Zusammenfassung
Institutions matter ist ein von Institutionenökonomen häufig bemühter Satz. Er dient nicht nur zur Selbstvergewisserung einer relativ jungen Forschungsdisziplin, sondern bringt auch zum Ausdruck, dass in der Betrachtung ökonomischer Zusammenhänge bis zum Aufkommen dieser neuen Forschungsrichtung etwas Wichtiges keine Beachtung fand. Zwar waren sich auch Ökonomen der Existenz von Institutionen bewusst, sie hielten ihre Bedeutung zur Erklärung wirtschaftlicher Phänomene jedoch für vernachlässigbar. Das begründet auch die späte Rezeption einer der grundlegenden Arbeiten der Neuen Institutionenökonomik (NIÖ). Denn bereits 1937 und 1960 setze sich Ronald Coase mit der Existenz von Transaktionskosten auseinander.
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Dauner, M., Voigt, S. (2015). Institutionen. In: Kollmorgen, R., Merkel, W., Wagener, HJ. (eds) Handbuch Transformationsforschung. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-05348-2_3
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