

Constant-Round Leakage-Resilient Zero-Knowledge from Collision Resistance

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Abstract. We construct a constant-round leakage-resilient zero-knowledge argument system under the existence of collision-resistant hash function family. That is, using collision-resistant hash functions, we construct a constant-round zero-knowledge argument system such that for any cheating verifier that can obtain arbitrary amount of leakage of the prover's state, there exists a simulator that can simulate the adversary's view by obtaining at most the same amount of leakage of the witness. Previously, leakage-resilient zero-knowledge protocols were constructed only under a relaxed security definition (Garg-Jain-Sahai, CRYPTO'11) or under the DDH assumption (Pandey, TCC'14).

Our leakage-resilient zero-knowledge argument system satisfies an additional property that it is simultaneously leakage-resilient zero-knowledge, meaning that both zero-knowledgeness and soundness hold in the presence of leakage.

1 Introduction

Zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs and arguments [14] are interactive proof/argument systems with which the prover can convince the verifier of the correctness of a mathematical statement while providing *zero additional knowledge*. This “zero additional knowledge” property is formalized thorough the *simulation paradigm*. Specifically, an interactive proof or argument is said to be zero-knowledge if for any adversarial verifier there exists a *simulator* that can output a simulated view of the adversary.

Recently, Garg et al. [12] introduced a new notion of zero-knowledgeness called *leakage-resilient zero-knowledge (LRZK)*. Roughly speaking, LRZK is a notion of zero-knowledgeness in the setting where adversarial verifiers can obtain arbitrary leakage on the entire state of the honest prover (including the witness and the randomness) during the entire protocol execution. LRZK is motivated by the studies of *side-channel attacks* (e.g., [2, 18, 27]), which demonstrated that adversaries might be able to obtain leakage of honest parties' secret states by attacking physical implementations of cryptographic algorithms.

Informally speaking, LRZK requires that the protocol does not reveal anything beyond the validity of the statement *and the leakage that the adversary obtained*. More formally, LRZK is defined as follows. In the definition of LRZK,

the cheating verifier is allowed to make arbitrary number of *leakage queries* during the interaction with a honest prover, where each leakage query f is answered by $f(w, \text{tape})$ for the witness w and the randomness tape that the honest prover generated thus far. On the other hand, the simulator is allowed to make queries to the *leakage oracle* \mathcal{L}_w , which is parametrized by the witness w of the honest prover and outputs $f(w)$ on input any function f . LRZK is then defined by requiring that for any cheating verifier V^* there exists a simulator \mathcal{S} such that for any $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$, when V^* obtains ℓ bits of leakage of the prover’s state via leakage queries, \mathcal{S} can simulate the view of V^* by obtaining ℓ bits of leakage of the witness via queries to the leakage oracle \mathcal{L}_w .¹

In [12], Garg et al. showed a proof system that satisfies a weaker notion of LRZK called $(1 + \epsilon)$ -LRZK. Specifically, they showed that for any $\epsilon > 0$, there exists a proof system such that when V^* obtains ℓ bits of leakage from the prover, a simulator can simulate the verifier’s view by obtaining at most $(1 + \epsilon) \cdot \ell$ bits of leakage from \mathcal{L}_w . The round complexity of this protocol is at least $\omega(\log n)/\epsilon$, and its security is proven under a standard general assumption (the existence of statistically hiding commitment scheme that is public-coin w.r.t. the receiver).

A natural question left open by [12] is whether we can construct a LRZK protocol without weakening the security requirement. That is, the question is whether we can reduce ϵ to 0 in the protocol of [12]. This question is particularly of theoretical interest because reducing ϵ to 0 is optimal in the sense that λ -LRZK for $\lambda < 0$ is impossible to achieve in the plain model [12].

Recently, this question was solved affirmatively by Pandey [23], who constructed the first LRZK argument system by using the DDH assumption and collision-resistant hash functions. Pandey’s protocol has only constant number of rounds; therefore, it follows that asymptotically optimal round complexity can be achievable even in the presence of leakage.

A question that is explicitly left open by Pandey [23, Section 1] is whether we can construct LRZK protocols under a standard *general* assumption. In fact, although the protocol of Pandey [23] is superior to the protocol of Garg et al. [12] in terms of both leakage resilience (LRZK v.s. $(1 + \epsilon)$ -LRZK) and round complexity (constant v.s. $\omega(\log n)/\epsilon$), the assumption of the former is seemingly much stronger than that of the latter (the DDH assumption v.s. the existence of statistically hiding commitment scheme that is public-coin w.r.t. the receiver, which is implied by, say, the existence of collision-resistant hash function family or even the existence of one-way functions²).

Question. *Can we construct a (constant-round) leakage-resilient zero-knowledge protocol under standard general assumptions?*

¹ In [22], it is pointed out that nowadays *leakage tolerance* is the commonly accepted term for this security notion. In this paper, however, we use the term “leakage resilience” for this security notion for consistency with previous works [12, 23].

² A constant-round one can be constructed from collision-resistant hash functions [10, 21] and a polynomial-round one can be constructed from one-way functions [15].

1.1 Our Results

In this paper, we answer the above question affirmatively by constructing a LRZK protocol from collision-resistant hash functions (CRHFs). Like the protocol of [23], our protocol has only constant number of rounds. Also, our protocol has an additional property that it is public coin (w.r.t. the verifier).

Theorem. *Assume the existence of collision-resistant hash function family. Then, there exists a constant-round public-coin leakage-resilient zero-knowledge argument for \mathcal{NP} .*

Simultaneously Leakage-Resilient Zero-Knowledge. Our protocol has an additional property that it is *simultaneously leakage-resilient zero-knowledge* [12], meaning that not only zero-knowledgeness but also soundness holds in the presence of leakage. The *leakage-resilient (LR) soundness* (i.e., soundness in the presence of leakage) of our protocol follows immediately from its public-coin property. In fact, any public-coin interactive proof/argument system is LR sound for arbitrary amount of leakage of the verifier because the verifier has no secret state in public-coin protocols.

To the best of our knowledge, our protocol is the first simultaneously LRZK protocol. The $(1 + \epsilon)$ -LRZK protocol of Garg et al. [12] is LR sound in a weak sense—it is LR sound when there is an a-priori upper bound on the amount of leakage—but is not LR sound when the amount of leakage is unbounded,³ and similarly, the LRZK protocol of Pandey [23] is also not LR sound with unbounded amount of leakage. In contrast, our protocol is sound even when cheating verifiers obtain arbitrary amount of leakage.

The summary of the previous results and ours is given in Table 1. In the table, “bounded-LR sound” means that the soundness holds when there is an a-priori upper bound on the amount of leakage from the verifier.

Table 1. Summary of the results on LRZK protocols. The round complexity of the protocol of [12] depends on the assumption that is used to instantiate the underlying statistically-hiding commitment scheme; in particular, when only one-way functions (OWFs) are used, there is a polynomial additive overhead because statistically hiding commitment schemes currently require polynomial number of rounds in this case [15].

	LR ZKness	LR soundness	#(round)	Assumptions
[12]	$(1 + \epsilon)$ -LRZK	Bounded-LR sound	$\text{poly}(n) + \omega(\log n)/\epsilon$ $\omega(\log n)/\epsilon$	OWFs CRHFs
[23]	LRZK	-	$O(1)$	DDH + CRHFs
This work	LRZK	LR sound	$O(1)$	CRHFs

³ This is because in the protocol of [12], the verifier commits to the challenge bits of Blum’s Hamiltonicity protocol in advance and hence an cheating prover can easily break the soundness by obtaining the challenge bits via leakage.

1.2 Related Works

Several works study interactive protocols in the presence of arbitrary leakage in the models other than the plain model, e.g., the work about leakage-tolerant UC-secure protocols in the CRS model [5], the work about non-transferable interactive proof systems in the CRS model with leak-free input encoding/updating phase [1], and the works about secure computation protocols in the CRS model with leak-free preprocessing/input-encoding phase and constant fraction of honest parties [6–8]. We remind the readers that, like [12, 23], this work considers LRZK protocols in the plain model without any leak-free phase.

In [22], Ostrovsky et al. showed an impossibility result about black-box LRZK in the model with only leak-free input-encoding phase (i.e., without CRS and preprocessing). We notice that this impossibility result does not contradict our result since the definition of LRZK in [22] is different from the one we use (i.e., the definition given by [12]). Specifically, in the definition of [22], the simulator is not allowed to obtain any leakage, whereas in the definition that we use, the simulator can obtain the same amount of leakage as the cheating verifier. (In other words, Ostrovsky et al. [22] considers leakage resilience whereas we consider leakage tolerance; see Footnote 1.)

2 Overview of Our Techniques

2.1 Previous Techniques

Since our techniques rely on the techniques that are used in the previous LRZK protocols of [12, 23], we start by recalling these protocols.

Protocol of [12]. In [12], Garg et al. constructed a $(1 + \epsilon)$ -leakage-resilient zero-knowledge proof system, i.e., a proof system such that when V^* obtains ℓ bits of leakage from the prover, its view can be simulated by obtaining at most $(1 + \epsilon) \cdot \ell$ bits of leakage from \mathcal{L}_w .

A key idea behind the protocol of [12] is to give the simulator two independent ways of cheating—one for simulating prover’s messages and the other for simulating leakages. Concretely, Garg et al. constructed their protocol by combining two well-known techniques of constant-round zero-knowledge protocols—the technique by Goldreich and Kahan [13] that requires the verifier to commit to its challenges in advance and the technique by Feige and Shamir [11] that uses equivocal commitment schemes. They then proved the security by considering a simulator that simulates the prover’s messages by extracting the challenges and simulates the leakages by using the equivocality of the commitment scheme.

In more details, the protocol of [12] consists of the following two phases. In the first phase, the verifier uses an extractable commitment scheme to commit to a challenge string ch of Blum’s Hamiltonicity protocol and trapdoor information td of an equivocal commitment scheme.⁴ In the second phase, the prover and

⁴ Actually, there is a coin-tossing protocol that determines the parameter of the equivocal commitment, and td is the trapdoor for biasing the outcome of the coin-tossing.

the verifier execute Blum’s Hamiltonicity protocol that is instantiated with the equivocal commitment scheme. In simulation, the simulator extracts ch and td in the first phase and then simulates the prover’s messages and the leakages in the second phase by using the knowledge of ch and td in the following way. (For simplicity, we assume that Blum’s protocol is executed only once instead of many times in parallel.)

When the extracted challenge ch is 0, the simulator commits to a randomly permuted graph of statement G , and after V^* decommits the challenge ch (which must be 0), the simulator decommits the commitment to the permuted graph of G .

Notice that the simulator does exactly the same things as a honest prover. Hence, the simulator can simulate prover’s randomness \mathbf{tape} easily and therefore can answer any leakage query f from V^* by querying $f(\cdot, \mathbf{tape})$ to \mathcal{L}_w .

When the extracted challenge ch is 1, the simulator commits to a randomly chosen cycle graph H at the beginning and then partially decommits it in the last step so that only the edges on the cycle are revealed.

When V^* makes a leakage query, the simulator answers it by using w and td to compute randomness that “explains” the commitment to H as a commitment to a permuted graph of G . (Recall that the prover is supposed to commit to a permuted graph of G .) Specifically, the simulator answers a leakage query f from V^* by querying the following function $\tilde{f}(\cdot)$ to \mathcal{L}_w .

1. On input w , function \tilde{f} first computes a permutation π that maps the Hamiltonian cycle w in G to the cycle in H (i.e., computes π such that $\pi(G)$ has the same cycle as H).
2. Then, by using equivocality⁵ with trapdoor td , it computes randomness \mathbf{tape} that explains the commitment to H as a commitment to $\pi(G)$ (i.e., it computes \mathbf{tape} such that committing to $\pi(G)$ with randomness \mathbf{tape} will generate the same commitment as the one that the simulator has sent to V^* by committing to H).
3. Finally, it outputs $f(w, \mathbf{tape})$.

Notice that since $\pi(G)$ has the same cycle as H , the simulated leakages (from which V^* may be able to compute $\pi(G)$) are consistent with the cycle of H that is decommitted by the simulator in the last step.

We remark that the reason why the protocol of [12] satisfies only $(1 + \epsilon)$ -LRZK (rather than standard LRZK) is that the extraction of ch and td involves the rewinding of V^* . In fact, since V^* can make new leakage queries after being rewound, the simulator need to obtain new leakages from \mathcal{L}_w in each rewinding and hence the simulator need to obtain more bits of leakage than V^* .

Protocol of [23]. In [23], Pandey constructed a constant-round LRZK argument system under the DDH assumption. Roughly speaking, Pandey’s idea is

⁵ What is actually used here is *adaptive security*, which guarantees that for each underlying commitment, it is possible to compute randomness \mathbf{tape}_0 and \mathbf{tape}_1 such that \mathbf{tape}_b explains the commitment as a commitment to b for each $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

to replace the rewinding simulation technique in the protocol of [12] with the “straight-line” simulation technique of Barak [3]. In particular, Pandey replaced the first phase of the protocol of [12] with the following one.

1. First, the prover and the verifier execute an encrypted version of so called *Barak’s preamble* [3, 24, 25], which determines a “fake statement” that is false except with negligible probability.
2. Next, the prover and the verifier execute Yao’s garbled circuit protocol [28] in which the prover can obtain ch and td only when it has a valid witness for the fake statement.

From the security of the encrypted Barak’s preamble, no cheating prover can make the fake statement true; hence, ch and td are hidden from the cheating prover. In contrast, a non-black-box simulator can make the fake statement true by using the knowledge of the code of the verifier; hence, the simulator can obtain ch and td without rewinding V^* . An issue is that, to guarantee leakage resilience, it is required that Yao’s protocol is executed in a way that all prover’s messages are pseudorandom (since otherwise it is hard to simulate randomness that explains the simulated prover’s messages as honest prover’s messages during the simulation of the leakages). Since Yao’s protocol involves executions of an oblivious transfer protocol (in which the prover behaves as a receiver), this property is hard to satisfy. Pandey solved this problem by using the DDH assumption, under which there exists an oblivious transfer protocol such that all receiver’s messages are indistinguishable from random group elements.

2.2 Our Techniques

The reason why the protocols of [12, 23] either guarantee only weaker security or rely on a stronger assumption is that the simulation involves extraction from V^* . In fact, in [12], the simulator need to obtain more amount of leakage than V^* because it rewinds V^* during extraction, and in [23], the DDH assumption is required because Yao’s protocol is used for extraction.

Based on this observation, our strategy is to modify the protocols of [12, 23] so that no extraction is required in simulation. We first remove the extraction of trapdoor td and next remove the extraction of challenge ch .

Removing Extraction of Trapdoor td . We first modify the protocols of [12, 23] so that leakages can be simulated without extracting the trapdoor td of an equivocal commitment scheme.

Our main tool is Hamiltonicity commitment scheme **H-Com** [9, 11], which is a well-known instance-dependent equivocal commitment scheme based on Blum’s Hamiltonicity protocol. **H-Com** is parametrized by a graph G with $q = \text{poly}(n)$ vertices. To commit to 0, the committer chooses a random permutation π and commits to the adjacent matrix of $\pi(G)$ using any commitment scheme **Com**; to decommit, the committer reveals π and decommits all the entries of the matrix. To commit to 1, the committer commits to the adjacent matrix of a random

q -cycle graph; to decommit, the committer decommits only the entries that corresponds to the edges on the cycle. H-Com satisfies equivocality when G has a Hamiltonian cycle; this is because after committing to 0, the committer can decommit it to both 0 and 1 given a Hamiltonian cycle w in G .

Given H-Com, we remove the extraction of td by combining H-Com with an encrypted variant of Barak’s preamble. Specifically, we replace the equivocal commitment scheme in the protocols of [12, 23] with H-Com that depends on the fake statement G' that is obtained by the encrypted Barak’s preamble. From the security of Barak’s preamble, any cheating prover cannot make G' true and hence it cannot use the equivocality of H-Com, whereas the simulator can make G' true and hence it can use the equivocality of H-Com as desired.

Remark 1. As observed in [23], it is not straightforward to use the encrypted Barak’s preamble in the presence of leakage. Roughly speaking, in the encrypted Barak’s preamble, the prover commits to its messages instead of sending them in clear, and in the proof of soundness, it is required that the prover’s messages are extractable from the commitments. The problem is that it is not easy to guarantee this extractability in the presence of leakage (this is because the prover’s messages are typically not pseudorandom in the techniques of extractability). Pandey [23] solved this problem by having the prover use a specific extractable commitment scheme based on the DDH assumption. In this paper, we instead have the prover use a commitment scheme that satisfies only very weak extractability but the prover’s messages of which are pseudorandom and the security of which is based on the existence of CRHFs.⁶ For details, see Sect. 4.1.

Removing Extraction of Challenge ch . Next, we modify the protocols of [12, 23] so that prover’s messages can be simulated without extracting the challenge ch of Hamiltonicity protocol.

We first notice that although the simulator can use equivocality without extraction as shown above, it is not easy for the simulator to use equivocality for simulating prover’s messages. This is because when the leakages to V^* includes the randomness that is used for commitments, V^* may be able to determine the committed values from the leakages and therefore equivocation may be detected by V^* .

As our main technical tool, then, we introduce a specific instance-dependent equivocal commitment scheme GJS-Com that we obtain by considering the technique of [12] on Hamiltonicity protocol in the context of H-Com. Recall that, as explained in Sect. 2.1, in [12] Garg et al. use Blum’s Hamiltonicity protocol that is instantiated with an equivocal commitment scheme. Here, we use H-Com that is instantiated with an equivocal commitment scheme (i.e., we use H-Com in which the adjacent matrix is committed to by an equivocal commitment scheme). The equivocal commitment scheme that we use here is, as above, H-Com that depends on the fake statement generated by the encrypted Barak’s preamble.⁷

⁶ This extractability is used only in the proof of soundness. Hence, the proof of zero-knowledgeness works even in the presence of this extractable commitment scheme.

⁷ Actually, we use an adaptively secure H-Com [9, 19]. See Footnote 5.

Hence, the commitment scheme GJS-Com is a version of H-Com that is instantiated by using H-Com itself as the underlying commitment scheme.⁸ GJS-Com depends on two statements of the Hamiltonicity problem: The “outer” H-Com (the H-Com that is implemented with H-Com) depends on the real statement G , and the “inner” H-Com (the H-Com that is used to implement H-Com) depends on the fake statement G' . GJS-Com inherits equivocality from the outer H-Com, i.e., given a witness for the real statement G , a GJS-Com commitment to 0 can be decommitted to both 0 and 1.

Since GJS-Com is obtained by considering the technique of [12] in the context of H-Com, it satisfies a property that is useful for proving LRZK property. First, observe that given GJS-Com, the second phase of the LRZK protocol of [12] (i.e., Hamiltonicity protocol phase) can be viewed as follows.

1. The prover commits to 0 by using GJS-Com.
2. The verifier reveals the challenge $ch \in \{0, 1\}$ that is committed to in the first phase.
3. When $ch = 0$, the prover decommits the GJS-Com commitment to 0 honestly, and when $ch = 1$, the prover decommits it to 1 by using the equivocality with the knowledge of Hamiltonian cycle w in G .

When the second phase of the protocol of [12] is viewed in this way, the key property that is used in the simulation of the leakages in [12] is the following.

- Given a Hamiltonian cycles in G and G' , a GJS-Com commitment to 1 (in which a random cycle graph is committed) can be “explained” as a commitment to 0 (in which a permutation of G is committed) by using the equivocality of the inner H-Com.

Furthermore, even after being explained as a commitment to 0, the commitment can later be decommitted to 1 in a consistent way with the explained randomness (cf. function \tilde{f} in Sect. 2.1).

Because of this property, even when the simulator commits to 1 instead of 0 using GJS-Com to simulate the messages, the simulator can answer any leakage query f from V^* by querying \mathcal{L}_w a function \tilde{f} that, on input w , computes randomness tape that explains the commitment to 1 as a commitment to 0 and then outputs $f(w, \text{tape})$.

A problem of this property is that it can be used only in a very limited situation. Specifically, this property can be used only when the simulator knows which GJS-Com commitment will be decommitted to 1, and this is the reason why the extraction of ch is required in the simulation strategy of [12, 23]. Hence, to remove the extraction of ch , we need to use GJS-Com in a way that, given a witness for the fake statement, the simulator can predict which value each GJS-Com commitment will be decommitted to.

Our key observation is that we can use this property if we use GJS-Com to implement the Hamiltonicity protocol *in which the fake statement is proven*. Concretely, we consider the following protocol.

⁸ In the “inner” H-Com, the underlying commitment scheme is Com as before.

1. The prover and the verifier execute an encrypted variant of Barak’s preamble. Let G' be the fake statement and let q' be the number of the nodes of G' .
2. (a) The prover commits to a $q' \times q'$ zero matrix by using GJS-Com.
 (b) The verifier sends a challenge $ch \in \{0, 1\}$.
 (c) When $ch = 0$, the prover sends a random permutation π over G' to the verifier and then decommit the GJS-Com commitments to the adjacent matrix of $\pi(G')$ by using the equivocality of GJS-Com with the knowledge of a witness for the real statement.
 When $ch = 1$, the prover chooses a random q' -cycle graph H and decommits some of the GJS-Com commitments to 1 by using the equivocality of GJS-Com so that the decommitted entries of the matrix correspond to the cycle in H .
 (d) When $ch = 0$, the verifier verifies whether the decommitted graph is $\pi(G')$. When $ch = 1$, the verifier verifies whether the decommitted entries corresponds to a q' -cycle in a graph.

Since any charting prover cannot make the fake statement G' true, GJS-Com is statistically binding when the real statement G is false, and hence soundness follows. In contrast, the simulator can cheat in Barak’s preamble so that it knows a Hamiltonian cycle w' in the fake statement G' , and therefore it can simulate the prover’s messages by “honestly” proving the fake statement, i.e., by committing to $\pi(G')$ in step 2(a) for a randomly chosen π and then revealing the entire graph $\pi(G')$ or only the cycle $\pi(w')$ depending on the value of ch . Furthermore, since in step 2(a) the simulator do know which value each GJS-Com commitment will be decommitted to (the commitments to the edges on $\pi(w')$ will be always decommitted to 1 and others will be decommitted honestly or will not be decommitted), the simulator can simulate the leakage in the same way as in the protocol of [12] by using the property of GJS-Com described above.

This completes the overview of our techniques. The details are given in what follows.

3 Preliminaries

3.1 Notations

We use n to denote the security parameter. For any $k \in \mathbb{N}$, we use $[k]$ to denote the set $\{1, \dots, k\}$. For any randomized algorithm Algo , we use $\text{Algo}(x; r)$ to denote the execution of Algo with input x and randomness r , and we use $\text{Algo}(x)$ to denote the execution of Algo with input x and uniform randomness.

We use \mathbf{L}_{HC} to denote the languages of the Hamiltonian graphs. For any $G \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$, we use $\mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G)$ to denote the set of the Hamiltonian cycles in G . Generally, for any language \mathbf{L} and any instance $x \in \mathbf{L}$, we use $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}}(x)$ to denote the set of the witnesses for $x \in \mathbf{L}$.

For any two-party protocol $\langle A, B \rangle$, we use $\text{trans}[A(x) \leftrightarrow B(y)]$ to denote a random variable representing the transcript of the interaction between A and B with input x and y respectively, and use $\text{output}_A[A(x) \leftrightarrow B(y)]$ (resp.,

$\text{output}_B[A(x) \leftrightarrow B(y)]$) to denote a random variable representing the output of A (resp., B) in the interaction between A and B with input x and y respectively.

3.2 Leakage-Resilient Zero-Knowledge

We recall the definition of leakage-resilient zero-knowledgeness [12]. For convenience, we use a slightly different formulation of the definition.

For any interactive proof system $\langle P, V \rangle$, any PPT cheating receiver V^* , any statement $x \in \mathbf{L}$, any witness $w \in \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}}(x)$, and any oracle machine \mathcal{S} called *simulator*, consider the following two experiments.

$\text{REAL}_{V^*}(x, w, z)$

1. Execute $V^*(x, z)$ with a honest prover $P(x, w)$ of $\langle P, V \rangle$.
During the interaction, V^* can make arbitrary number of adaptive leakage queries on the state of P . A leakage query consists of an efficiently compatible function f_i (described as a circuit) and it is answered with $f_i(w, \text{tape})$, where tape is the randomness used by P so far.
2. Output the view of V^* .

$\text{IDEAL}_{\mathcal{S}}(x, w, z)$

1. Execute $\mathcal{S}(x, z)$ with access to a leakage oracle \mathcal{L}_w . A query to \mathcal{L}_w consists of an efficiently computable function f and answered with $f(w)$. Let τ be the output of \mathcal{S} .
2. If τ is not a valid view of V^* , the output of the experiment is \perp . Otherwise, let ℓ be the total length of the leakage that V^* obtains in τ . If the total length of the answers that \mathcal{S} obtained from \mathcal{L}_w is larger than ℓ , the output of the experiment is \perp . Otherwise, the output is τ .

Let $\text{REAL}_{V^*}(x, w, z)$ be the random variable representing the output of $\text{REAL}_{V^*}(x, w, z)$ and $\text{IDEAL}_{\mathcal{S}}(x, w, z)$ be the random variable representing the output of $\text{IDEAL}_{\mathcal{S}}(x, w, z)$.

Definition 1. *An interactive argument system $\langle P, V \rangle$ for a language \mathbf{L} with witness relation \mathbf{R} is **leakage-resilient zero knowledge** if for every PPT machine V^* and every sequence $\{w_x\}_{x \in \mathbf{L}}$ such that $(x, w_x) \in \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}}$, there exists a PPT oracle machine \mathcal{S} such that the following hold.*

Indistinguishability Condition

$$\{\text{REAL}_{V^*}(x, w_x, z)\}_{x \in \mathbf{L}, z \in \{0,1\}^*} \approx \{\text{IDEAL}_{\mathcal{S}}(x, w_x, z)\}_{x \in \mathbf{L}, z \in \{0,1\}^*}.$$

Leakage-length condition. *For every $x \in \mathbf{L}$ and $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$,*

$$\Pr[\text{IDEAL}_{\mathcal{S}}(x, w_x, z) = \perp] = 0.$$

3.3 Commitment Scheme

Recall that commitment schemes are two-party protocols between a committer C and a receiver R . We say that a commitment is *valid* if there exists a value to which it can be decommitted. We denote by $\text{value}(\cdot)$ a function that, on input a commitment (i.e., a transcript in the commit phase), outputs its committed value if it is uniquely determined and outputs \perp otherwise.

3.4 Naor's Commitment

We recall Naor's statistically binding commitment scheme Com , which can be constructed from one-way functions [16, 20].

Commit Phase. The commit phase consists of two rounds. In the first round, the receiver sends a random $3n$ -bit string $r \in \{0, 1\}^{3n}$. In the second round, the committer chooses a random seed $s \in \{0, 1\}^n$ for a pseudorandom generator $\text{PRG} : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{3n}$ and then sends $\text{PRG}(s)$ if it wants to commit to 0 and sends $\text{PRG}(s) \oplus r$ if it wants to commit to 1.

We use $\text{Com}_r(\cdot)$ to denote an algorithm that, on input $b \in \{0, 1\}$, computes a commitment to b as above by using r as the first-round message.

Decommit Phase. In the decommit phase, the committer reveals the seed s .

Security. Com is statistically binding and computational hiding. Furthermore, the binding and hiding property hold even when the same first-round message r is used in multiple commitments.

Committing to Strings. For any $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$, we can commit to an ℓ -bit string by simply committing to each bit using Com . We notice that the same first-round message r can be used in all the commitments.

We abuse the notation and use $\text{Com}_r(\cdot)$ to denote an algorithm that, on input $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, computes a commitment to m as above by using r as the first-round message. Notice that $\text{Com}_r(\cdot)$ has pseudorandom range. Thus, by using an algorithm Com_{pub} that outputs a random $3n\ell$ -bit string on input 1^ℓ , we can obtain a “fake commitment” that is indistinguishable from a real commitment.

3.5 Hamiltonicity Commitment

We recall a well-known instance-dependent commitment scheme H-Com [9, 11] that is based on Blum's zero-knowledge proof for Hamiltonicity.

Commit Phase. H-Com is parametrized by a graph G . Let q be the number of its vertices. To commit to 0, the committer chooses a random permutation π over the vertices of G and then commits to the adjacent matrix of $\pi(G)$ by using Com . To commit to 1, the committer chooses a random q -cycle graph and then commits to its adjacent matrix by using Com .

We use $\text{H-Com}_{G,r}(\cdot)$ to denote an algorithm that, on input $b \in \{0, 1\}$, computes a commitment to b as above by using r as the first-round message of all the Com commitments.

Decommit Phase. When the committer committed to 0, it reveals π , and also reveals all the entries of the adjacent matrix by decommitting all the **Com** commitments. When the committer committed to 1, it reveals only the entries corresponding to the edges on the q -cycle by decommitting the **Com** commitments in which these entries are committed.

Security. **H-Com** is computationally hiding, and it is statistically binding when $G \notin \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$.

Equivocality. When $G \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$, a commitment to 0 can be decommitted to 1 given a Hamiltonian cycle $w \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G)$ in G . Specifically, a commitment to 0 can be decommitted to 1 by decommitting the entries that corresponds to the edges on $\pi(w)$ (i.e., the cycle that is obtained by applying π on w).

3.6 Adaptive Hamiltonicity Commitment

We recall the adaptively secure Hamiltonicity commitment scheme **AH-Com**, which was used in, e.g., [9, 19].

Commit Phase. **AH-Com** is parametrized by a graph G . Let q be the number of its vertices. To commit to 0, the committer does the same things as in **H-Com**; i.e., it chooses a random permutation π over the vertices of G and then commits to the adjacent matrix of $\pi(G)$ by using **Com**. To commit to 1, the committer chooses a random q -cycle graph and then commits to its adjacent matrix in the following way: For all the entries corresponding to the edges on the q -cycle, it commits to 1 by using **Com**, and for all the other entries, it simply sends random $3n$ -bit strings instead of committing to 0. (Since **Com** has pseudorandom range, random $3n$ -bit strings are indistinguishable from **Com** commitments.)

We use $\text{AH-Com}_{G,r}(\cdot)$ to denote an algorithm that, on input $b \in \{0, 1\}$, computes a commitment to b as above by using r as the first-round message of all the **Com** commitments.

Decommit Phase. To decommit, the committer reveals all the randomness used in the commit phase. We use $\text{AH-Dec}_r(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$ to denote an algorithm that, on input c, b, ρ such that $\text{AH-Com}_r(b; \rho) = c$, outputs a decommitment d as above.

Security. Like **H-Com**, **AH-Com** is computationally hiding both when $G \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$ and when $G \notin \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$, and it is statistically binding when $G \notin \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$.

Adaptive Security. When $G \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$, a commitment to 0 can be “explained” as a valid commitment to 1 given a witness $w \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G)$. Specifically, for a commitment c to 0, we can compute ρ such that $\text{AH-Com}(1; \rho) = c$. This is because commitments to the entries that do not correspond to the edges on $\pi(w)$ are indistinguishable from random strings.

Formally, there exists an algorithm **AH-ExplainAsOne** such that for security parameter $n \in \mathbb{N}$, graphs $G \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$, witness $w \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G)$, and string $r \in \{0, 1\}^{3n}$, the following hold.

Correctness. Given witness $w \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G)$ and c, ρ such that $\text{AH-Com}_{G,r}(0; \rho) = c$, $\text{AH-ExplainAsOne}_{G,r}$ outputs ρ' such that $\text{AH-Com}_{G,r}(1; \rho') = c$.

Indistinguishability. Consider the following two probabilistic experiments.

$\text{EXP}_0^{\text{AH}}(n, G, w, r)$

/ commit to 1 and reveal randomness */*

1. Computes $c \leftarrow \text{AH-Com}_{G,r}(1)$.
Let ρ_1 be the randomness used in AH-Com.
2. Output (c, ρ_1) .

$\text{EXP}_1^{\text{AH}}(n, G, w, r)$

/ commit to 0 and explain it as commitment to 1 */*

1. Computes $c \leftarrow \text{AH-Com}_{G,r}(0)$.
Let ρ_0 be the randomness used in AH-Com.
Compute $\rho_1 := \text{AH-ExplainAsOne}_{G,r}(w, c, \rho_0)$.
2. Output (c, ρ_1) .

Let $\text{EXP}_b^{\text{AH}}(n, G, w, r)$ be the random variable representing the output of $\text{EXP}_b^{\text{AH}}(n, G, w, r)$ for each $b \in \{0, 1\}$. Then, the following two ensembles are computationally indistinguishable.

$$\left\{ \text{EXP}_0^{\text{AH}}(n, G, w, r) \right\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}, G \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}, w \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G), r \in \{0, 1\}^{3n}}$$

$$\left\{ \text{EXP}_1^{\text{AH}}(n, G, w, r) \right\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}, G \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}, w \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G), r \in \{0, 1\}^{3n}}$$

3.7 Barak's Non-black-box Zero-Knowledge Protocols

As explained in Sect. 2, in our LRZK protocol, we use a variant of so called “encrypted” Barak’s preamble [24, 25], which is based on the preamble stage of Barak’s non-black-box zero-knowledge protocol [3]. In this section, we recall Barak’s non-black-box zero-knowledge protocol. Our variant of encrypted Barak’s preamble is described in Sect. 4.1.

Barak’s non-black-box zero-knowledge protocol is constructed from any collision-resilient hash function family \mathcal{H} . Informally speaking, Barak’s protocol BarakZK proceeds as follows.

Protocol BarakZK

1. The verifier V sends a random hash function $h \in \mathcal{H}$ and the first-round message $r_1 \in \{0, 1\}^{3n}$ of Com to the prover P .
2. P sends $c \leftarrow \text{Com}_{r_1}(0^n)$ to V . Then, V sends random string r_2 to P .
3. P proves the following statement by a witness-indistinguishable argument.
 - $x \in L$, or
 - $(h, c, r_2) \in \Lambda$, where $(h, c, r_2) \in \Lambda$ holds if and only if there exists a machine Π such that c is a commitment to $h(\Pi)$ and Π outputs r_2 in $n^{\log \log n}$ steps.

Note that the statement proven in the last step is not in \mathcal{NP} . Thus, P proves this statement by a witness-indistinguishable *universal argument* (WIUA), with




Fig. 1. Encrypted Barak’s preamble $\langle P_B, V_B \rangle$.

which P can prove any statement in $\mathcal{N}\mathcal{E}\mathcal{X}\mathcal{P}$. Intuitively, BarakZK is sound since $\Pi(c) \neq r$ holds with overwhelming probability even when a cheating prover P^* commits to $h(\Pi)$ for a machine Π . On the other hand, the zero-knowledge property can be proven by using a simulator that commits to $h(\Pi)$ such that Π is a machine that emulates the cheating verifier V^* ; since $\Pi(c) = V^*(c) = r$ holds from the definition, the simulator can give a valid proof in the last step.

For our purpose, it is convenient to consider a variant of BarakZK that we denote by $\langle P_B, V_B \rangle$. $\langle P_B, V_B \rangle$ is the same as BarakZK except that in the last step, instead of proving $x \in L \vee (h, c, r_2) \in \Lambda$ by using WIUA, P proves $(h, c, r_2) \in \Lambda$ by using four-round public-coin universal argument system UA [4]. (Hence, $\langle P_B, V_B \rangle$ is no longer zero-knowledge protocol.) The formal description of $\langle P_B, V_B \rangle$ is shown in Fig. 1. We remark that in $\langle P_B, V_B \rangle$, the language proven in the last step is replaced with a slightly more complex language as in, e.g., [3, 23–25]. This replacement is important for using $\langle P_B, V_B \rangle$ in the setting of leakage-resilient zero-knowledge, because the cheating verifier can obtain arbitrary information (i.e., leakage) before sending r_2 .

In essentially the same way as the soundness of BarakZK, we can prove the following lemma on $\langle P_B, V_B \rangle$, which roughly states that there exists a “hard” language \mathbf{L}_B on the transcript of $\langle P_B, V_B \rangle$ such that no cheating prover can generate a transcript that is included in \mathbf{L}_B .

Language L_B :
 $\tau = (h, r_1, c, r_2, \alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta) \in L_B$ if and only if $(\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta)$ is an accepting transcript of UA for statement $(h, r_1, c, r_2) \in \Lambda$.

Fig. 2. A “hard” language L_B .

Lemma 1 (Soundness). *Let L_B be the language defined in Fig. 2. Then, for any cheating prover P^* against $\langle P_B, V_B \rangle$, any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, and any $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$,*

$$\Pr[\tau \leftarrow \text{trans}[P^*(1^n, z) \leftrightarrow V_B(1^n)] : \tau \in L_B] \leq \text{negl}(n).$$

A proof sketch of this lemma is given in the full version of this paper [17].

3.8 Somewhat Extractable Commitment Scheme

As we mentioned in Remark 1 in Sect. 2.2, in our variant of encrypted Barak’s preamble, we use a commitment scheme that satisfies only very weak extractability, which we call *somewhat extractability*. An important point is that since only very weak extractability is required, we can construct a somewhat extractable commitment scheme such that the committer sends only pseudorandom messages. Furthermore, we can construct such a scheme from one-way functions.

Concretely, we consider the commitment scheme SWExtCom in Fig. 3. SWExtCom is the same as the extractable commitment scheme of [26] except that in the last step, the committer simply reveals the values that it committed to in the first step (instead of decommitting the commitments). Because of this simplification, SWExtCom does not satisfy extractability in the standard sense. Still, it is not hard to see that SWExtCom satisfies extractability in the sense that, given two valid commitments c and c' such that the transcripts of the commit stage are identical but those of the challenge stage are different, the committed value of c can be extracted. Formally, SWExtCom satisfies the following extractability.

Lemma 2 (Somewhat Extractability). *Let us say that two commitments $c = (\{c_{i,b}\}_{i \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}}, \{e_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{a_{i,e_i}\}_{i \in [n]})$ and $c' = (\{c'_{i,b}\}_{i \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}}, \{e'_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{a'_{i,e_i}\}_{i \in [n]})$ are **admissible** if*

- $c_{i,b} = c'_{i,b}$ for every $i \in [n]$ and $b \in \{0, 1\}$,
- there exists $i^* \in [n]$ such that $e_{i^*} \neq e'_{i^*}$, and
- the committed value of $c_{i,b}$ is uniquely determined for every $i \in [n]$ and $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

Let $\text{Extract}(\cdot, \cdot)$ be the algorithm shown in Fig. 3. Then, for any two admissible commitments c and c' , if both c and c' are valid, $\tilde{v} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{Extract}(c, c')$ is equal to $\text{value}(c)$ (i.e., \tilde{v} is the committed value of c).




Fig. 3. A somewhat extractable commitment scheme SWExtCom.

Proof. First, when c and c' are valid, $a_{i^*,e_{i^*}}$ and $a'_{i^*,e'_{i^*}}$ are the committed values of $c_{i^*,e_{i^*}}$ and $c'_{i^*,e'_{i^*}}$ (since otherwise, any decommitments of c and c' would be rejected because the decommitted values of $c_{i^*,e_{i^*}}$ and $c'_{i^*,e'_{i^*}}$ are not consistent with $a_{i^*,e_{i^*}}$ and $a'_{i^*,e'_{i^*}}$). Second, when c and c' are valid, the committed value of c can be computed by XORing the committed values of $c_{i^*,e_{i^*}}$ and $c'_{i^*,e'_{i^*}}$ (since otherwise, any decommitments of c and c' would be rejected). From these, the lemma follows. □

A nice property of SWExtCom is that all the messages that the committer sends in the commit phase are pseudorandom. Formally, we have the following lemma.

Lemma 3 (Existence of Public-Coin Fake Committing Algorithm).
Let C be a honest committer algorithm of SWExtCom. There exists a PPT public-coin algorithm C_{pub} such that for any PPT cheating receiver R^ that interacts with C in the commit phase of SWExtCom, the following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable.*

- $\{\text{output}_{R^*} [C(v) \leftrightarrow R^*(1^n, z)]\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}, v \in \{0,1\}^n, z \in \{0,1\}^*}$
- $\{\text{output}_{R^*} [C_{\text{pub}}(1^n) \leftrightarrow R^*(1^n, z)]\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}, v \in \{0,1\}^n, z \in \{0,1\}^*}$

Proof (sketch). C_{pub} is an algorithm that is the same as C except that, instead of sending commitments of Com , it sends fake commitments of Com using Com_{pub} (i.e., sends random strings with the same length as the Com commitments). Since Com has pseudorandom range, the indistinguishability can be proven by using a standard hybrid argument (in which the commitments of Com are replaced with random strings one by one). The formal proof is omitted. \square

4 Building Blocks

4.1 Special-Purpose Encrypted Barak’s Preamble

In our LRZK protocol, we use a variant of so called “encrypted” Barak’s preamble [24, 25]. The encrypted Barak’s preamble is the same as (a variant of) Barak’s non-black-box zero-knowledge protocol $\langle P_B, V_B \rangle$ in Sect. 3.7 except that P_B commits to its UA messages β and δ instead of sending them in clear. In this paper, we use a variant in which, instead of giving valid commitments, P_B gives fake commitments of Com and SWEExtCom by using Com_{pub} and C_{pub} . A nice property of this variant is that the prover sends only random strings; as will become clear later, this property is useful for constructing leakage-resilient protocols. The formal description of this variant, which we denote by $\langle \mathbb{P}_B, \mathbb{V}_B \rangle$, is shown in Fig. 4.

We first show that, as in the case of $\langle P_B, V_B \rangle$, there exists a “hard” language on the transcript of $\langle \mathbb{P}_B, \mathbb{V}_B \rangle$.

Lemma 4 (Soundness). *Let \mathbb{L}_B be the language defined in Fig. 5. Then, for any cheating prover \mathbb{P}^* against $\langle \mathbb{P}_B, \mathbb{V}_B \rangle$, any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, and any $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$,*

$$\Pr [\tau \leftarrow \text{trans} [\mathbb{P}^*(1^n, z) \leftrightarrow \mathbb{V}_B(1^n)] : \tau \in \mathbb{L}_B] \leq \text{negl}(n).$$

Proof. Assume for contradiction that there exists \mathbb{P}^* such that for infinitely many n ’s, there exists $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$ such that

$$\Pr [\tau \leftarrow \text{trans} [\mathbb{P}^*(1^n, z) \leftrightarrow \mathbb{V}_B(1^n)] : \tau \in \mathbb{L}_B] \geq \frac{1}{p(n)}$$

for a polynomial $p(\cdot)$. We use \mathbb{P}^* to construct a cheating prover P^* against $\langle P_B, V_B \rangle$ and show that it contradicts the soundness of $\langle P_B, V_B \rangle$ (i.e., Lemma 1).

Consider the following cheating prover P^* against $\langle P_B, V_B \rangle$. First, P^* internally invokes \mathbb{P}^* . Then, while externally interacting with a honest V_B of $\langle P_B, V_B \rangle$, P^* interacts with internal \mathbb{P}^* as a verifier of $\langle \mathbb{P}_B, \mathbb{V}_B \rangle$ in the following way.

- In Stage 1 and 2 (of $\langle \mathbb{P}_B, \mathbb{V}_B \rangle$), P^* forwards all messages from external V_B to internal \mathbb{P}^* and forwards all messages from internal \mathbb{P}^* to external V_B . (Notice that the verifier of $\langle P_B, V_B \rangle$ and that of $\langle \mathbb{P}_B, \mathbb{V}_B \rangle$ are identical.) Let (h, r_1, c, r_2) be the transcript of these stages.
- In Stage 3-1, P^* forwards α from external V_B to internal \mathbb{P}^* .




Fig. 4. Special-purpose encrypted Barak’s preamble $\langle \mathbb{P}_B, \mathbb{V}_B \rangle$.

- In Stage 3-2, P^* interacts with internal \mathbb{P}^* as a honest receiver of SWExtCom and obtains $\hat{\beta}_1$. Let st be the current state of \mathbb{P}^* . Then, P^* rewinds \mathbb{P}^* to the point just before the challenge stage of SWExtCom, interacts with \mathbb{P}^* again, and obtains $\hat{\beta}_2$. Then, P^* computes a potential committed value $\tilde{\beta} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{Extract}(\hat{\beta}_1, \hat{\beta}_2)$ of $\hat{\beta}_1$ (recall that Extract is the extracting algorithm of SWExtCom shown in Fig. 3) and sends $\tilde{\beta}$ to external V_B .
- In Stage 3-3, P^* receives γ from V_B and sends it to internal \mathbb{P}^* (which is restarted from state st).
- In Stage 3-4, P^* interacts with internal \mathbb{P}^* as a honest receiver of SWExtCom and obtains $\hat{\delta}_1$. Then, P^* rewinds \mathbb{P}^* to the point just before the challenge stage of SWExtCom, interacts with \mathbb{P}^* again, and obtains $\hat{\delta}_2$. Then, P^* computes $\tilde{\delta} := \text{Extract}(\hat{\delta}_1, \hat{\delta}_2)$ and sends $\tilde{\delta}$ to external V_B .

Whenever internal \mathbb{P}^* aborts, P^* also aborts.

Before analyzing the success probability of P^* , we first introduce some terminologies regarding the internally emulated interaction between \mathbb{P}^* and \mathbb{V}_B . Let $\tau = (h, r_1, c, r_2, \alpha, \hat{\beta}_1, \gamma, \hat{\delta}_1)$ be its transcript. Notice that since P^* emulates \mathbb{V}_B for internal \mathbb{P}^* perfectly, we have $\tau \in \mathbb{L}_B$ with probability at least $1/p(n)$.

Language \mathbb{L}_B :

- $(h, r_1, c, r_2, \alpha, \widehat{\beta}, \gamma, \widehat{\delta}) \in \mathbb{L}_B$ if and only if there exist
- decommitments $d_1, d_2 \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(n)}$ for SWExtCom
 - the second-round and the fourth-round messages $\beta, \delta \in \{0, 1\}^n$ of UA
- such that
- d_1 is a valid decommitment of $\widehat{\beta}$ to β , and
 - d_2 is a valid decommitment of $\widehat{\delta}$ to δ , and
 - $(\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta)$ is an accepting transcript of UA for statement $(h, r_1, c, r_2) \in \Lambda$.

Fig. 5. Language \mathbb{L}_B .

- We say that a transcript τ_1 up until the commit stage of SWExtCom in Stage 3-2 is *good* if under the condition that τ_1 is a prefix of τ , the probability that $\tau \in \mathbb{L}_B$ holds is at least $1/2p(n)$.
- We say that a transcript τ_2 up until the commit stage of SWExtCom in Stage 3-4 is *good* if (1) a prefix of τ_2 up until the commit stage of SWExtCom in Stage 3-2 is good and (2) under the condition that τ_2 is a prefix of τ , the probability that $\tau \in \mathbb{L}_B$ holds is at least $1/4p(n)$.

We then analyze the success probability of P^* as follows. Let GOOD_1 be the event that a prefix of τ up until the commit stage of SWExtCom in Stage 3-2 is good, and let GOOD_2 be the event that a prefix of τ up until the commit stage of SWExtCom in Stage 3-4 is good. From an average argument, we have

$$\Pr[\text{GOOD}_1] \geq \frac{1}{2p(n)} \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[\text{GOOD}_2 \mid \text{GOOD}_1] \geq \frac{1}{4p(n)}.$$

Hence, we have

$$\Pr[\text{GOOD}_2] = \Pr[\text{GOOD}_1 \wedge \text{GOOD}_2] \geq \frac{1}{8(p(n))^2}. \quad (1)$$

Also, from the definition of GOOD_2 , we have

$$\Pr[\tau \in \mathbb{L}_B \mid \text{GOOD}_2] \geq \frac{1}{4p(n)}. \quad (2)$$

Hence, from Eqs. (1) and (2), we have

$$\Pr[\text{GOOD}_1 \wedge \text{GOOD}_2 \wedge \tau \in \mathbb{L}_B] = \Pr[\text{GOOD}_2 \wedge \tau \in \mathbb{L}_B] \geq \frac{1}{32(p(n))^3}. \quad (3)$$

Next, we observe that when the transcript up until the commit stage of SWExtCom in Stage 3-2 is good, \mathbb{P}^* gives a valid commitment of SWExtCom in Stage 3-2 with probability at least $1/2p(n)$, and similarly, when the transcript up until the commit stage of SWExtCom in Stage 3-4 is good, \mathbb{P}^* gives a valid commitment of SWExtCom in Stage 3-4 with probability at least $1/4p(n)$.

(This is because when the transcript is in \mathbb{L}_B , the SWExtCom commitments in Stage 3-2 and 3-4 are valid.) Hence, under the condition that $\text{GOOD}_1 \wedge \text{GOOD}_2 \wedge \tau \in \mathbb{L}_B$, the probability that both of $\widehat{\beta}_2$ and $\widehat{\delta}_2$ are valid is at least $1/8(p(n))^2$. Also, from the definition of \mathbb{L}_B , both of $\widehat{\beta}_1$ and $\widehat{\delta}_1$ are valid when $\tau \in \mathbb{L}_B$, and furthermore, $\widehat{\beta}_1$ and $\widehat{\beta}_2$ (resp, $\widehat{\delta}_1$ and $\widehat{\delta}_2$) are admissible except with negligible probability. Hence, from Lemma 2, for $\widetilde{\beta} = \text{Extract}(\widehat{\beta}_1, \widehat{\beta}_2)$ and $\widetilde{\delta} = \text{Extract}(\widehat{\delta}_1, \widehat{\delta}_2)$ we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr \left[\widetilde{\beta} = \text{value}(\widehat{\beta}_1) \wedge \widetilde{\delta} = \text{value}(\widehat{\delta}_1) \mid \text{GOOD}_1 \wedge \text{GOOD}_2 \wedge \tau \in \mathbb{L}_B \right] \\ & \geq \frac{1}{8(p(n))^2} - \text{negl}(n). \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

Hence, from Eqs. (3) and (4), we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr \left[\text{GOOD}_1 \wedge \text{GOOD}_2 \wedge \tau \in \mathbb{L}_B \wedge \widetilde{\beta} = \text{value}(\widehat{\beta}_1) \wedge \widetilde{\delta} = \text{value}(\widehat{\delta}_1) \right] \\ & \geq \frac{1}{256(p(n))^5} - \text{negl}(n). \end{aligned}$$

Notice that from the definition of \mathbb{L}_B , when $\tau \in \mathbb{L}_B \wedge \widetilde{\beta} = \text{value}(\widehat{\beta}_1) \wedge \widetilde{\delta} = \text{value}(\widehat{\delta}_1)$, it holds that $(\alpha, \widetilde{\beta}, \gamma, \widetilde{\delta})$ is an accepting UA proof for $(h, r_1, c, r_2) \in \Lambda$. Hence, we have

$$\Pr \left[(h, r_1, c, r_2, \alpha, \widetilde{\beta}, \gamma, \widetilde{\delta}) \in \mathbf{L}_B \right] \geq \frac{1}{256(p(n))^5} - \text{negl}(n),$$

which contradicts Lemma 1. \square

We next note that a non-black-box simulator can simulate the transcript τ in such a way that $\tau \in \mathbb{L}_B$ holds, and the simulator can additionally output a witness for $\tau \in \mathbb{L}_B$.

Lemma 5 (Simulatability). *Let \mathbb{L}_B be the language defined in Fig. 5. Then, for any PPT cheating verifier \mathbb{V}^* against $\langle \mathbb{P}_B, \mathbb{V}_B \rangle$, there exists a PPT simulator \mathcal{S} such that the following hold.*

- Let $\mathcal{S}_1(x, z)$ be the random variable representing the first output of $\mathcal{S}(x, z)$. Then, the following indistinguishability holds.

$$\{\text{view}_{\mathbb{V}^*} [\mathbb{P}_B(1^n) \leftrightarrow \mathbb{V}^*(1^n, z)]\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}, z \in \{0,1\}^*} \approx \{\mathcal{S}_1(1^n, z)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}, z \in \{0,1\}^*}$$

- For any $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $z \in \{0,1\}^*$, the following holds.

$$\Pr \left[(v, w) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(1^n, z); \right. \\ \left. \text{reconstruct transcript } \tau \text{ from view } v \text{ of } \mathbb{V}^* : w \in \mathbf{R}_{\mathbb{L}_B}(\tau) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(n)$$

This lemma can be proven in essentially the same way as the zero-knowledge property of Barak's non-black-box zero-knowledge protocol. A proof sketch is given in the full version [17].

4.2 Special-Purpose Instance-Dependent Commitment

In our LRZK protocol, we use a special-purpose instance-dependent commitment scheme GJS-Com, which is shown in Fig. 6. GJS-Com is parametrized by two graphs, G and G' , and obtained by modifying Hamiltonicity commitment scheme $\text{H-Com}_{G,r}$ in such a way that the adjacent matrix is committed to by using $\text{AH-Com}_{G',r}$ instead of Com_r . GJS-Com inherits many properties from H-Com—hiding, binding, and equivocality—and additionally, thanks to the adaptive security of AH-Com, it provides adaptive security in the following sense: When $G \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$ and $G' \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$, a commitment to 1 can be explained as a valid commitment to 0, and furthermore, even after being explained as a commitment to 0, it can be decommitted to 1 in a consistent way. Details follow.

Parameters:

- Security parameter n .
- Two graphs G and G' , where the number of vertices in G is $q = \text{poly}(n)$ and that in G' is $q' = \text{poly}'(n)$.

Inputs:

- C has secret input $b \in \{0, 1\}$, which is the value to be committed to.

Commit phase:

1. R sends the first-round message $r \in \{0, 1\}^{3n}$ of Com .
2. **To commit to 0**, C chooses a random permutation π over the vertices of G , computes $H_0 := \pi(G)$, and commits to its adjacent matrix $A_0 = \{a_{0,i,j}\}_{i,j \in [q]}$ by using $\text{AH-Com}_{G',r}$, i.e., sends $c_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{AH-Com}_{G',r}(a_{0,i,j})$ for every $i, j \in [q]$.

To commit to 1, C chooses a random q -cycle graph H_1 and commits to its adjacent matrix $A_1 = \{a_{1,i,j}\}_{i,j \in [q]}$ by using $\text{AH-Com}_{G',r}$, i.e., sends $c_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{AH-Com}_{G',r}(a_{1,i,j})$ for every $i, j \in [q]$.

Let $\text{GJS-Com}_{G,G',r}(\cdot)$ be a function that, on input $b \in \{0, 1\}$, computes a commitment to b as above by considering r as the first-round message from the receiver.

Decommit phase:

- **When C committed to 0**, it reveals π and decommits $c_{i,j}$ to $a_{0,i,j}$ for every $i, j \in [q]$. R verifies whether the decommitted matrix is the adjacent matrix of $\pi(G)$.
- **When C committed to 1**, it decommits $c_{i,j}$ to 1 for every i, j such that edge (i,j) is on the q -cycle in H_1 (i.e., every i, j such that $a_{1,i,j} = 1$). R verifies whether the decommitted entries correspond to the edges on a Hamilton cycle.

Let $\text{GJS-Dec}_r(\cdot)$ be a function that, on input (c, b, ρ) such that $\text{GJS-Com}_{G,G',r}(b; \rho) = c$, outputs a decommitment to b as above.

Fig. 6. Special-purpose instance-dependent commitment GJS-Com.

Lemma 6 (Hiding and Binding). *GJS-Com is computationally hiding. Furthermore, it is statistically binding when $G \notin \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$ and $G' \notin \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$.*

Lemma 7 (Equivocality). *There exists an algorithm GJS-EquivToOne that is parametrized by graphs G, G' and a string $r \in \{0, 1\}^{3n}$ and satisfies the following: When $G \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$, on input any $w \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G)$ and any c and ρ such that $\text{GJS-Com}_{G, G', r}(0; \rho) = c$, $\text{GJS-EquivToOne}_{G, G', r}$ outputs a valid decommitment of c to 1.*

Proofs of these two lemmas are straightforward. We give the proofs in the full version [17].

Lemma 8 (Adaptive Security). *There exists an algorithm GJS-ExplainAsZero that is parametrized by graphs G, G' and a string $r \in \{0, 1\}^{3n}$ and satisfies the following.*

Correctness. *When $G, G' \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$, on input any $w \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G)$ and $w' \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G')$ and any c and ρ_1 such that $\text{GJS-Com}_{G, G', r}(1; \rho_1) = c$, $\text{GJS-ExplainAsZero}_{G, G', r}$ outputs ρ_0 such that $\text{GJS-Com}_{G, G', r}(0; \rho_0) = c$.*

Indistinguishability. *For security parameter $n \in \mathbb{N}$, graphs $G, G' \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$, witnesses $w \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G)$ and $w' \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G')$, and string $r \in \{0, 1\}^{3n}$, consider the following two probabilistic experiments.*

$\text{EXP}_0^{\text{GJS}}(n, G, G', w, w', r)$

/ commit to 0 and decommit it to 1 using equivocality */*

1. Compute $c \leftarrow \text{GJS-Com}_{G, G', r}(0)$.
Let ρ_0 be the randomness used in GJS-Com.
2. Compute $d_1 := \text{GJS-EquivToOne}_{G, G', r}(c, w, \rho_0)$.
3. Output (c, ρ_0, d_1) .

$\text{EXP}_1^{\text{GJS}}(n, G, G', w, w', r)$

/ commit & decommit to 1 and explain it as commitment to 0 */*

1. Compute $c \leftarrow \text{GJS-Com}_{G, G', r}(1)$.
Let ρ_1 be the randomness used in GJS-Com.
Compute $d_1 := \text{GJS-Dec}_{G, G', r}(c, 1, \rho)$.
2. Compute $\rho_0 := \text{GJS-ExplainAsZero}_{G, G', r}(c, w, w', \rho_1)$.
3. Output (c, ρ_0, d_1) .

Let $\text{EXP}_b^{\text{GJS}}(n, G, G', w, w', r)$ be the random variable representing the output of $\text{EXP}_b^{\text{GJS}}(n, G, G', w, w', r)$ for each $b \in \{0, 1\}$. Then, the following two ensembles are computationally indistinguishable.

$$\left\{ \text{EXP}_0^{\text{GJS}}(n, G, G', w, w', r) \right\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}, G, G' \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}, w \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G), w' \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G'), r \in \{0, 1\}^{3n}}$$

$$\left\{ \text{EXP}_1^{\text{GJS}}(n, G, G', w, w', r) \right\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}, G, G' \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}, w \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G), w' \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G'), r \in \{0, 1\}^{3n}}$$

Proof (sketch). GJS-ExplainAsZero is shown in Fig. 7. A key idea is that given the ability to explain AH-Com commitments to 0 as AH-Com commitments to 1, we can explain a GJS-Com commitment to 1 (which is AH-Com commitments to the adjacent matrix of a cycle graph) as a GJS-Com commitment to 0 (which is AH-Com commitments to the adjacent matrix of a Hamiltonian graph G). Intuitively, this is because a cycle graph can be transformed to any Hamiltonian graph by appropriately adding edges (which corresponds to changing some entries of the adjacent matrix from 0 to 1). A formal proof is given in the full version [17]. \square

<p>Parameter:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Graphs $G, G' \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$ – String $r \in \{0, 1\}^{3n}$ <p>Input:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Witnesses $w \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G)$ and $w' \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G')$ – Commitment c and randomness ρ_1 s.t. $\text{GJS-Com}_{G, G', r}(1; \rho_1) = c$ <p>Output:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Parse c as $\{c_{i,j}\}_{i,j \in [q]}$, where each $c_{i,j}$ is a AH-Com commitment. Also, from ρ_1, reconstruct $A_1 = \{a_{1,i,j}\}_{i,j \in [q]}$ and $\{\sigma_{1,i,j}\}_{i,j \in [q]}$ such that A_1 is the adjacent matrix of a q-cycle graph H_1 and $\text{AH-Com}_{G', r}(a_{1,i,j}; \sigma_{1,i,j}) = c_{i,j}$ for every $i, j \in [q]$. 2. Choose a random permutation π under the condition that a q-cycle in $H_0 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \pi(G)$ coincides with the q-cycle in H_1 (i.e., H_0 has the same cycle as H_1).^a Let $A_0 = \{a_{0,i,j}\}_{i,j \in [q]}$ be the adjacent matrix of H_0. 3. For every $i, j \in [q]$, define $\sigma_{0,i,j}$ by $\sigma_{0,i,j} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sigma_{1,i,j}$ when $a_{0,i,j} = a_{1,i,j}$ and by $\sigma_{0,i,j} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{AH-ExplainAsOne}_{G', r}(w', c_{i,j}, \sigma_{1,i,j})$ when $a_{0,i,j} \neq a_{1,i,j}$.^b 4. Outputs $\rho_0 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\pi, \{\sigma_{0,i,j}\}_{i,j \in [q]})$. <p>^a Given w, this can be done efficiently.</p> <p>^b When $a_{0,i,j} \neq a_{i,j}$, it holds that $a_{0,i,j} = 1$ and $a_{1,i,j} = 0$.</p>

Fig. 7. GJS-ExplainAsZero.

5 Our Leakage-Resilient Zero-Knowledge Argument

Theorem 1. *Assume the existence of collision-resistant hash function family. Then, there exists a constant-round public-coin leakage-resilient zero-knowledge argument system LR-ZK.*

Proof. LR-ZK is shown in Fig. 8. Since $\langle \mathbb{P}_{\text{B}}, \mathbb{V}_{\text{B}} \rangle$ can be constructed from any collision-resistant hash function family, and SWExtCom can be constructed from any one-way function (which can be obtained from any collision-resistant hash function family), LR-ZK can be constructed from any collision-resistant hash function family. Also, by inspection, it can be seen that LR-ZK is public-coin and has constant number of rounds.

Roughly speaking, the soundness of LR-ZK can be proven as follows. From the soundness of $\langle \mathbb{P}_{\text{B}}, \mathbb{V}_{\text{B}} \rangle$, we have $\tau \notin \mathbb{L}_{\text{B}}$ (and hence $G' \notin \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$) in Stage 1 except with negligible probability. Hence, $\text{GJS-Com}_{G, G'}$ is statistically binding except with negligible probability, and thus we can use essentially the same argument as in the proof of the soundness of Blum’s Hamiltonicity protocol to show that any cheating prover can give valid response in Stage 2-3 of all n iterations only with negligible probability. The formal proof is given in the full version [17].

In the following, we prove leakage-resilient zero-knowledgeness.

Lemma 9. *LR-ZK is leakage-resilient zero-knowledge.*

Input.

- Common input is graph $G \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$.
Let $n \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} |G|$, and q be the number of vertices in G .
- Private input to the prover P is witness $w \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G)$.

Stage 1.

- P and V execute special-purpose encrypted Barak's preamble $\langle \mathbb{P}_{\text{B}}, \mathbb{V}_{\text{B}} \rangle$.
Let τ be the transcript.
- P and V reduce statement " $\tau \in \mathbb{L}_{\text{B}}$ " to Hamiltonicity problem via general \mathcal{NP} reduction. Let G' be the graph that P and V obtained. Let q' be the number of vertices in G' .

Stage 2.

- V sends the first-round message $r \in \{0, 1\}^{3n}$ of Com to P .
- P and V do the following for n times in parallel.
 1. P commits to a $q' \times q'$ zero matrix in a bit-by-bit manner by using $\text{GJS-Com}_{G, G', r}$. That is, P sends $c_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{GJS-Com}_{G, G', r}(0)$ to V for every $i, j \in [q']$. Let $\rho_{i,j}$ be the randomness that was used to compute $c_{i,j}$.
 2. V sends a random bit $ch \in \{0, 1\}$ to P .
 3. **When $ch = 0$:**
 - P chooses a random permutation π and computes $H_0 := \pi(G')$.
Let $A_0 = \{a_{0,i,j}\}_{i,j \in [q']}$ be the adjacent matrix of H_0 .
 - P sends π to V and decommits the GJS-Com commitments in Stage 2-1 to A_0 by using the equivocality of GJS-Com . That is, for every $i, j \in [q]$, P sends a honest decommitment $d_{i,j} := \text{GJS-Dec}_{G, G', r}(c_{i,j}, 0, \rho_{i,j})$ to V when $a_{0,i,j} = 0$ and sends a fake decommitment $d_{i,j} := \text{GJS-EquivToOne}_{G, G', r}(c_{i,j}, w_0, \rho_{i,j})$ to V when $a_{0,i,j} = 1$.
 - V computes $H_0 = \pi(G')$ and verifies whether the decommitted matrix is equal to the adjacent matrix of H_0 .
 - When $ch = 1$:**
 - P chooses a random q' -cycle graph H_1 . Let $A_1 = \{a_{1,i,j}\}_{i,j \in [q]}$ be the adjacent matrix of H_1 .
 - P decommits $c_{i,j}$ to $a_{1,i,j}$ for every i, j such that $a_{1,i,j} = 1$ (i.e., for every i, j such that edge (i, j) is on the q' -cycle of H_1). That is, for every such i and j , P sends a fake decommitment $d_{i,j} := \text{GJS-EquivToOne}_{G, G', r}(c_{i,j}, w_0, \rho_{i,j})$ to V .
 - V checks whether the decommitted entries of the matrix correspond to the edges on a q' -cycle.

Fig. 8. Constant-round leakage-resilient zero-knowledge argument LR-ZK.

In the following, we prove this lemma only w.r.t. a simplified version of LR-ZK in which Stage 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3 are executed only once (instead of executed n times in parallel). The proof w.r.t. LR-ZK can be obtained by modifying the following proof in a straight-forward way.

Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that after receiving each message from the prover, the cheating verifier makes exactly a single leakage query.

To see that we indeed do not lose generality, observe that instead of making two queries f_1 and f_2 , the cheating verifier can always query a single query f such that, on input witness w and prover's randomness tape , it computes the first leakage $L_1 := f_1(w, \text{tape})$, chooses the second query f_2 adaptively, computes the second leakage $L_2 := f_2(w, \text{tape})$, and outputs (L_1, L_2) .

Description of the Simulator. Given access to leakage oracle \mathcal{L}_w and input (G, z) , our simulator \mathcal{S} simulates the view of cheating verifier V^* by internally invoking $V^*(G, z)$ and interacting with it as follows.

Simulating Messages and Leakages in Stage 1. Roughly speaking, \mathcal{S} simulates the messages in Stage 1 by interacting with V^* in the same way as the simulator of $\langle \mathbb{P}_B, \mathbb{V}_B \rangle$ (cf. Lemma 5). To simulate the leakages in Stage 1, \mathcal{S} uses the fact that Stage 1 of LR-ZK is public coin w.r.t. the prover and therefore all the randomness that a honest prover generates during Stage 1 is the messages themselves. Specifically, \mathcal{S} simulates the leakages by considering the messages msgs that it has sent to V^* thus far as the randomness of the prover. An issue is that due to the existence of leakage queries, \mathcal{S} cannot use the simulator of $\langle \mathbb{P}_B, \mathbb{V}_B \rangle$ in a modular way. Nonetheless, \mathcal{S} can still use the technique used in the simulator of $\langle \mathbb{P}_B, \mathbb{V}_B \rangle$ as long as the length of the leakages is bounded by n^2 . (Notice that when the length of leakage exceeds n^2 , \mathcal{S} can simply obtain a Hamiltonian cycle w of G from \mathcal{L}_w .)

Formally, \mathcal{S} interacts with V^* as follows.

1. After receiving h and r_1 from V^* , \mathcal{S} sends $c \leftarrow \text{Com}_{r_1}(h(V^*))$ to V^* . Let rand be the randomness that was used in this step.

Leakage query: When V^* makes a leakage query f , \mathcal{S} does the following.

- Let $\text{tape} := c$.
- If the output length of f is more than n^2 , \mathcal{S} obtains w from \mathcal{L}_w and returns $f(w \parallel \text{tape})$ to V^* .
- Otherwise, \mathcal{S} queries $f(\cdot, \text{tape})$ to \mathcal{L}_w , obtains reply L from \mathcal{L}_w , and forwards L to V^* .

If \mathcal{S} obtained w , from now on \mathcal{S} interacts with V^* in exactly the same way as a honest prover. Otherwise, do the following.

2. After receiving r_2 and α from V^* , \mathcal{S} computes the second-round UA message β by using witness (V^*, rand, L) and then honestly commits to β by using SWExtCom . Let $\widehat{\beta}$ be the commitment and d_1 be the decommitment.

Leakage query: When V^* makes a leakage query f , \mathcal{S} sets $\text{tape} := \text{msgs}$, queries $f(\cdot, \text{tape})$ to \mathcal{L}_w , and forwards the reply from \mathcal{L}_w to V^* , where msgs are the messages that \mathcal{S} has sent to V^* thus far.

3. After receiving γ from V^* , \mathcal{S} computes the fourth-round UA message δ and then honestly commits to δ by using SWExtCom . Let $\widehat{\delta}$ be the commitment and d_2 be the decommitment.

Leakage query: When V^* makes a leakage query f , \mathcal{S} answers it in exactly the same way as above.

Let $\tau \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (h, r_1, c, r_2, \alpha, \widehat{\beta}, \gamma, \widehat{\delta})$ and $\bar{w} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (d_1, d_2, \beta, \delta)$. Since (V^*, rand, L) is a valid witness for $(h, r_1, c, r_2) \in A$, we have $\tau \in \mathbb{L}_B$ and $\bar{w} \in \mathbf{R}_{\mathbb{L}_B}(\tau)$. Let G' and w' be the graph and its Hamiltonian cycle that are obtained by reducing statement “ $\tau \in \mathbb{L}_B$ ” to Hamiltonicity problem through the \mathcal{NP} reduction.

Simulating Messages Stage 2. If \mathcal{S} obtained w during Stage 1, it interacts with V^* in the same way as a honest prover. Otherwise, \mathcal{S} interacts with V^* as follows. The idea is that, since \mathcal{S} know a witness w' for $G' \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$, \mathcal{S} can correctly respond to the challenge for both $ch = 0$ and $ch = 1$ by committing to a random permutation of G' in the first step.

1. \mathcal{S} chooses a random permutation π and computes $H := \pi(G')$. Then, \mathcal{S} commits to the adjacent matrix $A = \{a_{i,j}\}_{i,j \in [q']}$ of H by using $\text{GJS-Com}_{G,G',r}$. That is, \mathcal{S} sends $c_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{GJS-Com}_{G,G',r}(a_{i,j})$ to V^* for every $i, j \in [q']$. Let $\{\rho_{i,j}\}_{i,j \in [q']}$ be the randomness used in the GJS-Com commitments and $\pi(w')$ be the Hamiltonian cycle in H that is obtained by applying π on Hamiltonian cycle w' in G' .
2. \mathcal{S} receives a random bit $ch \in \{0, 1\}$ from V^* .
3. **When $ch = 0$,** \mathcal{S} sends π to V and decommits $c_{i,j}$ to $a_{i,j}$ honestly for every $i, j \in [q']$. That is, \mathcal{S} sends $d_{i,j} := \text{GJS-Dec}_{G,G',r}(c_{i,j}, a_{i,j}, \rho_{i,j})$ to V for every $i, j \in [q']$.

When $ch = 1$, \mathcal{S} decommits $c_{i,j}$ to 1 honestly for every i, j such that edge (i, j) is on the Hamiltonian cycle $\pi(w')$ in H . That is, for every such i and j , \mathcal{S} sends $d_{i,j} := \text{GJS-Dec}_{G,G',r}(c_{i,j}, a_{i,j}, \rho_{i,j})$ to V^* .

Simulating Leakage Queries in Stage 2. When V^* makes a leakage query f , \mathcal{S} simulates the leakage as follows. Recall that in Stage 2-1, a honest prover commits to a $q' \times q'$ zero matrix whereas \mathcal{S} commits to the adjacent matrix of H . Hence, \mathcal{S} simulates the leakage by “explaining” commitments $\{c_{i,j}\}_{i,j \in [q']}$ to $\{a_{i,j}\}_{i,j \in [q']}$ as commitments to $\{0\}$ by using the adaptive security of GJS-Com and the knowledge of w' . Concretely, \mathcal{S} does the following.

- First, for each $i, j \in [q']$, \mathcal{S} constructs a function $F_{i,j}(\cdot)$ such that on input w , it outputs $\tilde{\rho}_{i,j}$ such that $\text{GJS-Com}_{G,G',r}(0; \tilde{\rho}_{i,j}) = c_{i,j}$. Concretely, when $a_{i,j} = 0$, $F_{i,j}(\cdot)$ is a function that always outputs $\rho_{i,j}$, and when $a_{i,j} = 1$, $F_{i,j}(\cdot) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{GJS-ExplainAsZero}_{G,G',r}(c_{i,j}, \cdot, w', \rho_{i,j})$.
- Next, \mathcal{S} constructs a function f such that on input w , it computes $\text{tape} := \text{msgs} \parallel \{F_{i,j}(w)\}_{i,j \in [q']}$ and outputs $f(w, \text{tape})$.
- Finally, \mathcal{S} queries f to \mathcal{L}_w and forwards the reply from \mathcal{L}_w to V^* .

Amount of Total Leakage. From the construction of \mathcal{S} , it always obtains at most the same amount of leakages as V^* .

Indistinguishability of Views. For any cheating verifier V^* and any sequence $\{w_G\}_{G \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}}$ such that $w_G \in \mathbf{R}_{\text{HC}}(G)$, we show the following indistinguishability.

$$\{\text{REAL}_{V^*}(G, w_G, z)\}_{G \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}, z \in \{0,1\}^*} \approx \{\text{IDEAL}_{\mathcal{S}}(G, w_G, z)\}_{G \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}, z \in \{0,1\}^*} \quad (5)$$

Toward this end, we consider the following hybrid experiments.

Hybrid $\text{HYB}_0(G, z)$ is identical with experiment $\text{REAL}_{V^*}(G, w, z)$. That is, V^* interacts with honest $P(G, w)$ and obtains leakage that is computed honestly based on witness w and the prover's randomness. The outputs of this hybrid is the view of V^* .

Hybrid $\text{HYB}_1(G, z)$ is the same as HYB_0 except for the following.

- In Stage 1, a honest prover is replaced with the simulator. That is, c is computed by committing to $h(V^*)$, $\hat{\beta}$ is computed by committing to β , and $\hat{\delta}$ is computed by committing to δ .

Let τ and \bar{w} be the statement and the witness generated in it. Let G' and w' be the graph and its Hamiltonian cycle that are obtained by reducing statement “ $\tau \in \mathbb{L}_B$ ” to Hamiltonicity problem through the \mathcal{NP} reduction.

- The leakage queries are answered by considering that the randomness generated by the prover during Stage 1 is equal to the messages sent to V^* during Stage 1.

Hybrid $\text{HYB}_2(G, z)$ is the same as HYB_1 except for the following.

- As in \mathcal{S} , a random permutation π is chosen randomly at the beginning of Stage 2-1. Let $H \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \pi(G')$, and $A = \{a_{i,j}\}_{i,j \in [q']}$ be the adjacent matrix of H . Let $\pi(w')$ be the Hamiltonian cycle in H that is obtained by applying π on Hamiltonian cycle w' in G' .

We remark that in this hybrid, the prover still commits to a $q' \times q'$ zero matrix as in HYB_1 . Also, the leakage query immediately after Stage 2-1 is answered in exactly the same way as in HYB_1 . In particular, when the leakage query is answered, π is not included in the randomness generated by the prover in Stage 2-1.

- In Stage 2-3, graph H_0 or H_1 is chosen as follows.

When $ch = 0$, $H_0 := H$.

When $ch = 1$, H_1 is the graph that is obtained by removing every edge in H except for the ones on Hamiltonian cycle $\pi(w')$.

The leakage query immediately after Stage 2-3 is answered in the same way as in HYB_1 by considering that H_0 or H_1 was chosen during Stage 2-3 as in HYB_1 .

Hybrid $\text{HYB}_3(G, z)$ is the same as HYB_2 except for the following.

- In Stage 2-1, for every $i, j \in [q']$, commitment $c_{i,j}$ is computed by committing to $a_{i,j}$ (instead of 0), i.e., $c_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{GJS-Com}_{G,G',r}(a_{i,j})$.
- In Stage 2-3, for every $i, j \in [q']$, if commitment $c_{i,j}$ need to be decommitted, it is decommitted to $a_{i,j}$ honestly.
- When the leakage queries are answered during Stage 2, the randomness $\rho_{i,j}$ used for computing $c_{i,j}$ is simulated by $\tilde{\rho}_{i,j}$ that is computed by function $F_{i,j}$ as in \mathcal{S} for every $i, j \in [q']$.

Hybrid $\text{HYB}_4(G, z)$ is identical with $\text{IDEAL}_{\mathcal{S}}(x, w, z)$. That is, $\mathcal{S}(G, z)$ is executed given access to \mathcal{L}_w . The outputs of this hybrid is that of \mathcal{S} .

Claim 1. *The output of $\text{HYB}_0(G, z)$ and that of $\text{HYB}_1(G, z)$ are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. HYB_1 differs from HYB_0 only in that fake commitments of Com and SWExtCom are replaced with real commitments. Hence, the indistinguishability follows from the security of Com_{pub} and C_{pub} (see Sects. 3.4 and 3.8). \square

Claim 2. *The output of $\text{HYB}_1(G, z)$ and that of $\text{HYB}_2(G, z)$ are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. This claim can be proven by inspection. Observe that HYB_2 differs from HYB_1 only in the way graph H_0 or H_1 is chosen in Stage 2. When $ch = 0$, the distribution of H_0 in HYB_2 is the same as that in HYB_1 since H_0 is obtained both in HYB_2 and HYB_1 by applying a random permutation on G' . When $ch = 1$, the distribution of H_1 in HYB_2 is the same as that in HYB_1 since the Hamiltonian cycle w' in G' is mapped to a random q -cycle by π . Hence, the output of HYB_2 is identically distributed with that of HYB_1 . \square

Claim 3. *The output of $\text{HYB}_2(G, z)$ and that of $\text{HYB}_3(G, z)$ are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. Assume for contradiction that for infinitely many $G \in \mathbf{L}_{\text{HC}}$, there exists $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$ such that a distinguisher \mathcal{D} distinguishes the output of $\text{HYB}_2(G, z)$ and that of $\text{HYB}_3(G, z)$ with advantage $1/p(n)$ for a polynomial $p(\cdot)$. Fix any such G and z . To derive a contradiction, we consider the following intermediate hybrids.

Hybrid $\text{hyb}_{2,0}(G, z)$ is identical with $\text{HYB}_2(G, z)$.

Hybrid $\text{hyb}_{2,k}(G, z)$, where $k \in [q'^2]$, is the same as $\text{HYB}_{2:k-1}$ except for the following. Let $u \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lfloor (k-1)/q' \rfloor + 1$ and $v \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} k - \lfloor (k-1)/q' \rfloor \cdot q'$.

- In Stage 2-1, commitment $c_{u,v}$ is computed by committing to $a_{u,v}$ (instead of 0), i.e., $c_{u,v} \leftarrow \text{GJS-Com}_{G,G',r}(a_{u,v})$.
- In Stage 2-3, if commitment $c_{u,v}$ need to be decommitted, it is decommitted to $a_{u,v}$ honestly.
- When the leakage queries are answered during Stage 2, the randomness $\rho_{u,v}$ used for computing $c_{u,v}$ is simulated by $\tilde{\rho}_{u,v}$ that is computed by function $F_{u,v}$ as in \mathcal{S} .

Clearly, $\text{HYB}_{2:q'^2}$ is identical with HYB_3 . Hence, there exists $k^* \in [q'^2]$ such that the output of $\text{HYB}_{2:k^*-1}$ and that of $\text{HYB}_{2:k^*}$ can be distinguished with advantage $1/q'^2 p(n)$. Furthermore, from an average argument, there exists a prefix σ of the execution of HYB_{k^*-1} up until permutation π is chosen in Stage 2-1 (i.e., just before $\{c_{i,j}\}_{i,j \in [q']}$ is sent to V^*) such that under the condition that a prefix of the execution is σ , the output of $\text{HYB}_{2:k^*-1}$ and that of $\text{HYB}_{2:k^*}$ can be distinguished with advantage $1/q'^2 p(n)$. Notice that σ determines $G', w', r, \{a_{i,j}\}_{i,j \in [q]}$.

We derive a contradiction by showing that we can break the adaptive security of GJS-Com (Lemma 8). Specifically, we show that $\text{EXP}_0^{\text{GJS}}(n, G, G', w, w', r)$ and $\text{EXP}_1^{\text{GJS}}(n, G, G', w, w', r)$ can be distinguished with advantage $1/q'^2 p(n)$. Toward this end, consider the following distinguisher \mathcal{D}' .

- Externally, \mathcal{D}' takes (c, ρ_0, d_1) as well as (n, G, G', w, w', r) as input. \mathcal{D}' also takes (σ, z) as non-uniform input.

- Internally, \mathcal{D}' invokes V^* and simulates $\text{HYB}_{2:k^*-1}(G, z)$ for V^* from σ honestly except for the following. Let $u^* \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lfloor (k^* - 1)/q' \rfloor + 1$ and $v^* \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} k^* - \lfloor (k^* - 1)/q' \rfloor \cdot q'$. Notice that it must hold that $a_{u^*, v^*} = 1$ since $\text{HYB}_{2:k^*}$ is identical with $\text{HYB}_{2:k^*-1}$ when $a_{u^*, v^*} = 0$.
 - In Stage 2-1, commitment c_{u^*, v^*} is defined by setting $c_{u^*, v^*} := c$.
 - In Stage 2-3, when commitment c_{u^*, v^*} is decommitted, it is decommitted to $a_{u^*, v^*} = 1$ by sending d_1 .
 - When the leakage queries are answered during Stage 2, the randomness ρ_{u^*, v^*} used for computing c_{u^*, v^*} is simulated by setting $\tilde{\rho}_{u^*, v^*} := \rho_0$.
- Let view be the view of V^* . Then, \mathcal{D}' outputs $\mathcal{D}(\text{view})$.

When $(c, \rho_0, d_1) \leftarrow \text{EXP}_0^{\text{GJS}}(n, G, G', w, w', r)$ (i.e., when c is a commitment to 0, ρ_0 is the randomness that is used to generate c , and d_1 is a decommitment to 1 that is computed by GJS-EquivToOne), \mathcal{D}' emulates $\text{HYB}_{2:k^*-1}$ for V^* perfectly. On the other hand, when $(c, \rho_0, d_1) \leftarrow \text{EXP}_1^{\text{GJS}}(n, G, G', w, w', r)$ (i.e., when c is a commitment to 1, ρ_0 is randomness that is computed by GJS-ExplainAsZero, and d_1 is a decommitment to 1 that is computed honestly), \mathcal{D}' emulates $\text{HYB}_{2:k^*}$ for V^* perfectly. Hence, from our assumption, \mathcal{D}' distinguishes $\text{EXP}_0^{\text{GJS}}(n, G, G', w, w', r)$ and $\text{EXP}_1^{\text{GJS}}(n, G, G', w, w', r)$ with advantage $1/q'^2 p(n)$, and therefore we reach a contradiction. \square

Claim 4. *The output of $\text{HYB}_3(G, z)$ and that of $\text{HYB}_4(G, z)$ are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. In HYB_3 , the prover interacts with V^* in exactly the same way as \mathcal{S} . Hence, the claim follows. \square

Equation (5) follows from these claims. This concludes the proof of Lemma 9. \square

This concludes the proof of Theorem 1. \square

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