To Andrea M. Weisberger, 'Haack on Dummett: A Note’, Philosophical Studies 55 (1989), 337-343.
p. 338, line 9: "with" should be "which"
p. 338, quote \#1: This passage is not a quote and should not be in small print. The following quote, which was omitted, should precede it and both should read as follows in entirety:
... let us envisage a dispute over the logical validity of the statement 'Either Jones was brave or he was not'. A imagines Jones to be a man, now dead, and who never encountered danger in his life. $B$ retorts that it could still be true that Jones was brave, namely if it is true that if Jones had encountered danger, he would have acted bravely. A agrees with this but still maintains that it does not need to be the case that either 'Jones was brave' = 'If Jones had encountered danger, he would have acted bravely' nor 'Jones was not brave' = 'If Jones had encountered danger, he would not have acted bravely' is true. For, he argues, it might be the case that however many facts we knew of the kind which we should normally regard as grounds for asserting such counter-factual conditionals, we should still know nothing which would be a ground for asserting either. ${ }^{3}$

Now if the realist ( $B$ ) still wants to hold that 'Either Jones was brave or he was not' he must insist that there is something which makes it true - some spiritual mechanism of 'character' for example. The choice is either to accept a belief in this mechanism or adopt $A$ 's proposal. For Dummett, anyone with a "sufficient degree of sophistication" will reject $B$ "s belief since if the disjunction is to be true, it must be true in virtue of the sorts of things that we have been taught justify us in asserting it. If it is true in virtue of a spiritual mechanism, for example, then 'Jones was brave' has a meaning we have not given it. This places the realist in a dilemma: he can deny his own thesis or admit that terms don't mean what we think.

