

for constituting arithmetical concepts out of logical terms. He had to mark a mathematical object which is characterized by praedicates which are non-contradictory. On a more elevated plane as in our mental experiment operating with extremely simple signs (section 18), Russell had to suppose that the reader of his definition of d.d. has a notion of certain more fundamental concepts and is therefore able to understand the newly introduced concepts designated by the new sign. Russell further presupposes the semantical feature of his symbolic language and relies upon its pragmatical nature, i.e. its use by the interpreter, for reasoning and not for misleading.

In our mental experiment we had to take for granted that our marsonian interlocutors had the same object in view as ourselves when repeating our flashsignals. In the case of d.d. as defined in P.M. *14 the underlying concepts in the definiens are those of logical existence and of identity. These in turn lead back to further concepts and those which we cannot define any more are linked up with the question how we can recognize something as a determinate object.

The solution to that most fundamental question works out differently if we apply it to mathematical objects or to sense data. In so far as we arithmetize our observations we can hope to use the concepts defined symbolically without ambiguity.

Erratum. In section 2 the last sentence should read:

"The third group of primitive terms denote propositional functions and certain general concepts about classes, which can, for *finite* classes, be expressed by means of logical constants."