

ABSTRACTS

cally different particulars are from properties. The relevance of these matters to some considerations of 'simplicity' and the principles of empiricism is explored.

EDWIN B. ALLAIRE, 'Things, Relations and Identity', *Philosophy of Science* **34** (1967), No. 3.

Philosophers have long believed that if the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles were *logically* true, there would be no problem of individuation. I show (a) that if spatial relations are, as seems plausible, of such a *nature* that it makes no sense to say of one thing that it is related to itself, then the Principle is a *logical* truth, asserting that a certain kind of state of affairs is impossible because the kind of sentence purporting to express it is ill-formed and (b) that even if the Principle were such a truth the problem of individuation would remain. I then examine some of what Leibniz and Wittgenstein have said about the notions of individuation, difference and non-identity.

RECTIFICATION

The Subtitle of *Synthese* Volume 18 No. 1 unfortunately appeared in a slightly misleading form. The correct form should be:

Including a Symposium on Causation