

tertium quid consisted in exploiting the notion of necessity₂. Our metaphysician urged that there are entailments between synthetic propositions, such that the first can be necessary₂, while the second is not. The proof, however, is as cogent when it is necessity₂ which is at stake. Hume's dictum can thus be generalized to claim that if a ~~promise~~ premise is necessary in any sense of that term, then its consequences will be necessary in that same sense.

It is left to the reader to expose the ambiguities which made the inferences concerning the velocity of light and *perpetua mobiles* seem trans-type in that special way which might help the cause of metaphysics. But it is assured in advance that something has gone astray; the *tertium quid* will sooner or later always collapse into a *tertium non datur*. Although this very conclusion is itself inductive, being based on special examples, and analyses such as those preceding, it is no less convincing for that. The probability that no metaphysician will ever produce an argument which is a genuine entailment and also moves across logical types is 1. So the probability of there ever being a valid metaphysical argument is 0.

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Corrigendum

In line 3, page 66, of "Logic, Meaning, and Mystical Intuition" by Robert Hoffman (October 1960) read "amenable" for "amendable."