readers relax their initial expectations do the pleasures of reading the text come into view. The process of reading gets more and more interesting as the odd observations multiply: Cephalus the elder is but a child; Polemarchus, his son, may be brought to any conclusion, and yet he is immovable; and Thrasymachus, whose name has come down in the history of Western political thought as the fierce attack dog of the sophists, really just wants life to be fair. What makes us concur with Stauffer and conclude such things? It is his careful attention to the defensive maneuvers of the interlocutors and to the intentionally weak arguments generated by Socrates, as well as deep respect for other verbal cues of the dialogue.

Stauffer is a detective with an eye for the exemplary detail. So, for instance, he makes much of the differences among the three arguments that Socrates makes in answer to Thrasymachus (347e4-354a11) after the so-called "shepherd speech," where Thrasymachus "makes fully explicit his belief that *there is no common good* and thus that the rulers would harm themselves by serving the ruled" (Stauffer, 97). In Socrates' response, the procedural and substantive problems of justice are laid out at the same time that he draws attention to the perils of his own argumentative method. Stauffer shows how the first and third Socratic responses are interdependent, as they purport to establish that the just man is wise, good, and happier than the unjust man. The arguments are ponderous (the first one alone takes 28 steps, in Stauffer's count; 103), fallacious – yet effective, for they allow Socrates to move back to the side of conventional opinion against the "radical" Thrasymachus, a position he had relinquished in his toying with Polemarchus. Thrasymachus becomes mortified, then, not at the strength of Socrates' argument, but at its easy assimilation to the orthodox view, as his own position stands exposed. He knows enough to blush at his own imprudence. Meantime in the second response, Socrates argues that any common enterprise requires *some* justice among its members for any objective to be attained. In this, Socrates holds on to the troubling double nature of justice – its outer-directedness concerning the good of the whole, and its inner meaning, concerning the good of the individual. Stauffer highlights the two questions that seem to coexist uneasily: first, "what *is* justice?" and second, the Thrasymachean "is justice *good*?" The unresolved problem as we leave Book 1 is "that what we ordinarily take to be justice is of questionable goodness for the individual, and what we might be able to show to be good for the individual is not so clearly justice" (118). Stauffer takes this problem to be underscored and not concealed by the poor arguments to which Socrates himself draws attention (354b4-c3).

The dissatisfaction experienced by all participants in Book 1 is magnified and

drawn out as the discussion proceeds in Books 2-4, for it turns out that their conclusions and definitions at the end of Book 4 merely reproduce their original assumptions. In bringing forth their newly "rigorous" definitions of justice, Socrates acknowledges openly that what they have constructed is an elaboration of their premises (433a). Has any progress been made? The interlocutors know that more needs to be said, that they are still held fast by their conventional views, but it seems significant that this situation is recognized by them as a dilemma still to be reckoned with, as the new Thrasymachus evidences: "What? Do you suppose these men have come here now to look for fool's gold and not to listen to argument?"[2] The seeds for further growth of this argument were planted earlier, when Socrates alluded to some unconventional prospects, in the form of the communism of women and children. The three waves are a helpful image to remind the interlocutors that they must lose their footing before they can begin to escape the rigidities of conventional belief. The waves are the prompt and the pivot that makes ascent possible, for Socrates then introduces the notion of dialectic (454a) and *diairesis*, or division into categories. Stauffer does not take his analysis this far, in line with his project of studying the "humbler beginnings" of the *Republic*. But it is a validation of his approach to recognize that Socrates is leading his interlocutors to refine their multiple points of view by reference to a single concept, but that the ever-present temptation is for them to *settle* on an idea too readily. That is, the interlocutors show a growing capacity to maneuver this line from multiplicity to unity, but their urge to rest on a final position recurs – with the same urgency first seen in Book 1. So Glaucon pleads with Socrates for a full account of the idea of the good: "You're not going to withdraw when you are, as it were, at the end." And Socrates demurs: "you blessed men, let's leave aside for the time being what the good itself is" (506d); the time never comes for resolving *that* issue.

Not until the interlocutors see themselves enacting the literary designs of their dialogue – in the image of the ship, the divided line, the cave – do they come to grips with the substantive challenge of justice. This is to conclude, finally, that Plato is not a Platonist, as John Wallach has recently written: he is "not a dogmatist advocating a new metaphysics of reason or systematic form of discourse as self-sufficient truth but, rather, a critical interpreter of a multidimensional world of words and deeds."[3] And Stauffer imitates this openness of Plato's *Republic* by not overdetermining the issues he brings to the surface. In this he joins a significant trend in recent Platonic scholarship.[4]

Stauffer begins his book where we now conclude, in his civil but devastating indictments of communitarian and liberal thinkers. In their caricatures of Plato, or in their insistence on remaining with the moral intuitions of their own time, thinkers from Rorty to Rawls and Sandel all reveal their antifoundational beginnings in which they bracket out "the metaphysical." This supplies an apparent solidity of belief without them having to defend their points of departure. Stauffer shows that there is a concomitant inability to judge, in a way that makes them strangely in line with the most thoughtless of Socrates' interlocutors. This appears to be more than a mere academic quarrel, as intellectuals have been shown to be lacking in ethical resources to

2. Plato, *The Republic*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968): 450b.
3. John R. Wallach, *The Platonic Political Art: A Study of Critical Reason and Democracy* (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), p.10.
4. See my chapter "Plato's Socrates" in *The Ship of State: Statecraft and Politics from Ancient Greece to Democratic America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 52-70.

deal with the major crisis of the twenty-first century: terrorism and its aftermath of fear, uncertainty, and lack of conviction. Anti-foundationalists come to light as those who would have us stay on the horizon of conventional opinion. By considering their own beliefs as "mere beliefs," Stauffer charges, they relinquish the ability to attain a critical stance. He shows Rawls taking Kant without the universality; implicitly, Stauffer represents contemporary theorists taking their Plato without Socrates.

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Leo Strauss, *Leo Strauss on Plato's Symposium* (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), IX + 294 pp.

Plato, *Plato's Symposium*, translated by Seth Benardete, with commentary by Allan Bloom and Seth Benardete (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 199 pp.

Nothing recent has been written for these two books on Plato's *Symposium* except for a brief foreword by Seth Benardete to the Strauss Lectures which were delivered in 1959. The second book contains a translation that Benardete first published in a collection by Erich Segal in 1986 and a lecture he delivered at the Carl Friedrich von Siemens Foundation in Munich in 1993, published the next year by the Foundation. Sandwiched between the translation and this commentary is the chapter "The Ladder of Love" from Allan Bloom's *Love and Friendship*, which appeared in 1993. These publications by Chicago University Press, however, will be of interest particularly to those who are interested in Strauss' reading of Plato and his influence on a generation of students.

The volume by Strauss is a literal transcription of tapes made of a course he offered at the University of Chicago. The twelve chapters seem to be the twelve lectures that constituted that course. There are gaps, indicated by "[Tape change]," and questions from anonymous listeners. The text of the lectures is a mix of carefully formulated points and an informal, almost extemporaneous, working out of ideas. Strauss often summarizes and repeats points, especially at the beginning of each chapter. The effect is that one feels almost in the presence of the man, or his mind, rather than reading his otherwise rather reserved writings. This is an interesting feeling to have, given Strauss' views on understanding philosophers through their writings, especially Plato. His procedure for the entire lecture course, after justifying how a study of Plato's *Symposium* is appropriate for a course in political philosophy, is to read a few sentences of the text and then comment, sometimes only with a few of his own sentences, sometimes with pages. This means that some of his larger interpretive ideas get explicated in pieces and often explanations are deferred. The compensation for this disorder is that one gets to observe how his interpretations emerge from a close reading of the text. And even though many of the ideas and his general approach are familiar to those who have read his students' work on Plato, one gets the sense reading these lectures of how radical and profound his distinctive style of reading must have been.

A few of Strauss' overall conclusions, of course argued from details of the dialogue, are as follows. The *Symposium* is Plato's version of the profanation of the mysteries that occurred before the Sicilian expedition. It is Socrates, not Alcibiades, who is guilty, and the mysteries are not those of Eleusis, but about the god Eros. This point is connected to a larger theme that the *Symposium* is a presentation of Socrates' hubris, both with respect to the gods and to his fellow human beings. Another interesting focus of Strauss' reading is his attempt at various groupings of the speeches on Eros. For example, the first three are unified in presenting deficient praises because they subordinate eros to something outside of eros: gain for Phaedrus, moral virtue for Pausanias, and techne or science for Eryximachus. The second triad treats eros as an end in itself, and presents a version of the contest between poetry and philosophy. Aristophanes' eros is essentially tragic. The poets also present the fundamental tension within eros between love of one's own and love of the beautiful which Socrates does not quite resolve because his presentation, like the tragic poet, also abstracts from the ugly or lower principle. Strauss has some interesting interpretations of Socrates' speech, for example, that ultimately it is "a poetic presentation of philosophy and its object, and not a philosophic one" (236). And finally, Alcibiades' limitations allow him to feel the religious effect of Socrates' speeches and discover his moderation; he does not fully understand his love of wisdom nor his peculiar virtue.

The translation by Benardete is, in my opinion, both useful and sparse. Although there are no stated principles of translation, it seems that he does not, as most others do, try to produce a literary rendering of this most literary of Plato's works, but a very literal one, thus allowing the strange beauty of the Greek to shine through a not particularly beautiful English. The notes are sparing – there are only 23 notes to the whole text – and they mostly detail the literary allusions. Only a couple of brief ones explain the use of important words like *kalos* and *daimonion*, and there are none on Greek homosexuality or the like. This version will thus be most helpful to those who have some knowledge of ancient Greek and the culture, and who are not new to Plato, either.

Allan Bloom's essay, as noted, is part of a larger book and so, although a speech-by-speech commentary on the *Symposium*, focuses on trying to see what Plato has to say about love and friendship rather than allowing the dialogue to tell the reader what it is about. The first section, accordingly, contains some rather broad-ranging thoughts on such topics as the connection between philosophy and thinking about sexual desires and the major contrast between the traditional Greek and Jewish views on love. There are also references to other authors covered in *Love and Friendship*, like Rousseau, Shakespeare, and Montaigne (Nietzsche is the most frequently cited modern author throughout the essay). Once focused on dialogue, however, Bloom's commentary, like his teacher's, tries to make sense of the details of the drama and speeches, but with the lively and candid style that won him some attention. For example, about Pausanias' praise of pederasty, he says, "To put it shamelessly, but as Pausanias really intends it, the boy is a prostitute. Some prostitutes do it for money, some to get ahead, and others do it for wisdom. Wisdom is admittedly higher, but it is also cheaper" (92). Or, about Diotima's attempt to make philosophic life erotic, "But one has to give up an awful lot of what one originally understood to be desirable about Eros, just as one had to with justice or piety. The philosophic life may contain all other ways of life, but in a way that is completely alien to those who lead them. It is justice without the city, piety without the gods, and Eros without copulation or reciprocity" (147). As an indication

of the kind of interpretation that Bloom works toward, let me quote at length from near the end of his essay, where he is developing the point that "The whole question of Eros comes down to the question of psychology" (174):

> A psychology that hopes to do any justice to the phenomena must begin by understanding the highest and most interesting human types. On the basis of such an understanding, one can easily understand lower and less interesting types simply by slicing off the peaks from the higher ones. But you cannot do it the other way around. You cannot get the causes and motives for the higher types from observing the lower ones, and any attempt to do so will be ludicrously distorting. Plato tries to show in the *Symposium* that philosophy is the most complete and most revealing form of Eros. On that basis he is capable of working down to the activities and hopes of persons who will never be philosophers or perhaps even know that there is such a thing as philosophy. But if one says that the fundamental erotic activity is the gross coupling of two individuals, you can explain the philosophic vision only as some kind of miraculous covering up of what one really wanted, rather than a cosmic solicitation. (175)

Benardete's commentary is short, some twenty pages, and dense, but it contains some very suggestive insights into the dialogue; examples of such follow. He notes about Diotima's postponing the plague in Athens that had she not done so, it would not have been as devastating as it was in an uncrowded city and Athens might have eventually won the Peloponnesian War (192). About Diotima's associating lovers and makers or poets, he says, "Diotima, then, manages to combine the tragic poet Agathon's stress on production and the beautiful as characteristic of Eros with Aristophanes' stress on the recovery of the eternal self as the forlorn desire of Eros" (195). And finally at the end of his essay, Benardete speculates on Alcibiades' misunderstanding of Socrates' moderation and the fact that Alcibiades was eventually to return to Athens to recommend a moderate course of action:

> It is Plato's conceit that this act of moderation was due to Alcibiades' failure to understand Sorates, and thus the enactment in himself of his false image [of Socrates]. It is through this long-delayed effect that Socrates came that close to saving Athens. Now that Alcibiades is dead – he died in 404 B.C .– the crazy Apollodorus can tell the true story. Alcibiades will never know. (199)

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Raymond Geuss, *Public Goods, Private Goods* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), VII + 148 pp.

The positive contribution of this book to discussions about public and private is its methodological point. Geuss believes that consideration of purposes and values should precede attempts to distinguish public and private. The point seems prescient in that the September 11th attack on America and its aftermath, before which Geuss's book was published, validates that belief, in particular by compelling examination of the compatibility between existing civil liberties and national security.

The arguments Geuss makes in connection with that belief show, however, that he has not, despite his early claim that his "final interest" is "the good" (6), sufficiently reflected on the premises from which a consideration of purposes and values must proceed. In particular, Geuss's endorsement, at the end of his book, of Hobbesian claims about man, undermines his conclusion—which he thinks congruent with his methodological point—that there is no single substantive distinction between public and private. If "the urges for self-preservation and self-assertion" have "fundamental status" (112), then the public/private distinction cannot be entirely a function of local purposes and values. Hobbes gives us to understand that it is precisely the human mind and body that define the private and make the matter of living together collectively problematic. In other words, nature defines the private. Paradoxically, nature also gives man the means to master nature, but only to a point: man cannot reconstitute himself. The faculty of reason that authorizes a commonwealth cannot alienate itself from the private urges of the organism of which it is a part. Hobbes thus implies that human purposes and values, and thus conceptions of public and private, will always be shaped by man's fundamental urges.

Of course Hobbes may not be right, or completely right, about human nature, and one might adopt other premises to begin a consideration of purposes and values. Aristotle, for example, believes that our fundamental urges extend beyond our selves to others and the gods, or thought itself, implying that the private is properly the preserve of the entire range of virtue, not just the virtue of self-preservation, and the public its caretaker, with concomitant virtues of its own. Failure to recognize that such premises must inform considerations of purposes and values can yield only arbitrary distinctions between public and private at the local level.

Geuss adopts the wholly relativistic conclusion that he does because he sees only two other alternative theories of public/private and deems them both inadequate. Georg Lukacs cannot arrive at a coherent public/private theory because he incorrectly perceives only the two competing interests of labor and capital rather than the plural interests of innumerable antagonistic groups. Liberal theories, founded by Benjamin Constant and Wilhelm von Humboldt, have not been successful in establishing a clear principle for structuring public and private because their privileging individual sovereignty conflicts with the requirements of law, economics, and politics. Failure to recognize a third alternative, alluded to above, is the main shortcoming of Geuss's book. That alternative is a conception of public and private deriving from a consideration of both the invariable aspects of man's nature and his inevitably variable circumstances. Such a view would recognize different and overlapping public and private goods such as those Geuss identifies (privacy understood variously as for the sake of competitive advantage, concentration, shame-inducing activities, solitude, experimentation, and intimacy; public conceived as fraternity or mutual acceptance, consensual regulation,

and joint enterprise), but unlike Geuss's view would give guidance for locally adjudicating the conflicts those goods present.

To illustrate weaknesses of conceptions of public and private that privilege individual sovereignty, Geuss analyzes not liberal thought, but three specific actions performed by three known figures of Mediterranean Antiquity. According to Geuss, the habitual masturbation by Diogenes the Cynic in the Athenian marketplace, the crossing of the Rubicon by Julius Caesar, and the retreat to spiritual meditation by St. Augustine are private actions that reveal incomplete conceptions of public and private.

Geuss argues that Diogenes' act and the Athenians' objection to it cannot provide the framework for a public/private model because the notion of the public they imply is defined by the principles of disattendability (the expectation to comport oneself in public in a way that others can easily ignore) and decency, and the notion of the private by the principle of inaccessibility (a place where one cannot offend others)—principles that respectively might be important in the other sphere. For example, concentration to undertake a (private) task such as writing a book review might require the inattention of those in the immediate vicinity; whereas public matters such as protecting national interests might require or benefit from inaccessibility. On this point, my criticism is confined to the way in which Geuss makes this argument, which renders it almost indiscernible.

Geuss's discussion of Caesar crossing the Rubicon argues that Caesar's decision to incite civil war rather than give up his military power is ultimately a selfish and private act, albeit one for the sake of his dignity, because it is contrary to the common good of all Romans. Although Geuss points out the contrast between the Roman sense of public, meaning the realm of things that concern everyone and the agencies over that realm, and the earlier discussed sense, of a realm to which everyone has access, he does not make an obvious next move of relating that contrast to the contrast between the nature of Caesar's action and the nature of Diogenes'. Whereas Diogenes' action corrodes his dignity, Caesar's preserves his. Is there a connection between the respective senses of public delineated in these cases and the nature of the actions of these individuals? Does the free access to the Athenian marketplace, by failing to establish grounds of exclusion, foster licentiousness, as Plato and Aristotle argued? By contrast, does Caesar's concern for his own good not only challenge but mirror the concern of the Roman public for the common good? In other words, does freedom beget freedom, and virtue, virtue, if in altered form? If public and private together preserve, rather than undermine, a communal living arrangement, then perhaps they not only differ, but share traits or values.

Geuss's analysis of St. Augustine's retreat to an isolated villa with a few close friends for spiritual meditation uncovers a third sense of privacy. Privacy is neither a location where one cannot offend others, nor is it a quality of character, such as dignity, that others can recognize and experience. Rather, it is an orientation of the will that yields self-knowledge. Conformity of the will to God's injunctions enables a human being to see himself similarly to the way God does, and thus to see himself more correctly than from any other perspective. This essentially epistemic sense of the private, while compatible with liberalism insofar as it affirms the infinite value of the life of the mind, does not according to Geuss contribute to a liberal definition of the private (sphere) as that which specifically deserves protection.

Had Geuss completed his account of Augustine's act by considering, as he did in

his accounts of Diogenes and Caesar, the motivation for the act, he might have seen that a case can be made that spiritual meditation should be protected by liberal society. Diogenes strives to achieve self-sufficiency, and Caesar, to preserve his dignity. That Augustine sought release from the demand of his teaching career that he constantly prove his competence to others does not account for his engagement in spiritual meditation per se. Was his pursuit of spirituality possibly motivated by some kind of self-interest, by for example the desire for (eternal) self-preservation, (divine) recognition, or (earthly) personal happiness? Although Augustine apparently rejects pagan answers to that question, his own answer and ideas about the self are more difficult to nail down, and may not be incompatible with Hobbes's reflections about the self and Christianity.

Geuss's penultimate chapter on liberalism induces the hope of a proposal or theory about the public and private of his own—some way to think about the distinction that will help us, either as individuals or as a society, or both, to live or cope better, if not politically or materially, then philosophically. But his belief that there is no preeminent conception of either private or public—and thus no good as such—dashes that hope.

Geuss's conclusion is thus not merely skeptical, but cynical. The claim that "Not every public has a common or public good" (94) is wrong. Geuss's metaphor of three persons struggling to stay afloat on a plank that holds only one does not illustrate his point. The common good might be taking turns on the plank. Or, in the case of two parents and a child, it might be the parents letting go. Nor does his example of an extremely deprived society prove that there could be "no policy that would be good for the society as a whole" (95). Just because, whatever is done, "some will live and many will die" does not make impossible a common good, because the imponderables of who will die and when would motivate attempts to find such a good.

In a similar vein, rejection of cosmopolitan liberalism—the necessity of which September 11th drove home, despite continued denials by proponents of cosmopolitanism to the contrary—should not discourage parochial liberalism. Just because western liberal democracies cannot save the world does not mean that they cannot, and should not, save themselves. Although Geuss sounds again prescient in speculating that "a feasible common good for the world might require that some of us . . . say the 600 million or so over-privileged consumers of the developed world, simply did not exist," he notes that that common good would not be ours, and not even probably the result of political decision or social planning, but of "wild forms of large-scale social vengeance"—i.e., not the civilized world's common good (102-103). Having now not the time, resources, or obligation to figure out the whole world's common good, western liberal democracies should hold on to what they've got—warts (in Geuss's view, their private property rights) and all: namely, a political system that recognizes both the sanctity and the limitations, imposed by nature and the prudence of leaders, of a conception of private defined by individual sovereignty.

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Seth Schwartz, *Imperialism and Jewish Society, 200 B.C.E. to 640 C.E.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 320 pp.

Seth Schwartz, Professor of History at the Jewish Theological Seminary, has presented a tremendous challenge—learned and critical, yes, but also, most dramatically, bold and fearless—with the thesis of this book, which is that to make sense of the remains of ancient Judaism one must consider the effects of shifting types of imperial domination and that, incredible as it may seem, there is a direct connection between the rise of the synagogue and the religious ideology that justified its construction and the rise of Christianity. His argument, in brief, is that if we want to understand Jewish society and culture in Palestine during the period from 200 B.C.E. to the time of the Arab conquest we must view Jewish developments in the light of the much broader political, social, economic, cultural, and, most strikingly, religious developments of that period in that part of the world. He has supplied evidence, particularly archaeological, that appears to support his thesis. But even if one questions his conclusions one must stand in awe of his uncanny ability to ask searching questions; and there is hardly a page in which he does not interrupt his argument with a pregnant parenthetical remark followed by a question mark.

Schwartz (p. 10) rightly emphasizes that the authors of all ancient Jewish literature necessarily belonged to a tiny elite; but one wonders at his statement that to his knowledge this has never been previously mentioned. He argues (p. 14) that books of apocalyptic mythology were the product of the same scribal and priestly elites who produced Jewish literature in general; but, if so, we may ask why so many of these books did not survive as Jewish books, and why it is to the Christians that we often owe their survival.

Schwartz (p. 13) contends that during the period under review Torah study did not become more democratic, though we may point out that according to tradition Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach (Jerusalem Talmud, *Ketubot* 8:11.32c) in the first century B.C.E. established schools in Jerusalem and in the area around it and obliged parents to send their children to them. We hear of a similar regulation introduced by Joshua ben Gamala (*Baba Batra* 21a) in the first century C.E. that teachers should be appointed in each district and each town and that children should enter school at the age of six or seven. And the Talmud makes much of the fact that the greatest of the rabbis in the first century, Hillel, was extremely poor (*Yoma* 35b). One wonders, therefore, at Schwartz's statement that Torah study did not become more democratic.

Schwartz (p. 14) argues that it was imperial support for the central national institutions of the Jews, the Jerusalem temple and the Torah, that helps to explain why these eventually became the chief symbols of Jewish corporate identity. But the centrality of the Temple for Jews surely is clear in the Books of Kings and in the weeping for the destruction of the Temple in Jeremiah and the Book of Lamentations.

Schwartz (p. 20) wonders why the Persian kings in the sixth century B.C.E. should have been interested in sponsoring the return of the Jews from the Babylonian captivity and, as he puts it, "imposing Judaism on the Jews." However, we may remark, the Persians had a huge empire in which the Persians themselves, including their language, were in the minority; and it was in the interest of the Persians, as of Alexander and the Romans after them, to be tolerant toward various minorities. In particular, the Jews, who were numerous, would, in gratitude, be especially loyal to the Persians, especially on the sensitive border with Egypt.

Scholars wonder how it happened that the Hasmoneans, after their hard-fought triumph over the Hellenizers, so quickly embraced Greek culture. Schwartz remarks that this facilitated their integration with their neighbors and, we may add, with the many non-Jews living in their newly acquired kingdom. Indeed, Schwartz (p. 40) convincingly suggests that the Hasmonean expansion was a small-scale version of Roman imperialism and that the Hasmoneans may have been inspired by the example of their allies, the Romans, who had combined the exercise of force with judicious granting of Roman citizenship to those whom they conquered. This, he says, will also explain the forcible conversion by the Hasmoneans of vast (though one may question this word, since we have no figures at all) numbers of non-Judaean Palestinians, notably the Idumaeans and Ituraeans, to Judaism—what we may call imperialism in religion. Schwartz goes further and suggests, though with insufficient evidence, that the Judaization of the Idumaeans and Ituraeans must have been gradual and that the Hasmoneans combined subjection and alliance. He even suggests that it is no coincidence that Christianity arose in Galilee, which was adjacent to one of the annexed districts. However, if there were some connection between the conversion of the Ituraeans in Lebanon and the rise of Christianity in Galilee, one might have expected the Pauline Christians to note and even to emphasize this in their appeal to non-Jews to accept Christianity, just as the genealogy of Jesus in Matthew 1:1 ff. makes a special point of mentioning Rahab and Ruth, non-Jews who were converted to Judaism. Schwartz (p. 42) remarks that we would have expected that the mass conversions by the Hasmonean kings would be controversial, whereas there is surprisingly little evidence that they were. Indeed, we may add, there is in the rabbinic literature, to be sure recorded later, no mention at all of such opposition. We may guess that a major reason for this silence is that there were so many Jews whose genealogy was uncertain. Thus, the Mishnah (*Yadayim* 4:4) relates that a certain Ammonite proselyte asked whether he was allowed "to enter the congregation of the L-rd," since the Bible (Deut. 23:4) specifically declares that an Ammonite may not do so, that is, to marry a born Jew, even to the tenth generation, whereupon Rabban Gamaliel said that he was forbidden; but Rabbi Joshua ben Hananiah and the other rabbis permitted it on the grounds that the Assyrian king Sennacherib had mixed up all the nations, so that it was no longer clear who was an Ammonite.

As to why Josephus says so little about Hasmonean expansion, Schwartz (p. 41) asserts that this was because he was hostile to non-Judaean Jews; but we may reply that Josephus (*Antiquities* 20.17-96) speaks favorably and at length about the conversion to Judaism of the Adiabenian royal family.

Schwartz (p. 51) also asserts that during the first century period there must have persisted alongside public Judaism a subterranean pro-Jewish tradition. We may add that there is evidence of such "Judaizers" or "sympathizers" in Philo (*Quaestiones in Exodum* 2.2), in Josephus (e.g., *War* 2.463), in the New Testament (e.g., *Acts* 10:2), and in pagan writers, such as Juvenal (14.96-99). Schwartz himself says that it may also explain an Aramaic incantation text invoking pagan deities; but, we may object, the mere fact that it is in Aramaic does not necessarily imply that it is Jewish.

Schwartz (p. 56) contends that the authority of the Torah rested not so much on the consensus of the Jews as on the might of the imperial and native rulers of Palestine. But, we may reply, the fact that masses of Jews demonstrated against the introduction of the bust of Caligula into Jerusalem (*War* 2.184-203, *Ant.* 18.240-308) and threatened the Roman governor with an uprising unless he punished the Roman soldier who had cut up a Torah scroll (*War* 2.228-31, *Ant.* 20.113-17) shows that it was

popular feeling and not the act of the authorities that insisted on the authority of the Torah. Schwartz (p. 57) notes that there is remarkably little representational decoration in post-Maccabean Judaea and explains this as due to the intolerance by the authorities of radical dissent, but we must respond by noting that there is little indication that the authorities issued decrees prohibiting it.

One of Schwartz's most striking theories (p. 103) is that a rabbinocentric account of the first four centuries C.E. is inadequate, that the rabbis did not have any officially recognized legal authority until the end of the fourth century, and that the patriarchs, such as Rabbi Judah the Prince, acquired much of their influence precisely by relaxing their ties to the rabbis and by allying themelves with the Palestinian city counsellors, wealthy Diaspora Jews, and prominent gentiles. The Jewish world, he says, was ruled by the patriarchs as a sort of empire in miniature. He argues that Jewish Palestine between 100 and 350 scarcely differed from any other high imperial provinical society. But if there is any truth to the large numbers of students that individual rabbis, notably Rabbi Akiva (*Nedarim* 50a), had, their influence must have been great.

Schwartz (p. 108) asserts that "probably everywhere . . . the failure of the revolts [of 66-70, 115-117, and 132-135] had led to disaffection with and attrition from Judaism." But, we may remark, 4 Ezra, which he cites, reflects the gloom felt by the Jews but does not indicate that it led to defection from Judaism. Schwartz comments that the book cannot have satisfied everyone and that "those whom it failed to satisfy will have reacted with panic, despair, and finally abandonment of Judaism." Perhaps Schwartz is thinking of the reaction of some modern Jews to the Holocaust, but if we examine the writings of pagans (e.g., Cassius Dio), Christians, and the rabbis, we find no such mass defection. We may remark that the fact that apparently so few Jews converted to Christianity would indicate that Jews did keep their separate identity strong. Even after the conversion of the Roman emperors to Christianity in the fourth century it was paradoxically the Roman government that protected the Jews and their institutions. Yet, Schwartz admits that cities with predominantly Jewish populations in the second and third centuries issued coins with pagan gods and symbols. He explains this as due to the fact that the rabbis had a weak hold, if any, on the rest of the Jews. But as to the coins with pagan symbols, why not say that these cities contained pagans also, that the people who governed these cities were most likely non-Jews, and that the coins were intended for circulation not only in the cities but also in surrounding areas that did contain pagans? He argues (p. 159) that pagan art used by the Jews had a specifically pagan religious meaning and that this indicates a post-revolt collapse of any normatively Jewish ideological system. But such pagan symbols in Renaissance Italian *ketubot* are apparently merely decorative, and we may suggest that the same may have been the case here as well.

Schwartz contends (p. 128) that the patriarchs had little impact upon the lives of Palestinian Jews, that their main interest, especially in the fourth century, was in maintaining their ties with the Diaspora, and that this enhanced their fund-raising potential there. He argues (p. 129) that since the rabbis had so little influence, the constitutional role of the Torah was assumed by the Roman government and that in important and surprising respects Jewish Palestine was hardly distinguishable from other eastern provinces. But, we may remark, the government protected the Jews but apparently did not interfere with them; and the fact that so few Jews converted to Christianity even after Christianity became the state religion would indicate that Jews did keep their separate identity strong.

Schwartz (p. 165) suggests that the rabbis' disregard of compromises with idol worship allowed them to live and work in the cities, the very places where they could most easily accumulate wealth, social ties, and influence. But, we may respond, the main reason why the rabbis lived in the cities was that this was where their places of study attracted the largest number of students.

According to Schwartz (p. 175), "A citizen of Caesarea might be a proud Roman citizen, too, but also a Jew, a Samaritan, a Christian, or a Syrian, in addition to thinking of himself as being in some sense Greek. If he took his municipal responsibilities seriously, though, his Jewishness or Christianity would necessarily have been attenuated, for the public life of the city was pagan to the core." This might have been true of Sardis in Asia Minor in the third century, where we have evidence of Jewish members of the city council, but what evidence is there that this was also true in Palestine, so holy to the Christians, after Christianity became the religion of the Empire? As Schwartz himself (p. 189) admits, Tertullian never implies that the legality of Judaism was a matter of state policy. Schwartz himself (p. 192) acknowledges that the emperors explicitly recognized the Jews as a legitimate religious organization, with a clergy whose authority and privileges approximated those of the Christian clergy, but this does not mean that Jews held positions in civic life.

The greatest paradox of all in Schwartz's work is that one of the main causes of the "rejudaization" of the Jews in 350-640 (p. 179) was the Christianization of the Roman Empire and that a great deal of the distinctive Jewish culture was nothing less than repackaged Christianity! The fourth to the sixth centuries are the period when the synagogue was reaching its maximal diffusion in the Palestinian countryside, precisely the period of maximal church construction. Schwartz's explanation (p. 201) of this coincidence is that both point to the growing importance of religion in the self-understanding of the villagers. This may well be an important factor, but we may also suggest that the building boom was also accelerated by the economic prosperity and by the security fostered by the Empire, as well as by the rivalry between the emperor and the Church.

It is the rabbis, Schwartz contends, who rejected the widespread conception of the synagogue as a holy place. Schwartz's chief evidence is from archaeology, which, he claims (p. 182), shows that the Jews, starting in the third century, especially in Palestine, experienced a period of unprecedented prosperity and demographic growth, despite the fact that this has sometimes been regarded as the century that was the key period in the decline of the Roman Empire. The Jews, he contends, engaged in extensive cultural borrowing from their pagan and Christian neighbors, even to the point that, he suggests, many synagogues were built with apses, a feature borrowed from the basilical church but adapted for use as a niche for Torah scrolls, and that many had chancel screens in front of the apses—another borrowing, he says, from church design. But, we may suggest, all that this last point may indicate is that the architects of the synagogues were sometimes or often the same as the architects of the churches (see, e.g., Robin M. Jensen, "The Dura Europos synagogue, early-Christian art, and religious life in Dura Europos," in *Jews, Christians, and Polytheists in the Ancient Synagogue*, ed. Steven Fine [London: Routledge, 1999], pp. 174-189, and the bibliography that she cites). Schwartz (p. 259) contrasts the attitude of the rabbis and of the congregants to the synagogue: the former regarded it as primarily a place of Torah and the study of Torah, whereas the latter looked upon it as a reflection of the heavenly temple and as an inherently sacred space, which is very close to the Christian conception of the

sacred. However, if we examine the rules (Mishnah, *Megillah* 3:1-3 and the Gemara that follows) concerning the sale of a synagogue building one sees that the rabbis viewed it as an inherently sacred space.

Moreover, Schwartz points (p. 199) to the *piyyutim*, the learned poems added to the liturgy, which, he thinks, may have been borrowed from a popular type of Christian liturgical poetry of the period. He cites (p. 263) the striking formal resemblance of some *piyyutim* to the *kontakion*, a type of Christian liturgical poetry written in Greek and, like the *piyyutim*, introduced in the sixth century. He notes (p. 282) that the nearest parallels to the synagogue inscriptions, especially the Aramaic dedicatory formula, *dakir letab* ("may he be remembered for good"), are to be found in pagan temples and churches.

Schwartz contends (p. 192) that starting in the fourth century the Roman emperors explicitly recognized the Jews as a legitimate religious organization with a clergy whose authority and privileges approximated those of the Christian clergy. Apparently, the emperors, like their pagan predecessors, recognized the continued strength of the Jews in numbers and economic power. The rabbis (p. 199) thus paradoxically benefited from the marginalization of the Jews and their rejudaization, though they themselves remained marginal in the Jewish world.

Schwartz stresses (p. 284) that the ideology of the late antique community was characterized by tension between the hierarchy of the rabbis and the egalitarianism of the populace. While the Torah and the rabbis granted special status to priests and scholars, there is little evidence for these groups in the synagogue inscriptions. But, we may counter, this may indicate not tension between scholars and laypeople but merely that the inscriptions memorialize those who gave the money. One is reminded of the story of the person who asked the tourist guide in Tel Aviv, "After whom is the Mann auditorium named—Horace Mann or Thomas Mann?" His answer was: "Neither. It is named after the man who wrote the check."

In the last analysis we must explain the triumph of the rabbis and the Talmud. Why would Christian emperors, who generally were not eager to seek a confrontation with the Christian clergy, have permitted this, though Justinian in the sixth century forbade the Deuterosis, that is the Mishnah? And if the Jews were so indebted to Christian institutions, why do the Church Fathers, who are often so eager to belittle and to denounce the Jews, not make a point of this? One thing does seem clear: the masses seem to have remained true to the Jewish tradition and to have become more and more immersed in the study of the rabbinic tradition. Moreover, most importantly, if the triumph of the rabbis is due to the Christian emperors, how can we explain the triumph of the rabbis in Babylonia under the Parthians and Sassanians, who were not Christians?

But I now return to my initial statement. This is the most original and the most provocative book on this period that has appeared in many years. It will, and deservedly, be the subject of debate for a long time to come.

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Cicerone, In difesa di Lucio Flacco (Pro Flacco), a cura di Giorgio Maselli, ser. Letteratura universale Marsilio (Venice: Marsilio Editore, 2000), 204 pp.

There are more than a few reasons why Cicero's *Pro Flacco* should, over the centuries, have attracted a fair number of editors, commentators, and readers. The speech, delivered in 59 BC on behalf of L. Valerius Flaccus, who was accused of extortion (*de repetundis*) during his governorship of Asia, represents a critical moment in the political history of the late Republic and in Cicero's own political and personal biography. If we are to trust the evidence of the orator's letters to Atticus (e.g., *Att.* 2.19), in this period the "triumvirate" of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus was extremely unpopular among all classes, while Cicero himself enjoyed widespread approval, although he was cognizant of the threat posed by his enemy Publius Clodius, recently elected *tribunus plebis* for 58. From a purely rhetorical point of view, the speech is an excellent specimen (along with the *Pro Fonteio*) of the *topoi* to be employed in the defense of a provincial governor—the very arguments concerning the supposed unreliability of provincial witnesses and the bravery of the accused in defending Roman interests that Cicero himself must have faced in prosecuting Verres more than a decade earlier. The speech also constitutes a useful sourcebook on various social, legal, and economic aspects of Rome's relationship with its provinces and Roman attitudes towards the Greek east.

Maselli's treatment of the *Pro Flacco* may be divided into three areas: textual edition, introduction/commentary, and translation. Of the first little will be said, as Maselli has, for the most part, followed Friedrich Zucker's 1963 edition—although, as he points out, his edition differs from Zucker's "in the more frequent use of quotation marks (to indicate *sermocinatio*), in the use of the letter v (following Italian printing conventions), in the preference assigned to particular readings." The reasons behind the choice of the more important of these readings are clarified in the notes. Maselli also differs from Zucker in the order in which he prints the fragments that belong in the lacuna between paragraphs 5 and 6. Here he follows the same sequence of fragments as used by Luigi Giannaccari in his translation of the speech for the 1967 Mondadori edition—a sequence which, with the minor transposition of one fragment, is also found in Giovanni Bellardi's UTET edition of Cicero's works (*Le orazioni*, Turin, vol. II, 1981).

Maselli's introduction discusses, in a clear and compelling style directed to the expert and the more casual reader alike, a number of contextual issues, including: Flaccus' career, the political atmosphere prevailing in Rome at the time of the trial, and the results of Cicero's successful defense; Cicero's multi-layered rhetorical strategy for winning the goodwill both of the senators, *equites*, and *tribuni aerarii* on the jury and of the *boni* whose interests Cicero equated with his own and those of the republic; various stylistic features of the speech, with special attention to the orator's use of wit/humor/sarcasm (*ridiculum*) and of *varietas*; and the history of the text from ancient to modern times. The issues treated in the introduction adumbrate those given special notice in the commentary. The latter constitutes an extremely rich source of information of every sort about the speech. It is particularly strong in the attention paid to rhetorical analysis of the speech both on the small scale (i.e., *elocutio*) as well as on a larger scale (i.e., *dispositio, inventio*). Equally valuable is Maselli's careful explication in the commentary of difficult legal, political, and economic issues.

While there is a wealth of comment and analysis contained in the introduction

and commentary, several areas of evident interest stand out. Referring to the *Pro Flacco*, Macrobius observed that in it a manifestly guilty defendant had been saved from conviction by Cicero's jokes (*Sat.* 2.1.13), and Maselli is eager to show that the speech as preserved gives ample reason for Macrobius' comment. He alludes to word play, the satirical use of proverbs and sayings, instances of *aprosdoketon*, and various passages containing ridicule, irony, or wit. Although I do not believe that Maselli ultimately proves the thesis that Cicero used the comic element in this speech with more care and allowed it larger scope than in his other speeches (especially the *Pro Caelio* and the *Pro Murena*), Maselli's exploration of the *ridiculum* in the speech is nevertheless a valuable contribution.

A second area of interest concerns the strategy, or—to use the term illustrated so well in the works of Classen, Stroh, *et al.*—the *taktik* of the speech. Maselli accurately sees that, as in the *Pro Murena*, Cicero is here encouraging "jury nullification." In his first footnote, Maselli states that the *leit-motiv* of the speech is that "Lucius Valerius Flaccus, because of his own merits and those of his ancestors, should be acquitted" (151). Although Maselli shrewdly analyses Cicero's layered and polysemous approach to convincing the jury of this proposition (cf. 30: "*una strategia . . . composita e pluridirezionale*") his remarks are confined for the most part to Cicero's attempts to sway the jurors and the *boni* and take little account of the way the oration speaks to the larger popular audience (whether through its original delivery or later publication). This may be related to the fact that Maselli accepts at face value Cicero's contention that the prosecution of Flaccus, as well as that of C. Antonius Hybrida earlier in the year, was motivated by his enemies' desire to destroy those responsible for suppressing Catiline's conspiracy. The fact that much of Hortensius' speech was devoted to praise of Cicero and Flaccus for their actions in 63 (*Att.* 2.25.1) and that Cicero presents this as the chief motivation for the prosecution of Flaccus might well be because the *gloria* for saving the city continued to be a powerful means of gaining sympathy with the masses and not because it had been, implicitly or explicitly, the reason for the prosecutions of either Antonius or of Flaccus. Presenting the case in this way also made it possible for Cicero to use a tried and true tactic, and one he had exploited from the time of his earliest speeches: identifying the defendant's cause with his own. Given the overall astuteness of Maselli's analysis, it is odd that at the end of this footnote reviewing Cicero's strategy he quotes Julius Victor's statement that the chief question pertaining to the case was whether "magistrates in the provinces might dare to order their allies to do that which benefited the (Roman) state." As T.B.L. Webster points out in his 1931 Oxford (OCT) edition of the speech, "the . . . *quaestio* which [Julius Victor] quotes is to be found in *Font.* 17 and has no connexion with the thought of this speech" (54).

On the back cover of this edition of the *Pro Flacco*, the speech is termed "*Una splendida difesa per una cattiva causa*"; but, in fact, it might be more accurately said that the *causa* of defending himself and Flaccus was *buona*, but the *difesa* itself was *cattiva*, for in the speech we are faced with what seems to be Cicero's use of a straightforward ethnic and religious attack on the foreign witnesses who had come to Rome to give evidence against Flaccus. In note 35 and elsewhere Maselli attempts a valiant defense of Cicero's use of this material, but ultimately shows only that 1) the orator was surely not "anti-Greek" in reality; and 2) that this was perhaps the only way he could undermine the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses.

Maselli's translation is clear and eloquent. He gives particularly lively versions of

several instances of *sermocinatio* and *percontatio*, i.e., passages where Cicero voices the supposed objections or thoughts of a listener continuously or as a fictional dialogue. In section 6, Cicero says:

> *At vero in summo et periculosissimo rei publicae tempore etiam ab inimicis eadem praetura laudatur. "At a testibus laeditur." Ante quam dico a quibus, qua spe, qua vi, qua re concitatis, qua levitate, qua egestate, qua perfidia, qua audacia praeditis, dicam de genere universo et de condicione omnium nostrum.*

This Masilli renders as:

> *Anzi in un momento molto delicato e molto pericoloso per lo stato tale pretura viene lodata persino dai suoi avversari. "Anzi da alcuni testimoni viene lordata." Prima di parlarvi di costoro, delle lusinghe, delle pressioni, delle circonstanze con cui sono stati condizionati, della inconsistenza, miseria, malafede e sfrontatezza che li caratterizza, vi parlerò della loro categoria nel suo complesso e della condizione di noi tutti.*

Here Maselli has been able to reproduce the play on words *laudatur/laeditur* with *lodata/lordata*. While electing not to continue the anaphora throughout the passage (as has Cicero with the repetition of *qua*) or to match the elaborate metrical effects (three one-syllable words followed by four four-syllable words) he has nevertheless produced a weighty and sonorous period, yet sufficiently lively in sound and rhythm to carry the reader to its end.

While the translation, excellent as it is, is perhaps no more skillful than that of Bellardi (or, for that matter, of Giannaccari), the mere fact that almost twenty years have passed since Bellardi's edition has allowed Maselli to produce a work that is, at least to my ear, less "flowery," more "modern"—despite the need to translate passages as elaborate as that quoted above.

Maselli's *Pro Flacco*, then, is an excellent representative of a type of text common in continental Europe, less so in Great Britain, and all but non-existent in America: an edition of a classical work meant not as a school text but rather directed at the educated "humanistic" reader. For this reader the introduction provides an excellent rhetorical and historical background to the speech, the commentary illuminates a wide variety of issues of complexity and importance, and the translation is at once a work of literary craft and an interpretation of the meaning of the speech.

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Antonio Santosuosso, *Storming the Heavens : Soldiers, emperors and Civilians in the Roman Empire* (Boulder, CO : Westview Press, 2001), XI + 265 pp.

Poursuivant une œuvre récemment entreprise (*Soldiers, citizens and the Symbols of War from classical Greece to Republican Rome, 500-167 BC*, Boulder, 1997),[1] le Professeur A. Santosuosso nous donne un ouvrage agréable à lire et intéressant parce qu'il pose de nombreux problèmes importants pour comprendre l'histoire de Rome. Ce nouveau livre montre surtout comment l'armée romaine a évolué, en expliquant qu'elle a su s'adapter aux circonstances historiques diverses qu'elle a dû affronter. Il peut être divisé en trois parties.

1. À l'époque républicaine, c'étaient les aristocrates qui commandaient les armées. Le temps de Marius vit s'opérer un grand changement. D'une part, les guerres contre Jugurtha puis contre les Cimbres et les Teutons, et d'autre part, la volonté politique de l'*imperator* entraînèrent des modifications profondes de l'institution militaire. En ouvrant les légions aux hommes les plus pauvres, les prolétaires, Marius a provoqué la naissance d'une nouvelle armée : le salaire prit une plus grande importance, un nouvel équipement s'imposa, des transformations de la tactique furent mises en œuvre et le système traditionnel de valeurs, le *mos maiorum*, fut sinon abandonné du moins en déclin.

Ce début de reconstruction, très convaincant dans l'ensemble, n'appelle que deux remarques portant sur des détails. D'abord, il est possible que Tite-Live commette un de ces anachronismes dont il est coutumier quand il mentionne l'existence de cohortes en Orient dès 178 avant J.-C. (XLII, 31), car la cohorte est sans doute née dans la péninsule Ibérique peu après. Ensuite, on peut se demander s'il ne faut pas montrer de l'esprit critique à l'égard des auteurs de l'Antiquité quand ils parlent de déclin moral, d'abandon du *mos maiorum*, de renonciation aux vertus des anciens ; l'excellence du passé et le déclin du sens civique sont des banalités de tous les temps, et on les rencontre fréquemment chez les auteurs de l'Antiquité. Quoi qu'il en soit, ce premier chapitre montre le souci de l'auteur de relier le fait militaire à l'histoire sous ses divers aspects, politique, économique, sociale et culturelle. Son principal apport tient à ce qu'il accorde une grande importance aux faits qui relèvent de la psychologie collective, en insistant sur le rôle du *mos maiorum*. Le lecteur aura le droit de ne pas approuver; en ce début de XXIe siècle, il ne pourra pas nier l'originalité de la démarche.

Quand elle cessa d'être une armée de citoyens, l'armée romaine devint « une armée de pillards », dit ensuite A.S. (ch. 2, p. 29 sv). Il faut peut-être, toutefois, envisager une autre manière d'aborder le problème, car le butin ne peut pas être assimilé au pillage; c'était lui qui poussait tous les soldats de tous les peuples de l'Antiquité à faire la guerre, et à bien la faire ; le droit « international » reconnaissait parfaitement son caractère légal. La troupe intervint aussi dans les conflits politiques et sociaux. L'auteur essaie alors de décrire « *the face of the new soldier* » (p. 34), ce qui est très moderne et bien venu. Les massacres qui inaugurent la dictature de Sylla en 82 illustrent cette nouveauté. Il faut cependant minorer l'ampleur de ce drame et replacer la première proscription dans son contexte ; F. Hinard, *Les proscriptions de la Rome républicaine*, Paris-Rome, 1985, a montré qu'elles étaient au contraire un moyen de canaliser la violence, et donc de la limiter.

1. [Cf. the review by Loren J. Samons III in this journal, *IJCT* 7 (2000/2001), pp. 265-266. – W.H.]

2. C'est César qui acheva ce nouveau type de soldat, qui fut désormais un professionnel et devint un acteur politique majeur. Le lecteur curieux approfondira cette question avec L. Canfora, *César, le dictateur démocrate*, Paris, 2001 (= *Giulio Cesare: il dittatore democratico*, Rome, ^{2}1999), et avec notre livre *César, chef de guerre*, Paris, 2001. À noter qu'on ne parle pas encore de *Lugdunensis* ou Lyonnaise en 58 avant J.-C. (carte p. 59), la ville de Lyon ayant été fondée seize ans plus tard. Pour en revenir au rôle de César, A.S. le crédite de nombreuses améliorations, en ce qui concerne la logistique, le renseignement, etc., ce qui est tout à fait juste. L'œuvre d'Auguste compléta et acheva celle qui avait été entreprise par le dictateur. L'armée cessa d'être l'armée du peuple Romain pour devenir l'armée de l'empereur, comme l'a bien montré B. Campbell, *The Emperor and the Roman Army*, Oxford, 1984. Le nouveau mode de recrutement des hommes explique en grande partie la solidité de l'empire : venus de plus en plus des provinces, les soldats se battaient bien puisqu'ils défendaient leur propre terre.

L'armée de l'Empire présente plus de points forts que de faiblesses. Les thèses de Luttwak sont examinées avec mesure (p. 119) ; elles ne sauraient donc être totalement rejetées, point de vue digne d'approbation. Les ennemis sont clairement identifiés, Bretons et Germains ; sans doute faut-il accorder une grande place aux Parthes ou Perses. Quant au Teutoburgerwald (p. 139-140), il faut dorénavant tenir compte des travaux de nos collègues allemands qui ont retrouvé le site de cette bataille à Kalkriese et qui y ont fait des fouilles remarquables (voir, à ce propos, *Arminius und die Varusschlacht*, édit. R. Wiegels et W. Woesler, Munich, 1995, et *Rom, Germanien und die Ausgrabungen von Kalkriese*, édit. W. Schlüter et R. Wiegels, Osnabrücker Forschungen zu Altertum und Antike-Rezeption 1, Osnabrück, 1999). Pour résumer ce passage, nous dirons que la principale explication du succès des armes de Rome tient à un choix politique : les vainqueurs ont voulu transformer les vaincus et en faire des citoyens Romains au lieu de les garder comme sujets.

3. Une troisième étape est marquée par une série de réformes : Septime Sévère provoqua une rupture entre les provinces et l'Italie, Gallien créa une armée mobile et une réserve de cavalerie dont il ne faut peut-être pas exagérer l'importance, et enfin Dioclétien et Constantin opérèrent des choix stratégiques et tactiques, repoussant le corps de bataille loin des frontières. On arrive alors à l'armée du Bas-Empire. De nouveaux ennemis apparurent, et un autre instrument de guerre se mit en place pour barrer le passage aux envahisseurs. Curieusement, l'auteur étudie la bataille de Strasbourg (357) après celle d'Andrinople (378). Mais ce renversement de la chronologie vise à justifier une théorie. Pour A.S., et nous partageons absolument son point de vue, le monde romain disparut entre 410 et 476 (p. 187), c'est-à-dire que l'Occident romain devint l'Occident barbare dans cet intervalle, pendant que l'Orient romain se transformait en monde byzantin.

Reste alors à expliquer l'échec des armes de Rome. Plusieurs hypothèses peuvent être formulées et, pour l'auteur, la principale relève de la démographie : « *The major problem was the lack of manpower* » (p. 216). Mais, dit-il, la crise économique qui frappa l'Europe doit également être prise en compte (p. 214), ainsi que le déclin quasi total du sens civique, abandon qui fit perdre toute son efficacité à la défense de l'Empire. Tous ces facteurs ont assurément joué, et on rappellera également la thèse d'A. Ferrill, *The fall of the Roman Empire. The military explanation*, Londres, 1999, qui accorde, lui, une grande importance aux faiblesses de l'armée romaine du Bas-Empire. Elle s'était épuisée dans les guerres civiles qui ont ponctué le IVe siècle ; l'encadrement avait perdu sa valeur ; les stratégies de Constantin (armée en arrière du *limes*) et de Théodose (instal-

lation de barbares du côté romain du même *limes*) étaient mauvaises ; enfin, la division politique du monde méditerranéen se révéla funeste pour l'Occident.

Derrière une histoire qui est, finalement, bien connue dans ses grandes lignes, nous relèverons ce qui, à notre avis, constitue les apports originaux d'A. Santosuosso. Il accorde une réelle importance dans l'histoire aux facteurs moraux et psychologiques, de même qu'il privilégie le rôle de grands personnages comme Marius, César, Auguste et Septime Sévère. De ce fait, son livre se présente souvent comme une thèse. Il suscitera donc des débats, pour lesquels ont été ouvertes ici quelques pistes.

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Kirk Freudenburg, *Satires of Rome: Threatening Poses from Lucilius to Juvenal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 289 pp.

In this follow-up to his book on the satires of Horace, *The Walking Muse: Horace on the Theory of Satire* (Princeton, 1993), Freudenburg extends his range to cover not only Horace (once again, but with a different focus), but also Lucilius (who does not rate a separate section but is omnipresent), Persius and Juvenal. The two books have much in common, and F. covers many of the important issues introduced in *The Walking Muse*: the historical context of the satires, the figuring of the satiric speakers as fictional characters (and so "impersonal"), the split between the persona and the author/speaker, the positioning of the satirist himself as one of the main objects of the satire, and parody as one of the defining characteristics of Roman satire. F. departs here from his earlier highlighting of satire as poetry and a genre about writing, a topic more appropriate to Horace than to Persius or Juvenal. As in his earlier book, F.'s strength in *Threatening Poses* is his historical recontextualization of the satires and his insistence that the meaning of the satires draws much of its strength from its cultural, historical, social and political matrices. F. is right to believe that satire cannot *mean* without being embedded in these matrices, and, further, that we, the audience/readers, cannot make meaning without attention to the context out of which the satires arose.

F.'s stated aim is to try to answer the question "What is satire?" by drawing "the study of Roman satire out from the shadowy margins of Roman literary history . . . by locating its most salient possibilities and effects at the center of every Roman reader's cultural and political self-understanding" (3). He intends to do this by examining the major practitioners of Roman satire and the shifts in focus and tone in these writers, not as simply "generic adjustments" but rather as "separate chapters in a . . . generically encoded story of Rome's lost . . . Republican identity" (3). He claims to be charting new territory by asking not "vertical" questions (e.g., how did each satirist respond to his predecessor in turn?) but rather "horizontal" questions (e.g., how can we study each satirist's response to "specific pressures felt in the separate political and social worlds that they inhabit" [4]?). In his focus on the crisis in Roman identity, the Roman self and aggression as a defining feature of the elite, male Roman, F. follows in the footprints of Habinek, whose book, *The Politics of Roman Literature: Writing, Identity, and Empire in Ancient Rome* (Princeton 1998), similarly focuses on literature as a representation of society and aims to assess the social function of Latin literature. Indeed,

this contextualizing of Roman literature in its social and cultural framework has become one of the dominant approaches to Roman literature of late; thus F. is not really wading into uncharted waters but is following a good and useful trend.

F. does not intend this to be a comprehensive study of Roman satire but rather a "free-roaming sampling of poems that . . . best expose the hidden pressures behind each poet's 'choosing' to speak the way he speaks" (5). This approach will involve close readings for social/historical issues and also "implicit political motivations, often quite topical and author-specific." Thus, in his three long chapters on Horace, Persius, and Juvenal, F. goes back and forth between close attention sometimes to particular passages, turns of phrase, literary borrowings and wordplay, and at other times to the cultural and social contexts of the satires (he has not, then, departed entirely from literary critical readings in this second book). Although Lucilius does not rate his own chapter, he is accorded primacy of place as the *inventor* of this genre (if indeed this is a genre, a question on which F. indicates some doubts), the progenitor of the three satirists who followed in his wake, and, in particular, the earliest of these, Horace.

Certain themes emerge repeatedly as the book progresses: lines of influence ("consultation dialogues") between and among the ancient authors and the importance of intertextuality for making real sense of these texts; the figuring of the author as a fictional construct; the vital role of readers/audience for making sense of the satires by acting as commentators and diagnosticians (reader response criticism is used heavily by F.); the great cultural obsession of the Roman writers of the early empire with their recent, traumatic past under the Julio-Claudians and Flavians (this appears mostly in the third chapter, on Juvenal); Roman satire in its role as drama, spectacle and show (and the speakers and readers as part of the show); satire's role as parody (so Juvenal is not really full of *ira* and *indignatio* but rather parodying "the whole indignation industry" [239]); and the vital importance of positionality (of both writer and reader) in making meaning.

F. is adept at making these writers come alive for us, both by embedding them securely in their social/historical contexts and by his almost aggressively lively style. This is not dull writing; it is designed to pull us up short and to shock us out of our readerly lethargy: so "hermeneutical SWAT-teams" (236); Lucilius' "pornographic romp" (55); "a cheap pornographic sideshow featuring Nero's outsized dick performing spectacular feats of multiple-penetration on Rome's . . . orgasmic aristocracy" (129); the "Golden-Age-Nero action figure stuffed into every Roman *Happy Meal*" (143); the Persian performer's "tear-jerking (-off) show" (164). The writing is flamboyant, attention-getting. But often it attracts too much attention to itself and distracts from the argument, and the (interactive) reader feels misled by the odd, slangy diction and the show that F. is putting on. One wonders by the end if F. is purposely trying to become a part of this spectacle in which he claims we readers are all complicit.

There are some serious problems with F's book. He makes greater claims to originality than he should; his approach has been pioneered by others (see above) and they are sometimes left unmentioned. While he is generous in his acknowledgements in many cases (see, e.g., the Acknowledgements section and frequent notes), there are some very surprising omissions. F. claims at the outset (and in the title) to be focusing on satire's aggressive speech as "a key defining feature of the elite, male self" (3), but no mention is ever made of Amy Richlin's hallmark work on this topic, *The Garden of Priapus* (New Haven, 1983) — it is not even listed in the Bibliography. One of F's major, and most interesting, observations is that satire is full of problem passages,

which should be seen as "meaning-filled entanglements rather than obstructions to meaning" (6). Most older commentators are stuck in an Aristotelian rut, he says, obsessed with finding "clear and stable meanings." But these obstructions and awkward moments often *are* the point of satire; so, as Barbara Johnson has framed it: "The poem is not *about* something *separate* from the activity required to decipher it" (quoted, via John Henderson, on p. 236). This, it seems to me, is the most productive way to approach Roman satire. But it has been done before for a variety of classical authors, and F. needs also to generously acknowledge this very sophisticated work that has preceded his (starting with Pierre Macherey's classic work, *A Theory of Literary Production* [London & Boston, 1978 = *Pour une théorie de la production littéraire*, Paris, 1971], and, among other classicists, see in particular the work of Paul Allen Miller, W. R. Johnson and the special issue of *Arethusa* [31.3, 1998] on Roman satire edited by Gold and Braund).

F. makes use of a wide array of critical and theoretical approaches to the text (reader response, genre, narratology, intertextuality, performance), and this openness to such a range of hermeneutical tools generates interesting questions for Roman satire but also at times confuses. Particularly at the end, F. gets caught in a welter of ideas that sometimes run *in contrarias partes*. So Juvenal becomes the butt of his own satires, then we (readers) ultimately become the butt, duped by Juvenal, then we (readers) become embedded (with Juvenal) in this satiric drama, then we *become* Juvenal, and then Juvenal and we become the show. Perhaps I too am still naively searching for stability, but I found myself wishing occasionally for a somewhat clearer sorting out of who plays which role in this dramatic spectacle. Since the book ends quite abruptly without any conclusion, there is no chance for any last reflections on the ideas presented.

Included in F.'s book is a list of key dates (suggesting the importance of historical context to his analyses) and a glossary of key terms. It was not clear to me why such a book, which is written for specialists, would need a glossary. Professional classicists would know these words (e.g., consul, neoteric); non-professionals would need to know far more (e.g., ecphrasis). Who then is F.'s putative audience?

In sum, F.'s book fills a gap in a field—Roman satire—that has only recently begun to attract the kind of sophisticated approaches that have been applied to other genres. And it is useful to have a broader study devoted to several authors of the genre of satire instead of an in-depth study of one author. There are interesting ideas collected here, many adapted from F.'s worthy predecessors, that should hatch new growth in the ever-evolving satire industry.

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James L. Kugel (ed.), *Studies in Ancient Midrash* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 177 pp.

James Kugel has edited the proceedings of a one day conference on early Midrash into a volume of eclectic studies. Six of the essays were delivered at the conference, two further essays (by conference participants) round out the book. Since the only common theme among these essays is their consideration of various forms of early

midrashic literature, with midrash used in a broad sense, they will be reviewed individually.

The introductory essay by Prof. Kugel, "Ancient Biblical Interpretation and the Biblical Sage" (pp. 1-26), focuses on its Wisdom context, a case he has been making since his *Idea of Biblical Poetry* (New Haven: Yale, 1981). Kugel contends there are "four fundamental assumptions about Scripture that characterize all ancient biblical interpretation." These are: 1) "the Bible is fundamentally a cryptic document." 2) "Scripture constitutes one great Book of Instruction." 3) "Scripture is perfect and harmonious." 4) "All of Scripture is somehow divinely sanctioned, of divine provenance, or divinely inspired."

Kugel is engaged in a bit of polemic. He prefers to see midrash grow from a Wisdom milieu, for he can then justify midrash as an inner-biblical development which grows naturally out of canonical Scripture. This argument, which he made in *Early Biblical Interpretation* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986: "Early Interpretation: The Common Background of Late Forms of Biblical Exegesis," pp. 9-106), is a counter-point to Rowan Greer's similar argument about the organic nature of Christian exegesis (found in that same volume: "The Christian Bible and Its Interpretation," pp. 107-203). Yet in arguing here for the natural outgrowth of midrash from the Hebrew Bible and Wisdom traditions, Kugel gives short shrift to the hellenistic origins of ancient midrashic exegesis.

I might quibble with two of Kugel's assumptions, characteristic of "all" ancient interpretation. The great rabbinic sage Rabbi Ishmael expressly rejected his colleague Aqiba's assertion that Scripture was a cryptic document that demanded a special hermeneutic to decode. Ishmael famously insisted that "the Torah speaks in the language of human discourse." I would further debate his insistence that "all" of Scripture is divine in some way, when there are explicit statements in rabbinic literature disagreeing about the canonicity of Canticles, Ecclesiastes, Esther and, perhaps, Job. Despite these quibbles, Kugel's introduction is a masterful exposition of the basic principles of early biblical interpretation.

Albert Baumgarten follows with an essay on the role of "Literacy and the Polemics Surrounding Biblical Interpretation in the Second Temple Period" (pp. 27-41). Prof. Baumgarten seeks to correlate the increase in literacy in the Jewish community with a concomitant increase in interpretation of the biblical canon. Baumgarten claims to be following the "minimizing views of W. V. Harris, *Ancient Literacy*" (Cambridge, MA, 1989), while nevertheless doting on both a "newly literate people and the effects of the acquisition of this skill on a segment of the population." He turns to studies of seventeenth-century Britain and twentieth-century Andalusia in support of this argument. Baumgarten admits that such parallels are "no replacement for direct evidence in support of a thesis, unfortunately lacking in the case . . . presented here." His response to this impediment is, "Nevertheless, I propose the thesis I outline here."

Baumgarten's essay is based on a paper first delivered in 1994, and so he might be forgiven for not recognizing the seminal works on orality and performance theory by Martin Jaffee. But in revising the essay for publication in this volume, both the lack of evidence and the exclusion of important new work should have been addressed.

The third essay, by Menahem Kister, "'Leave the Dead to Bury Their Own Dead'" (pp. 43-56), purports to give the background of Matthew 8:21-22. Kister's suggestion is attractive, but it is hardly any longer methodologically sound to offer the fifth-century

midrash Genesis Rabba as background for the New Testament. Kister's work is marred as well by computer problems which have left the Greek texts rendered as gibberish.

Moshe Bernstein muses on "Contours of Genesis Interpretation at Qumran" (pp. 57-85) with particular emphasis on the nomenclature modern scholars have imposed upon the various documents and fragments. There is much to be said for Bernstein's desire to see a common nomenclature that would accurately describe the documents in question. Still, the essay will be of primary benefit only to those who specialize in Qumran studies.

Marc Hirshman follows with an essay on the "reception and interpretation" of Ecclesiastes in early rabbinic literature (pp. 87-99). Hirshman is the reigning expert on the later midrash Ecclesiastes Rabba, and has written brilliantly on the relationships among the various genres of interpretive works on Ecclesiastes found in synagogue and Church. Hirshman elsewhere paid close heed to the Hellenistic antecedents and parallels which these various works share or reject. Here he undertakes the daunting task of culling the earliest layers of rabbinic exegesis on the biblical book. Prof. Hirshman attempts to reconstruct the world-views of Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Aqiba as these great interpreters read Ecclesiastes. Unfortunately, he does not consider the possibility of spurious attributions to these legendary sages. Thus we are left with a construct of what the literature reports as their opinions, with no historic controls as to the accuracy or the actual date of these opinions. On the whole, Hirshman is careful to cull for exegeses among the earliest (Tannaitic) layer of the rabbinic corpus, and he is extremely cautious in drawing his list of six conclusions about the reading of early midrash on Ecclesiastes.

Gary Anderson offers an extended essay on "The Garments of Skin in Apocryphal Narrative and Biblical Commentary" (pp. 101-143). Anderson's work is a masterful exercise in Traditions-history. He works in Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek, and Syriac; and moves with ease among rabbinic, patristic and apocryphal traditions. Anderson maintains full control of all the details while painting a broad canvas. One looks forward to Anderson's continued work on comparative exegesis of the biblical Adam and Eve narratives. Unfortunately, his work, too, is marred by occasional typographical errors.

The volume is rounded out by a second essay by Menahem Kister, called "Law, Morality, and Rhetoric in Some Sayings of Jesus" (pp. 145-154). It is a futile exercise in parallelomania. Kister's lack of method is best characterized by his note, "It is therefore legitimate to use rabbinic literature as evidence for Pharisaic halakha." It is rare to see such a pietistic expression of faith in rabbinic documents on this side of the Atlantic. One might be heartened by a postscript noting the discovery of a "striking parallel" in the works of Tatian and the promise of a forthcoming Hebrew work discussing it. Perhaps there Kister will allow his readers the luxury of some historical method.

Finally, Kugel himself contributes an essay on "Some Instances of Bible Interpretation in the Hymns and Wisdom Writings of Qumran" (pp. 155-169). Kugel moves with ease among the Hebrew, Greek, and Aramaic traditions of the early Jewish communities. While ranging broadly, Kugel always displays the discipline of a traditions-historian.

The volume ends with an index of ancient sources, but lacks either a bibliography or a subject index, both of which would have made this slim volume much more useful. On the whole, readers of this journal will be disappointed with the lack of engagement with Hellenism and Hellenistic exegesis, usually common in studies of

ancient midrash. This book will be of greatest use to those who focus more narrowly on biblical exegesis in the earliest period.

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Nigel Spivey, *Enduring Creation. Art, Pain and Fortitude* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2001), 272 pp., 177 b. & w. ills.

This is a passionate, eloquent book, and one that deserves to be widely read and deeply contemplated. Its scope is extensive; the entire Western tradition, no less. It is a personal and in many ways original work of meditation, yet it follows well-worn grooves and channels, which are perhaps inescapable. Those deep paths extend backwards in time from our own lived response in the past decade to the events that were experienced by the two generations that preceded us. One of the most powerful effects (among many) to emerge from the exhibition *The War of Extermination* (*Vernichtungskrieg*) that travelled around Germany between 1995 and 1999, and which visually documented through photographs the atrocities committed by "ordinary" solders of the Wehrmacht (not the specially-trained mass murderers of the SS or the Police Battalions) in parts of the Eastern Front from 1941-44, was the way some visitors identified their fathers or grandfathers in the act of killing civilians.[1] Spivey's departure point is a sensitive visual *aperçu*, arising from a photograph taken at Auschwitz of a group of children and mothers at the threshold of the gas chamber. His eye settles on a barefoot little girl, fiddling distractedly with a button on her coat, while others around her register palpable fear, as they sense what she is too young to comprehend. Spivey honestly grounds his visual horror at such an image in his own specific experience; that of fatherhood, and of travel to the place of execution itself.

That a "protracted sequence of meditations" (174) of one's own heightened sense of humanity arising from the contemplation of the representation of pain, suffering, compassion and atrocious cruelty in Western art should begin with a journey to a site of atrocity is characteristic of our recent thinking about such matters. Simon Schama's *Landscape and Memory* (London, 1995) opens with his search for the place where the corpses of his murdered forbears lay in the forest of the Poland/Lithuania borderland. For some of us, whose parents were combatants or civilians in World War Two, many places in Europe generate distressing images and narratives of suffering which cannot be extinguished by enjoyment of the restored cultural pleasures. Too much blood was spilled, too many bitter tears were shed. Spivey puts it well; "The grass spreads green at Birkenau. The onus of knowing remains." Robert Hughes's *Heaven and Hell in Western Art* (London, 1968) was one of the first books in art history to say that we should not shrink from viewing medieval, Renaissance, and modern depictions of atrocious suffering through the lens of one's twentieth-century comprehension of the mass murder and genocide of civilians by totalitarian regimes. And, by implication, that the roots of our scholarly blindness to the extremities of suffering experienced by people

1. Hannes Heer, "The Difficulty of Ending a War: Reactions to the Exhibition 'War of Extermination: Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941 to 1944,'" trans. Jane Caplan, *History Workshop Journal* 46 (1998) 187-203.

in the past, as represented say in medieval Last Judgement imagery, ought to be excavated and laid bare. Today our list of places polluted by atrocity and of ravaged peoples is longer, but the essentials remain the same.

Spivey, a distinguished scholar of Greek and Etruscan art, demonstrates that a profoundly reflective reading of the classical tradition has much to bring to these inquiries. He knows well that the Laocoön group would not have signified to Greeks or Romans "a paragon of pathetic but ennobling heroism under extreme duress," as it did to Winckelmann (34). It was "the sculpture of tough justice" (p. 36). The change of course on such matters exhibited by Christianity is aptly summarized: "Christianity thrived because it mined for virtue in striations of distress" (40). Spivey rightly focuses on the "sufferer triumphant" who was Christ, and his unfeeling, victorious imitator, the martyr; and he tackles the conundrum of luridly descriptive literary martyrdoms and their contemporaneous sanitised visual images. St Lawrence in the chapel of Galla Placidia is indeed "happy to quit flesh and bones," and surely suffers without screams on Prudentius' gridiron (42). One may note, though, that the "official" account of Lawrence's *passio* does include many more excruciating stages of torture than those recounted by Prudentius, who trims the series down to what is manageable for his poem. But the martyr remains impervious to physical agony. In judging Roman attitudes to Christian suffering in the amphitheatre, Spivey is correct in concluding that "the successful institutionalization of cruelty rests upon a rationale of just deserts; also upon the specious classification of certain humans as sub-human." Hence the problem that Romans had comprehending Christ's death upon the cross, the "death deserved by the most unworthy of all unworthies" (44). The crucified Christ came to public view in art only in the fifth and sixth centuries, and even then eschewed the pain and gore, the pathetic, cadaverous imagery of the slaughtered god-man that was to flood the churches, convents and prayerbooks of Europe from the thirteenth century onwards. Spivey tracks through this pretty well, but misses one important nuance. In justly observing an apparent contradiction between the impulse driving Christian asceticism as a prerequisite for holiness (as Peter Brown has taught us) and an attraction to expensive liturgical equipment, Spivey misses the point that ever more precious and costly liturgical trappings were justified by arguments from fittingness, the same argument that justified Christ's ignominious death on the cross. Gorgeous, jewelled crosses were seen to be "rightful belongings of the Church" (as Spivey notes, 56) because more humble or crudely decorated materials could be declared inappropriate for the house of the Lord.

Spivey charts convincingly the emergence of a Christian argument from the late seventh century that an emphasis in the visual arts on Christ's human nature, humiliation, physical suffering and "saving death" was used to justify the devotional use of images of Christ in agony. This leads him to consider how "a devotional culture of inspired suffering" (57) emerges in thirteenth-century Europe. He follows the main trail of recent art-historical scholarship to the re-contextualizing of Christ's suffering in the experience of Francis of Assisi. Spivey ranges with justification into the righteous mass-murders perpetrated by the Crusaders against Muslim civilians, and from there into the theology of damnation expounded in Dante's *Comedia*, where pity for the cruelly-tortured souls in *Inferno* is denied. His eyes tell him the truth about Giotto's scenes of the damned in the Scrovegni chapel at Padua: they are no less terrible than those of other artists of the time. From there we are taken into northern Europe, to the mystic Passion devotions of Margery Kempe, Richard Rolle, and Ludolph of Saxony,

to the Lazarus-houses of the lepers, to the cult of the *Mater dolorosa*, and the empathetic devotional practises counselled in late-medieval treatises on the Passion, many of which were directed to women, the custodians of compassion in the gendered theory of the time.

Chapter five, "Vasari and the pangs of St Sebastian," is a perceptive study of the neglected tale told by Giorgio Vasari in his artistic biography of Francesco Bonsignori (1455-1519), where the duke of Mantua reportedly instructed the artist how to achieve the requisite fear in the artist's model for a martyrdom of St Sebastian picture by having the man tied up, and burst into the room suddenly to threaten his life with a loaded crossbow. Spivey, reasonably well-acquainted with the art historical literature on St Sebastian, informatively takes us back through the classical tropes that prefigure the story (95), and to the aesthetic, ethical, and legal issues implicit in it. He rightly comments that "the moral connection between the human experience of pain and art that 'reproduces' or articulates such pain was not of apparent concern to Italian Renaissance artists and their hagiographer, Giorgio Vasari." (96). Spivey's focus on the dominance of aesthetic decorum here is appropriate, as is his importing Elaine Scarry's notion of pain's "resistance to language". But one needs to know whether Renaissance artists and their biographers were distinctive in their culture for holding such attitudes. Montaigne's essays might have been drawn into the discussion here (see D. Quint, *Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy*, Princeton, 1998). Chapter six begins with a vivid account of Holbein's *Dead Christ in the Tomb*, of its "proud graphic power," approached through Julia Kristeva's reading of Holbein's experiential "severance" as being present in the image, and the next chapter offers a thoughtful study of Raphael's *Entombment*, now in the Borghese collection, which takes the death of Meleager as its departure-point for a commemoration of a Renaissance mother's lamentation for her murdered son. Aby Warburg's notion of "pathos formula" is usefully explored, as is the Renaissance and Baroque reception of the rediscovered Laocoön group. The Council of Trent decree on sacred images, we are told, unleashed a "direct, beseeching, inflammatory art" (128), but which was permeated with "the physical insignia of sexual bliss." Spivey does not write as a specialist art historian here, but charts an intelligent path through a good range of scholarship. Chapter eight, on the Massacre of the Innocents, ranges from Italian Gothic sculpture to Peter Brueghel and Italian Baroque works, and contains some memorable ekphrasis, food for thought for art historians. Chapter nine roams through aspects of Rembrandt's works, from his disturbing self-portrait in *The Stoning of Stephen* to the defecating dog in *The Good Samaritan*, exploring the idiosyncratic subtleties of his "earthy packaging"(162) of biblical narrative and classical myth. Spivey appropriately introduces Ludwig Wittgenstein's aphorism, "The face is the soul of the body." He could also have employed Wittgenstein's saying, suprisingly omitted in the book: "Endurance of suffering isn't rated highly because there is supposed not to be any suffering—really it's out of date." (*Culture and Value*, ed. G. von Wright and H. Nyman, trans. P. Winch, Oxford, 1980, 71).

Chapter ten opens with a cautious critique of Norbert Elias' "civilizing process," leading to interesting reflections on the role of "visual polemics" put in the service of "the ideologues of human progress," from Thomas More to Lord Shaftesbury and Condorcet. Using Jacques Callot's etchings of the Thirty Years War as a foil for the developing contemporary notions of polite civility and sympathy in philosophical discourse, Spivey takes us into territory already explored, in part, by Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* (trans. A. Sheridan, New York, 1977; French orig. *Surveiller et*

punir, Paris, 1975), and Lionello Puppi's *Torment in Art: Pain, Violence and Martyrdom* (trans. J. Scott, New York, 1991; Italian orig. *Lo splendore dei supplizi*, Milan, 1990). He then enters, with vivid descriptive power, the even more familiar landscape of images of tragic suffering, assassination and mass murder in the works of Jacques-Louis David, Francisco Goya, and Théodore Géricault. The chapter continues on through the beginnings of war photography, the representation of "the suffering of drudgery" in Courbet's labourers, Vincent van Gogh's lifelong struggle to create "art with power to alleviate misery" (210), Rodin's *The Gates of Hell*, and the Futurists' engagement with the "beauty" of war. The two final chapters explore the maelstrom of ideas in the visual and literary arts generated by the responses of participants in the First World War; the Dadaists, the Surrealists, the fascination with horror in Romantic theory of the sublime, and the Marquis de Sade as promoted in the works of Georges Bataille. Leopold von Sacher-Masoch finds his place here too. Spivey's journey culminates, of course, where it began: with the Jewish children of concentration camps, with their innocent recording of the *heimlich* mendacity that was Theresienstadt.

This is an important book. It is far from being the last word on such issues, and does not pretend to be. It is driven by its author's deep commitment to exploring why it is that we want to be "touched" and "moved" by works of visual art (22). It does not explore, however, why we should, at this particular moment in history, be preoccupied with both the philosophy and visuality of compassion, pain, cruelty, torture and atrocity. A flood of significant studies in these areas has lately appeared.[2] It would seem that a reassessment of how the human experience of suffering is mediated by art and scholarly disciplines is presently being undertaken.

Ironically, it is perhaps the photograph and the documentary film that have unleashed this painful reassessment of how earlier societies represented human suffering in the media available to them. This point could have been made more strongly by Spivey, although it is implicit in his beginning with a photograph, and ending with the drawings of children; children denied the cameras that were used by their killers to record the appalling extinction of human feeling that was the Holocaust.

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2. Among these one might mention David B. Morris, *The Culture of Pain*, Berkeley Los Angeles/London, 1991; Roselyne Rey, *The History of Pain*, trans. L. E. Wallace, J. A. Cadden, S. W. Cadden, Cambridge MA/London, 1993 (French orig.: *Histoire de la douleur*, Paris, 1993); Susan D. Moeller, *Compassion Fatigue. How the media sell disease, famine, war and death*, New York/London, 1999; Lawrence A. Tritle, *From Melos to My Lai: War and Survival*, (London & New York, 2000 (cf. the review by Simon Goldhill in this journal, *IJCT* 9 [2002/03] 132-135); William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions*, Cambridge, 2001; Martha C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions*, Cambridge, 2001; Keith Tester, *Compassion, Morality and the Media*, Buckingham/Philadelphia, 2001; Terry Eagleton, *Sweet Violence. The Idea of the Tragic*, Oxford, 2003; Susan Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, New York, 2003; James Tatum, *The Mourner's Song: War and Remembrance from the Iliad to Vietnam*, Chicago, 2003; Daniel Baraz, *Medieval Cruelty. Changing Perceptions, Late Antiquity to the Early Modern Period*, Ithaca, 2003; James A. Steintrager, *Cruel Delight. Enlightenment Culture and the Inhuman*, Bloomington, 2003. (I am grateful to Wolfgang Haase for his advice in augmenting this list.)

Robert Kirstein, *Paulinus Nolanus, Carmen 17*, Chrêsis: Die Methode der Kirchenväter im Umgang mit der antiken Kultur VIII (Basel: Schwabe & Co., 2000), 280 pp.[1]

We badly need more commentaries on the literary productions of late antiquity. Too often, the texts still languish in the daunting (and frequently ill-catalogued) series of GCS, CSEL, CC, even the Patrologiae, uncontextualized and unmediated for the inquisitive reader. This guarantees the neglect of all but a few fortunate works designated exemplary, whether by intrinsic interest or by tradition, which are constantly commented upon, translated, and reinterpreted – the *Confessions* of St Augustine must be the palmary example. The result of all this is a vicious circle: these texts are too hard to read, therefore they are neglected; these texts are neglected, because they're not worth reading.

In this volume, K[irstein] seeks to fill one of these myriad gaps, with an Introduction and Commentary on the existing text (ed. Hartel, CSEL 30, 1894) of *Poem* 17 of Paulinus of Nola. This is a most unusual work: a long propemptikon in Sapphic metre for Bishop Nicetas of Remesiana, written to send him on his way from Southern Italy to his barbarous see in the outlying province of Dacia. The poem was presumably written as a performance piece; one of Paulinus' best-known productions, the poetic description of his Christian building projects at Nola, seems to have been performed while actually walking around his church and its environs, and was addressed to Nicetas as well (*Poem* 27). K., however, does not discuss this likely context for the poem's genesis: as we shall see, this has some bearing on how he focuses his work.

Amid such an embarrassment of unannotated texts, we are never given a clear idea of what has drawn K. to comment on this particular poem. He declares he has two goals for his work (12): to use it as an example of the Church Fathers' contact "*mit der vor- und nichtchristlichen Literatur*"; and to make a thorough critical inspection of Paulinus' text. The first goal represents a worthy act of *pietas* towards K.'s mentor Christian Gnilka, in whose series this work appears, and his ideas about *chrêsis*; but it is the second which really animates K. Giving close attention to the internal characteristics of his text, he concludes that it has been subject to substantial interpolation (20-29). Fourteen strophes out of 85 are declared definitely "*unecht*"; three more are found to be of dubious provenance. Is it, then, the scope for excision which has really attracted K. to Paulinus' propemptikon?

So cavalier an attitude to the transmitted text demands careful consideration. K. himself admits that it goes against the uniform testimony of the MSS. – but then, he follows Tarrant's suggestion that late antiquity was the "*Hochblüte*" of interpolation, and the earliest MS. dates from the eighth century. The problem that this poem itself dates from late antiquity is not directly addressed, but we should probably assume that K. envisages the interpolation occurring very early on. Certainly, for one stanza which he claims to have been interpolated, he has the *terminus ante quem* of a 6th-century citation (229). One is loath to be pusillanimous about emendation (A.E. Housman's imprecations come to mind: "It would not be true to say that all conservative scholars are stupid, but it is very near the truth to say that all stupid scholars are conservative. Defenders of corruptions are therefore assured beforehand of wide approval" [preface to Lucan edition, xxvii]). But it requires better justification than "*die* obscuritas *ist typisch für Interpolationen*" (228): how do we know? Might not

1. Numbers in brackets refer to page numbers in this work, not to line numbers in the poem.

obscurity simply be "*typisch*" of passages which commentators assume must have been interpolated? Similarly, a strophe will simply be dismissed as "*gänzlich mißlungen*" or "*schief.*" The presumption of a poetic ideal from which some strophes decline is, to say the least, old-fashioned (implicitly acknowledged by K., 28).

Meanwhile, several matters which might help to decide the question of interpolation are not addressed. References to Paulinus' poetic practice elsewhere, for the sake of comparison, are hardly to be found. In one instance, K. finds two interpolated and two suspect stanzas out of a thematic grouping of eight (158), in another, five out of ten (225): could he be misunderstanding Paulinus' expansive poetics? The issue of performance, again elided, is crucial here: if this is, like *Poem* 27, written to be heard, might we not expect a more spacious, not to say repetitious, development of its themes? There is also the question of who else could write metrically correct Sapphics, in order to introduce them into the tradition: K. himself remarks on their "*Seltenheit*" in late antique literature (86).

This is not to say that K. is necessarily wrong in his excisions; but he needs to produce more evidence to be convincing. Sometimes, in fact, he must surely be correct: as he argues, stanzas 64 and 67 are too similar for both to stand; and in stanza 72 (the middle one of five deleted), the phrase "*laqueo fideli*" is indeed very odd: *laquei*, in late antique Latin, are almost always the snares of the devil. Here, K. fails to strengthen his case by linking the textual difficulties of stanza 74 explicitly to his argument for interpolation.

Enough of the interpolations. Other than those, K. concentrates in his introduction on Nicetas himself – his identity, his mission and its scope, his episcopal status (with or without see?), all prefaced by a useful list of "*Quellen*"; on the overall structure and themes of the propemptikon; and on the use and characteristics of the Sapphic strophe. Paulinus, mysteriously, is almost invisible: how many readers do not need some sort of "life and works" guide to this elusive literary saint? And, though the "*Leitmotive*" (spiritual connection; Christ's entourage; and the joy spread by Nicetas) are well discussed, there is little overall sense of how they are mobilized through Biblical allusion. (A small example: the telling use of the phrase "*euge Niceta*" [71] is not elaborated.)

K.'s third subject, the Sapphics, is the least satisfactorily explored. If Gnilka's *chrêsis* describes the use of pagan sources as if they are "seasoning" (16-17), how are we to account for the fact that Paulinus is still choosing to write – at enormous length – in the "pagan" meter of Sapphics ten years after his withdrawal to Nola? Maybe there is a clue in one of K.'s favourite themes, that of "*Einheit im Geiste*": perhaps Sapphics – whether one takes their tradition from Catullus or from Sappho herself – are the perfect metrical medium in which to express this "*Einheit.*" This would then become a spiritualized expression of the desire for erotic fusion, along the lines (*mutatis mutandis*) of Paulinus' epithalamium, *Poem* 25.

The commentary itself needs to be far more focused. K.'s zeal for discovering interpolation means that his sense of the structure of the overall work is acute, and so the architecture of the commentary – the subsections into which it is divided, and K's comments upon them – is excellent; but within that structure, the citations are billowing. Again, K.'s lack of attention to issues of audience reveals itself – but now, the problem is the audience in the 21st century, not the fourth. For example, when a particular biblical episode is alluded to, the commentary quotes extensive excerpts from the Vulgate: are we to assume that the reader sufficiently interested to engage

with this poem neither knows his or her Bible nor has a copy to hand? K. tends towards redundancy: it seems hardly surprising that *ire* or *linquere* (and their cognates) should be key thematic words in a propemptikon (104). Do we need a page of examples of the use of *sanctus* (106-7)? And the comment on *uia . . . spatiosa* moves through a specific identification of the Via in question, to citations for the road system in South Italy, to an evocation of Mt. 7:13 – with no comment, however, on whether Paulinus might really be supposed to be likening Calabria to Hell (*perditio*). Overall, K. would have profited from the sort of reflection on the purposes and strategies of commentary which is included in the recent volumes of essays edited by Most (1999) and Gibson/Kraus (2002).[2]

While we need commentaries, then, they cannot be haphazardly produced, for they will carry a certain burden of persuasion. Those who work in late antiquity have no doubt of the period's cardinal significance; but in disciplinary terms (ironically, the disciplines first formalized in late antiquity) it remains marginal. Commentaries must show why this particular text is worth reading. The reluctant reader must be wooed through the text; her attention cannot be taken for granted. K. has worked hard on this commentary, and there is much of value here; but he has not wooed his reader.

To have a commentary on any text in this period is much better than nothing; but ideally, it should be more finely honed for a potential audience.

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Peter Murphy, *Civic Justice: From Greek Antiquity to the Modern World* (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2001), 339 pp.

The classical tradition—or, more accurately, selected bits of it—has long been used to buttress ideological arguments of a largely presentist cast. Peter Murphy's book, intriguing as it sometimes is, uses the classical tradition in such a selective fashion.

This is not a work of systematic scholarship. The bibliography consists entirely of works in English. A quick perusal of that list, moreover, discloses a number of puzzling omissions. A medievalist, for example, would perceive the lack of works by R. W. Southern, Joseph Strayer, or Brian Tierney, to name just a few and remain with English language authors. But then a medievalist would find most of the Middle Ages lacking, because Murphy sees the era as one of "the retreat of the city" and thus useless from his perspective. But even Renaissance scholars will be surprised at the omission of relevant works by the likes of Anthony Grafton, James Hankins, John Najemy, and Donald Kelley, among others. Translated works by seminal figures like Eugenio Garin and Roberto Weiss are missing. Where is Quentin Skinner? But then one might wonder what Murphy would do with any of them in a book that devotes a single paragraph to Machiavelli but four pages to Shaftesbury.

What, then, is Murphy's argument in *Civic Justice*? It is that "the Greek city em-

2. G.W. Most, ed., *Commentaries / Kommentare*, Aporemata 4, Göttingen 1999; R.K. Gibson and C.S. Kraus, eds., *The Classical Commentary: Histories, Practices, Theory, Mnemosyne* Supplementum 232, Leiden & Boston, 2002.

bodied a particular (civic) conception of justice: justice as an equilibrium (an isonomy) of contending powers and forces" (p. 9), which he traces through time to the New World. The making of a "rational" civic order (*kosmopoiêsis*) was transmitted to Rome, revived in the city-states of Renaissance Italy and, although overshadowed by the growing absolutist states of the seventeenth century, kept alive in English political and humanistic discussions (hence the importance of Shaftesbury as someone who "brilliantly reworks classical humanist ideas of moral beauty, political virtue, and just proportion" [p. 11]) to be transplanted to North America and epitomized in Jeffersonian political thought.

Murphy's presentist concern, succinctly put in his introduction, revolves around what he sees as the American failure to embody the ideal of civic justice as he understands it:

> What was lost in this American transfiguration was the constructive ethos of the engaged city dweller who prefers the beautiful ordering of the city to the laws and commands of the state, the productivist ethic of republican citizenship to the distributist ethic of the modern consumer, and who refuses to allow the architectonic justice materialized in the city to be overwhelmed by the demands of the abstract liberty of modern life. As we can see all around us today, in the greatest of the modern republics, there is a failure of *kosmopoiêsis*. (p. 12)

Deterioration of the urban fabric, sprawling suburbs, distrust of government, unskilled jobs, welfare, loss of civic consciousness are all indicative of this American failure in Murphy's eyes. That is because Murphy's civic justice is about spaces. The ethos of a city is its center, its public spaces. "The locus of identification of the city dweller proper is not the household . . . but the life of the streets, the places of assembly, the public theaters, and so on" (p. 20). One wonders what such spaces would have to be like in modern cities with populations in the hundreds of thousands or millions, but the seemingly obvious issue of size is downplayed in Murphy's quest to touch on virtue and civic activity.

In such a polemical work, the cogency of the arguments has to rest on the compelling power of the guiding conception—here *kosmopoiêsis*. In this regard it is interesting that this term that is so central in the introduction is not encountered again until chapter 6, where it serves as the title as well. That chapter is dedicated to analysis of that particularly conflicted exiled citizen of Florence, Dante Alighieri, whose inferno is configured as an anti-city, and whose "powerful classical streak," as Murphy admits, also "sits uneasily with the Neoplatonic and Christian mystical desire to transcend form and limit" (p. 147). Subsequent Florentine humanism, exemplified by Coluccio Salutati and Leonardo Bruni, rediscovered republican Rome "whose constitutive value was the *res publica*—the public space at the center of the city where the diverse forces of society engage politically with one another, where they speak frankly of their concern, be it that of *caritas*, righteousness, excellence, or otherwise" (p. 154).

Florence's failures—while they can be ascribed to a "weakness in foreign policy" (p. 164) that Machiavelli decried—are seen by Murphy as captured in the transition from the "builder" Cosimo de' Medici to his more "mystical" grandson Lorenzo, or in the passage from the *engagé* Bruni to the neoplatonist Marsilio Ficino. Florence represents the first attempt since Rome to give shape and space to civic justice; it is the

architects of the Quattrocento who balanced spaces, contrasted opposites, imposed symmetries. Palladio and others later brought that spirit to Venice. In this account it is the rediscovery of Vitruvius, not that of Plato, that is central to the Renaissance.

More surprising than Murphy's treatment of Florence is what he does to Athens and America. He poses the ethos of the beautiful city (*kallipolis*) as universal, transported to colonies in the ancient Hellenic world and encompassing foreigners (except in Sparta). In architecture and civic justice the ideal was a balancing of opposing elements, not a hierarchy. For Athens it was Cleisthenes who set up a truly civic order, balancing the public against the household. Athens, however, was not a colonizer and Athenians were too attached to the soil of Attica. The classical period of the fifth century was "a time of enormous self-destructiveness" (p. 66) and justice and balance were ideals rather than realities. Philosophy subsequently fled from politics after the Peloponnesian War, even if ideals of civic life persisted in Aristotle and the Stoics. This book that makes so much of public space does not confront those famous spaces in Athens (leave alone attribute Athenian failure to them); this book about civic justice does not confront some of the more vivid, if problematic, treatments of the matter in the singular Athenian medium of classical tragedy.

When, at the other end of the book, he comes to America, Murphy is eager to look at spaces—at the continent-wide frontier that shaped life as opposed to "the absent agora," at Jefferson's Ciceronian villa as a retreat from politics, at the results of the City Beautiful Movement on public spaces that yet, he insists, remain "empty," devoid of a "spirit of carnival" (p. 302) by which to recreate the ordering of society. Murphy recognizes that American colonies were territorial states, not cities, and that the U.S. is the paradox of a republican empire, such that in its constitution the state is not a "public thing" but a set of institutions adapting classical senses of equilibrium to the modern world. Still, while America thus has great institutions, it lacks "great architectonic places in which reason and justice (and meaning) might reside" (p. 277).

It is probably not fair to say that the public spaces of Washington, D.C., and its classically inspired architectural knockoffs fill such a function in the U.S., although there is a degree of attachment to that city on the part of many Americans. But it is worth noting that those European cities that sport civic centers and copious *piazze* are not necessarily vibrant today with civic justice in his sense as a result. And it is indeed fair to say that "the failure of the excluded to enter into the *vita activa*, the *politikos bios*, . . . has haunted the United States" (p. 296). But one cannot ignore how race has been the predominant criterion in defining the excluded, any more than how slaves did not in the ancient world rise to a level of participation with ease in society. The large empires of the Hellenistic kingdoms and Rome more easily assimilated foreigners than did the enclosed city-states.

There are some interesting speculations on matters like city life, bureaucracy, religion, and much more in *Civic Justice*. If Murphy's ideas gain little resonance it will be in part because of his sometimes convoluted style (e.g., far too frequent recourse to italics numbs the mind) but mainly because there seems no remedy or program here, merely an extended lament that, despite the survival of ideals of civic space even through the overwrought urbanism of Baroque, the U.S. is not a beautiful city.

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Sofia Kotzabassi, *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung der rhetorischen und hagiographischen Werke des Gregor von Zypern*, Serta Graeca. Beiträge zur Erforschung griechischer Texte 6 (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1998), XIX + 352 pp.

Sofia Kotzabassi beschäftigt sich in dieser Monographie mit der Überlieferung der rhetorischen und hagiographischen Schriften des Gregorios Kyprios und sieht ihre Arbeit als Beitrag zur Klärung textgeschichtlicher Probleme der spätbyzantinischen Hagiographie und Rhetorik. Als Hauptziel ihrer Studie betrachtet sie die Textkonstituierung der rhetorischen und hagiographischen Schriften des Gregorios (S. 19).

Der Inhalt des Buches gliedert sich in drei große Blöcke: Der erste Block (S. 1-27) ist zunächst der Person des Gregorios Kyprios gewidmet, wobei sich die Autorin mit seinem Leben sowie seiner Tätigkeit als Handschriftenschreiber und Schriftsteller befaßt. Danach wendet sie sich der Frage der Überlieferung seiner Werke zu und nennt alle Handschriften, die die rhetorischen und hagiographischen Schriften des Gregorios Kyprios enthalten. Der zweite, quantitiv größte Block (S. 29-219) hat die Beschreibung der Handschriften, in denen Rhetorisches oder Hagiographisches des Zyprioten überliefert ist, zum Inhalt. Der dritte Block (S. 221-331) behandelt die Abstammung und das wechselseitige Verhältnis der Handschriften der angeführten rhetorischen bzw. hagiographischen Werke. Ein Index hagiographicus, ein Index patristicus, ein Index zu den Initia der in den untersuchten Handschriften vorkommenden unedierten oder nicht identifizierten Texte, ein Handschriftenindex sowie ein Namen- und Sachregister komplettieren die Monographie. Daran anschließend findet man 52 Abbildungen von einzelnen Seiten der insgesamt 95 von Kotzabassi beschriebenen Handschriften und ein stemma codicum eines der hagiographischen Werke, nämlich der Lobrede auf den heiligen Georg.

Nach diesem ersten Überblick über die Anlage der Studie sollen nun die einzelnen Abschnitte genauer betrachtet werden:

In dem als Einleitung gedachten ersten Teil erfahren wir, daß Gregorios Kyprios (1241-1289, Patriarch von Konstantinopel 1283-1289 als Gregorios II.) – sein Taufname war Georgios – in der Geistesgeschichte der frühen Paläologenzeit eine bedeutende Rolle spielte. Er ließ nicht nur eine Reihe von theologischen und profanen Autoren kopieren, sondern betätigte sich auch selbst als Kopist. In seiner Autobiographie lesen wir, daß neben verschiedenen körperlichen Leiden die Mühsal des Abschreibens alter Autoren der Grund dafür sei, daß die Zahl seiner eigenen Arbeiten nicht sehr groß ist. Da er sich selbst auch als Bücherliebhaber bezeichnet, gleichzeitig seinen eigenen Angaben nach aber zu arm war, um sich seine „Lieblinge" zu kaufen, schrieb er sich die meisten Bücher selbst ab (W. Lameere, *La tradition manuscrite de la correspondance de Grégoire de Chypre Patriarche de Constantinople [1283-1289]* [Études de philologie, d'archéologie et d'histoire anciennes, publiées par l'Institut Historique Belge de Rome II], Brüssel-Rom 1937, S. 189,15-24; zur Autobiographie des Gregorios Kyprios wäre nun die unlängst erschienene Studie von Martin Hinterberger nachzutragen: M. Hinterberger, *Autobiographische Traditionen in Byzanz* [Wiener byzantinistische Studien XXII], Wien 1999, bes. S. 354-358). Von den antiken Autoren interessierte sich Gregorios Kyprios offenbar besonders für Demosthenes, Aischines, Ailios Aristeides, Libanios, Themistios und Synesios von Kyrene. Der Codex Paris. 2998, der von Gregorios selbst abgeschrieben wurde, enthält u.a. diese Autoren. Eine besondere Verehrung hegte er – wie viele seiner Zeitgenossen und Byzantiner zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts – für den Rhetor Aristeides, wie er selbst in einem Brief schreibt (ed. S. Eustratiades [1910], S. 28 [Nr. 38]).

Außer an den bereits erwähnten antiken Autoren hatte Gregorios auch ein Interesse an Homer, Pindar, Aischylos, Sophokles, Thukydides, Platon, Aristoteles und Plutarch, die er alle in seinen Werken zitiert. Teile des Werkes dieser Autoren hat er auch selbst abgeschrieben. So weiß man, daß er beispielsweise eigenhändig Platons *Timaios* (Cod. Paris. 2998, ff. 206-243) und *Gorgias* (Cod. Paris. 2953, ff. 293-318) kopiert hat. Dies wirft ein Licht auf die Bedeutung des Gregorios Kyprios für die Geistesgeschichte seiner Zeit und für die Tradition bestimmter antiker Autoren (vgl. I. Pérez Martín, *El patriarca Gregorio de Chipre [ca. 1240-1290] y la transmisión de los textos clásicos en Bizancio* [Nueva Roma. Bibliotheca graeca et latina aevi posterioris 1], Madrid 1996).

Bevor Kotzabassi zu dem Teil ihrer Studie kommt, in dem die einzelnen Handschriften, in denen Werke des Gregorios Kyprios zu finden sind, beschrieben werden, widmet sie sich den rhetorischen und hagiographischen Arbeiten des Autors. Sie nennt alle Handschriften, in denen diese Werke (vier rhetorische und fünf hagiographische) vorkommen und von denen sie viele *in situ* gesehen hat. Ferner zitiert sie die jeweiligen Ausgaben. Die insgesamt neun Werke sind folgende: Enkomien auf die Kaiser Michael VIII. und Andronikos II., ein Lob des Meeres, eine Chreia und Lobreden auf die Heiligen Georg, Dionysios Areopagites, Euthymios von Madyta, Marina und Lazaros Galesiotes.

Als Grund für die weite Verbreitung seiner Werke in den Handschriften nennt die Verfasserin die Tatsache, daß Gregorios Kyprios bei seinen Zeitgenossen und den nachfolgenden Generationen hoch angesehen war und daß zwei Heilige, auf die er Lobreden geschrieben hat – nämlich der hl. Georg und die hl. Marina – im Menologium eine wichtige Stellung einnahmen (S. 14f.). Außerdem kommt hinzu, daß man im 14. Jahrhundert, aus dem die Mehrzahl der Handschriften stammt, ein großes Interesse an hagiographischen Texten hatte. Die handschriftliche Verbreitung der Werke des Gregorios Kyprios dauerte auch nach dem Untergang von Byzanz (1453) an. Die erste gedruckte Ausgabe eines seiner Werke – es handelt sich um eine rhetorische Abhandlung, nämlich um das Lob des Meeres – entstand 1591 in Leiden und wurde von Bonaventura Vulcanius herausgegeben (Edition: *Aristotelis de Mundo* [...] *cum scholiis et castigationibus Bonaventurae Vulcanii* [...] *Accessit seorsim Gregorii Cyprii encomium maris, graece, numquam antea excussum* [...], Lugdunum Batavorum [= Leiden] 1591).

Im größten Teil der Arbeit widmet sich Kotzabassi – wie bereits erwähnt – der Beschreibung der Handschriften. Es ist ein Verdienst der Autorin, erstmals auch Handschriften beschrieben zu haben, von denen es bislang keine ausführliche Beschreibung gab. Sie verzeichnet die Codices nach dem Ort ihrer Aufbewahrung (Athen bis Wien) und kommt auf insgesamt 95 Nummern. Neben dem Inhalt beschreibt sie den allgemeinen Zustand der Codices, versucht verschiedene Kopisten zu unterscheiden, die Frage der Provenienz zu klären und zitiert die vorhandene Sekundärliteratur.

Darauf folgt der eigentliche Kern der Arbeit, nämlich die Untersuchung der Abhängigkeit der einzelnen Textzeugen der erwähnten rhetorischen und hagiographischen Werke, wobei die Autorin den, wie gesagt, weit verbreiteten Lobreden auf die Heiligen Georg (S. 242-298) und Marina (S. 309-326) besonders viel Platz einräumt. Hervorzuheben ist, daß Kotzabassi aufgrund ihrer Handschriftenkollationen, Beobachtungen und Untersuchungen zu allen Werken ein Stemma erstellt und dabei die Abhängigkeit der einzelnen erhaltenen und rekonstruierten Textzeugen bis hin zum Archetypus aufzeigen kann.

Die Lobrede auf den heiligen Georg hat die größte Verbreitung gefunden (Edition: J.P. Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, Bd. 142 [Paris 1857], 299-346). Es gibt 56 erhaltene,

zwei verschollene, in alten Handschriftenkatalogen erwähnte, und "mindestens 27" aus erhaltenen Handschriften erschließbare Textzeugen. Ein weiteres besonderes Verdienst der Arbeit Kotzabassis besteht darin, daß durch die Analyse und den Vergleich der einzelnen Handschriften verlorengegangene Textzeugen rekonstruiert werden können.

Hervorzuheben ist auch, daß es der Verfasserin gelungen ist, manche der Kopisten zu identifizieren: So konnte sie aufgrund des Schriftzuges einen Teil des Cod. Escor. Ψ. III. 15 (ff. 336-351) (vgl. Abb.20) dem Kopisten Alexios (vgl. *Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palälogenzeit* [*PLP*], erstellt von E.Trapp u.a., 1 [1976], Nr. 603) zuschreiben. Für fast den ganzen Cod. Lond. Har. 5576 (vgl. Abb.28) konnte Theodoros Kazanopulos (vgl. *PLP* 5 [1981], Nr. 10117) als Kopist ermittelt werden.

Wertvoll ist auch der Teil des Index, der die Initia von in den beschriebenen Handschriften gefundenen, aber noch unedierten bzw. noch nicht identifizierten Texten auflistet (S. 342). Die qualitativ hochstehenden Abbildungen von Handschriftenseiten mit Texten des Gregorios Kyprios ermöglichen einen guten Einblick in Eigenarten der Kopisten.

Abschließend möchte ich eine Gesamtbewertung der Studie wagen: Abgesehen von manchen sprachlichen Unsicherheiten im Deutschen und Druckfehlern ist die Arbeit in mehrfacher Hinsicht ein Erfolg. Sofia Kotzabassi hat durch ihre Analysen und Vergleiche mit großer Akribie die Textkonstitution der rhetorischen und hagiographischen Werke des Gregorios Kyprios ermöglicht. Sie hat außerdem die geistesgeschichtliche Bedeutung sowie die Überlieferung und Rezeption seiner Schriften aufgezeigt. Nicht zu vergessen ist auch die Identifzierung mancher Kopisten für Handschriften bzw. Teile von Handschriften. Somit stellt die Arbeit einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Erforschung der Überlieferungsgeschichte byzantinischer Literatur dar.

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Anne D. Hedeman, *Of Counselors and Kings: the Three Versions of Pierre Salmon's "Dialogues"* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001), XVII + 123 pp.

This handsomely produced volume is, if not exactly an *explication de texte*, what might be termed an *explication d'images*. Hedeman has composed a sixty-page presentation of the three versions of Pierre Salmon's contributions to the "mirror of princes" genre, first composed for the mentally unstable Charles VI in 1409 (preserved in BNF ms. fr. 23279). A second, revised and expanded version was composed between 1412 and 1415, and this is now preserved in three copies: one composed more or less contemporaneously (Geneva ms. 165); an incomplete version done sometime in the 16th century (BNF ms. fr. 5032); and a copy closely resembling the Geneva manuscript, done c.1500 (BNF ms. fr. 9610). Specialists will appreciate the detailed description of the technical differences between these versions, but the general reader will be specially gratified by H.'s discussion of the conceptual differences between them and above all of the evolving relationship between text and image which makes of the *Dialogues* a particularly interesting object of study. This last point is worth stressing, given that one of the critical problems presented by illuminated manuscripts is the fact that one

cannot always know how much of a hand the author of the text had in the selection and execution of the illustrations. Such ambiguity thus engages the critical consideration of the text's integrity as a cultural artifact. Interestingly enough, of course, some of the same questions arise concerning the first century or so of the age of print: emblem study in particular has proved specially instructive in this regard, and H.'s work has the further merit of providing a historical context for this important aspect of illustrated print production in the 16th century.

H. does not present the actual texts of the *Dialogues*, which have already benefited from serious scholarly attention, and so anyone seriously interested in the historical, ideological or political dimensions of Salmon's thought would be well-advised to consult the originals with this volume at hand. What H. does, and does well, is to summarize the texts, with a running commentary on how the rhetoric of the word and that of the image interact. For example: of considerable importance in the first version of the text, a presentation copy composed while Salmon could still envisage a kingdom governed by the king restored to sanity, is the concern expressed over the dangers to the monarch's dignity occasioned by his madness. The text appeals to the king himself to remember that his dignity and that of the kingdom go hand in hand, and H. deftly shows how the coloration and design of the accompanying illuminations conform to contemporary theories relating to the interplay of moral precept and the *ars memoriae*. Quoting from a contemporary of Salmon, Jacques Legrand, H. reminds us of the importance of the visual depiction of what is to be remembered: " . . . one best learns from illuminated books, for the difference between the colors bestows remembrance of the different lines, and therefore of the thing itself" (cit. p. 27).

Salmon's second version of his text, written some three to eight years later, has to deal with the realities of the situation, rather than his hopes to ameliorate the king's ability to rule well: Charles's insanity had worsened by then, and Salmon was now obliged to adapt his original material to a wider audience, one in which he himself hoped to find patronage. H. offers a succinct review of the textual revisions occasioned by the new realities, and then discusses the role played therein by the new illustrations. Discussion of the king's dignity, for example, now takes second place to questions of vice and virtue, and the illustrations follow suit. Pictures now typically serve a complementary role, as "concrete embodiments of more abstract ideas present in the text," leading to substantial revision of the whole (p. 30). As H. demonstrates, the first version had failed in its purpose to instruct the king, and thus the second version seeks to be less bound to the historical moment that necessitated it, to be more "timeless" (p. 47)

H. concludes her introduction with a discussion of what the later versions of the treatise, done long after Salmon's death, tell us of the state of the genre, and of the underpinnings of the way in which text and image were conceptualized by the start of the 16th century. The first version was written in part with an eye to healing the schism in the church and restoring both the monarch and the body politic to good health, while the second version was more focused on the grievous state of the nation under the continuing civil wars. But by the reign of Louis XII and France's increased role as a political and military power, Salmon's text (by then virtually forgotten) was revised so as to emphasize more graphically the importance of the role of the writer as major advisor, along with a certain degree of mythography with regard to the national past, in ways that can be somewhat compared to the role of Shakespeare's historical plays written under Elizabeth I. "Reshaped images" and re-edited text make for an

updated artifact in which the "mirror for kings" now emerges more as a "mirror for counselors" (pp. 52-53). Finally, H.'s "Conclusion" successfully summarizes her argument that "illuminated manuscripts simultaneously encode an author's desired reading and the means for readers' appropriations," and that the Salmon texts furnish us with a model to understand "the importance of visual images in this process of construction and reception" (p. 57).

Eight beautifully reproduced color plates from the various manuscripts follow, and then thirty-nine black and white illustrations from the *Dialogues* and related manuscripts. These are followed by three appendices containing detailed recensions of the four known manuscripts: a register of the distribution of text and image in the two principal manuscripts; a descriptive catalog of all four manuscripts; some twenty-five pages of notes and ten of bibliography; and finally a complete index. All of this makes for an important *instrument de travail*, which will be appreciated by codicologists, medievalists, and art historians alike. It will certainly be enjoyed by all lovers of illumination, and it makes an informative contribution to our understanding of the relationships between word and image during the last years of manuscript-based textual production in the early modern period.

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James S. Ackerman, *Origins, Imitation, Conventions. Representation in the Visual Arts* (Cambridge, MA, & London: The MIT Press, 2002), XI + 328 pp., ill.

James Ackerman, il grande studioso di Harvard, laureato recente del Premio Balzan per la sua opera sulla storia dell'architettura del Rinascimento, riunisce in questo volume dodici saggi, di cui due inediti, redatti nel corso degli ultimi dieci anni (una prima antologia, *Distance Points*, è stata pubblicata dallo stesso editore nel 1991). Il tema centrale dell'opera è la continuità dei modelli artistici, in particolare nell'ambito della tradizione classica.

Ogni tradizione si fonda su un *corpus* canonico di principi o di esempi che, per divenire la fonte o l'oggetto di una riappropriazione creativa, devono essere registrati e trasmessi. Alcuni capitoli del libro sono dedicati alla teoria ed alla pratica dell'imitazione, altri alle tecnologie di riproduzione dell'immagine che costituiscono il vettore spesso indispensabile per la comunicazione dei modelli artistici ed architettonici. La chiave di volta del discorso teorico dell'autore si trova probabilmente nel quinto capitolo, dedicato alle teorie rinascimentali dell'imitazione creatrice.

Numerose generazioni di umanisti dedicarono il meglio delle loro energie al tentativo, che in sé può sembrare incongruo, di far rinascere il latino classico, ed il latino di Cicerone in particolare: due lingue morte per definizione, dato che il latino di Cicerone è morto con Cicerone ed è noto solo attraverso un *corpus* di scritti che gli sono, o erano, attribuiti. L'estremismo dei puristi dell'imitazione ciceroniana, che attribuivano valore esemplare a tutti e solo gli scritti di Cicerone, fu ridicolizzato in un celebre pamphlet al vitriolo di Erasmo—redatto beninteso in latino ciceroniano perché altrimenti, nessuno lo avrebbe letto. Altre dispute celebri sul ciceronianismo nel Cinque e Seicento sono recensite qui dall'autore, che infine attribuisce a Vasari l'onore di aver

traferito certe categorie dell'imitazione letteraria dalla questione della lingua, dove avevano preso forma, al discorso sulle arti figurative—dunque dalla retorica alla teoria nascente delle arti del disegno. Le conclusioni dell'autore in questo capitolo sono corroborate da studi recenti che hanno messo in evidenza l'analogia fra la teoria dell'imitazione letteraria elaborata da varie correnti ciceroniane del primo Cinquecento e alcuni principi compositivi dell'architettura rinascimentale: questo vale in particolare per la riforma cinquecentesca del sistema dei cinque ordini architettonici, che a partire dal trattato di Serlio vengono spesso presentati come citazioni visuali decontestualizzate ed iterabili—simili in questo a *topoi* secondo la definizione moderna (non classica) del "metodo" dei luoghi comuni.

Vasari è anche il protagonista del primo capitolo del libro, sulle origini della critica e della storia dell'arte, in cui Ackerman discute le fonti classiche che ispirano l'idea di progresso nella teoria vasariana delle tre età dell'arte post-medievale—una teoria che, quasi hegelianamente, sembra inscrivere la fine della storia in un eterno zenith senza tramonto (nel caso di Vasari, il punto d'arrivo non è lo stato prussiano ma l'arte di Michelangelo, e forse anche il granducato mediceo contro cui Michelangelo si era a lungo battuto).

Altrove nel libro l'autore presenta altri esempi di questa stessa dialettica fra convenzione ed invenzione che l'intertestualità della tradizione classica presuppone e postula. Un saggio sulla villa del Rinascimento in Italia studia la sopravvivenza dei tracciati antichi nel paesaggio italiano all'inizio dell'età moderna (la *centuriatio* in campagna, la *castrametatio* ancora leggibile in numerosi tessuti urbani), poi l'influenza delle fonti letterarie e dei trattati di agricoltura antichi sull'ideologia rinascimentale della vita rustica. Un capitolo sulla teoria architettonica dell'erudito veneziano Daniele Barbaro, mentore, associato e committente di Palladio, prova come la sua estetica di matrice aristotelica, benché presentata sotto le apparenze di un commentario a Vitruvio, si fondi in realtà su una serie di malintesi creativi, e talvolta di alterazioni deliberate dell'ipotesto vitruviano. Ad esempio, la notoria ed enigmatica distinzione fra *quod significat* e *quod significatur*, luogo celebre dell'ermeneutica vitruviana (ed oggetto di un singolare *revival* negli anni Settanta del ventesimo secolo), diviene per Barbaro poco più di un pretesto per illustrare la sua teoria, interamente moderna, del progetto disegnato in pianta, alzato e sezione—una nozione che Vitruvio non avrebbe trovato familiare.

Ackerman ritorna ad uno dei suoi soggetti d'elezione in due capitoli di argomento palladiano, uno sul "classicismo" di Palladio, l'altro sul palladianesimo del terzo presidente degli Stati Uniti, e dilettante di architettura, Thomas Jefferson. Il primo saggio ("Palladio: in che senso classico?") tratta soprattutto della teoria degli "abusi" accennata in un breve capitolo del primo libro del trattato di Palladio (1570). Palladio si attiene alla lezione moderna della teoria vitruviana della mimesi naturale che fu la prima e a lungo la principale giustificazione teorica del linguaggio degli ordini classici: tutte le modanature classiche imitano la ragione costruttiva di una struttura primitiva in legno che non esiste più, che nessuno ha mai visto e che non ha alcuna ragione di esistere se non nella rappresentazione, o piuttosto nella messa in scena architettonica che si realizza quando questa struttura ideale viene emulata con altri materiali costruttivi (principalmente in pietra). Tutto ciò che contraddice questa logica, che in epoca post-semperiana si dovrebbe dire tettonica, è per Vitruvio un atto contro natura—in senso proprio ed in senso figurato: la rappresentazione artistica di ciò che in natura non può esistere, ed un segno della stupidità di chi lo esegue. Ma a partire dalla metà

del Cinquecento questi principi di verosimiglianza strutturale avevano assunto anche un nuovo registro di valenze ideologiche: si veda ad esempio il lessico serliano, dove *"abusi"*, *"licenze"* e "superfluità" sono spesso sinonimi. Se una "superfluità" decorativa può suggerire le nozioni, economiche in senso moderno, di spesa inutile, consumo improduttivo, lusso, o altre forme di *conspicuous consumption*, una "licenza", architettonica o no, evoca piuttosto un universo di significati teologici, etici e morali: una licenza è qualcosa che si fa sapendo che non si dovrebbe; un peccato che si può tollerare se il peccatore ne è cosciente e contrito. Come avrebbero detto un semiologo o un linguista del secolo scorso, una licenza esiste solo in rapporto dialettico con le norme della lingua: senza regola, non esiste irregolarità.

Le opinioni politiche di Palladio non sono note, ma nel Settecento si attribuiva sovente al classicismo palladiano un valore repubblicano, al punto che Thomas Jefferson intitolò la propria residenza di Monticello, in Virginia, ispirandosi ad un passo dei *Quattro Libri* in cui Palladio descrive la Villa Rotonda, costruita "sopra un monticello di ascesa facilissima" nei pressi di Vicenza (altri Monticelli sono in seguito apparsi in quasi tutti gli stati della Confederazione e dell'Unione). Ma quando Jefferson partì per l'Italia da Parigi nell'aprile del 1787 il suo interesse principale era la risicoltura; durante il suo breve soggiorno a Vercelli acquistò in segreto alcune manciate di risone piemontese che si affrettò a spedire nella Carolina del Sud, probabilmente tramite la valigia diplomatica (o il suo equivalente dell'epoca), dato che lo stato sardo impediva l'esportazione di riso non brillato, cioè utilizzabile per la semina, apparentemente per motivi di sicurezza nazionale. Non si conosce il resto della storia—anche se non sembra che il riso vercellese si sia acclimatato in America. Arrivato a Milano, Jefferson si limita a notare nel suo diario di viaggio che la cattedrale della città, come in generale l'architettura delle chiese in Italia, gli sembrano un buon soggetto di riflessione filosofica, visto che in nessun luogo al mondo si è mai visto un simile spreco di denaro.

Due capitoli dedicati a Leonardo da Vinci (uno sui suoi progetti di chiese, per la maggior parte a pianta centrale; l'altro sui suoi disegni scientifici e tecnici: macchine, studi anatomici, di dinamica dei fluidi, gatti, e la celebre pianta 'icnografica' di Imola, 1502) provano che anche nel caso di un uomo che si definiva notoriamente "senza lettere" e che non aveva ricevuto una vera formazione umanistica, l'eredità dei classici, la tradizione libresca e le convenzioni di produzione dell'immagine (ad esempio le regole della prospettiva centrale) erano in dialogo permanente ed occasionalmente in conflitto con il genio di un artista sovente considerato idiosincratico ed isolato nella sua ricerca di un realismo visuale senza precedenti, ed a lungo senza eredi.

Due altri saggi, di cui uno, "Sulle origini del disegno architettonico", è probabilmente il più importante ed innovatore fra quelli qui riuniti, trattano delle convenzioni di rappresentazione nel progetto di architettura. Ackerman non affronta la questione difficile e forse insolubile del disegno d'architettura nell'antichità. Si presume in genere che la nozione di un progetto di architettura che precede la costruzione, concepito nella mente, espresso dal disegno, poi realizzato senza cambiamenti, sia un'acquisizione dell'inizio dell'età moderna (la formula appena citata è in effetti una parafrasi di un celebre passo albertiano). In realtà, è difficile stabilire la data di nascita di un documento grafico in grado di riunire tutti i dati necessari alla costruzione di un oggetto tridimensionale complesso, e nello stesso tempo interamente separato ed indipendente dalla costruzione e dal cantiere.

Nel suo trattato sulla pittura (1435-36) Alberti è stato il primo ad adattare alla pratica del disegno i principi geometrici delle proiezioni centrali, ma nel suo trattato di

architettura lo stesso Alberti insiste perché gli architetti evitino la prospettiva dei pittori e rappresentino non apparenze, ma vere misure in proporzione: ciò che sembra implicare l'uso di proiezioni parallele o ortogonali disegnate in scala (p. 62, n. 2). Il topos delle "vere misure" nei disegni di architettura ricorre fra gli altri anche in Raffaello e Daniele Barbaro—un altro teorico della prospettiva che raccomanda agli architetti di non servirsene.

Barbaro non esitò ad emendare la *lectio* del termine vitruviano *scaenographia*, normalmente interpretato all'epoca come "disegno in prospettiva", per sostituirlo con *sciagraphia*, un neologismo latino che nelle intenzioni di Barbaro avrebbe dovuto significare una sezione in proiezioni ortogonali (p. 64, n. 33; p. 225; p. 233 n. 29). Il disegno geometrico in pianta, alzato e sezione è stato usato in modo empirico ed approssimativo per secoli, ma le proiezioni parallele che sottendono questo tipo di rappresentazione sono state formalizzate matematicamente solo con la geometria descrittiva di Gaspard Monge (1798). Per secoli il principale metodo di rappresentazione per il progetto disegnato di architettura si è dunque fondato su tecniche proiettive che in qualche modo tutti utilizzavano, ma nessuno sapeva o voleva teorizzare con precisione. Ci vollero quasi quattro secoli perché il punto di vista della prospettiva centrale, che genera una rappresentazione funzionale dell'infinito, venisse a sua volta rimosso ad una distanza infinita. Eppure, in termini puramente geometrici, proiezioni centrali e parallele non sono che due casi particolari dello stesso sistema proiettivo (in cui punti propri e punti impropri, o a distanza infinita, vengono trattati indifferentemente).

Altro paradosso: perché tanti sforzi da parte dei teorici del Rinascimento italiano per promuovere—del resto senza grande successo—un modo di rappresentazione, le proiezioni ortogonali, che il settentrione gotico aveva usato più o meno correntemente a partire almeno dall'inizio del quattordicesimo secolo? Ackerman studia alcuni esempi di proiezioni ortogonali gotiche, dagli schizzi di Villard de Honnecourt ai disegni per la facciata della cattedrale di Strasburgo (su pergamena, datati circa 1300-1330) ed alle sezioni del coro della cattedrale di Praga (contemporanee alla costruzione della cupola di Brunelleschi a Firenze) per concludere che tutte le convenzioni del disegno geometrico moderno e contemporaneo in pianta, alzato e sezione erano già sperimentate ed interamente disponibili nel mondo gotico settentrionale prima della diffusione della cultura figurativa rinascimentale: l'inclinazione degli umanisti meridionali in favore dell'illusionismo prospettico avrebbe dunque ritardato di qualche secolo la standardizzazione del formato moderno del progetto disegnato. Le nuove tecnologie dell'immagine digitale sono discusse da Ackerman nell'ultimo capitolo, dove l'autore prevede che le tecnologie CAD-CAM avranno per la storia dell'architettura conseguenze paragonabili a quelle della diffusione del disegno su carta nel quattordicesimo secolo (pp. 294, 305).

Proseguendo nella stessa ricerca di continuità—che è in qualche caso forse anche una forma di inerzia estetica: un ritardo nell'adeguamento dell'atto creativo nei momenti di passaggio da una tecnologia di riproduzione dell'immagine ad un'altra—Ackerman prova facilmente l'influenza di lunga durata delle categorie del pittoresco e delle convenzioni visuali della pittura di paesaggio durante i primi decenni di storia della fotografia di architettura, che diverrà nondimeno nel ventesimo secolo uno dei vettori principali del rinnovamento modernista. Un saggio sull'opera d'arte (o di architettura) nell'epoca della sua riproducibilità meccanica, ed in particolare fotografica,

senza alcun riferimento a Benjamin non passa inosservato. Ma questa nota aneddotica ne suggerisce un'altra, più generale, e che vale per la totalità dell'opera.

La grande facilità del racconto di Ackerman può trarre in inganno. L'autore è perfettamente informato degli sviluppi più o meno recenti della teoria critica (traduzione approssimativa dell'americano *critical theory*) moderna e contemporanea, così come del vasto apparato metodologico e concettuale che avrebbe potuto mutuare da altre discipline, come la linguistica o le scienze della comunicazione. Ma l'autore non utilizza direttamente che ciò che gli è strettamente necessario, e distilla e trasfigura le proprie fonti applicando egli stesso quel processo di assimilazione creativa proprio alla teoria classica dell'imitazione che è l'oggetto di questi studi. Le fonti del lavoro critico dell'autore (non le fonti storiche, che sono ben inteso citate in nota ed in bibliografia) sono sempre in filigrana, ed il lettore accorto saprà riconoscerle. Fra i suoi interlocutori ideali, con i quali polemizza, l'autore cita due eminenti studiosi recentemente scomparsi, Michel Foucault e Manfredo Tafuri; ma questa difesa delle ragioni della continuità implica anche una presa di posizione ideologica contro varie tendenze che caratterizzano il paesaggio attuale della storia, della teoria e della critica architettonica.

Ogni tradizione, classica o altra (pensiamo per esempio alla tradizione del modernismo nel ventesimo secolo) presuppone un linguaggio comune, quindi la possibilità dello scambio e della comunicazione, l'esistenza di una comunità che condivide gli stessi valori ed infine un'idea della storia come sequenza che non esclude apriori né l'idea di declino né l'idea di progresso. Al contrario, per molti nostri contemporanei ogni espressione è, o dovrebbe essere, personale e geniale, unica ed ispirata—talvolta illuminata da una fonte soprannaturale, esoterica o mistica. Quest'attitudine è singolarmente diffusa nelle scuole d'architettura ovunque nel mondo. Non si insegna una tradizione: si presentano esempi eminenti. Infatti, in ogni scuola di architettura c'è almeno un maestro che si considera un esempio eminente e che insegna sé stesso, presentandosi in quanto tale. Se il solo metodo pedagogico è l'autobiografia, ogni creatore è un'isola, ogni linguaggio è idioletto. Quando il corso è finito, si chiude la porta e si pulisce la lavagna. Il prossimo maestro ripartirà da capo; ogni volta si ricomincia da zero.

Al contrario, la storia della tradizione classica prova che un approccio razionale alla teoria ed alla pratica dell'imitazione è possibile, perché una pedagogia dell'atto imitativo è esistita per secoli. La complementarietà epistemica fra convenzione e invenzione, fra codice e creatività è alla base di ogni linguaggio, di ogni tradizione nelle arti ed inerente ad ogni comunità. Senza consapevolezza della tradizione non può esistere neppure la rivoluzione. Come qualcuno ha detto molto tempo fa, un nano può vedere più lontano di un gigante, se gli sale in spalla.

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H. Lee Cheek, Jr., *Calhoun and Popular Rule: The Political Theory of the Disquisition and Discourse* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001), 202 pp.

Calhoun and Popular Rule will disappoint readers of this journal. While the author correctly identifies the three fountainheads of John C. Calhoun's thought as the classical, English, and American founding traditions, he devotes nearly all of his attention to the last of these influences. While acknowledging Aristotle's influence on Calhoun's belief in the need for balanced government and on his organic conception of society, Cheek fails to discuss the origins and development of mixed government theory, the tradition that culminated in Calhoun's concurrent majority theory. Such information is essential to a comprehension of Calhoun's political theory and to an appreciation for his important place in the history of Western thought.

Cheek fails to note that Calhoun, like John Adams before him, drew his description of the social harmony and unity produced by balanced government directly from Polybius' *Histories* (6.18). Cheek is equally oblivious to the classical origin of Calhoun's (and Jefferson's) pastoralism. While Cheek emphasizes the bond between the founders and Calhoun, he fails to explore one of their most important shared affections, their common love of the classics.

Cheek rightly contends that Calhoun's concurrent majority theory was an innovative attempt to address concerns, such as the potential for majority tyranny in a democracy and the danger of a federal tyranny in a centralized system, that are still relevant today. But Cheek does his cause little good when he refuses to acknowledge the slightest degree of opportunism, or even inconsistency, in the arguments and actions of his idol. For instance, he glosses over Calhoun's strong support for nationalist measures, including a protective tariff, after the War of 1812. Cheek refuses to even entertain the possibility that, at this early stage in Calhoun's political career, when South Carolina possessed a few factories of its own and was not yet irrevocably committed to cotton production, the wily senator supported the tariff in order to keep his state's options open. Cheek quotes the South Carolinian on the injustice of the Tariff of 1828, failing to note that Calhoun himself had secretly schemed for the introduction of the tariff bill for the purpose of giving his political ally, Andrew Jackson, a campaign issue—only to look on, in horror, when the bill passed unexpectedly. One will find no allusion to any of the senator's political maneuvers in these pages; he is presented as a marble statue, the very personification of integrity and consistency, rather than as the successful practical politician he was—with all the compromises, moral and political, that entails. On the same page (74) that Cheek castigates the essayist "Patrick Henry" (probably President John Quincy Adams) for slandering Calhoun by accusing him of promoting anarchy, he quotes, without similar indignation, Calhoun's attribution of "sinister motives" to the essayist. Cheek then accuses Adams of "cronyism" for favoring the appointment of Congressional committee chairmen who agreed with his policies—this despite the fact that Adams failed in his re-election bid, at least in part, because of his refusal to engage in the kind of partisanship regularly practiced by the Jacksonians, including Calhoun. Indeed, one would never gather from *Calhoun and Popular Rule* that Calhoun played any role whatsoever, much less a highly prominent one, in Jackson's election, or that Calhoun never complained about Jackson's "spoils system" until after Calhoun had broken with the president on other matters—especially upon Jackson's learning that it had been Calhoun who had denounced him in a

cabinet meeting during the Monroe Administration, a secret Calhoun had successfully concealed from Jackson for many years.

Nor can any reasonable person help but note the incongruity between Calhoun's passionate denunciations of majority tyranny and his defense of slavery. The system of slavery Calhoun defended was a far more brutal form of majority tyranny than any northern tariff. While Cheek relegates to a footnote the profound influence of Aristotle's concept of the "natural slave" on Calhoun, Calhoun's Africanization of the natural slave is crucial to understanding how he could reconcile his genuine concern for minority rights with his equally genuine defense of slavery. But Cheek will see and hear no evil concerning his hero, even going so far as to deny that slavery held any important place in Calhoun's thought. Yet Calhoun's disagreements with Jefferson concerning the natural equality of human beings and regarding the existence of individual rights, disagreements Cheek de-emphasizes in favor of their agreement on state rights, were hardly trivial. In fact, they were central to Calhoun's defense of slavery. They also demonstrate that Calhoun was even more classical than Jefferson. He followed Aristotle where Jefferson would not, concerning the fundamental issues of human nature.

While Cheek's dry, convoluted style renders *Calhoun and Popular Rule* unsuitable for general readers, the absence of sufficient historical background also detracts from its interest for historians and classicists. Its intended audience appears to be academic political scientists, and even among that group the author's untempered zeal for Calhoun will limit its appeal. It is a pity because Calhoun, for all of his faults, was a truly great thinker whose ideas remain pertinent to the challenges of modern democracy. In fact, some African-American activists, such as Lani Guinier, now celebrate his arguments for institutional arrangements designed to guarantee the rights of minorities. Of such ironies is history made.

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Stephen Sicari, *Joyce's Modernist Allegory: "Ulysses" and the History of the Novel* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), XV + 252 pp.

This study pivots on a paradox: it displays some of the quirks and occasionally the diction of contemporary academic criticism, as it seeks to demonstrate a thesis vibrating with old-time homiletic audacity and evangelical fervor. Nowhere is this odd mixture of mode and motive better illustrated than by the climax of the final sentence of its key-stone chapter:

> ... and even if the new epic family proves to be just another culturally relative configuration becoming fascistic, the love and mercy of Christ as seen in Bloom — first by Stephen, then by the reader, and then by Molly — are eternal. (192)

That's correct: "Bloom's triumphant act of Christian behavior, to forgive and love

those who hurt us" is "to brush from his bed the adulterer's crumbs" which specifically include "some flakes of potted meat, recooked" (*U* 17.2125).[1] Sicari reinforces his hero's role as a Christ-figure by citing Bloom's willing assumption of one of the prophetic missions of Isaiah's Servant ("Light to the gentiles" [186; Isaiah 49:6; *U*[*lysses*] 17.353] and Stephen's vision of his host at Eccles Street combining the divine and human natures of Christ ("the traditional figure of hypostasis" [180-81; *U.* 17.783]).

What energizes this interplay between scripture and *Ulysses* is Sicari's claim that Joyce used a modernist adaptation of Dante's "allegory of theologians" as a prime pattern for his novel. Simply put, that medieval method of biblical interpretation posited four levels (or "senses") that may be derived from scripture: the *literal/history*, the *incarnational/mystery*, the *moral/ethics*, the *anagogical/eschatology*. For example, (1) the exodus of the Hebrew people from bondage in Egypt is (2) fulfilled in Christ's delivery of all believers from the clutches of sin, (3) just as those so saved must flee from the circumstances that lead them morally astray, (4) so that, at end-time, the Christian community may be judged worthy of admission into the eternal Promised Land.[2] Exactly that four-fold method of exegesis was exemplified by Dante in Psalm 113 (*In exitu Israel de Egypto*), when he suggested that the scheme was equally applicable to the *Divina Commedia*. The Joycean hook into this polysemous chain is his ceremonial quotation of that same Psalm, as host and guest file out of Bloom's house in "Ithaca" to relieve themselves in the garden (*U.* 17.1021-31).[3] According to Sicari, this passage flashes to readers of *Ulysses* the clear signal that Joyce intended his novel to be interpreted through the medium of the allegory of the theologians, or a reasonably updated version thereof. Thus, the ritual enacted at 7 Eccles Street[4] foreshadows the founda-

1. Neither claim is as off-the-wall as many conclusions in another recent examination of *Ulysses* as biblical allegory: e.g., Plumtree's Potted Meat as a caricature of the Incarnation and Eucharist, "meat in a can for the Catholic community in an era of mass media" (Giuseppe Martella, *Ulisse: Parallelo biblico e modernità* [Bologna: CLUEB, 1997 = Testi e Discorsi 16], 164-65).
2. In the most impressive examples of this multiple-level allegory, the second stage (*incarnational/mystery*) is linked to the first-level *historical* event in the Old Testament by distinct similarities: as Joseph is sold by his brothers for twenty pieces of silver (Genesis 38:28), so too is Jesus betrayed by an apostle for thirty pieces of silver (Matthew 26:16). This providential congruity of scriptural detail is "typology," an inter-covenant figure of exegesis frequently used by the Church fathers even when no additional allegorical senses (*moral, eschatological*) were derived from a passage. (For the principles of typological exegesis see, e.g., G.W.H. Lampe and K.J. Woolcombe, *Essays on Typology* [London: Allenson, 1957 = Studies in Biblical Theology 22].)
3. Sicari does not cite Hélène Cixous' two applications of Dante's prefatory epistle to Can Grande to Joycean criticism. In a rare instance of interpretive caution, Cixous hesitated to claim an analogy — much less a modernist allegory — between the *Commedia* and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*; her brief discussion of Psalm 113 in *Ulysses* is contextually confused and inferentially vapid (*The Exile of James Joyce*, translated by Sally A. J. Purcell [New York: David Lewis, 1972], 638-40, 730-31; French orig. *L'Exil de James Joyce ou l'Art du remplacement* [Paris: B. Grasset, 1968 = Publications de la Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines de Paris-Sorbonne. Série "Recherches" t. 46], 724-26, 824-25).
4. Sicari states that "it is no coincidence that 'Eccles' is the root for the Greek word we translate as 'church,' *ecclesia*" (183); from an analogous perspective, why not add apocalyptic numerology to fortuitous etymology by linking Bloom's address to the "*seven* churches of Asia" (Revelation 1:4)?

tion, when Bloom retires aslant Molly, of a new church with a radical moral code based on forgiveness and love — the benign cuckold as new-age Redeemer.

Two additional lines of evidence are wrapped around and intertwined with the central core of the argument for a figurative dimension in *Ulysses*. First, allegory is firmly bound to memory, since a reader must "remember" or "reread" the text to see and benefit from the author's "retrospective arrangement" of apparently unimportant or incidental details. This repeated Joycean phrase is cited in six of its appearances in the novel to show how meaning and relationships unfold only as memory re-examines the material (20). A significant seventh occurrence of the phrase certainly deserved notice and comment, especially since it appears in "Ithaca," an episode which is crucial to the demonstration of allegory. In that chapter's series of questions and answers, the deceased Rudolph Bloom is recalled narrating to his son, Leopold, "a retrospective arrangement" of the family's migrations (*U.* 17.1907). The very next item in the catechism is, "Had time equally but differently obliterated the memory of these migrations in narrator and listener?" (*U.* 17.1916-17). The answer is an emphatic "Yes." The denotative precision of the question's verb ("obliterated") and object ("memory") calls for some comment — as does the context, with its nearby appearance of the recurring formula and its alleged cumulative significance for allegory.

Second, Sicari's subtitle and a conspicuous topic-sentence indicate that "[o]ne of the main features of [his] argument about *Ulysses* is that it is enacting the history of the novel" (32). Although a number of contemporary studies of the novel's history and current situation are mentioned, the parallel is not established with precision or consistency. One formulation more or less matches the "levels" of the novel with those of the allegory of theologians: naturalistic, novelistic, epic, allegorical (166-75). The historical literary-critical bases for these stages or modes are not clearly explained, but a case is made for four levels of structure in *Ulysses* — culminating in its status as a Christianizing allegory. That link is reasonably established in the introductory section which lays out the evidence that the work's "earlier naturalistic episodes" are related to its later "wildly experimental" episodes in a way "analogous to the way that the New Testament is taken to reread certain features of the Old" (8-17). This essentially "typological" portion of the study demonstrates that Sicari has gone over the text with care and can skillfully point out significant instances of Joyce's retrospection; his principal interest, however, is not in these compositional details, but in moralizing megacepts. At the same time, the argument here sets the stage for the central importance of the "Ithaca" chapter[5] in Joyce's allegorical design: it contains the necessary "Christ event."

Next, a brief rationale for my injection of typology into the discussion, and its bearing on the argument for Stephen's recognition of Christ in Bloom and the investiture of Bloom with quasi-Christian ecclesial-moral status. Readers are likely to view these conclusions with the same skepticism that was generally directed toward allegorical rereadings of scripture in the history of Christian exegesis. That is, *typology* (firmly grounded in "historical" details on both sides of the intertestamental equation)

5. In my judgment, it is far from self-evident that "[n]othing could be less poetic than 'Ithaca,' written in plainest style imaginable" (xiv) or that its style "presumes a vantage point on the action of the world that is as close to the eternal as humanity can achieve" (173). In fact, at the opening of the episode, "Bloom dissented tacitly from Stephen's views on the eternal affirmation of the spirit of man in literature" (*U.* 17.29-30).

has been seen as an acceptable procedure, even for specifically theological purposes; whereas *allegory* (with its highly subjective moralizing or eschatological emphases) may be permitted as an occasional homiletic finesse, but it is suspect as a valid retrospective illumination of the text of the bible or an enduring guide to Christian conduct. Ditto, in my judgment, for Sicari's central allegorical thesis and many of the passages "reread" from *Ulysses* to corroborate and illustrate it.[6]

Finally, there is a recurrent (and patently earnest) homiletic aspect to this work of literary criticism. Although I found Sicari's "Conclusion" (the "modernist allegory" in the works of Pound, Eliot, and Stevens) largely irrelevant to a study of *Ulysses*, its final paragraph endorses an appropriation of the figure of Christ "as the cornerstone of the artistic project" (220-21). I suspect many readers of this study will have some difficulty accepting this conclusion and the arguments adduced in its support. The Buck Mulligans of the world will probably "still read [*Ulysses*] with great interest in and deriving pleasure from the humor and reductive irony that is always at work, but their eyes are blind to the truth presented. The veil has not been lifted from their eyes" (178). Amen. And, as Joyce himself counseled in his final apocalyptic liturgy of the word, "Eat a missal lest" (*FW* 456.18).

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6. Sicari does not mention two other recent works (both quite bizarre) that propose scriptural allegory as the overriding principle of design and detail in Joyce's major works: for *Ulysses*, Martella's monograph (see note 1); for the *Wake*, Harry Burrell, *Narrative Design in "Finnegans Wake" : The "Wake" Lock Picked* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1996).