Abstract
This study investigates the security of split federated learning (SFL), a collaborative deep learning scheme that provides similar peak performance to federated learning while significantly reducing its computation time for multiple clients. We find that the basic security assumptions of SFL are flawed, in which the honest-but-curious server can easily conspire with a motivated client to break the security of SFL. More prominently, we show that the server can train an inversion model (DecodeNet) and perform an inference attack on clients’ private data. To support DecodeNet training, we implement a data-free training scheme to provide train data in the absence of the original training dataset. The experimental results demonstrate that our attack can reconstruct pixel-wise private images from clients on four different datasets and overcome the differential privacy protection mechanism in SFL.
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Huang, H., Li, X., He, W. (2023). Pixel-Wise Reconstruction of Private Data in Split Federated Learning. In: Wang, D., Yung, M., Liu, Z., Chen, X. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14252. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7356-9_26
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7356-9_26
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