

Mechanical Verification of Transactional Memories with Non-transactional Memory Accesses^{*}

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Abstract. *Transactional memory* is a programming abstraction intended to simplify the synchronization of conflicting memory accesses (by concurrent threads) without the difficulties associated with locks. In a previous work we presented a formal framework for proving that a transactional memory implementation satisfies its specifications and provided with model checking verification of some using small instantiations. This paper extends the previous work to capture non-transactional accesses to memory, which occurs, for example, when using legacy code. We provide a mechanical proof of the soundness of the verification method, as well as a mechanical verification of a version of the popular TCC implementation that includes non-transactional memory accesses. The verification is performed by the deductive temporal checker TLPVS.

1 Introduction

Transactional Memory [5] is a simple solution for coordinating and synchronizing concurrent threads that access the same memory locations. It transfers the burden of concurrency management from the programmers to the system designers and enables a safe composition of scalable applications, we well as efficiently utilizes the multiple cores. Multicore and many-core processors, which require concurrent programs in order to gain a full advantage of the multiple number of processors, has become the mainstream architecture for microprocessor chips and thus many new transactional memory implementations have been proposed recently (see [9] for an excellent survey).

A transactional memory (TM) receives requests from clients and issues responses. The requests are usually part of a *transaction* that is a sequence of operations starting with a request to *open* a transaction, followed by a sequence of read/write requests, followed by a request to *commit* (or *abort*). The TM responds to requests. When a transaction requests a successful “commit,” all of its effects are stored in the memory. If a transaction is aborted (by either issuing an abort request or when TM detects that it should be aborted) all of its effects are removed. Thus, a transaction is a sequence of *atomic* operations, either all complete successfully and all its write operations update the memory, or none completes and its write operations do not alter the memory. In

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addition, committed transaction should be serializable – the sequence of operations belonging to successful transactions should be such that it can be reordered (preserving the order of operations in each transaction) so that the operation of each transaction appear consecutive, and a “read” from any memory location returns the value of the last “write” to that memory location.

TMs are often parameterized by their properties. These may include the conflicts they are to avoid, when are the conflicts detected, how they are resolved, when is the memory updated, whether transactions can be nested, etc. (see [9] for a list of such properties). Each set of parameters defines a unique set of sequences of events that can occur is a TM so to guarantee atomicity and serializability. We refer to the set of sequences of events allowed by a TM as its *specifications*. A particular implementation does not necessarily generate all allowed sequences, but should only generate allowed sequences. The topic of this paper (as well as [3]) is to formally verify that a TM implementation satisfies its specification that is uniquely defined by its parameters.

Such parameters were given in [12]’s widely-cited paper, which was the first to characterize transactional memory in a way that captured and clarified the many semantic distinctions among the most popular implementations of TMs. Scott’s ([12]) approach is to begin with classical notions of transactional histories and sequential specifications, and to introduce two important notions. The first is a *conflict function* which specifies when two overlapping (concurrent) transactions cannot both succeed (a safety condition). The second is an *arbitration function* which specifies which of two transactions must fail (a liveness condition). Scott’s work went a long way towards clarification of the semantics of TMs, but did not facilitate mechanical verification of implementations.

The work in [3] (co-authored by the authors of this paper) took a first step towards modeling TMs, accordingly to [12]’s parameters, so to as allow for mechanical verification of their implementations. There, a specification of a TM is represented by a fair state machine that is parameterized by a set of *admissible* interchanges — a set of rules specifying when a pair of consecutive operations in a sequence of transactional operations can be safely swapped without introducing or removing a conflict. All the conflicts described in [12] can be cast as admissible sets. The specification machine takes a stream of transactional requests as inputs, and outputs a serializable sequence of the input requests and their responses. The fairness is used to guarantee that each transaction is eventually closed (committed or aborted) and, if committed, appears in the output. Some proof rules are given to show that a TM implementation satisfies its specification. The applicability of the approach is demonstrated on several well-known TM implementations. Small instantiations of each of the case study were shown to specify their specification using the model checker TLC [8].

This paper extends the work of [3] in two directions. The first is to add another parameter to the system — *non-transactional* memory accesses. Unlike their transactional counterparts, non-transactional accesses cannot be aborted. While atomicity and serializability requirements remain, where a non-transaction operation is cast as a singleton, successfully committed, transaction. The second direction is a framework that allows for a mechanical formal verification that TM implementations satisfy their specifications. The tool we use is TLPVS [11], which embeds temporal logic and its deductive framework within the theorem prover PVS [10]. Using TLPVS entailed some changes to

the [3] proof rules that establish that an implementation indeed refines its specification. In fact, the rule presented here is more general than its predecessor. Using TLPVS also entailed restricting to interchange rules that can be described by temporal logics (which still covers all of [12]’s conflicts). For simplicity, we chose to restrict to interchanges whose temporal description uses only past temporal operators (i.e., depend only on the history leading to the interchange), which rules out [12]’s mixed invalidation conflict.

We make here a strong assumption on non-transactional accesses, namely, that the transactional memory is aware that non-transactional accesses, as soon as they occur. While the TM cannot abort such accesses, it may use them in order to abort transactions that are under its control. It is only with such or similar assumption that total consistency or coherence can be maintained.

We demonstrate the new framework by presenting TLPVS proofs that some TM implementations with non-transactional accesses satisfy their specifications, given an admissible interchange.

To the best of our knowledge, the work presented here is the first to employ a theorem prover for verifying correctness of transactional memories and the first to formally verify an implementation that handles non-transactional memory accesses.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides preliminary definitions related to transactional memory, and defines the concept of admissible interchanges. Section 3 provides a specification model of a transactional memory. Section 4 discusses a proof rule for verifying implementations. Section 5 presents a simple implementation of transactional memory that handles non-transactional memory accesses. Section 6 shows how to apply deductive verification using TLPVS to verify this implementation. Section 7 provides some conclusions and open problems.

2 Transactional Sequences and Interchanges

We extend the [3] to support non-transactional memory accesses and separate each action into a request/response pair, as well as give a temporal definition for interchanges.

2.1 Transactional Sequences

Assume n clients that direct requests to a *memory system*, denoted by *memory*. For every client p , let the set of *non-transactional invocations by client p* consists of:

- $\iota R_p^{nt}(x)$ – A non-transactional request to read from address $x \in \mathbb{N}$.
- $\iota W_p^{nt}(y, v)$ – A non-transactional request to write value $v \in \mathbb{N}$ to address $y \in \mathbb{N}$.

Let the set of *transactional invocations by client p* consists of:

- $\iota \blacktriangleleft_p$ – An open transaction request.
- $\iota R_p^t(x)$ – A transactional read request from address $x \in \mathbb{N}$.
- $\iota W_p^t(y, v)$ – A transactional request to write the value $v \in \mathbb{N}$ to address $y \in \mathbb{N}$.
- $\iota \blacktriangleright_p$ – A commit transaction request.
- $\iota \blacktriangledown_p$ – An abort transaction request.

The memory provides a response for each invocation. Erroneous invocations (e.g., a $\iota \blacktriangleleft_p$ while client p has a pending transaction) are responded by the memory returning an error flag *err*. Non-erroneous invocations, except for ιR^t and ιR^{nt} are responded by the memory returning an acknowledgment *ack*. Finally, for non-erroneous $\iota R_p^t(x)$ and $\iota R_p^{nt}(x)$ the memory returns the (natural) value of the memory at location x . We assume that invocations and responses occur atomically and consecutively, i.e., there are no other operation that interleave an invocation and its response.

Let $E_p^{nt} : \{R_p^{nt}(x, u), W_p^{nt}(x, v)\}$ be the set of *non-transactional observable events*, $E_p^t : \{\blacktriangleleft_p, R_p^t(x, u), W_p^t(x, v), \blacktriangleright_p, \blacktriangledown_p\}$ be the set of *transactional observable events* and $E_p = E^{nt} \cup E^t$, i.e. all events associated with client p . We consider as observable events only requests that are accepted, and abbreviate the pair (*invocation, non-err response*) by omitting the ι -prefix of the invocation. Thus, $W_p^t(x, v)$ abbreviates $\iota W_p^t(x, v)$, ack_p . For read actions, we include the value read, that is, $R_p^t(x, u)$ abbreviates $\iota R^t(x)$, $\rho R(u)$. When the value written/read has no relevance, we write the above as $W_p^t(x)$ and $R_p^t(x)$. When both values and addresses are of no importance, we omit the addresses, thus obtaining W_p^t and R_p^t (symmetric abbreviations and shortcuts are used for the non-transactional observable events). The output of each action is its relevant observable event when the invocation is accepted, and undefined otherwise. Let E be the set of all observable events over all clients, i.e., $E = \bigcup_{p=1}^n E_p$ (similarly define E^{nt} and E^t to be the set of all non-transactional and the set of all transactional observable events, respectively).

Let $\sigma : e_0, e_1, \dots, e_k$ be a finite sequence of observable E -events. We say that the sequence $\hat{\sigma}$ over E^t is σ 's *transactional sequence*, where $\hat{\sigma}$ is obtained from σ by replacing each R_p^{nt} and W_p^{nt} by $\blacktriangleleft_p R_p^t \blacktriangleright_p$ and $\blacktriangleleft_p W_p^t \blacktriangleright_p$, respectively. That is, each non-transactional event of σ is transformed into a singleton committed transaction in $\hat{\sigma}$. The sequence σ is called a *well-formed transactional sequence* (TS for short) if the following all hold:

1. For every client p , let $\hat{\sigma}|_p$ be the sequence obtained by projecting $\hat{\sigma}$ onto E_p^t . Then $\hat{\sigma}|_p$ satisfies the regular expression T_p^* , where T_p is the regular expression $\blacktriangleleft_p (R_p^t + W_p^t)^* (\blacktriangleright_p + \blacktriangledown_p)$. For each occurrence of T_p in $\hat{\sigma}|_p$, we refer to its first and last elements as *matching*. The notion of matching is lifted to $\hat{\sigma}$ itself, where \blacktriangleleft_p and \blacktriangleright_p (or \blacktriangledown_p) are matching if they are matching in $\hat{\sigma}|_p$;
2. The sequence $\hat{\sigma}$ is *locally read-write consistent*: for any subsequence of $\hat{\sigma}$ of the form $\langle W_p^t(x, v) \eta R_p^t(x, u) \rangle$ where η contains no $\blacktriangleright_p, \blacktriangledown_p$, or $W_p^t(x)$ events, $u = v$.

We denote by \mathcal{T} the set of all well-formed transactional sequences, and by $\text{pref}(\mathcal{T})$ the set of \mathcal{T} 's prefixes. Note that the requirement of local read-write consistency can be enforced by each client locally. To build on this observation, we assume that, within a single transaction, there is no $R_p^t(x)$ following a $W_p^t(x)$, and there are no two reads or two writes to the same address. With these assumptions, the requirement of local read-write consistency is always (vacuously) satisfied. A TS σ is *atomic* if:

1. $\hat{\sigma}$ satisfies the regular expression $(T_1 + \dots + T_n)^*$. That is, there is no overlap between any two transactions;
2. $\hat{\sigma}$ is *globally read-write consistent*: namely, for any subsequence $W_p^t(x, v) \eta R_q^t(x, u)$ in $\hat{\sigma}$, where η contains \blacktriangleright_p , which is not preceded by \blacktriangledown_p , and contains no event $W_k^t(x)$ followed by event \blacktriangleright_k , it is the case that $u = v$.

2.2 Interchanging Events

The notion of a correct implementation is that every TS can be transformed into an atomic TS by a sequence of interchanges which swap two consecutive events. This definition is parameterized by the set \mathcal{A} of *admissible interchanges* which may be used in the process of serialization. Rather than attempt to characterize \mathcal{A} , we choose to characterize its complement \mathcal{F} , the set of *forbidden interchanges*. The definition here differs from the one in [3] in two aspects: There, in order to characterize \mathcal{F} , we allowed arbitrary predicates over the TS, here, we restrict to temporal logic formulae. Also, while [3] allowed swaps that depend on future events, here we restrict to swaps whose soundness depends only on the history leading to them. This restriction simplifies the verification process, and is the one used in all TM systems we are aware of. Note that it does not allow to express [12]’s mixed invalidation conflict. In all our discussions, we assume *strict serializability* which implies that while serializing a TS, the order of committed transactions has to be preserved.

Consider a temporal logic over E using the past operators \ominus (previously), \Diamond (sometimes in the past), and \mathcal{S} (since). Let σ be a prefix of a well-formed TS over E^t (i.e., $\sigma = \hat{\sigma}$). We define a satisfiability relation \models between σ and a temporal logic formula φ so that $\sigma \models \varphi$ if at the end of σ , φ holds. (The more standard notation is $(\sigma, |\sigma| - 1) \models \varphi$, but since we always interpret formulae at the end of sequences we chose the simplified notation.)

Some of the restrictions we place in \mathcal{F} are structural. For example, the formula $p \neq q \wedge \blacktriangleright_p \wedge \ominus \blacktriangleright_q$ forbids the interchange of closures of transactions belonging to different clients. This guarantees the strictness of the serializability process. Similarly, the restriction $u_p \wedge \ominus v_p$, where $u_p, v_p \in E_p$, forbids the interchanges of two events belonging to the same client. Other formulas may guarantee the absence of certain conflicts. For example, following [12], a *lazy invalidation* conflict occurs when committing one transaction may invalidate a read of another, i.e., if for some transactions T_p and T_q and some memory address x , we have $R_p(x), W_q(x) \prec \blacktriangleright_q \prec \blacktriangleright_p$ (where “ $e_i \prec e_j$ ” denotes that e_i precedes e_j). Formally, the last two events in σ *cannot* be interchanged when for some $p \neq q$,

$$\sigma \models \blacktriangleright_q \wedge \ominus (R_p(x) \wedge (\neg \blacktriangleright_q) \mathcal{S} W_q(x)) \quad (1)$$

Similarly, we express conflicts by TL formulae that determine, for any prefix of a TS (that includes only E^t events), whether the two last events in the sequence can be safely interchanged without removing the conflict. For a conflict c , the formula that forbids interchanges that may remove instances of this conflict is called the *maintaining formula for c* and is denoted by m_c . Thus, Formula 1 is the maintaining formula for the conflict lazy invalidation. See [2] for a list of the maintaining formulae for each [12]’s conflicts (expect for mixed invalidation that requires future operators).

Let \mathcal{F} be a set of forbidden formulae characterizing all the forbidden interchanges, and let \mathcal{A} denote the set of interchanges which do not satisfy any of the formulas in \mathcal{F} . Assume that $\sigma = a_0, \dots, a_k$. Let σ' be obtained from σ by interchanging two elements, say a_{i-1} and a_i . We then say that σ' is *1-derivable from σ with respect to \mathcal{A}* if $(a_0, \dots, a_i) \not\models \bigvee \mathcal{F}$. Similarly, we say that σ' is *derivable from σ with respect to \mathcal{A}* if there exist $\sigma = \sigma_0, \dots, \sigma_\ell = \sigma'$ such that for every $i < \ell$, σ_{i+1} is 1-derivable from σ_i with respect to \mathcal{A} .

A TS is *serializable with respect to \mathcal{A}* if there exists an atomic TS that is derivable from it with respect to \mathcal{A} . The sequence $\tilde{\sigma}$ is called the *purified version* of TS σ if $\tilde{\sigma}$ is obtained by removing from $\hat{\sigma}$ all aborted transactions, i.e., removing the opening and closing events for such a transaction and all the read-write events by the same client that occurred between the opening and closing events. When we specify the correctness of a transactional memory implementation, only the purified versions of the implementation's transaction sequences will have to be serializable.

3 Specification and Implementation

Let \mathcal{A} be a set of admissible interchanges which we fix for the remainder of this section. We next describe $Spec_{\mathcal{A}}$, a specification of transactional memory that generates all sequences whose corresponding TSs are serializable with respect to \mathcal{A} . The process $Spec_{\mathcal{A}}$ is described as a fair transition system. In every step, it outputs an element in $E_{\perp} = E \cup \{\perp\}$. The sequence of outputs it generates, once the \perp elements are projected away, is the set of TSs that are admissible with respect to \mathcal{A} . $Spec_{\mathcal{A}}$ uses the following data structures:

- $spec_mem$: **array** $\mathbb{N} \mapsto \mathbb{N}$ — A persistent memory. Initially, $spec_mem[i] = 0$ for all $i \in \mathbb{N}$;
- \mathcal{Q} : **list over** $E^t \cup \bigcup_p \{mark_p\}$ — A queue-like structure, to which elements are appended, interchanged, deleted, and removed. The sequence of elements removed from this queue-like structure defines an atomic TS that can be obtained by serialization of $Spec_{\mathcal{A}}$'s output with respect to \mathcal{A} . For each client p , it is assumed that $mark_p \notin E_p$ is a new symbol. Initially, \mathcal{Q} is empty;
- $spec_out$: **scalar in** $E_{\perp} = E \cup \{\perp\}$ — An output variable, initially \perp ;
- $spec_doomed$: **array** $[1..n] \mapsto \mathbf{bool}$ — An array recording which pending transactions are doomed to be aborted. Initially $spec_doomed[p] = \mathbf{F}$ for every p .

Fig. 1 summarized the steps taken by $Spec_{\mathcal{A}}$. The first column describes the value of $spec_out$ with each step; it is assumed that every step produces an output. The second column describes the effects of the step on the other variables. The third column describes the conditions under which the step can be taken. The following abbreviations are used in Fig. 1:

- A client p is *pending* if $spec_doomed[p] = \mathbf{T}$ or if $\mathcal{Q}|_p$ is not empty and does not terminate with \blacktriangleright_p ;
- a client p is *unmarked* if $\mathcal{Q}|_p$ does not terminate with $mark_p$;
- a p -action a is *locally consistent with \mathcal{Q}* if $\mathcal{Q}|_p, a$ is a prefix of some locally consistent p -transaction;
- a transaction T is *consistent with $spec_mem$* if every $R^t(x, v)$ in T is either preceded by some $W^t(x, v)$, or else $v = spec_mem[x]$;
- the *update of $spec_mem$ by a transaction T* is $spec_mem'$ where for every location x for which T has no $W^t(x, v)$ actions, $spec_mem'[x] = spec_mem[x]$, and for every memory location x such that T has some $W^t(x, v)$ actions, $spec_mem'[x]$ is the value written in the last such action in T ;

$spec_out$	other updates	conditions
\blacktriangleleft_p	append \blacktriangleleft_p to \mathcal{Q}	p is not pending
$R_p^t(x, v)$	append $R_p^t(x, v)$ to \mathcal{Q}	p is pending, unmarked and $spec_doomed[p] = F$; $R(x, v)$ is locally consistent with \mathcal{Q}
$R_p^t(x, v)$	none	p is pending, unmarked and $spec_doomed[p] = T$
$W_p^t(x, v)$	append $W_p^t(x, v)$ to \mathcal{Q}	p is pending, unmarked and $spec_doomed[p] = F$
$W_p^t(x, v)$	none	p is pending, unmarked and $spec_doomed[p] = T$
\blacktriangleright_p	delete p 's pending transaction from \mathcal{Q} ; set $spec_doomed[p]$ to F	p is pending
\blacktriangleright_p	update $spec_mem$ by p 's pending transaction; remove p -pending transaction from \mathcal{Q}	p has a consistent transaction at the front of \mathcal{Q} that ends with $mark_p$ (p is pending and marked)
$R_p^{nt}(x, v)$	append $\blacktriangleleft_p, R_p^t(x, v), \blacktriangleright_p$ to \mathcal{Q}	p is not pending
$W_p^{nt}(x, v)$	append $\blacktriangleleft_p, W_p^t(x, v), \blacktriangleright_p$ to \mathcal{Q}	p is not pending
\perp	set $spec_doomed[p]$ to T ; delete all pending p -events from \mathcal{Q}	p is pending and $spec_doomed[p] = F$
\perp	apply a \mathcal{A} -valid transformation to \mathcal{Q}	none
\perp	append $mark_p$ to \mathcal{Q}	p is pending and unmarked
\perp	none	none

Fig. 1. Steps of $Spec_{\mathcal{A}}$

- an \mathcal{A} -valid transformation to \mathcal{Q} is a sequence of interchanges of \mathcal{Q} 's entries that is consistent with \mathcal{A} . To apply the transformations, each $mark_p$ is treated as if it is \blacktriangleright_p .

The role of $spec_doomed$ is to allow $Spec_{\mathcal{A}}$ to be implemented with various arbitration policies. It can, at will, schedule a pending transaction to be aborted by setting $spec_doomed[p]$, by so “dooming” p 's pending transaction to be aborted. The variable $spec_doomed[p]$ is reset once the transaction is actually aborted (when $Spec_{\mathcal{A}}$ outputs \blacktriangleright_p). Note that actions of doomed transactions are not recorded on \mathcal{Q} .

We assume a fairness requirement, namely, that for every client $p = 1, \dots, n$, there are infinitely many states of $Spec_{\mathcal{A}}$ where $\mathcal{Q}|_p$ is empty and $spec_doomed[p] = F$. This implies that every transaction eventually terminates (commits or aborts). It also guarantees that the sequence of outputs is indeed serializable. Note that unlike the specification described in [3] where progress can always be guaranteed by aborting transactions, here, because of the non-transactional accesses, there are cases where \mathcal{Q} cannot be emptied.

While $Spec_{\mathcal{A}}$ resembles its counterpart in [3], the treatment of non-transactional accesses entailed numerous changes: Roughly speaking, each transactional access is appended to the queue, and removed from it when the transaction commits, aborts, or is doomed to abort. When a transaction attempts to commit, a special marker $mark_p$ is appended to the queue, and, if there are admissible interchanges that move the whole transaction into the head of the queue, its events are removed from the queue and it commits. Thus, the queue never contains \blacktriangleright -events, and it contains at most one $mark$ -event. A non-transactional p -access a_p^{nt} (that can only be accepted when p -has no pending transaction) is treated by appending $\blacktriangleleft_p, a_p^t, \blacktriangleright_p$ to the queue. (Note that the non-transactional event is replaced by its transactional counterpart.) Hence, here the queue may have \blacktriangleright -events. The transactions (or, rather, non-transaction) corresponding to them *cannot* be “doomed to abort” since such a transaction is, by definition (see below), not pending. The liveness properties require that all transaction are eventually removed from the queue. As a consequence, unlike its [3] version, $Spec_{\mathcal{A}}$ does not support “eager version management” that eagerly updates the memory with every W^t -action (that doesn't

conflict any pending transaction) which is reasonable since eager version management and the requirement to commit each non-transactional access are contradictory.

A sequence σ over E is *compatible* with $\text{Spec}_{\mathcal{A}}$ if it can be obtained by the sequence of spec_out that $\text{Spec}_{\mathcal{A}}$ outputs once all the \perp 's are removed. We then have:

Claim. For every sequence σ over E , σ is compatible with $\text{Spec}_{\mathcal{A}}$ iff $\hat{\sigma}$ is serializable with respect to \mathcal{A} .

An *implementation TM*: $(\text{read}, \text{commit})$ of a transactional memory consists of a pair of functions $\text{read}: \text{pref}(TS) \times [1..n] \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ and $\text{commit}: \text{pref}(TS) \times [1..n] \rightarrow \{\text{ack}, \text{err}\}$. For a prefix σ of a TS, $\text{read}(\sigma, p, x)$ is the response (value) of the memory to an accepted $\iota R_p^{nt}(x)/\iota R_p^t(x)$ request immediately following σ , and $\text{commit}(\sigma, p)$ is the response (*ack* or *err*) of the memory to a $\iota \blacktriangleright_p$ request immediately following σ .

A TS σ is said to be *compatible* with the memory *TM* if:

1. For every prefix $\eta R_p^{nt}(x, u)$ or $\eta R_p^t(x, u)$ of σ , $\text{read}(\eta, p, x) = u$.
2. For every prefix $\eta \blacktriangleright_p$ of σ , $\text{commit}(\eta, p) = \text{ack}$.

An implementation *TM*: $(\text{read}, \text{commit})$ is a *correct implementation of a transactional memory with respect to \mathcal{A}* if every TS compatible with *TM* is also compatible with $\text{Spec}_{\mathcal{A}}$.

4 Verifying Implementation Correctness

We present a proof rule for verifying that an implementation satisfies the specification *Spec*. The rule is adapted [7], which, in turn is based on [1]'s *abstraction mapping*. In addition to being case in a different formal framework, and ignoring compassion (which is rarely, if ever, used in TMs), the rule generalizes on the two given in [3] by allowing for general stuttering equivalence.

To apply the underlying theory, we assume that both the implementation and the specifications are represented as OPFSS (see [2] for details). In the current application, we prefer to adopt an *event-based* view of reactive systems, by which the observed behavior of a system is a (potentially infinite) set of events. Technically, this implies that one of the system variables O is designated as an *output variable*. The observation function is then defined by $\mathcal{O}(s) = s[O]$. It is also required that the observation domain always includes the value \perp , implying no observable event. In our case, the observation domain of the output variable is $E_{\perp} = E \cup \{\perp\}$.

Let $\eta: e_0, e_1, \dots$ be an infinite sequence of E_{\perp} -values. The E_{\perp} -sequence $\tilde{\eta}$ is called a *stuttering variant* of the sequence η if it can be obtained by removing or inserting finite strings over $\{\perp\}$ at (potentially infinitely many) different positions within η .

Let $\sigma: s_0, s_1, \dots$ be a computation of OPFS \mathcal{D} , that is, a sequence of states where s_0 satisfies the initial condition, each state is a successor of the previous one, and for every justice (weak fairness) requirement, σ has infinitely many states that satisfy the requirement. The *observation* corresponding to σ (i.e., $\mathcal{O}(\sigma)$) is the E_{\perp} sequence $s_0[O], s_1[O], \dots$ obtained by listing the values of the output variable O in each of the states. We denote by $\text{Obs}(\mathcal{D})$ the set of all observations of system \mathcal{D} .

Let \mathcal{D}_C be a *concrete* system whose set of states is Σ_C , set of observations is E_\perp , observation function is \mathcal{O}_C , initial condition is Θ_C , transition relation is ρ_C , and justice requirements are $\cup_{f \in \mathcal{F}_C} \mathcal{J}(f)$. Similarly, let \mathcal{D}_A be an *abstract* system whose set of states, set of observations, observation function, initial condition, transition relation, and justice requirements are Σ_A , E_\perp , \mathcal{O}_A , Θ_A , ρ_A , and $\cup_{f \in \mathcal{F}_A} \mathcal{J}(f)$ respectively. (For simplicity, we assume that neither system contains compassion requirements.) Note that we assume that both systems share the same observations domain E_\perp . We say that system \mathcal{D}_A *abstracts* system \mathcal{D}_C (equivalently \mathcal{D}_C *refines* \mathcal{D}_A), denoted $\mathcal{D}_C \sqsubseteq \mathcal{D}_A$ if, for every observation $\eta \in \text{Obs}(\mathcal{D}_C)$, there exists $\tilde{\eta} \in \text{Obs}(\mathcal{D}_A)$, such that $\tilde{\eta}$ is a stuttering variant of η . In other words, modulo stuttering, $\text{Obs}(\mathcal{D}_C)$ is a subset of $\text{Obs}(\mathcal{D}_A)$. We denote by s and S the states of \mathcal{D}_C and \mathcal{D}_A , respectively.

Rule ABS-REL in Fig. 2 is a proof rule to establish that $\mathcal{D}_C \sqsubseteq \mathcal{D}_A$. The method advocated by the rule assumes the identification of an *abstraction relation* $R(s, S) \subseteq \Sigma_C \times \Sigma_A$. If the relation $R(s, S)$ holds, we say that the abstract state S is an R -image of the concrete state s .

R1. $\Theta_C(s) \rightarrow \exists S : R(s, S) \wedge \Theta_A(S)$ R2. $\mathcal{D}_C \models \Box (R(s, S) \wedge \rho_C(s, s') \rightarrow \exists S' : R(s', S') \wedge \rho_A(S, S'))$ R3. $\mathcal{D}_C \models \Box (R(s, S) \rightarrow \mathcal{O}_C(s) = \mathcal{O}_A(S))$ R4. $\mathcal{D}_C \models \Box \Diamond (\forall S : R(s, S) \rightarrow \mathcal{J}(f)(S)),$	for every $f \in \mathcal{F}_A$
$\mathcal{D}_C \sqsubseteq \mathcal{D}_A$	

Fig. 2. Rule ABS-REL

Premise R1 of the rule states that for every initial concrete state s , it is possible to find an initial abstract state $S \models \Theta_A$, such that $R(s, S) = \text{true}$.

Premise R2 states that for every pair of concrete states, s and s' , such that s' is a ρ_C -successor of s , and an abstract state S which is R -related to s , there exists an abstract state S' such that S' is R -related to s' and is also a ρ_A -successor of S . Together, R1 and R2 guarantee that, for every run s_0, s_1, \dots of \mathcal{D}_C there exists a run S_0, S_1, \dots , of \mathcal{D}_A , such that for every $j \geq 0$, S_j is R -related to s_j . Premise R3 states that if abstract state S is R -related to the concrete state s , then the two states agree on the values of their observables. Together with the previous premises, we conclude that for every σ a run of \mathcal{D}_C there exists a corresponding run of \mathcal{D}_A which has the same observation as σ . Premise R4 ensures that the abstract justice requirements hold in any abstract state sequence which is a (point-wise) R -related to a concrete computation. Here, \Box is the (linear time) temporal operator for “henceforth”, \Diamond the temporal operator for “eventually”, thus, $\Box \Diamond$ means “infinitely often.” It follows that every sequence of abstract states which is R -related to a concrete computation σ and is obtained by applications of premises R1 and R2 is an abstract computation whose observables match the observables of σ . This leads to the following claim which was proved using TLPVS (see Section 6):

Claim. If the premises of rule ABS-REL are valid for some choice of R , then \mathcal{D}_A is an abstraction of \mathcal{D}_C .

5 An Example: TCC with Non-transactional Accesses

We demonstrate our proof method by verifying a TM implementation which is essentially TCC [4] augmented with non-transactional accesses. Its specifications is given by $Spec_{\mathcal{A}}$ where \mathcal{A} is the admissible set of events corresponding to the lazy invalidation conflict described in Subsection 2.2.

In the implementation, transactions execute speculatively in the clients' caches. When a transaction commits, all pending transactions that contain some read events from addresses written to by the committed transaction are “doomed.” Similarly, non-transactional writes cause pending transactions that read from the same location to be “doomed.” A doomed transactions may execute new read and write events in its cache, but it must eventually abort.

Here we present the implementation, and in Section 6 explain how we can verify that it refines its specification using the proof rule ABS-REL in TLPVS. We refer to the implementation as *TM*. It uses the following data structures:

- *imp_mem*: $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ — A persistent memory. Initially, for all $i \in \mathbb{N}$, $imp_mem[i] = 0$;
- *cache*: **array** $[1..n]$ **of list of** E^t — Caches of clients. For each $p \in [1..n]$, $cache[p]$, initially empty, is a sequence over E_p^t that records the actions of p 's pending transaction;
- *imp_out*: **scalar in** $E_{\perp} = E \cup \{\perp\}$ — an output variable recording responses to clients, initially \perp ;
- *imp_doomed*: **array** $[1..n]$ **of booleans** — An array recording which transactions are doomed to be aborted. Initially $imp_doomed[p] = \text{F}$ for every p .

TM receives requests from clients, to each it updates its state, including updating the output variable *imp_out*, and issues a response to the requesting client. The responses are either a value in \mathbb{N} (for a ιR^t or ιR^{nt} requests), an error *err* (for $\iota \blacktriangleright$ requests that cannot be performed), or an acknowledgment *ack* for all other cases. Fig. 3 describes the actions of *TM*, where for each request we describe the new output value, the other updates to *TM*'s state, the conditions under which the updates occur, and the response to the client that issues the request. For now, ignore the comments in the square brackets under the “conditions” column. The last line represents the idle step where no actions occurs and the output is \perp .

Comment: For simplicity of exposition, we assume that clients only issue reads for locations they had not written to in the pending transaction.

The specification of Section 3 specifies not only the behavior of the Transactional Memory but also the combined behavior of the memory when coupled with a typical clients module. A generic clients module, *Clients*(n), may, at any step, invoke the next request for client p , $p \in [1..n]$, provided the sequence of E_p -events issued so far (including the current one) forms a prefix of a well-formed sequence. The justice requirement of *Clients*(n) is that eventually, every pending transaction issues an *ack*-ed $\iota \blacktriangleright$ or an $\iota \blacktriangleright_p$.

Combining modules *TM* and *Clients*(n) we obtain the complete implementation, defined by:

$$Imp : \quad TM \parallel Clients(n)$$

Request	imp_out	Other Updates	Conditions	Response
$\iota \blacktriangleleft_p$	\blacktriangleleft_p	append \blacktriangleleft_p to $cache[p]$	$[cache[p] \text{ is empty}]$	ack
$\iota R_p^t(x)$	$R_p^t(x, v)$	append $R_p(x, v)$ to $cache[p]$	$v = imp_mem[x];$ $[cache[p] \text{ is empty}]$ (see comment)	$imp_mem[x]$
$\iota W_p^t(x, v)$	$W_p^t(x, v)$	append $W_p(x, v)$ to $cache[p]$	$[cache[p] \text{ is not empty}]$	ack
$\iota \blacktriangleright_p$	\blacktriangleright_p	set $cache[p]$ to empty; set $imp_doomed[p]$ to F	$[cache[p] \text{ is not empty}]$	ack
$\iota \blacktriangleright_p$	\blacktriangleright_p	set $cache[p]$ to empty; for every x and $q \neq p$ such that $W_p^t(x) \in cache[p]$ and $R_p^t(x) \in cache[q]$ set $spec_doomed[q]$ to T; update imp_mem by $cache[p]$	$imp_doomed[p] = F;$ $[cache[p] \text{ is not empty}]$	ack
$\iota \blacktriangleright_p$	\perp	none	$imp_doomed[p] = T;$ $[cache[p] \text{ is not empty}]$	err
$\iota R_p^{nt}(x)$	$R_p^{nt}(x, v)$	none	$v = imp_mem[x];$ $[cache[p] \text{ is empty}]$	$imp_mem[x]$
$\iota W_p^{nt}(x, v)$	$W_p^{nt}(x, v)$	set $imp_mem[x]$ to v ; for every q such that $R^t(x) \in cache[q]$ set $imp_doomed[q]$ to T	$[cache[p] \text{ is empty}]$	ack
none	\perp	none	none	none

Fig. 3. The actions of TM

where \parallel denote the *synchronous* composition operator defined in [6]; This composition in combines several of the actions of each of the modules into one.

The actions of Imp can be described similarly to the one given by Fig. 3, where the first and last column are ignored, the conditions in the brackets are added. The justice requirements of $Clients(n)$, together with the observation that both $\iota \blacktriangleright$ and an ack -ed $\iota \blacktriangleright$ cause the cache of the issuing client to be emptied, imply that Imp 's justice requirement is that for every $p = 1, \dots, n$, $cache[p]$ is empty infinitely many times.

The application of rule ABS-REL requires the identification of a relation R which holds between concrete and abstract states. In [3], we used the relation defined by:

$$\begin{aligned}
 spec_out &= imp_out \wedge spec_mem = imp_mem \\
 &\wedge spec_doomed = imp_doomed \\
 &\wedge \bigwedge_{p=1}^n imp_doomed[p] \longrightarrow (\mathcal{Q}|_p = cache[p])
 \end{aligned}$$

however, there the implementation did not support non-transactional accesses. In Section 6 we provide the relation that was applied when proving the augmented implementation using TLPVS.

6 Deductive Verification in TLPVS

In this section we describe how we used TLPVS [11] to verify the correctness of the implementation provided in Section 5. TLPVS was developed to reduce the substantial

manual effort required to complete deductive temporal proofs of reactive systems. It embeds temporal logic and its deductive framework within the high-order theorem prover, PVS [10]. It includes a set of theories defining linear temporal logic (LTL), proof rules for proving soundness and response properties, and strategies which aid in conducting the proofs. In particular, it has a special framework for verifying unbounded systems and theories. See [10] and [11] for thorough discussions for proving with PVS and TLPVS, respectively. In [3] we described the verification of three known transactional memory implementations with the (explicit-state) model checker TLC. This verification involved TLA^+ [8] modules for both the specification and implementation, and abstraction *mapping* associating each of the specification's variables with an expression over the implementation's variables.

This effort has several drawbacks: The mapping does not allow for *abstraction* relations between *states*, but rather for *mappings* between *variables*. We therefore used a proof rule that is weaker than ABS-REL and auxiliary structures. For example, for $Q|_p = \text{cache}[p]$, which cannot be expressed in TLA^+ , we used an auxiliary queue that can be mapped into Q and that records the order in which events are invoked in the implementation. And, like any other model checking tool, TLC can only be used to verify small instantiations, rather than the general case. A full deductive verification requires a theorem prover.

Our tool of choice is TLPVS. Since, however, TLPVS only supports the model of PFS, we formulate OPFS in the PVS specification language. We then defined a new theory that uses two OPFSs, one for the abstract system (specification) and another for the concrete system (implementation), and proved, in a rather straightforward manner, that the rule ABS-REL is sound.

We then defined a theory for the queue-like structures used in both specification and implementation. This theory required, in addition to the regular queue operations, the definition of the projection ($|$) and deletion of projected elements, which, in turn, required the proofs of several auxiliary lemmas.

Next all the components of both OPFS's defining the abstract and concrete systems were defined. To simplify the TLPVS proofs, some of the abstract steps were combined. For example, when a $Spec_A$ commits a transaction, we combined the steps of interchanging events, removing them from Q , and setting $spec_out$ to \blacktriangleright . This restricts the set of $Spec_A$'s runs but retains soundness. Formally, $TM \sqsubseteq \widetilde{Spec}_{\phi_{li}}$ implies that $TM \sqsubseteq Spec_{\phi_{li}}$, where $\widetilde{Spec}_{\phi_{li}}$ is the restricted specification

The abstraction relation R between concrete and abstract states was defined by:

```
rel: RELATION = (LAMBDA s_c, s_a:
  s_c'out = s_a'out AND s_c'mem = s_a'mem AND
  s_c'doomed = s_a'doomed AND
  FORALL(id: ID): (NOT s_c'doomed(id)) IMPLIES
    project(id, s_a'Q) = s_c'caches(id) AND
  FORALL(id: ID): (empty(s_c'caches(id))) IMPLIES
    empty(project(id, s_a'Q)))
```

Here, s_c is a concrete state and s_a is an abstract state. The relation R equates the values of *out*, *mem* and *doomed* in the two systems. It also states that if the transaction of a client is not doomed, then its projection on the abstract Q equals to the concrete

client's cache, and if the concrete cache is empty then so is the projection of the abstract \mathcal{Q} on the client's current transaction. An additional invariant, stating that each value read by a non-doomed client is consistent with the memory was also added.

In order to prove that $TM \sqsubseteq Spec_{\phi_{li}}, \mathcal{D}_C$ and \mathcal{D}_A of ABS-REL were instantiated with TM and $Spec_{\phi_{li}}$, respectively, and all the premises were verified. The proofs are in <http://cs.nyu.edu/acsys/tlpvs/tm.html>.

7 Conclusion and Future Work

We extended our previous work on a verification framework for transactional memory implementations against their specifications, to accommodate non-transactional memory accesses. We also developed a methodology for verifying transactional memory implementations based on the theorem prover TLPVS that provides a framework for verifying parameterized systems against temporal specifications. We obtained mechanical verifications of both the soundness of the method and the correctness of an implementation which is based on TCC augmented with non-transactional accesses.

Our extension for supporting non-transactional accesses is based on the assumption that an implementation can detect such accesses. We are currently working on weakening this assumption. We are also planning to study liveness properties of transactional memory.

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