

in its ability to solve problems. In addition to its success, a rational theory must be logically consistent (most of the time), conceptually coherent, powerful in explanation, and criticizable. To be criticizable it cannot have true first principles. Kekes' theory of rationality is, on his own account, a rational theory. (p. 190)

Kekes' theory is well-grounded to the degree to which it is successful. Since pragmatic criteria are special cases of inductive criteria, the support for Kekes' theory rests with an inductive argument. Thus, all of rationality hangs on the justification of induction, and on the particular induction demonstrating the success of Kekes' theory. Is the law of non-contradiction less well-known than this induction? Are simple arithmetic relations less well-known than this induction? Is the necessity of ontological categories, such as quantity, quality, and relation, less well-known than this induction? Kekes' argument fails the test of epistemic seriousness.

Near the end of his book Kekes says that rationality is a method, not a state of mind. (p. 258) But one can always ask, "What does it mean to say that one knows that a method is correct?". One cannot know a method by a method, or as Nietzsche remarked about Kant's first *Critique*: "[he answers] "by means of a means" – but unfortunately not in five words."

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## ERRATUM

The Journal of Value Inquiry, Volume XI, issue 4.

In the article by J. Martin Stafford, *On Distinguishing Between Love and Lust*, line 28 on page 292 should read:

without commitment or love without respect'<sup>5</sup> (p. 119). If this is allowed,