Erratum

Alberto Peruzzi, "Towards a real phenomenology of logic," *Husserl Studies* 6 (1989): 1–24.

p. 7, 1.25 *should read*: ... that some kind of constructivism ...

p. 10, 1.8 *should read*: The formal can shift systematically.

p. 10, 1.32 *should read*: ... reason that linguistic structures ...

p. 11, 1.18 *should read*: ... for any stage $j \geq i$, ...

p. 13, 1.24 and 25 *should read*: ... or the notion of 'quantity', but ...

p. 24, Note 34 *should read*:
Let me explain this point with a minimum of formal tools. Let U be a fixed domain (universe of discourse, field of experience), described in terms of a language L, and T_U any L-theory satisfied in U. Now, subjects can be thought of as categories in various ways. Suppose σ is an empirical subject, with access to L, able to represent T_U through the mapping (functor) f. If f_* is a formalization of the abstract structure of involved σ-acts, then the existence of a transcendental subject Σ can be interpreted as equivalent to the existence of a "universal" g, such that f* is "adjoint" to f_* and $f = f^* g$:



(For the notion of "adjointness", see J. Lambek, "The Influence of Heraclitus on Modern Mathematics", in J. Agassi and R.S. Cohen (eds.), *Scientific Philosophy Today* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1981, pp. 111–121). A Kantian transcendental subject is U-universal for all U's. But there is no need for *postulating* such a uniformity, so there is room also for a phenomenology of different Σ's related to different U's – in accordance with *I2*, § 27.