

Verneinung falsch; wenn zwei Sätze der Physik wahr sind, so ist ihre Konjunktion wahr.

Empirisch lässt sich jedoch feststellen, dass sich die Menschen und die sozialen Gruppen den wahren Sätzen gegenüber in einer besonderen Weise verhalten. Die wahren Sätze werden unter gewissen Umständen in hier nicht weiter zu erörternder Weise beim praktischen Handeln berücksichtigt. In diesem besondern Verhalten den wahren Sätzen gegenüber besteht nun aber was man gewöhnlich als Sinn des Wahrheitsbegriffes bezeichnet. Dieser Sinn lässt sich also empirisch und nur empirisch feststellen.

Ich möchte zum Schluss die Vorteile der hier vertretenen Deutung der ethischen Sätze wie folgt angeben: bei dieser Deutung kann die allgemeine Ethik ihre Unabhängigkeit von der empirischen Forschung beibehalten. Die Feststellung des Sinnes der ethischen Sätze aber bleibt der Erfahrung vorbehalten und wird damit vor jeder Einmischung weltanschaulicher Elemente geschützt. Spezielle Schlussweisen sind für den Aufbau der Ethik nicht erforderlich.

E. Beth.

BOOK REVIEW

International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Volumes I and II:
Foundations of the Unity of Science, Volume I, Number I.
Encyclopedia and Unified Science.

The University of Chicago Press. 1938.

Readers of this journal do not need to be informed of the historical advent of this *Encyclopedia*; it will suffice to say that the intention of its promoters is to exhibit the interrelations of the various special sciences, analyzing their conclusions in terms of the method of science, and present them in a humanized form. Twenty monographs will constitute the first two volumes of the *Encyclopedia*; the number under review is to form a general introduction. Dr. Neurath's article is interesting but rather too discursive; it succeeds, however, in suggesting to the reader what he may hope to gain from the *Encyclopedia* itself. The most interesting of the Articles is Dewey's, entitled "Unity of Science as a Social Problem"; it is his merit to see clearly that the Unity of Science presents a problem that cannot be neglected although it is by no means easy to make clear exactly what that problem is. To bring about unity of the scientific attitude is, he says, "to bring those who accept it and who act upon it into active coöperation with one another". To promote this coöperation should be the main purpose of the *Encyclopedia*. C. W. Morris insists upon the need for this enterprise of a thoroughgoing study of signs. Carnap's Article presents the contents of his more technical writings in a simplified form, which will serve a useful purpose as an introduction. One page by Niels Bohr and three pages by Bertrand Russell have, no doubt, been included to indicate the goodwill of these distinguished thinkers; what they have written serves no other purpose.

This first number of the *Encyclopedia* must be welcomed as the first step in a great undertaking of considerable importance in our present time.

L. Susan Stebbing † (1939)

F. Conseth: Qu'est-ce que la logique? (Actualités Scientifiques et industrielles, 524. Hermann et Cie. Paris. 1937).

This essay consists of two parts. The first contains very brief accounts of the "grammatical realism" of the Port Royal logic, the logistic atomism of *Principia Mathematica*, the neo-positivism of the Vienna Circle, the transcendental logic of Kant, the "partial nominalism" of Poincaré, and the "mediatory" position of Enriques. The last is the position which the author wishes to advocate. In the second part he puts forward the view that logic is an abstract schematization of the properties of objects and a natural canon of judgments. Logic is regarded as a "mental technique". This view is not at all clearly presented; the discussion is vague and, in the opinion of the reviewer, of no great value.

L. Susan Stebbing † (1939)