

V. P. Škredov, *Metod issledovanija sobstvennosti v 'Kapitale' K. Marksa* (The Method of Investigating Property in Marx' Capital) Moskva, Izd. MGU, 1973, 261 str. 1r. 24k.

This is an interesting addition to the growing Soviet interest in the question of Marx' method. There was a time when Marx was mentioned only in passing – as a sort of titular god. There also was a time when 'method' meant nothing more serious than mention of some of the obvious inductive and deductive structures of sentences in some of Marx' works.

The present work represents an exception on both counts. It takes Marx seriously – and *in extenso*; and it takes him where he is most serious – in his assertions about having a special method. This special method of Marx' *Capital* is investigated – as the title indicates – on the matter of Marx' view on and analysis of (private) property. His basic thesis is that, for Marx, private property does not mean something like 'aggregate of the relations of production': it means something far more (dialectically) complex.

The first of the six chapters (pp. 10–40) constitutes a good review of the views on property held by Marx' predecessors – including John Locke, the classical political economists and the 19th Century socialists. In the second chapter (pp. 41–66) the author sees Marx in *Capital* as exposing property to be a juridical relation (rather than a primarily economic one) and to be derived rather than primary. Similarly, in the third chapter (pp. 67–99), Marx' analysis is described as penetrating behind the legal-economic façade to production and to surplus value, while Chapter Four (pp. 100–143) sees "'private' property" as derived from "'private' appropriation". Fundamental to the fifth chapter (pp. 114–202) is the equation "just as capital is not a thing but a relation of production, so private property is not a thing but a relation of production." Chapter Six (pp. 203–243) is devoted to viewing how Marx and Engels described the evolution of 'bourgeois' views on property and the brief conclusion (pp. 244–260) is a passable account of how a solid definition of property has to be 'dialectical' in terms of a given social context.

This sort of soundly Hegelian analysis can only be of benefit for the qualitative level of contemporary Soviet philosophy.

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